Defence Forces Review 2012
Intellectual growth should commence at birth and cease only at death.
Albert Einstein

It gives me great pleasure to present the Defence Forces Review for 2012. The Review was launched in 1993 with a mission ‘to inform’ and provide a focus for intellectual debate within the wider Defence Community on matters of professional interest. This edition continues these fine traditions and upholds the continued high standards of the journal, a tribute to the voluntary efforts of our contributors, to whom sincere thanks and congratulations are due. It comprises a collection of articles, designed to promote and support continued intellectual growth in the defence community. The continued expansion of intellectual activities within the Defence Forces included the hosting in 2012 of an international academic conference on military education titled Taking You a Stage Further… Military Education in the 21st Century. This was conducted by the Defence Forces Command and Staff School, in partnership with the National University of Ireland, Maynooth, to promote high quality, relevant research and enhanced awareness of the educational activities and research routinely conducted within the organisation (Work submitted for this conference can be accessed at: http://www.military.ie/education-hq/military-college/command-and-staff-school/academic-conference-2012). In conclusion, I wish to acknowledge the efforts of the personnel who undertook the work of preparing this Review in addition to their normal duties. I would like to thank the editor Comdt Mark Hearns, Comdt Dave O’Neill and his staff at the Defence Forces Printing Press and Capt Bernard Behan and his staff at An Cosantóir who ensure that the Review is brought to our readership. Further copies of the Review are available from the Defence Forces Public Relations Section at info@military.ie or online at http://www.military.ie/info-centre/publications/defence-forces-review

Rory Sheerin
Lieutenant Colonel
OIC Defence Forces Public Relations

The material contained in these articles are the views of the authors and do not purport to represent the official views of the Defence Forces.
EDITOR’S NOTE

During an economic crisis when financial resources are scarce, it is refreshing to find healthy intellectual capital within the defence community. The Defence Forces Review 2012 showcases this capital through an eclectic mix of articles by a wide range of voluntary contributors from civilians and Defence Force personnel both serving and retired. We are proud to present this body of work that is both current and relevant and bound to be of interest to our readership.

The Review commences, marking Ireland’s first ever chairmanship of the Organisation for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE), with a piece by James C. O’Shea from the Department of Foreign Affairs based at the Permanent Mission to the OSCE in Vienna. O’Shea examines the work carried out by the OSCE in the Transdniestrian settlement process one of Europe’s ‘protracted conflicts’. As Ireland assumes the presidency of the European Council in the first half of 2013 it is appropriate that the next article reflects on some of the important implications for European security. Dr John Doyle looks at the likely priorities in the defence and security arenas and analyses the Irish domestic factors that might influence government action in these areas. This is followed by Comdt Ian Byrne who provides an insider’s view of the mechanics of the CSDP infrastructure and an overview of some of the key issues to be developed during the Irish presidency.

The next two articles address issues in military decision making processes. Comdt Con Barber, using a historical case study of Napoleon’s battle plan for Waterloo, analyses the applicability of Game Theory to successful military strategies. Comdt Liz O’Neill follows with a comparative analysis of the traditional mechanistic reductionist approach and a systems approach to military problem solving in the contemporary dynamic environment. Next Lt Col Niall Connors examines contested knowledge in civil–military relations in the strategic space within which the two communities work together, producing interesting conclusions for successful military education programmes. Dr Graham Heaslip and Elizabeth Barber continue the civil–military theme by looking at the civil–military logistical interface and how fundamental differences in principles and doctrines between the two communities highlight the need for greater coordination to optimise the provision of humanitarian aid. They conclude with recommendations for the synergistic use of military logistic input in responses to natural disasters and man-made complex emergencies.

Changing tack the next article by Commander Pat Burke looks at the subject of targetted killings and the adequacy of law of armed conflict in contemporary counter terrorism campaigns. Capt Dónal Gallagher follows with an analysis of the credibility of embedded conflict reporting. He reviews the legitimacy of such reportage against conventional media norms to determine whether or not it can play a part in contributing to our overall understanding of war. Sticking to the media theme, Capt Pat O’Connor then looks at the impact of the omnipresent gaze of social media and the implications for behavioural education in the military.
Comdt Sean Murphy’s essay on the Irish participation at the Battle of Fredricksburg steers the Review onto a historical course. Murphy examines the performance of the Irish units and evaluates the leadership of the commanding generals of the Army of the Potomac in their handling of the battles of Antietam and Fredricksburg. He is followed by Comdt Billy Campbell (retd) who looks at how military doctrine failed to address changes in military technology during World War I with disastrous consequences. Then Lt Col Dave Dignam examines the case study of the French counterinsurgency campaign in Algeria in the late 1950s early 1960s. He concludes that pure military strategies as opposed to ‘comprehensive approaches’ are almost always destined to fail in counterinsurgency. Lt Conor MacCarthy continues with a case study of the 1972 defence of Mirbat in Oman by a small detachment of the SAS in order to evaluate Special Operations Forces as force multipliers in engagements with superior sized conventional forces. Comdt Mark Hearns concludes the contributions with a piece examining the current Syrian crisis and the efforts of the international community to find a negotiated peaceful solution to it.

As has been customary over the last number of editions, the Review concludes with the abstracts from the Theses of the MA in Leadership Management and Defence Studies completed by the students of the latest (67th) Senior Command and Staff Course. If you are interested in reading a complete version of any of these research papers please contact the Defence Forces Library in the DFTC at dftclibrary@gmail.com. These studies, the Defence Forces Review and the inaugural Academic Conference conducted in conjunction with NUI Maynooth earlier this year demonstrate the vibrant level of research conducted by the Defence Forces.

Mark Hearns
Commandant
**TABLE OF CONTENTS**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Article Title</th>
<th>Page</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>The Irish OSCE Chairmanship and the Transdniestrian Settlement Process</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><em>James C. O'Shea</em></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Defence, Security and the Irish EU Presidency, 2013</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><em>Dr John Doyle</em></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Clearing the EU ‘Fog of War’ – Ends, Ways and Means</td>
<td>15</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><em>Comdt Ian Byrne DSM</em></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Utilitarian Clausewitz:</td>
<td>27</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>A study of the doctrine of military decision making and the theory of utility</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>maximising games</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><em>Comdt Con Barber</em></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Change in the Work Environment – The reductionist versus the systemic approach</td>
<td>41</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>to future management problem solving</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><em>Comdt Liz O’Neill</em></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Civil-Military Relations:</td>
<td>51</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Contested Knowledge in a Community of Practice?</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><em>Lt Col Niall Connors</em></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Improving Civil Military Coordination in Humanitarian Supply Chains</td>
<td>61</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><em>Dr Graham Heaslip and Ms Elizabeth Barber</em></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>In the Cross-Hairs – Targeted Killing in Contemporary Conflict</td>
<td>73</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><em>Commander (NS) Pat Burke</em></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Embedded Reporting: History, Security, Objectivity, and War</td>
<td>83</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><em>Capt Dónal Gallagher</em></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The Strategic Private in the Virtual Sphere:</td>
<td>97</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Social Media’s Omnipresent Moral Gaze on the Defence Forces</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><em>Capt Pat O’Connor</em></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>“That damned infernal Green Flag!”</td>
<td>105</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><em>Comdt Seán Murphy</em></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>A Flawed Doctrine:</td>
<td>117</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The Descent into Stalemate on the Western Front in 1914</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><em>Comdt (Retd) Billy Campbell</em></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
The Importance of the Military Contribution to the Prosecution of a Counter-Insurgency Campaign: An Algerian Case Study
Lt Col David Dignam

The Battle of Mirbat
Lt. Conor MacCarthy

Complex Problem, Complex Peacekeeping, the Case of Syria
Comdt Mark Hearns

Abstracts – 67 Senior C&S Course, MA in Leadership Management and Defence Studies

Short Biographical Details
The Irish OSCE Chairmanship and the Transdniestrian Settlement Process

ABSTRACT
In January 2012 Ireland assumed the one year chairmanship of the Organisation for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) for the first time. This article examines the case study of the Transdniestrian settlement process which deals with one of Europe’s protracted conflicts. By looking at the background to the conflict as well as efforts to find solutions to date, the reader gets a taste of the type of activity carried out by the OSCE and the difficult role demanded by its chairmanship in long running conflicts.

As regular readers of the Defence Forces Review will be aware, Ireland took over the Chairmanship of the Organisation for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) on 1 January 2012. For the year, Ireland’s Tánaiste (Deputy Prime Minister) and Minister for Foreign Affairs and Trade, Eamon Gilmore, is the Chairperson-in-Office of the OSCE, and is supported in this role by a dedicated OSCE Chairmanship task force in the Department of Foreign Affairs in Dublin, a strengthened Irish diplomatic representation to the OSCE in Vienna, staffed by Department of Foreign Affairs and Defence Forces personnel, and of course by the OSCE Secretariat in Vienna. In addition to the Secretariat and field presences in over a dozen of the 56 participating States, the OSCE has specialised institutions in the areas of democratisation and human rights, national minorities and freedom of the media.

Among a wide range of areas of activity, the OSCE is involved in efforts to find solutions to a number of what are referred to as “protracted conflicts” in the area covered by the Organisation’s membership. The present article will focus on the efforts of the OSCE, and of the Irish Chairmanship in particular, in relation to one of these, in what is known as the Transdniestrian settlement process.

Space does not permit a lengthy account of the origins of the conflict on the banks of the Dniestr river which grew from protests in 1989 into armed clashes in 1992, coinciding with the collapse of the Soviet Union and conflicts in other parts of the former USSR (Nagorno-Karabakh, South Ossetia, Abkhazia). A combination of historical, linguistic, social and political factors led local political leaders in the part of the Moldavian Soviet Socialist Republic which lay on the eastern (left) bank of the Dniestr river (hence the English-language name “Transdniestria”) to resist the authorities of the Moldavian SSR.

1 See ‘From Vancouver to Vladivostok with Valentia in Between’ – Ireland’s Chairmanship of the OSCE, by Comdt Mark Hearns (Defence Forces Review 2011, p.123)
and later of the newly-independent Republic of Moldova, and to campaign first for incorporation as a separate entity into the Soviet Union, and later for independence as the “Transdnistrian Moldavian Republic” (in Russian: “Pridnestrovskaya Moldavskaya Respublika” – PMR).

While a number of violent incidents occurred as early as late 1991, active hostilities took place mainly between March and June 1992, with the heaviest fighting being in the period 19-21 June in and around the town of Bender, situated on the right bank but claimed by the PMR authorities – this ended with the Moldovan units being driven out. There have been numerous allegations that the Russian 14th Army, stationed on the left bank, directly or indirectly supported the secessionists.

An agreement reached on 21 July 1992 between the Presidents of the Republic of Moldova and the Russian Federation provided for an immediate ceasefire and the creation of a demilitarized Security Zone on both banks of the river, including the town of Bender, as well as for the deployment of a trilateral peacekeeping force, which was established with five Russian, three Moldovan and two Transdniestrian battalions, subordinated to a Joint Military Command, itself subordinated to a trilateral Joint Control Commission, responsible for the maintenance of the ceasefire. At the same time, the Presidents announced a set of principles for a peaceful solution of the conflict, including respect for the sovereignty and territorial integrity of the Republic of Moldova, the need for a special status for Transdniestria and the right of its inhabitants to determine its future in the event that Moldova reunited with Romania (most of the territory of the Republic of Moldova had been part of Romania from 1918 to 1940, and fears that the newly-independent republic would seek to reunite with Romania had been an important contributing factor to the conflict).

During the twenty years since, the ceasefire has held solidly, despite occasional increases in tension. The size of the JPKF has been reduced over the years from 3,140 on deployment at the end of July 1992, to 2,700 six weeks later, to an establishment of 1,400 today (actual strength 1,150, including ten military observers from Ukraine). These man a total of fifteen posts in the Security Zone, six of which are trilateral in their composition. The Moldovan and Transdniestrian components of the JPKF still nominally consist of three and two battalions respectively, but these in reality are company-sized units in the Moldovan case and company-plus in the Transdniestrian. The Russian component has been reorganised into one battalion. There are also other Russian troops in Transdniestria, known as the Operational Group of Russian Forces, whose main function is to guard a large Soviet-era depot in the village of Colbasna, which currently contains some 20,000 tonnes of ammunition, following the withdrawal of over twice that amount during the period 2000-2004.

Unlike other conflicts which attended the end of the Soviet Union, the one on the Dniestr was not based primarily on ethnic grounds, nor did it involve extensive hostilities or the long-term displacement of large numbers of people. Compared to other protracted conflicts within the OSCE area, the situation regarding freedom of movement, contacts between populations etc, is far from being the worst. It has therefore often been
considered to be the easiest to solve. Nonetheless, a solution has eluded the many who have tried over the twenty years since 1992. During this time, Transdniestria has been run with many of the attributes of an independent State – with its own currency, legislative, executive and judicial power, army, police, official television and radio etc - though heavily dependent financially on support from the Russian Federation. It is not recognised as an independent State by any member of the United Nations.

The OSCE Mission to Moldova was established in early 1993, with a mandate to facilitate the achievement of a lasting, comprehensive political settlement of the conflict in all its aspects. It does so by, *inter alia*, conducting regular patrols in the Security Zone, participating as an observer in the work of the Joint Control Commission, maintaining contact between the sides and facilitating direct meetings between them, and working together with the sides and with the mediators and observers in the multilateral settlement process. The mission is staffed by a mixture of civilian and military, local and international personnel, and has been headed since April 2012 by Ambassador Jennifer Brush (from the United States). As well as its main office in Chişinău, the mission has offices in Tiraspol and Bender. In addition to its conflict resolution mandate, the mission undertakes activities in several other areas including anti-trafficking and gender equality, arms control and disarmament, freedom of the media, human rights and democratisation.

The conflict resolution process has had its ups and downs over the years. A commitment by the Russian Federation at the Istanbul OSCE summit in 1999 to withdraw its troops from the territory of the Republic of Moldova by the end of 2002 was not implemented and forms part of an ongoing dispute between Russia and NATO about the Agreement on Adaptation of the Treaty on Conventional Armed Forces in Europe (the "Adapted CFE Treaty"). A proposal developed by Russia in 2003, known as the Kozak memorandum, was considered but eventually rejected by the Moldovan side, allegedly under Western pressure. This would have allowed the maintenance of a Russian military presence until 2020, as well as giving Transdniestria a very significant influence over decision-making in a new federal State structure. Agreement was reached in September 2005 to add the EU and the US as observers to the official negotiating process which includes the two sides, as well as the OSCE, Russia and Ukraine as mediators. Meetings in “5+2” format began in October 2005, but this process came to a halt in February 2006, when first one side and then the other refused to attend negotiations. Informal meetings during the period 2007-2011 led eventually, and due in no small part to the efforts of the then Lithuanian OSCE Chairmanship, to agreement in Moscow in September 2011 to resume the official negotiations. It was agreed that the first meeting would focus on the principles and agenda of the official negotiating process. The first meeting following this decision took place in Vilnius under the then Lithuanian Chairmanship on 30 November-1 December 2011. This meeting was mainly devoted to consideration of a draft of “principles and procedures for the negotiating process”, which had been prepared by the then Head of the OSCE Mission to Moldova, Ambassador Philip Remler, in consultation with the other international participants in the “5+2” process. While agreement was reached on over half of the content of this document, the paragraphs on which agreement was not reached included some notably difficult ones.
This was the state of play at the beginning of Ireland’s Chairmanship of the OSCE on 1 January 2012. The Tánaiste, as Chairperson-in-Office, appointed Ambassador Erwan Fouéré, an Irishman who had recently retired from a career with the institutions of the European Union, as his Special Representative for the Transdniestrian settlement process. Ireland was the first OSCE Chairmanship in several years to appoint a dedicated Special Representative for this issue. Ambassador Fouéré brought with him experience of conflict resolution and post-conflict reconciliation processes in South Africa and in the Balkans. During the second half of 2011, the Lithuanian OSCE Chairmanship involved Ambassador Fouéré in a number of activities relating to the process, including the Moscow and Vilnius meetings and a visit to Chișinău and Tiraspol in November. Given the short duration of an OSCE Chairmanship, this was important in order to ensure sufficient familiarity with the issues and the people involved, in order to be able to “hit the ground running” on 1 January.

However, events dictated that the Irish Chairmanship of the OSCE did not get off to a good start: on the morning of New Year’s Day, a member of the Joint Peacekeeping Force shot and fatally wounded a local civilian at one of the peacekeeping posts in the Security Zone, in circumstances which remain disputed. This event was followed by a public outcry and by a reiteration by Moldovan officials of their long-standing desire for the removal of the Joint Peacekeeping Force and its replacement by an international civilian mission, while the Transdniestrian side insisted that the JPKF was essential to security and stability.

Another new development at the turn of the year was the election of a new Transdniestrian leader, the 43 year old Yevgeny Shevchuk, in succession to the 70 year old Igor Smirnov, who had led the Transdniestrian independence movement during the war of the early 1990s and presided over the region ever since. Shevchuk put in place a new team of officials, and took a number of steps aimed at improving contacts across the river Dniester, including abolition of a 100% tax on products imported from the rest of Moldova and easing restrictions on freedom of movement. On 27 January, a very constructive first meeting took place in Odessa between Shevchuk and the Prime Minister of Moldova, Vlad Filat. This was the first of a number of contacts between the two leaders during a short space of time, which led to concrete results in several areas.

Following a first visit by Ambassador Fouéré to Chișinău and Tiraspol in early February, where he met with the leadership and negotiators of both sides, the first “5+2” meeting during Ireland’s OSCE Chairmanship took place in Dublin at the end of February. This was also the first meeting since the advent of the new leadership in Tiraspol. The Tánaiste addressed the participants before the meeting began, encouraging them to “go the extra mile” to reach agreement on the issues outstanding from Vilnius. The meeting saw progress made on a number of outstanding points of the “principles and procedures” document, as well as a good initial discussion of the possible content of an agenda for the negotiating process.

In parallel with the work in the “5+2” format, the first half of 2012 was a period of intensive interaction between the sides at all levels, facilitated by the OSCE. An important practical
result was the reaching of an agreement at the end of March between the leaders of the
sides on the resumption of railway goods traffic through Transdniestria, an agreement of
potential economic benefit to both sides. Traffic was resumed on 27 April after a six-year
gap, with the first train being seen off by the leaders of the sides, Filat and Schevchuk.
Working groups of experts also intensified their activity in other sectors.

At the second “5+2” meeting during Ireland’s OSCE Chairmanship, held in Vienna on
17-18 April, agreement was reached on the principles and procedures for the negotiating
process, as well as on an agenda for the process. The principles and procedures
document, which is to serve as the “ground rules” for the negotiations and contribute to
an atmosphere of confidence between the participants, includes some concepts which
will be familiar from other similar negotiation processes, such as that nothing is agreed
until everything is agreed, that the negotiations will be conducted on the basis of equality
and mutual respect, that each side can raise any issue it deems relevant, etc. The agreed
agenda is broad and non-exhaustive, and provides for the taking into account both of
previous agreements between the sides and of ongoing work in expert working groups.
It was agreed that the OSCE Mission to Moldova, based on the recommendations of the
sides, would conduct an analysis of past agreements, of which there are many but which
are for the most part not being implemented, with a view to the taking by the sides of any
decisions which they consider necessary in relation to these agreements.

Ireland has been keen to use its OSCE Chairmanship to highlight the experience of
conflict resolution on the island of Ireland, while recognising that every conflict has its
own particular circumstances and that there is no “single transferable” conflict resolution
model. To this end, in late May 2012, a visit to Dublin and Belfast was organised for the
chief negotiators from both sides and their immediate advisers. The participants met
officials, political party representatives and others, who were involved in the Northern
Ireland peace process, including the negotiation and implementation of the 1998 Good
Friday Agreement.

At the time of writing, the Irish OSCE Chairmanship year has not yet reached its half-
way point. While the agreement of the ground rules and agenda for the negotiations was
an important and necessary development, the substantive work of negotiations remains
ahead.

We hope that the positive momentum which has existed during the Irish OSCE
Chairmanship so far will be maintained during the remainder of the year, and afterwards.
Irish people know better than most that conflict resolution is a lengthy, time-consuming
and often frustrating process. We are determined, however, to make our best possible
contribution to the joint effort to find a comprehensive political settlement of the conflict
which broke out on the banks of the Dniestr twenty years ago.
ABSTRACT
The forthcoming Irish Presidency of the EU Council from January to June 2013, offers an opportunity for Ireland to play a much higher profile role in EU affairs, including in security and defence. The EU has been pre-occupied by economic crises in recent years and the earlier momentum around security and defence policy from 2003 to 2008 seems to have been lost. There will be little pressure from other member states or institutions in Brussels for Ireland to play a proactive role in seeking to re-energise CSDP, however it might be in Ireland’s own interests to do so and the Presidency offers an opportunity to re-start a debate. The article explore the domestic pressures that might arise around the issue of neutrality and argues that there is no reason to believe there would be any widespread public opposition to a more active Irish agenda on CSDP during its presidency.

Ireland will take over the EU rotating Presidency of the Council of the European Union on 1 January 2013, with the agenda inevitably dominated by the European economic, banking and fiscal crises. Nonetheless, even with a strong economic focus, security and defence policy will inevitably play a role in the agenda of the Presidency. The timing is also interesting. Ireland will on 31 December 2012, finish its role as Chair in Office of the OSCE and so that experience for the Ministerial team and the senior officials and military officers involved will be very fresh when the EU agenda is planned. This article explores the likely priorities in the defence and security arenas during the presidency, at an EU level and then analyses the potential domestic factors which might influence government activism in this area. While by design forward looking, it does situate that analysis in the context of recent developments in the EU Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP) and also explores what can be learned about Irish public opinion in the aftermath of the Lisbon and Fiscal Treaty referenda and how that might influence government policy.

European Affairs Minister Lucinda Creighton, setting out “Ireland’s priorities for the EU Presidency” refers to a broad range of areas, while inevitably focusing on economic growth issues. However while mentioning the growth in EU competencies and the post Lisbon changes, including the European External Action Service, there is no explicit mention of defence or security (other than energy security and food security). Partly this represents the domestic agenda too. Ireland’s referendum on the fiscal treaty, in June 2012, was the first vote held since EEC membership, where issues of neutrality and defence did not feature. While the focus was narrower than other Treaty debates, the
absence of explicit defence provisions has not prevented such issues being raised in
the past. The Government has separately announced an outline defence programme for
the Presidency in response to a parliamentary question, with Minister for Defence Alan
Shatter TD announcing to Dáil Éireann, that ‘In consultation with the European External
Action Service, EEAS, Ireland will facilitate a formal meeting of the Foreign Affairs Council
in Defence Ministers’ format and a formal Defence Policy Directors’ meeting in Brussels.
He also declared his ‘intention to host, in Ireland, a number of informal meetings and
seminars, including a Defence Ministers’ informal. Usually, the subjects of discussion at
the informal meetings range from current military operations, co-operation between the
EU and other international organisations, the development of EU military capabilities and
on-going developments in the European Defence Agency.’2 There clearly will therefore
be a programme of activity on defence matters, even if its specific agenda is as yet
unspecified.

The European Context
The role of the Presidency has changed since the Lisbon Treaty came into effect and
foreign and security policies issues are now more explicitly divided between the President
of the European Council Herman von Rompuy, the High Representative for Foreign Policy
Catherine Ashton and the Council of Ministers. There was a lot of discussion about a
single foreign and defence policy ‘phone number’ in the discussions around a possible
EU constitution and what ultimately became the Lisbon Treaty, however the nature of the
European Union is that, at least at this stage of its development, no such single source
of power is possible. Control over EU foreign and defence policy is divided between EU
institutions and member states and among the states it is influenced both by the formal
requirement for consensus among all states and the reality that larger states have more
influence on such matters, even if they cannot on their own (even when such states are
in agreement) move forward without the other smaller member states.

The Presidency therefore is part of a patchwork of institutions and influences, but an
important one for Ireland while it holds the office. It still represents a period of higher
profile and a period when a state has a greater capacity to set an agenda to influence
other aspects of the EU family, if it chooses to do so. The question remains as to whether
Ireland has such an agenda on defence and security issues for the EU at this time.

While defence and security policy issues are divided between institutions, the European
Council made up of Heads of Government/Heads of State still represents a good reflection
of EU political priorities at any point in time. From the adoption of the EU Security Strategy
in 2003 through to December 2008 it received a report or held a discussion on European
Security and Defence Policy (ESDP) as it was then termed, at almost every summit. As late
as December 2008, as the financial crisis was deepening the European Council adopted
a comprehensive declaration on ESDP.3 After this point however, the common security
and defence policy drops off the European Council agenda as it becomes dominated by
economic issues. Foreign policy issues with strong security focus are still discussed. For

---

2 Dáil Debates, 8 February, vol. 754, no. 4, accessed at; http://debates.oireachtas.ie/dail/2012/02/08/00018.asp
ec/104692.pdf
example, in March 2012, the Council agenda primarily deals with the Eurozone crisis but there are agreed conclusions supporting democratic transition in the Middle East and North Africa, recognising the Syrian National Council, supporting the UN mission in Syria and support for “the Council, the Commission and the High Representative to maintain a comprehensive engagement with Somalia”. What is missing through all of this is any specific discussion on CSDP, or any possible military role which the EU as an institution might play. Looking back through 2010 and 2011 the same pattern can be seen. There are European Council discussions on Libya, Iran and Syria for example, and even quite significant diplomatic agreements, which in an earlier time might have been newsworthy in themselves. In June 2011 the European Council ‘confirms its full support for UN Security Council Resolutions 1970 and 1973 on Libya and for the efforts Member States of the EU are taking for their implementation’. It also ‘noted that the actions taken in conformity with the mandate from the Security Council significantly contributed to protecting civilians and civilian-populated areas under threat of attack and helped to save lives of civilians’. Such broad based support for military action which, even then, was not without its critics shows continuing political willingness to agree common positions, but there is no evidence of a desire to involve the EU in military missions as an organisation, not even, to any significant degree in post conflict situations.

In contrast to the strong focus from 2003 to 2008 on building EU military and civilian capacities to deal with a range of security challenges, from relatively unchallenging advice and monitoring missions, through rapid deployments such as Artemus in the DRC and even relatively large scale civilian missions such as Kosovo, the momentum of CSDP from 2009-10 onwards is very limited. The opportunities have presented themselves. As NATO has struggled in Afghanistan, there was clearly little appetite among its European members for another significant international deployment and no-one, at time of writing, is seriously considering an intervention in Syria or Bahrain. However the language of the EU Security Strategy of 2003, of the EU's potential strengths in multi-faceted operations with a military dimension, but with strong civilian elements drawing on development assistance, economic aid and support for post-conflict rebuilding (or conflict prevention) are still true. Perhaps the crisis in NATO makes the EU's case even stronger.

An analysis of the Council of Ministers meeting in its foreign affairs configuration with Defence Minister twice a year, or even an analysis of specific documents on CSDP reinforces the impression provided by the lack of attention to CSDP at European Council level. In seems as if CSDP has reached a plateau. Current operations and some minor new ones can be agreed and financed without any political difficulty, but there seems to be no desire to mount a mission on the scale of the successful EUFOR mission in Chad, much less something even more challenging or long-term.

The context facing the EU's CSDP as Ireland prepares to take over the Presidency is one of remaining potential, but perhaps very limited ambition. The battle-groups concept is

---

a case in point. Announced with fanfare as a major step forward in EU military capacity, we are now likely to reach the end of the first cycle of battle-groups without the concept ever being tested with an actual deployment. If Libya or Syria were never the situations envisaged by the EU security strategy for EU deployment, South Sudan probably was. The mission to provide airport security, while not unimportant, is not the same as providing a border security force or a peace support force in the contested areas.

Does Ireland have an agenda for an EU specific defence and security policy? There is no domestic evidence of such debates and as the above discussion suggests, little pressure from Brussels for anything other than a status quo defence agenda. However if the EU is to re-establish any momentum for an EU specific security and defence policy – more than diplomatic support for or silence on operations carried out by coalitions of the willing - then the Presidency of a member state such as Ireland might be a good time to re-energise the policy along the lines set out in the 2003 Security Strategy and to start a debate on what contribution the combined military forces of member states, along with the civilian capacities built since 2003, might make under CSDP. Is the EU looking to play a role using its particular strengths for multi-faceted operations or is it content to play a minor role in global security in small largely civilian operations?

**Domestic Concerns**

One of the most significant limits on what Irish Governments have sought to do at a European level in the security arena has been the perceived public resistance to such policies, if they were seen to impact on 'Irish neutrality'. The many different ways the term is used by different actors has, however, made for a difficult public debate and a great deal of government nervousness as Ministers are very uncertain of the limits of public support for European security policies. There is no doubt that even during the euro crisis, European Union membership is popular in Ireland and opinion polls consistently show that a clear majority of the public believe that EU membership has been a positive experience for the country. The Irish public when asked also vocalise very strong support for state ‘neutrality’. At the same time there has been no serious public opposition to any of the military operations carried out by the Irish Defence Forces, regardless of whether they were carried out under UN, EU or NATO leadership. These are not seen as damaging ‘neutrality’. The public debate has however been hampered by the use of the term ‘neutrality’ to mean quite distinct things and so analysing possible public reaction to new activity is difficult.

Analyses of public opinion carried out on behalf of the Irish Department of Foreign Affairs after the first (defeated) Lisbon Treaty referendum, in an effort to clarify voter concerns, highlighted a number of significant facts.\(^7\) Opposition to the Treaty was strongest amongst 25-34 year olds (59%), lower income groups (66%) and women (56%). Amongst the two then dominant parties, 63% of the supporters of the governing Fianna Fáil party supporters voted ‘yes’ but only 52% of the traditionally more pro-EU Fine Gael (opposition) party did.

---


so. 61% of Labour Party supporters and 53% of Green Party supporters voted no – despite the fact that their party leaderships campaigned for a 'yes' vote.

Not understanding the Treaty was by far the most common spontaneous reason given for voting 'no'. In fact 23% of ‘yes’ voters and 53% of ‘no’ voters either said that they ‘did not know’ or were only ‘vaguely aware’ of what the Treaty was about, and over 40% of ‘no’ voters spontaneously mentioned this when asked why they voted no. Other more substantive reasons for voting ‘no’ included loss of independence (18%) and loss of neutrality/military issues (8%) and loss of an automatic Commissioner (4%). Supporters of the Treaty tended to mention the importance of the EU in quite a general way as the main reason for voting ‘yes’. When voters were directly asked about specific issues, which had featured strongly in the referendum, 82% of ‘no’ voters (compared to 71% of ‘yes’ voters) said military neutrality was important / very important in determining how they voted; 71% of ‘no’ voters said the loss of a commissioner was important and 86% of ‘no’ voters cited ‘workers’ rights’. Though of less concern than these issues, voters with a conservative religious position on abortion expressed concerns, that the EU Court of Justice could interpret abortion as a fundamental right – over-riding Ireland’s *de facto* legal prohibition on abortion and one conservative pro-business group Libertas, argued that Lisbon gave the EU the potential authority to require Ireland to raise its low level of corporation tax.

The issue of conscription, though hardly featuring during the campaign itself, apart from on the websites and leaflets of groups quite marginal to the campaign, was highlighted in the research report, as 48% of ‘no’ voters and remarkably 26% of ‘yes’ voters said the ‘introduction of conscription to a European army’ was ‘included’ in the treaty.

After the referendum, the Irish government opened negotiations with other member states and reached agreement that if the Lisbon Treaty was ratified they would alter their previous position on the Commission and each member state would retain the right to nominate a member of the Commission. The European Council also agreed a number of ‘legal declarations’ which among other things affirmed Ireland’s right to maintain its policy of military neutrality (without defining it in any way).

Given the variety of ways in which the term neutrality is used in political discourse an understanding of Ireland’s policy of neutrality requires a clear conceptual understanding of these different meanings and their implications for Irish policy on European and international security. Drawing on the historical development of policy on neutrality and in particular on the political contributions of the major parties to policy discussions on neutrality and EU security since the 1980s, five different concepts of neutrality can be identified, none of them based on the more limited definition from the international laws of war. These concepts have been commonly used by mainstream political parties and have had a significant influence in the wider discourse on Irish foreign policy. In brief they are:

- An assertion of independence and a desire to play an independent and non-aligned role in international affairs.
- Support for collective security through international organisations, while opposing the use of force by major world powers.
• An extension of Irish nationalism, separation from Britain and anti-partition sentiment.
• Military neutrality, defined as non-membership of common defence pacts.
• A values-based commitment to peace, disarmament, conflict resolution, development and human rights.

These are not mutually exclusive concepts, but they are different in their reasoning and will have very different implications for Ireland’s engagement with the development of EU security policy. These different dimensions cannot be easily dismissed. One of the issues in the first Lisbon referendum was that government insistence that ‘military neutrality’ was not impacted as there was no defence pact, did not speak to voters if their concept of ‘neutrality’ was on based on foreign policy values, or a desire for a very independent voice in world affairs. These five dimensions therefore need to be dealt with separately in an analysis of how such concepts might impact on likely public reaction to different aspects of a more energised CSDP.

The issue of pursuing an independent foreign policy is always a matter of degree. It is a trade-off between expressing an independent view as a small state which has a marginal impact on world affairs and a collective position within the EU which is more likely to have an impact on events. In practice this line of argument is often used (on both sides) when they disagree with a policy being pursued as a violation of Irish ‘traditions’, discussed further below. The issue of collective security has often been conflated with defence pacts but needs to be separated. DeValera in the late 1920s and early 1930s was a firm supporter of collective security through the League of Nations and it was only his frustration at the refusal of the major powers to act in defence of Manchuria and Ethiopia that pushed him towards a more isolationist stance.8 UN membership already imposes a duty to act collectively that is very broadly supported by the Irish public. The question that remains is whether CSDP adds a new dimension to potential collective security, supportive of and in parallel to the UN, or whether it weakens the UN. Kofi Annan during his period as UN Secretary General was strongly supportive of emerging EU capacities, seeing them a means to mobilise a greater commitment for peace support operations from EU member states which have been reluctant to join UN-led operations. All ESDP/CSDP operations to date have been broadly supportive of UN positions. Even if some such as Kosovo and Macedonia had no explicit UN mandate due to the positions of Russia and China respectively, in neither case was the mission itself contentious or opposed in practice by the vetoing power. On collective security therefore, there is evidence to suggest that a more proactive stance by an Irish government could be presented in a manner which is supportive of a vision of ‘neutrality’ based on collective security and which the Irish public have been very supportive of in the past – whether such efforts have been mainstream UN PKOs, EU led missions such as Chad, or NATO-led missions such as SFOR and KFOR. The evidence suggests it will depend on context and there is no widespread opposition in principle to such operations.

The connection of neutrality to Irish nationalism and anti-partitionism is historically linked to a position which analyses neutrality during world war 2 in such terms and to the actions

of the inter-party government at the foundation of NATO when they unsuccessfully sought to utilise potential Irish membership as a lever to pressurise the USA to intervene with the UK on the Northern Ireland question. The dominance of this line of analysis in Irish historiography has led to the neglect of the Irish Government's formal position – identical to most small European states, which was that we would remain neutral unless attacked. In so far as CSDP has any impact on anti-partitionism it could be said to strengthen Ireland’s independence from Britain and it is certainly hard to see how it weaken an Irish nationalist position vis-à-vis Britain. However, Devine's work on public opinion suggests that such voters are also likely to support a conceptually different but related view of neutrality which emphasises the state pursuing a very independent stance on foreign affairs.9

Official Irish government discourse since the 1990s now uses the term ‘military neutrality' almost exclusively and limits the term to mean membership of collective defence pacts. Notwithstanding some interpretations of aspects of the Lisbon Treaty to infer such a commitment, there is little political support within the Irish government or EU member states for such strong developments. No Irish Government is likely to want to pursue this option and, in practice, there is no EU pressure to do so from other members. However, a line of public argument which simply repeats this without engaging with other concepts in the neutrality discourse by-passes rather than responds to concerns of voters.

Finally, the question of values in foreign policy has dominated a lot of more recent discussion on neutrality. This is more difficult to respond to as almost every security decision involves multiple possible arguments. However, there is no intrinsic incompatibility between a values-based Irish foreign and security policy and the development of CSDP. The EUFOR mission in Chad is a clear case in point. Despite the complication of France’s historic involvement in the country before and after independence, the EU mission managed to establish its own separate bona fides and performed well in difficult political circumstances and challenging terrain. Again a form of discourse which moved beyond seeking to define ‘military neutrality' in very limited terms and ignore all other dimensions is overly cautious and actually fails to engage voters. A proactive stance which informs and engages voters of the potential benefits of a more active CSDP would have the ability to meet voter concerns worried about this concept of ‘neutrality' (as they use the term) and the experience of ESDP / CSDP mission to date does not raise issues any Irish Government would be comfortable defending.

A Possible Agenda

CSDP needs to be re-invigorated if it is to survive as a credible operational force. The international security situation would benefit from an organisation with the resources and strong capacities for well integrated military and civilian peace support operations of the type envisaged during the capacity building phase of ESDP. Ireland could play a role in re-starting such a debate, and there is no reason to fear that the Irish public would resist such developments as long as they were accompanied by an open debate and focused on the type of security strategy set out in 2003. In the context of an emerging

---

multi-polar world in the economic sphere at least, where does the EU wish to position itself in the security sphere? In a situation where NATO is still struggling to come to terms with its internal tensions and where it is clear that one of the significant reasons for the failure of the mission in Afghanistan was NATO’s inability to integrate the political, diplomatic, civilian, developmental and mediation elements of the Afghan strategy – precisely those elements which the EU has a stated aim to perform well. A mission on the scale of Afghanistan is clearly not within the EU’s reach, but the lessons of NATO failure in Afghanistan are just as relevant for other smaller but equally complex missions.

There are two choices for the Irish Presidency. A safe option would be status quo focused. If the Irish Government chooses that route, they will not face pressure to take any serious initiative. The cost at an EU level is that CSDP will be increasingly seen as a very minor initiative from a political union pre-occupied by its internal problems and which does not seek to play a role in the emerging world system beyond the economic arena. The lessons will not be lost on Brazil, Russia, India or China, or the G20 behind them. If Ireland’s global security interests are however seen as better protected by a strong EU, within a rules-based international system, based on the vision of security in the EU security strategy, then Ireland will need to work with like-minded countries within the EU to start a debate on the next phase of CSDP, and the Presidency may be an opportunity to play such a role.
Clearing the EU ‘Fog of War’– Ends, Ways and Means

“A … far more serious menace is the retinue of jargon.”

Von Clausewitz

ABSTRACT

In the case of the European Union (EU) an exploration of the relationship between the European Union, the Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP) and its capabilities is sufficient to deter the faint-hearted. As such, in order to clear the ‘fog of war’ and guide the reader towards some enlightenment, this essay will define the aims of the EU, outline its significance, and with a focus on security and defence related issues, highlight some key structures which make decisions on our behalf. With an eye towards our 2013 EU Presidency it touches on some of the most significant topics which will undoubtedly enter the Irish DF sphere of interest, such as capability development, pooling and sharing and Battlegroups. This essay clarifies the inter-relationship between the different EU policy making bodies and explains some commonly used EU terminology. A decade after the ESS the EU steadfastly wishes to remain an anchor of stability in order to spread democracy, and yet Europe faces increasingly complex threats and challenges. This reinforces the need for a business model in which the EU becomes a capable and coherent entity influencing security and defence as a global actor, especially in areas of crisis management and conflict prevention. In order to do this, the EU needs a comprehensive approach that increasingly mobilises different tools at the EU’s disposal, such as CSDP, capabilities development and a rapid reaction force as part of an effective strategy, thereby achieving EU strategic objectives.

Introduction

In the same manner that modern technological developments can sometimes provide a commander with overwhelming amounts of information, which more often than not according to Colin Gray will not be of use, so too the Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP) structures can appear to have the same effect. Information overload, at least in conflict situations, can present its own problems, because resultant ‘actions take place, so to speak, in a kind of twilight, which, like fog or moonlight often tends to make things seem grotesque’, and with that Clausewitz coined one of military’s most eponymous metaphors. I accept that this resultant ‘fog’ is certainly more critical in times of crisis but it can also be more evident in times of peace. This is true especially in the case of our multinational and supranational organisations, witnessed by many who have endeavoured to explore information on how these systems operate and relate to

---

those who are in effect the beneficiaries. In the case of the European Union (EU) such an exploration of the relationship between the European Union, the Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP) and its capabilities is sufficient to deter the faint-hearted. As such, in order to clear the ‘fog’ and guide the reader towards some enlightenment this essay will define the aims of the EU, outline its significance and with a focus on security and defence related issues highlight some key structures which make decisions on our behalf. With an eye towards our 2013 EU Presidency I hope to touch on some of the most significant topics which will undoubtedly be of interest to the Irish Defence community, such as capability development, pooling and sharing and Battlegroups. At the very least, within the defence domain, I hope to clarify the inter-relationship between the different EU bodies and simplify commonly used EU terminology thereby avoiding the ‘fog of war’, and hopefully directing the reader more towards the ‘moonlight’.

On the EU
The overall aim of the European Economic Community (EEC)/EU, since its foundation in 1958, has been to promote peace, the values of human rights, democracy, equality, solidarity, and the rule of law, not only for its own people but for people across the globe. These values remain as the platform for all EU enterprise because “an active and capable European Union would make an impact on a global scale.”4 In 1950, embedded in a post-war epistemology of multilateral cooperation, the French politician Robert Schuman proposed the creation of a community of peaceful interests to Germany and any other European countries that wanted to join. “Vitality springs from diversity – which makes for real progress so long as there is mutual toleration.”5 The European Coal and Steel Community (ECSC) Treaty was signed in Paris in 1951 followed by the Treaty of Rome on 25 March 1957 in order to build an EEC based on a common market and covering a whole range of goods and services. This Treaty of Rome was anchored in the strategic objective of ending war and the division of the European continent, thus helping Europe to move from war and conflict to cooperation and peace. It created a framework for a Europe of the future and a system of creating an ever closer union between the peoples of Europe. The EEC, as it was, experienced its first enlargement when Denmark, the United Kingdom and Ireland joined in 1973. Speaking of our application to join in July 1961 the Taoiseach, Seán Lemass said “the Government believes that there is general acceptance of their view that, in the circumstances now developing, this policy is dictated by the national interest”.6

Starting at the top and dealing firstly with the main structures and their impact on the defence environment, the EU consists of the European Council, the European Commission and the European Parliament. The highest-level political direction and definition of priorities is provided by the European Council, currently headed by Herman Van Rompuy, became a community institution on 01 December 2009 in accordance with the Treaty of Lisbon. The European Council is made up of the Heads of State and Government from each Member State (Ireland’s representative being Taoiseach Enda Kenny, TD) together with the President of the European Commission. It is chaired by the

---

Council Presidency, which also manages the agenda. The Presidency rotates every six months among the Member States. Ireland is due to hold the Presidency from 01 January 2013. The Presidency of the Council is held by groups of three Member States (Trio) for a period of 18 months, whereby each of the three States in turn chairs all configurations of the Council for a six-month period, except for Foreign Affairs.⁷ Ireland’s presidency (its seventh) is followed by Lithuania then Greece, both of whom will complete the Trio along with Ireland during its tenure. The role of the rotating presidency has changed post-Lisbon. It continues to plan and chair the meetings in the Council and associated bodies and move the work of the Council forward to create results, ensuring cooperation among Member States while acting in its capacity as honest broker in order to formulate compromise proposals. Decisions in the European Council are made, depending on the forum, either unanimously or by voting according to special rules known as “Qualified Majority Voting” (QMV). Unanimity ensures that each Member State has its own right of veto. In the area of Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) the Council agreed on the appointment of Baroness Catherine Ashton as the High Representative (HR) of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy which includes the area of Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP – see below). She now exercises the functions which were formally dealt with by the rotating Presidency.

The European Commission is also fully engaged with CFSP and participates in decision-making and political dialogue involving CSDP matters. A long-term solution for a region in crisis requires not only military engagement but more importantly political, financial and administrative support. A range of other issues such as terrorism, sanctions, human rights and democracy, all within the remit of the European Parliament, impact on the EU’s security commitments. Even though the European Commission has no role in specific military matters, it works to ensure that civilian activities which follow on from military activities in crisis management operations proceed smoothly and coherently. Civilian activities are inextricably linked to military operations. Areas such as rule of law, security sector reform (SSR) and disarmament, demobilisation and reintegration (DDR) are all integral to the development of a comprehensive approach to EU-led operations.⁸

Although its formal role is one of both political scrutiny and budgetary authority, the European Parliament can seek to influence developments in the CSDP area through the adoption of Resolutions approving specific operations such as EUFOR Chad. The Lisbon Treaty tasks the HR, who ‘double-hats’ as Vice President of the Commission, to work closely with the European Parliament, to regularly consult on main aspects and basic choices of CFSP, and to inform on how the policies evolve. Most of all she needs to ensure that the views of the European Parliament are duly taken into consideration.⁹ To enhance democratic legitimacy, national parliaments are invited to the European Parliament for exchanges of views on CSDP. This bridges the “double democratic deficit” whereby the European Parliament has weak decision-making powers but good insight on CSDP but where national parliaments have stronger formal powers but struggle with the EU decision-making process. In short, the Lisbon Treaty provides the European

---

Parliament with a role in helping the EU face up to the challenges set out in the European Security Strategy (ESS) by maintaining the public support for global engagement, which in turn shapes the policies as adopted under CSDP.\textsuperscript{10}

The External Action Service (EEAS) established in July 2010, and effective from 1 January 2011, represented the start of “an intense and challenging new phase in building the EU’s role in foreign policy and external relations.”\textsuperscript{11} The Lisbon Treaty had a central aim to create this new structure whose success depends upon sustained political support and collective commitment of member states. This institution is tasked to combat the global economic crisis and tensions within the Euro zone while simultaneously consolidating public administration. It is designed to bring substance and presence to the EU's foreign policy agenda. Its personnel were subsumed from the staffs of the Commission and Council Secretariats. However its functioning and command and control still remain long term challenges. Its priority areas of concern are the capacity to deliver policy substance, emphasis on EU Delegation work as a front-line of external action, and building a shared organisational structure.

The international system created after the Second World War has faced many pressures and in many ways the pressures facing these EU institutions today are more challenging than ever before. The current strategic history of the EU will form the dominant narrative for developments of the future and in this current political climate, every decision is under review. Even representation in international institutions cannot be sanctioned without much debated political and financial oversight. Grand strategy in the context of CSDP does not evolve with ease from EU institutions but “faced with common problems, there is no substitute for common solutions.”\textsuperscript{12} The EU will always face strategic challenges, perhaps the nature of the threats will change, or perhaps it is only the manner in which these threats manifest themselves will change, but either way and for whatever reason chosen, the employment of military forces to perform any task within CSDP always has been and will be to achieve political ends.

\textbf{On CSDP}

The CSDP,\textsuperscript{13} was given a range of crisis management functions, known as the ‘Petersburg Tasks’, and therefore it is through CSDP that crisis management came to lie at the heart of CFSP.\textsuperscript{14} The EU’s security and defence policy is focused on supporting international peace and security and on the resolution of conflict and international development, in accordance with the principles of the UN Charter. The CSDP structures fall under the authority of the European Council and differ from some others in that unanimity of decision-making at all levels is a prerequisite for agreement. The linchpin of CSDP is the Political and Security Committee (PSC), a Council body, which meets at ambassadorial level as a preparatory body for the Council and deals with “the definition of and follow-up to the EU’s response to a crisis”.\textsuperscript{15} It exercises “political control and strategic direction”

\begin{footnotesize}
\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{10} CSDP Handbook, op city, chapter 4.6.
\item \textsuperscript{11} The European External Action Service – Report by the High Representative to the European Parliament, the Council and the Commission, 2011.
\item \textsuperscript{13} CSDP was formerly known as the European Security and Defence Policy (ESDP) prior to the Treaty of Lisbon.
\item \textsuperscript{14} CSDP Handbook, Op cit, chapter 4.
\end{itemize}
\end{footnotesize}
over the military response to a crisis determined by the EU. This necessitates that the PSC must keep track of international developments in areas which fall under CFSP to determine whether and how the EU might assist. It also takes “responsibility for the political direction of the development of military capabilities” required in responding to a crisis, through evaluating essential military doctrinal elements such as the strategic military options, the chain of command and the operational concept (Conops) and plan (Oplan) as products of the operational planning process. Von Clausewitz remains relevant even in the EU as still “the political object … will thus determine both the military objective to be reached and the amount of effort it requires.” In the event of such a crisis or in the subsequent management of the EU’s actions in crisis areas the PSC considers the opinions and recommendations of another CSDP Council body, the European Union Military Committee (EUMC). When ready, the PSC forwards a recommendation to launch an operation to the Council, which then decides whether or not to launch the operation within the framework of a Council Decision.

Crisis Response Planning Process at the Political and Strategic Level

At Helsinki in 1999, the European Council created a new military body within the European Council. The EUMC, the highest military body within the European Council, comprises the Chiefs of Defence (CHODs), who meet at the level of CHODs at least twice a year, while for normal weekly meetings they are represented by their military representatives (Milreps). The EUMC gives Military Advice and makes Military Recommendations to the

---

16 ibid.
17 ibid.
19 A review of the Crisis Management Planning Process is currently being carried out.
PSC on all military matters within the EU. Among the functions of the EUMC, its military advice, based on outright consensus, becomes “the forum for military coordination and cooperation between the EU Member States in the field of conflict prevention and crisis management.”\(^{20}\) The advice proffered and/or recommendation(s) made, deals \textit{inter alia} with the nomination of an Operation Commander (Op Comd), development of the overall Crisis Management Concept (CMC) in its military aspects, risk assessment, and capability objectives. It will also articulate the military dimension of the strategic direction and political control of crisis management. The EUMC also advises on the EU's military relationships with external organisations such as NATO and the African Union (AU). In crisis management situations the EUMC, upon the request of PSC, issues a Military Strategic Options Directive (MSOD) followed by a direction to the Director General (DG) of the European Union Military Staff (EUMS) to draft an Initiating Military Directive (IMD). The purpose of the IMD is to draw up and present strategic military options for a way forward in dealing with the crisis, and following approval of the EUMC, the EUMS issues a draft IMD to Member States. The EUMC, through the preparatory work of the European Union Military Committee Working Group (EUMCWG) then evaluates these options, forwards them to the PSC, and upon approval, Council authorises an Initial Planning Directive (IPD) for the Operation Commander. Throughout any operation the EUMC will continue to monitor the conduct and execution of the military mission.\(^{21}\)

The EUMS, established by the Council in Helsinki, since 01 January 2011 has been subsumed under the wider umbrella of the EEAS. Through national voluntary contributions of personnel, EUMS provides military expertise and support designed to perform the operational functions of early warning, situation assessment and strategic planning for missions and tasks as required, including those identified in the ESS. The EUMS is also responsible for the identification of European national and multinational forces while also implementing policies and decisions as directed by the EUMC.\(^{22}\) It has the responsibility, through the Civil/Military Cell, for generating the capacity to plan and run an autonomous EU military operation, and to maintain the capacity within the EUMS to rapidly set up an operations centre (OPSCEN) for a specific operation, in particular where a civil/military response is required and where no national Headquarters (HQ) is identified. Incidentally, this reflects the ongoing challenges involved in the EU's response to the current crisis in the Horn of Africa.

The EU consistently focuses operations on conflict prevention, the protection of civilians in conflict zones and on re-building fragile societies in the aftermath of such conflicts. It conducts military, civilian and civil/military missions (most EU missions are civilian) and all go hand-in-hand with political, economic, diplomatic and development activity. The Union is involved in peacekeeping and crisis management in many places around the world and supports reconstruction efforts in countries like Bosnia and Herzegovina, Kosovo, Chad and the Democratic Republic of the Congo. Currently it operates military missions under CSDP as follows: Operation ALTHEA in Bosnia and Herzegovina designed as an executive mandate to support efforts to maintain a safe and secure environment (SASE)

\(^{21}\) ibid.  
under a renewed United Nations (UN) mandate; Operation ATALANTA to improve maritime security in and around the Horn of Africa and to deter and disrupt piracy and armed robbery at sea; and the EU Training Mission (EUTM) Somalia, which contributes towards strengthening the Transitional Federal Government as a functioning government through training Somali soldiers, currently focussing on leadership, specialists and trainers. Ireland has had participation in all of these missions at varying stages and in varying numbers, most notably with the current Mission Commander of EUTM Somalia. Participation in these CSDP military operations also increases Ireland’s value to the UN as a provider of quality professional forces for peace support operations. The Defence Forces also benefit greatly from access to modern international training, the use of planning and operational concepts and close cooperation with their counterparts from other EU countries. Ireland’s position is similar to the approach of the EU as a whole; believing that complex problems can only be solved though a broad multilateral comprehensive approach. This approach establishes the ways through which to achieve the ends in operations involving crisis management and conflict resolution.

**On Capabilities**

At the General Affairs Council in November 2001, and in line with CFSP objectives, the Council provided the EU with a means to play a full and comprehensive role at international level in accordance with the principles of the United Nations Charter. As defined in the Treaty of the European Union, the agreed ‘Petersburg Tasks’ allow the EU to face up to its responsibilities to cope with crises through the development of a range of crisis management instruments at its disposal and by adding a military capability in order to carry out conflict prevention and crisis management tasks. This development also facilitated greater cooperation through the strategic partnership between the EU and NATO, while also providing for the individual autonomy of each organisation. Europe should be capable of projecting and protecting its core interests and shared values. If CFSP is to be taken seriously as a credible international instrument across the political, diplomatic, economic, humanitarian and military domains, then the implementation of CSDP remains a *sine qua non*. The EU must therefore be capable of acting across the full spectrum of Petersburg Tasks and also those additional tasks defined in the Lisbon Treaty, which ultimately means a credible capability for military intervention.

At Helsinki in 1999, the EU reached an agreement on the development of civilian and military capabilities across a wide spectrum of tasks. On the military side, the European Headline Goal provides a quantitative and qualitative framework for armed intervention, while on the non-military side the EU has developed an arsenal of political, civil and diplomatic instruments. Civilian crisis management is an important tool in CSDP and in the EU’s support to international peace and security. In June 2000 the Feira Council, held by the Portuguese Presidency, identified four areas for priority action, which were then translated into the Civilian Headline Goal set by the Council in 2004. These are; police to substitute for failing local law enforcement authorities; rule of law to strengthen judicial systems; civil administration to create a rapidly deployable pool of experts; and
civil protection for emergency assessment. As civilian crisis management continues to grow, the development of civilian capabilities becomes more important, and so too does the synergy between the civilian and the military capability development.

In order to develop European military capabilities Member States also set themselves a Headline Goal 2010, building upon the Helsinki Accord. This goal, based upon the principles of an EU capability plan which remain the same as in 2001, reflects the current financial realities. The targets set include:

- Enhanced effectiveness and efficiency of EU military capability efforts,
- A ‘bottom-up’ approach to EU defence cooperation, driven by individual Member States in line with their specific political objectives,
- Coordination between EU Member States and cooperation with external agencies, and
- Importance of broad public support.

In order to prepare for this new Headline Goal 2010, which was rooted in the ESS, a Progress Catalogue was devised following from a Requirements Catalogue in order to identify military capability shortfalls on the basis of those requirements previously endorsed. The goal stated that Member States will “be able by 2010 to respond with rapid and decisive action applying a fully coherent approach to the whole spectrum of crisis management operations covered by the Treaty on European Union.”

If capabilities were to be recognised as fit for purpose then the initial strategic planning assumptions needed to be identified. Five illustrative scenarios were chosen as suitable for EU consideration for the deployment of EU military capability, encompassing the full range of the spectrum of military operations:

- Separation of parties by force,
- Stabilisation, reconstruction and Military Advice to third countries,
- Conflict prevention,
- Evacuation operations, and
- Assistance to humanitarian operations.

Such forces needed to be able to deploy rapidly with the necessary command, control, intelligence, logistics and other forces identified, and then to deploy within 60 days and sustain for at least one year. On 1 January 2007, the EU achieved full operational capability to conduct two concurrent rapid response operations of the size of a Battlegroup (BG) each varying in size between 1,500-2000 personnel. With the introduction of the BG concept the EU formed a military instrument at its disposal for early and rapid responses as decided by Council. The BG is the minimum militarily effective force package capable of initial stand-alone operations. It is based on a combined arms, battalion-sized force, reinforced with combat support and combat service support elements. These BGs are

---

27 General Affairs Council Meeting op. cit., p.4.
based on the principles of multi-nationality, interoperability and effectiveness and remain on stand-by for periods of six months. BG operations would as a rule be conducted under a UN Security Council Resolution (UNSCR). To qualify as a BG, the force package needs to meet predefined criteria and agreed military capability standards, thus no fixed organisation exists and it can be tailored by the Op Comd to suit a flexible design specific to the requirements of the operation.

To support Member States in their efforts towards capability development the European Defence Agency (EDA) was established under a Joint Action of the Council of Ministers on 12 July 2004. Its main tasks relate to improving Europe’s defence performance through a more integrated approach to capability, which in turn provides opportunities for industrial restructuring. In close cooperation the EUMC, Member States and the EDA provided a Capability Development Plan (CDP) to facilitate decision-making in the context of national capability choices and to stimulate and facilitate Member State cooperation. This CDP continuously considers and uses as a reference the Headline Goal 2010 estimates of capabilities required out to 2025, current plans and programmes, and lessons learned. The most contemporary means of cooperation in capability development is demonstrated though the “Ghent Initiative”, a programme designed to meet EU ambitions and to achieve, maintain and further develop a broad capability spectrum through the identification of new fields for intensified multinational cooperation. It introduces “pooling” of capabilities for areas where closer cooperation is possible without creating too strong a dependency and “sharing” where mutual dependency and reliance upon EU partners is acceptable. The commitment of each Member State is entirely a national choice depending on criteria such as operational effectiveness, economic efficiency and political implications. Ireland has demonstrated interest in areas such as training and education (Counter Improvised Explosive Device (CIED), Maritime, Command & Staff, etc). In May 2011 the Council with regard to pooling and sharing of military capabilities reiterated the “need to turn the financial crisis and its impact on national defence budgets into an opportunity for greater cooperation in the area of capability development.” While acknowledging that short quick-win projects can have a stimulating effect, the Council stresses the need for pooling and sharing on a systematic and sustainable basis as a key to preserving and developing EU military capabilities.

In December 2008 the Council declared that it wanted the Union, with all the resources at its disposal, to enhance its contribution to international peace and security and to provide a capacity to tackle the risks and threats which confront its existence. These threats and risks are more evident in 2012 and the areas of capability development are becoming more of a challenge to all Member States. Fiscal imperatives ensure that initiatives such as “pooling and sharing” become more of a necessity rather than an ambition. It will only be through joint, sustained and shared effort, a comprehensive and realistic capability

35 Ibid.
development plan, and cohesive partnership that the EU will remain in a position to cope
with future challenges, many of which may rise from within.36 This capacity provides the
means to conduct the ways with which to achieve the ends in operations involving crisis
management and conflict resolution.

Conclusion
A decade after the publication of the ESS, the EU steadfastly wishes to remain an anchor
of stability in order to spread democracy in an environment of increasingly complex
threats and challenges.37 This reinforces the need for a business model in which the EU
becomes a capable and coherent entity, influencing security and defence as a global
actor, especially in areas of crisis management and conflict prevention. In order to do
this, the EU needs a comprehensive approach that increasingly mobilises different tools
at the EU’s disposal as part of an effective strategy,38 thereby achieving EU strategic
objectives. Furthermore, the Council recently underlined the importance of CSDP as an
essential element of success and to ensure its effectiveness it “needs to be underpinned
by sufficient and adequate capabilities.”39 These capabilities will be required to do so
much more for less financial outlay than in previous years and this is why synergies,
cooperation, and pooling and sharing are set to become the way of the future. Further
development of civilian and military capability is envisaged. This will depend on the
commitment of member states and their desire to prioritise it as a national strategic
objective. The use of a rapid reaction asset remains central to EU’s capability but its
practical utility and function remain to be resolved. The potential uses for such an asset
have been identified and there is no question of its possible contribution to CSDP, should
it be used. The sequence of this article within the framework of ends, ways and means
has demonstrated who determines the ends, selects and approves the ways and how the
EU is continually developing the means through capability development.

Structurally, the EU has taken on a significant challenge with the creation of the EEAS and
the integration of CSDP. The fruits of this labour will ripen only in time while internally the
organisations come to terms with restructuring.40 The level of cooperation will define the
future direction of the EU, not only between internal EU institutions, but more importantly
with its strategic partners in an endeavour towards the much sought-after effective global
multilateralism. The Treaty on European Union states in Article 42 that CSDP shall be integral
to CFSP and provide the EU with an operational capacity drawing on civilian and military
assets, to be used on missions for peace-keeping, conflict prevention and strengthening
international security in accordance with the principles of the UN.41 Once unanimously
agreed and in line with the European Treaty, Council Decisions, in conjunction with the
provision that the character of Member States’ security and defence policy shall be upheld,
facilitate the participation of Irish personnel at every level of CSDP. This applies equally
to personnel at the EU military strategic level in Brussels where policy is determined and
to soldiers on operations abroad on EU missions. It also pertains across the full spectrum
of operations from civilian, to military to civil-military. The EU has a comprehensive, multi-

37 European Council (2008), op cit.
38 CSDP - Council Conclusions, Foreign Affairs Council 01 December 2011, ref 17991/11
39 ibid, p.2.
40 Ibid.
41 European Council, The Treaty on European Union, Section 2, Provisions on CSDP, Article 42.
faceted approach to crisis management operations. It remains the only organisation that can call on the full range of stabilisation instruments, both to pre-empt or prevent a crisis as well as to restore peace and rebuild institutions after a conflict." The “fog” of the EU may be thick at times and it has certainly demonstrated an unwieldy process before taking action, however, it remains a very unique organisation with capabilities that are difficult to match elsewhere. The comprehensive approach, identified as crucial in recent conflicts, is catered for by these EU instruments. Once the decision to act is established by the political community, and although admittedly the motivations for this decision can be “just as variable as are the political object”, they are always based on democracy, freedom and the rule of law.

EU at a Glance

---

Utilitarian Clausewitz:
A study of the doctrine of military decision making and the theory of utility maximising games

Mathematics has been turned from the physical world to the affairs of men – economic and military – with some surprising results.¹

ABSTRACT
The celebrated Prussian military theorist, Carl von Clausewitz (1780 – 1831), in his seminal work, On War, likens war to a game of cards. This paper draws upon his analogy, using it as a catalyst to investigate the doctrine of military decision making. Clausewitz’s analogy is tested by considering military strategies in the context of microeconomic games in order to ascertain whether optimal military strategies can be determined by enhancing our understanding of the risks and choices that are inherent to both war and games of chance. Game theory is a microeconomic theorem, which is predicated upon the hypothesis that opponents are locked in a zero sum game of chance, where the participants share the spoils of the game. The central tenet of game theory relates to the notion that the most erudite strategies are determined by considering the potential choices of one’s opponent in the game. This notion is analogous to the military commander’s decision dilemma, where winning strategies are determined by considering the enemy’s capabilities and intentions. The potential symbiosis between the theory of games and military decision doctrine is examined by applying the principles of game theory to the Waterloo campaign. Waterloo is selected as a case study because of its influence on Clausewitzian doctrine and because the decision dilemma faced by the opposing commanders resembles a zero sum game. By analysing the game theoretic solution to Waterloo, it is evident that the most efficient military strategies adhered to the principles of microeconomic choice and that a deviation from rational choice was catastrophic for Napoleon. The research and findings conclude that game theory can help to inform the commander; ensuring that he gains a better understanding of his optimising strategies in the context of the enemy’s influence on the outcome of the game.

Introduction
If we consider briefly the subjective nature of war – the means by which war has to be fought – it will look more than ever like a gamble... From the very start there is an interplay of possibilities, probabilities, good luck and bad that

weaves its way throughout the length and breadth of the tapestry. In the whole range of human activities, war most closely resembles a game of cards.2

In the pantheon of classical military theorists, Carl von Clausewitz can be found amongst those who have had the greatest influence in shaping modern military thought. Despite the passage of time, Clausewitz’s *On War*3 has an enduring relevance. Indeed, occidental military doctrine and the associated Military Decision-Making Process (MDMP)4 are heavily influenced by Clausewitzian theories.5 Recognising the Clausewitzian emphasis on possibilities, probabilities and his analogy of war to a game of cards, one might expect that the MDMP would reflect the latest developments in the fields of choice and risk management. It is surprising, therefore, that the MDMP has remained essentially unchanged since its inception in 1897 and that it has failed to evolve in parallel with the developments in choice and risk management that have taken place during the twentieth and twenty-first centuries.6

The seminal research in choice and risk theories lies in the field of behavioural economics.7 Its influence, however, can be found in a broad spectrum of other fields, including behavioural and social sciences, which have many potential applications in the realm of military decision making. Notwithstanding some contextual differences between economic theory and the MDMP, one might suggest that choice and risk analysis in both fields share a common analytic framework and that a better understanding of choice and risk in the context of behavioural economics might help to optimise the process by which a military commander arrives at his decision.

This paper will explore the potential symbiosis between the fields of military decision making and theories of behavioural economics relating to risk and choice. By exploring these theorems, in the context of the chosen case study, the paper will seek to ascertain whether the incorporation of economic behavioural theorems might enable the commander to stack the deck in his favour as he plays his Clausewitzian game of cards.

**The Doctrine of Military Decision Making**

As the nineteenth century drew to an end and the industrial revolution was reaching its zenith, a growing body of intellectual leaders advocated a shift in management philosophy away from intuitive decision-making models towards sequentially based scientific paradigms.8 Amongst the leaders of the vanguard for change, one can find an American mechanical engineer called Fredrick Taylor.9 Taylor is credited with being the father of scientific management and his central hypothesis relates to the notion that a thorough

---

3 *On War* was first published posthumously in 1832.
4 The MDMP is a five step decision-making paradigm, which has been adopted by the Irish Defence Forces. The Defence Forces doctrinal manual describes the MDMP as a systematic and logical decision-making paradigm which involves a thorough analysis of all available facts and assumptions, leading to sound conclusions, recommendations and effective decisions.
6 Ibid.
analysis of a problem enables the identification of the Pareto efficient\textsuperscript{10} solution-set to that problem.

The impact of Taylor’s philosophies resonated with United States (US) Army Major Eben Swift. Swift postulated that the philosophies of scientific management could be used to codify military doctrine into a sequential decision-making model. Swift’s approach was based on his examination of the writings of a Prussian Officer, Verdy du Verois.\textsuperscript{11} By combining Verdy du Verois’s Clausewitzian decision games with the principles of scientific management, Swift established a sequential decision-making paradigm, which is referred to as the Military Decision-Making Process (MDMP).\textsuperscript{12} As an instructor at the US Army Staff College at Fort Leavenworth, Kansas, Swift was afforded the opportunity to institutionalise his nascent MDMP and over time it has become the defining decision-making paradigm used by occidental military forces, including the Irish Defence Forces.\textsuperscript{13}

The MDMP is essentially a linear, step-based\textsuperscript{14} and formalised model for rational decision making that generates the commander’s optimal course of action. The commander, as a rational decision maker, is assumed to make consequential and preference-based decisions, where his choices are based on the expected future outcomes associated with current actions.\textsuperscript{15} The familiar and axiomatic nature of the MDMP provides a reassuring framework for military commanders. One might question, however, whether these axioms have made military commanders prisoners in Plato’s ‘Allegory of the Cave’,\textsuperscript{16} unable to escape from their preconceived notions of doctrine and rigid adherence to the MDMP, without due regard for the underlying tenets.\textsuperscript{17}

\textbf{The Commander’s Rational Choice}

The classical theorems of microeconomic judgement are predicated on the concept of rationality, which presupposes that the behaviour of individuals in microeconomics, and by extension in other fields, can be characterised by the motivation to maximise expected utility, where utility can essentially be defined as a measure of subjective value.\textsuperscript{18} The term \textit{homo economicus} (economic man) is often used to describe the rational actor. \textit{Homo economicus} is regarded as rational in the sense that his well-being is defined by the optimisation of the utility function.\textsuperscript{19} The military commander, like \textit{homo economicus}, seeks Pareto efficiency in the form of an optimised utility function in his search for a winning strategy.

While expected utility maximisation can provide an intuitively plausible characterisation of rational preferences, military decisions are usually based on situations which ‘involve

\begin{itemize}
\item The Italian philosopher, mathematician and economist Vilfredo Pareto hypothesised that problems involving multi-criteria trade-offs (for example risk and return) converge upon a set of optimum solutions. The optimum solution set is referred to as a Pareto efficient front. Optimising military strategies are considered Pareto efficient in the sense that optimisation is determined by a trade-off between different factors; strategies with greater risks often have potential for greater return.
\item Vandergriff, Op Cit, p. 30-39.
\item The Defence Forces MDMP consists of five steps. Step one is the \textit{mission analysis}. Step two consists of an analysis of the \textit{situation} and \textit{courses of action}. Step three consists of an analysis of the \textit{courses of action}. Step four consists of a comparison of the \textit{courses of action}. Finally, step five is the decision.
\item Plato’s \textit{Allegory of the Cave} is a parable in \textit{The Republic} where a group of prisoners are chained to the wall of a cave for their entire lives. The prisoners’ view of the world is limited to the shadows projected by those passing in front of the fire behind them.
\end{itemize}
two opposing military forces, each seeking utility maximisation in a *game* of mutually exclusive outcomes; there can be only one winner in war. Game theory logically extends the concept of rational choice by analysing situations in which two or more individuals can influence each other’s welfare, where the utility gain of one individual involves disutility for another. Such loss and gain interactions are referred to as zero net sum games, where the game’s participants share the available utility.

Von Neumann and Morgenstern’s game theory presents a compelling analogy between parlour games and zero net sum games involving decisions in economics, which characterised common trends in human behaviour. Their theory can be better explained using the popular exemplar of the prisoners’ dilemma.

The Prisoners’ Dilemma is a game theory problem, which demonstrates how rational individuals act in a zero sum game. The dilemma examines the decision-making process of two partners in crime who have been captured by the police and placed in separate prison cells for questioning. Each suspect is given the opportunity to confess in accordance with the pay-off matrix in Table 1.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Prisoner A Stays Silent</th>
<th>Prisoner B Stays Silent</th>
<th>Each serves 6 months</th>
<th>Prisoner A: 10 Years</th>
<th>Prisoner B: goes free</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Prisoner A Betrays</td>
<td>Prisoner B: 10 Years</td>
<td>Each serves 5 years</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

If both prisoners co-operate by remaining silent, they will be charged with a less serious crime and will each serve six months. If, however, one prisoner confesses and the other does not, then the confessor will go free and the silent prisoner will serve ten years. It is always possible that the prisoners made a deal beforehand, promising to remain silent. Such a promise, however, is not credible since it is always in the prisoner’s interest to renege when a game is predicated on a single iteration. Accordingly, a state of equilibrium is reached where both prisoners betray, each receiving a five-year sentence. The equilibrium state is referred to as a ‘Nash Equilibrium’ after the Nobel Prize winning economist, John Forbes Nash.

**Game Theory and Military Doctrine**

Haywood, in his insightful paper *Military Decision and Game Theory*, posits that game theory “proves with [its] difficult mathematics that... doctrine constitutes the most conservative philosophy of decision.” Current military doctrine emphasises the commander’s selection of the utility maximising course of action during the later stages of the MDMP. Haywood, however, postulates that the disassociation of course of action analysis and course of action comparison fails to integrate the enemy’s equal desire to

---

select his utility maximising course of action in a two-player game with mutually exclusive outcomes. The result is an inclination to select a conservative course of action, which is most suited to counter the enemy’s capabilities rather than his intentions. Haywood advocates an alternative approach when he notes that game theory can ensure that the enemy’s intentions are fully integrated and embedded in the process, he posits that,

The doctrine of decision known as the Estimate of the Situation demonstrates that the doctrine is identical to one solution of game theory (the minorant solution of the two-person zero sum game). This correlation suggests that decision doctrine may be better understood and perhaps improved through study of game theory.

While Haywood catalysed game theoretic research in the context of military decision making, his analysis was purely predicated on a qualitative analysis of the game. He notes that:

Before we can arrive at a precisely correct [game] strategy for a military situation, we must establish a numerical relationship between all possible outcomes. In other words, we must have some quantitative scale of military worth. The development of such a scale for a complex military situation is certainly a formidable task.

The discourse relating to the theory of games and economic behaviour centres upon the financial gains and losses associated with monetary transactions and it is axiomatic that the most erudite games are played with such quantitative data. The outcomes of military games, however, lack the discretely measurable characteristics of games involving monetary transactions and an investigation of the symbiosis between the theory of games and the doctrine of military decision making, therefore, necessitates consideration of how we can represent the outcomes of military games on a scale of measurable utility.

**Measuring Military Utility**

Von Neumann and Morgenstern’s theory of games is predicated upon the presence of quantitative data, as elucidated by the prisoners’ dilemma exemplar, where the outcomes are measured by the length of sentence that each prisoner might face. Not all zero sum games, however, have such discretely measurable outcomes, and an element of subjectivity exists where the outcomes of certain games are described in ambiguous qualitative terms. Imagine that our prisoners were faced with a similar decision matrix but, instead of measurable chronological sentences, the outcomes were measured in ambiguous qualitative terms, as illustrated in Table 2. The prisoners would clearly prefer a short sentence to a long sentence but by how much and what about the other outcomes?
The military commander faces a similar dilemma in his consideration of the utility of the possible outcomes associated with his engagement with the enemy. Military outcomes, like the prisoners’ sentences, have subjective value. The measure of utility for military outcomes is, therefore, influenced by the commander’s epistemology and the capacity of his mental faculties to assign value to ambiguous qualities. The commander’s cognition and mental processes, in his consideration of military outcomes, therefore, fall into the realm of the science of nomology. Nomology derives from the Greek word *nomos* meaning law, and refers to the science of the laws of the mind. As a science, nomology presumes that the mind works scientifically and that a scientific process can be used to more accurately characterise our true judgement. Swift’s MDMP and the pure rationality of game theory are also self evidently nomological, requiring a nomological method to derive a scale upon which the game’s outcomes can be placed.

The practical determination of a scale of military worth for game theoretic modelling requires a simple but representative nomological method to determine a quantitative measure for ambiguous qualitative outcomes of military engagements. Let us consider, therefore, the linear utility scale illustrated in figure 2. The scale measures the utility of outcomes from the commander’s perspective with scores from -10 to +10, where a negative score represents disutility (losing a battle or campaign), a positive score represents (positive) utility (winning a battle or campaign) and the origin represents a neutral or inconclusive outcome, where the battle or campaign is neither won nor lost.

![Military Utility Scale](image)

### Figure 2. Military Utility Scale

Strictly speaking the scale is ordinal, providing little more than an order of preference for the outcomes. However, this notion belies the value of a commander’s knowledge and experience, and his capacity to make accurate and representative heuristic judgements.

---

**Table 2. Prisoners’ Dilemma decision matrix with qualitative outcomes**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Prisoner B Stays Silent</th>
<th>Prisoner B Betrays</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Prisoner A Stays Silent</td>
<td>Each serves short sentence</td>
<td>Prisoner A: long sentence</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Prisoner A Betrays</td>
<td>Prisoner A: goes free</td>
<td>Prisoner B: long sentence</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Each serves medium sentence</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The table above illustrates the possible outcomes of the prisoners’ dilemma game. Each matrix entry indicates the sentence received by the respective prisoner, with a neutral outcome represented as 0, and disutility or utility represented as positive or negative scores.

---

28 The word heuristic comes from the Greek word for discovery and it refers to experienced-based approximations, or mental short cuts, that we use to solve day-to-day problems. Heuristics can be characterised as cognitive probability estimation techniques that are used to approximate the solution of maximum utility.
Having established an order preference, the commander can judge the relative merit of each outcome, adjusting its place on the scale to ascertain its value when measured against his objective criteria. The heuristic nature of this process is also compatible with the MDMP, which relies upon the commander’s subjective judgement and the requirement for expeditious decision making in the field.

It is possible to enhance such a scale by seeking the commander’s measure of uncertainty associated with each outcome and applying a distribution function to the scale. Random variables could also be added to represent the impact of friction and the fog of war to which Clausewitz refers. Such additional variables might enable a more complete game but are beyond the scope of this paper, which will limit further analysis to a simplified linear utility scale.

Having established the nomological framework to measure military utility, it is necessary to test the theorem in the context of an historical case study. The case selected for this paper is the Waterloo Campaign. Clausewitz served in the Prussian Army as Thielemann’s Chief of Staff during the Campaign and its impact on his doctrine is apparent in the analysis contained in Book II of On War. Given the Clausewitzian influence upon contemporary military decision doctrine, Waterloo seems to be a natural choice for further investigation. Furthermore, the juxtaposition of the choices available to the opposing commanders seems to provide a decision set which is analogous to Clausewitz’s game of cards and is compatible with a game theoretic analysis. This notion is validated in Mongin’s astute paper A Game-Theoretic Analysis of the Waterloo Campaign and Some Comments on the Analytic Narrative Project. Mongin advocates the use of utility calculus and, while his algorithm is consistent with utilitarian tenets of Clausewitzian doctrine, its complexity make it incompatible with the practicalities of the paradigmatic MDMP and its requirement for expeditious decision making. By reconsidering the same campaign, using a simplified nomological framework to establish a scale of worth, it may be possible to establish a more practical game theory model for expeditious military decision making.

The purpose of this paper is to validate the efficacy of game theory in context of military decision making and particularly to ascertain whether simplified nomological axioms can be used to establish a representative scale of military worth. The objectives and brevity of this paper obviates the need for a detailed account of Waterloo, however, the following section will provide a brief synopsis of the campaign in order to facilitate the population of the game theoretic model.

The Waterloo Campaign
After his escape from exile on Elba, the powers of Europe were uniting against Napoleon. As the summer of 1815 approached, Britain and Prussia had mustered armies under Wellington and Blücher and were poised for an invasion of France. Napoleon understood his adversaries’ strategy and, recognising his numerical inferiority, sought to re-enact his coup de maître from Montenotte, by defeating the British and Prussian forces in isolation before they could unite and concentrate under a single banner.
The initial execution of Napoleon's plan on 16th June was encouraging; the British and Prussian forces had not yet united and were ill prepared for battle. While the British were deployed in the vicinity of Brussels, Napoleon engaged the main Prussian force at Ligny. He defeated Blücher and shifted his focus towards Wellington, in accordance with his campaign plan. This shift in focus however, was premature, as the defeat of Blücher was not decisive and most of the Prussian Army’s combat power had been preserved. Blücher regrouped his forces at Wavre, from where he had three potential Courses of Action (COA); he could definitively withdraw North via Louvain, he could withdraw East via Perwez or he could march West to Waterloo.

As Blücher conducted the reorganisation of his forces, Napoleon separated his army, directing Grouchy to pursue Blücher, while his focus shifted to Wellington. As Grouchy set off in pursuit of the Prussians, Blücher directed one Corps to delay the French pursuit, as the main Prussian Army marched to Waterloo. On 18th June, Blücher’s army ploughed into the French right flank at Waterloo; just early enough to save Wellington, consigning the French to a defeat that had seemed less likely just a few days before.

Napoleon’s decision to separate his forces after the Battle of Ligny and his utilisation of Grouchy’s Corps were the seminal decisions of the campaign, ultimately consigning...
him to defeat at Waterloo. The discourse relating to the outcome of Waterloo centres on these decisions which, together with Blücher’s decision not to withdraw, determined the outcome of the campaign against Napoleon’s favour. If we simplify the events to consider the Prussian forces under Blücher and the French forces under Napoleon as unitary actors, each seeking utility maximisation at their opponents’ expense, and if we ignore Wellington\textsuperscript{35}, then it is possible to consider the problem as a zero sum two-person game.\textsuperscript{36} Strictly speaking, the game is not zero-sum, as the quantum of utility for Napoleon may not directly translate to comparable disutility for Blücher. Nonetheless, the perturbations are deemed to be sufficiently small to approximate a zero sum game in this instance.\textsuperscript{37} The game can, therefore, be represented in a similar fashion to the prisoners’ dilemma, by using a diametric decision matrix, as illustrated in table 3.

**Table 3. Waterloo Campaign Decision Matrix\textsuperscript{38}**

This matrix can be simplified, where $B_i$ and $N_j$ are Blücher’s and Napoleon’s possible courses of action and $U_k$ is the utility of the outcome from Napoleon’s perspective; as illustrated in Table 4.

**Table 4 –Simplified Decision Matrix\textsuperscript{39}**

\begin{table}[h]
\centering
\begin{tabular}{|c|c|c|c|}
\hline
 & $B_1$ & $B_2$ & $B_3$ \\
\hline
$N_1$ & $U_1$ & $U_2$ & $U_3$ \\
\hline
$N_2$ & $U_4$ & $U_5$ & $U_6$ \\
\hline
$N_3$ & $U_7$ & $U_8$ & $U_9$ \\
\hline
$N_4$ & $U_{10}$ & $U_{11}$ & $U_{12}$ \\
\hline
\end{tabular}
\end{table}

\textsuperscript{35} Wellington’s Army was deployed in a fixed position in the vicinity of the town of Mont St Jean, adjacent to Waterloo.
\textsuperscript{36} Mongin, Op Cit.
\textsuperscript{37} It should also be noted that certain Nash equilibrium situations exist where a strategic decision to discretely withdraw may be hugely beneficial to both sides.
\textsuperscript{38} Mongin, Op Cit.
\textsuperscript{39} Ibid.
Qualitative to Quantitative Data Conversion

Before conducting a game theoretic analysis of Waterloo, it is necessary to determine the utility for the possible outcomes of the campaign, \( U_k \), where \( k = 1, 2, \ldots, n \), so that the diametric decision matrix can be re-populated with quantitative in lieu of qualitative data. Before deciding on his scores, Napoleon would have to decide the criteria against which his utility scores should be measured. In the context of Waterloo, we can assume that he has several objective criteria. His first priority was to definitively defeat Wellington in the field of battle at Waterloo. His second priority was to prevent Blücher from intervening at Waterloo. His third priority was to maximise the attrition of the Prussian Army, preferably putting himself in a position to defeat the Prussians, once Wellington had been overcome. His final priority was to minimise his own losses, retaining combat power for future operations. In recognition of these priorities, Napoleon could deduce a score for each \( U_k \) measured against the congruence of the aforementioned priorities. Each \( U_k \) is placed on the scale such that the \( U_k \) with greatest utility is placed on the far right and the \( U_k \) with the greatest disutility is placed on the far left, as illustrated.

![Figure 3. Napoleon's Utility Scale](image)

With the scale and score for each \( U_k \) in place, the game matrix can be repopulated with quantitative in lieu of qualitative outcomes, as illustrated in table 5, and the game can be solved in accordance with von Neumann and Morgenstern’s axioms.

**Table 5 – Decision Matrix with Utility Scores**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>( B_1 )</th>
<th>( B_2 )</th>
<th>( B_3 )</th>
<th>Minimum in Row</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>( N_1 )</td>
<td>+4</td>
<td>+5</td>
<td>-5</td>
<td>-5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>( N_2 )</td>
<td>-2</td>
<td>-3</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>-3 (Maximin)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>( N_3 )</td>
<td>-2</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>-10</td>
<td>-10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>( N_4 )</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>-2</td>
<td>-10</td>
<td>-10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Maximum of Column</td>
<td>+4</td>
<td>+5</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>(Minimax)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Solving the Game

The first step in solving the game is to apply the minimax theorem\(^{40}\), which is represented mathematically as follows:

\[
\text{Max}_{\xi} \rightarrow \text{Min}_{\eta} \rightarrow K(\xi, \eta) = \text{Min}_{\eta} \rightarrow \text{Max}_{\xi} \rightarrow K(\xi, \eta)
\]

Essentially, “[t]he theorem states that in zero-sum games in which the players’ interests are strictly opposed (one’s gain is the other other’s loss), one player should attempt to minimize his opponent’s maximum payoff while his opponent attempts to maximize his own minimum payoff.”\(^{41}\)

Napoleon, as a rational actor, naturally wants to maximise the minimum of his row strategies (maximin), while minimising Blücher’s maximising column strategies (minimax)\(^{42}\). The maximin and minimax are determined by adding an additional row and column to the matrix for the row minima and column maxima, where maximum of row minima and minimum of column maxima are the maximin and minimax respectively. In this case, Napoleon’s maximin strategy is N\(_2\), resulting a worst-case outcome of -3. Conversely, Blücher wanted to minimise the utility of Napoleon’s outcome and should have sought the minimum of maximum column strategies (minimax), which in this case is his B\(_3\) strategy, resulting in a utility outcome of 0.

This discussion is restricted to the concept of pure strategies; where the game’s participants act rationally, selecting a single utility maximising course of action. Pure strategies are best suited to games where the maximin is equal in value to minimax, referred to as saddle point games.\(^{43}\) For such games the strategies are matched because no utility can be gained by deviating from the maximin strategy, even if one’s opponent’s strategy can be deduced.\(^{44}\) If no saddle point exists, however, the maximin pure strategy is inherently cautious and is best suited to countering the enemy’s capabilities rather than his intentions. The Clausewitzian recognition of the interplay between possibilities, probabilities and luck is, however, less cautious in outlook and doctrine should be capable of adjusting to the possibility of the enemy’s deviation from his minimax strategy in non-saddle point games. For Napoleon, there is no saddle point and an opportunity exists to increase the value of his game if he deviates from a pure maximin strategy.

Mixed Strategies

Game theory allows the commander to interchange strategies, switching between courses of action in accordance with carefully deduced probabilities. Such mixed strategies allow participants to increase their maximin by weighting the rationality of their opponent’s choices. Before proceeding further with mixed strategies, however, it is prudent to simplify the game by eliminating inferior choices. In one’s consideration of the game, “it may be self-evident that some [strategies]… are so inferior that they should never be

\(^{40}\) von Neumann and Morgenstern, Op Cit, p.158.
\(^{43}\) Ibid.
\(^{44}\) Haywood, Op Cit.
When a particular strategy is superior, irrespective of one's opponent's choices in the game, then it is deemed dominant and inferior strategies can be eliminated. For Napoleon, \( N_1 \) dominates \( N_3 \) and \( N_4 \), as all the outcomes for \( N_1 \) are superior, and the game matrix can be simplified by the elimination of the latter strategies, as illustrated in table 6.

### Table 6 – Matrix Reduced by Dominance

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>( B_1 )</th>
<th>( B_2 )</th>
<th>( B_3 )</th>
<th>Minimum in Row</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>( N_1 )</td>
<td>+4</td>
<td>+5</td>
<td>-5</td>
<td>-5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>( N_2 )</td>
<td>-2</td>
<td>-3</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>-3 (Maximin)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Maximum of Column</td>
<td>+4</td>
<td>+5</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>(Minimax)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Using his dominant strategies, Napoleon could transpose his simplified game matrix, representing each course of action with its associated utility in graphical form, as illustrated in figure 3. The x-axis represents Napoleon's strategies (\( N \)), the y-axis represents the scale of utility and Blücher's three possible strategies (\( B \)) are represented by the lines transecting the graph.

---

If Napoleon confined himself to the pure strategies previously discussed, he would be limited to the vertical lines on the graph, where his \( N_2 \) strategy would result in a maximin

---

45 Williams, Op Cit, p. 66-67.
value of -3. By using mixed strategies, however, Napoleon would not be confined to the vertical lines and could select any intermediate point by alternating between courses of action.46 In this case, Napoleon’s maximising mixed strategy is \{5/13, 8/13\} for \{N_1, N_2\}. Essentially, the game’s solution deduces that Napoleon’s optimum strategy lies somewhere between his N_1 and N_2 courses of action and that the final decision should be left to some device of weighted chance; alternating between N_1 and N_2 at a ratio of 5/13 : 8/13. By pursuing the ‘best-bet’ of a mixed strategy, with carefully deduced probabilities, Napoleon would dramatically increase his maximin from -3 to -1.15, increasing the value of his game and the probability of success.

Napoleon’s mixed strategy recognises that his winning course of action changes, depending on Blücher’s choices, and that a hedged bet assures the best outcome, in a game of multiple iterations. In practical terms, however, Napoleon might have been disinclined to trust his course of action selection on a device of chance, especially in the context of the existential threat levelled against him. By pursuing his most prudent ‘pure’ maximin strategy, using Grouchy as a blocking force to prevent Blücher’s intervention at Waterloo, Napoleon could be assured that the least favourable outcome would be to face Wellington alone while Blücher escaped to Prussia.

Mixed strategies clearly deliver the potential for greater utility but are also risky and are, therefore, best suited to games of multiple iterations where probability rather than anomalous deviations from probability determine the outcome of the game.47 If Napoleon expected multiple engagements either in parallel, where subordinate commanders were engaged in multiple comparable battles at the same time, or in series, where multiple engagements were separate by time, then a mixed strategy would deliver greater utility at the cost of negligible additional risk. However, if any single engagement is existential, then the potential gain from a mixed strategy could not outweigh the potential disutility of loss.48 For Napoleon, Waterloo fell into the latter category; the risk of Blücher’s intervention greatly outweighed the potential gains of a mixed strategy.

The game theoretic analysis concludes that Napoleon’s optimum strategy was a pure maximin N_2 strategy and that he should therefore have detached Grouchy to interpose himself on Blücher’s route to Waterloo. History validates this conclusion. Napoleon, having misjudged Blücher’s true intentions, directed Grouchy to attrit the expected Prussian withdrawal allowing Blücher to march unimpeded to Waterloo. If Napoleon had applied the maximin theorem, he might have concluded that Blücher’s utility maximising course of action was to march on Waterloo and he might have been minded to pursue a more prudent strategy.

**Conclusion**

The thesis guiding this paper derived from the hypothesis that knowledge of game strategies might enhance a military commander’s understanding of the Clausewitzian possibilities and of war. By integrating one’s opponent’s strategies into the decision-
making process, game theory seeks to guide the decision maker to Pareto efficient strategies by integrating one's opponent's capabilities and intentions into the game. This assumption was tested in the context of an historical case study where nomologically derived values were applied to a game theoretic analysis of the Waterloo Campaign.

The use of a nomologically derived utility scale in game theoretic modelling has overcome the traditional impediments associated with the inability to assign quantitative values to the ambiguities of military outcomes. The simplicity of the utility scale, where the commander makes subjective judgements relating to the relative value of the possible outcomes, is compatible with heuristic nature of the MDMP but also enables the most erudite analysis in the context of the vagaries of war, which would be difficult to capture using a more algorithmic framework.

Considering Clausewitz's analogy of war to a game of cards, it is imperative that the tenets of doctrine reflect the latest thoughts in choice and risk management in order to guide the commander to utility maximising strategies. Commanders might, therefore, be minded to use the theory of games as a theoretical framework to ensure that the doctrine of course of action comparison and selection integrates the impact of enemy capabilities and intentions into command decisions. This can be achieved by removing the currently non-explicit tenets of stage four of the MDMP, substituting a new paradigm for course of action selection, where the principles of game theory ensure that the deck is stacked in the commander's favour as he plays his Clausewitzian game of cards.
ABSTRACT

Change is evident in all facets of contemporary life and no less so in the military sphere. The next several decades are destined to witness a revolution in the character of warfare. It has been noted by academics that those military organisations that are highly innovative and adaptive will compete best in periods of military revolution. Innovation and adaptation incur change and change can only be brought about through a learning process. Systems thinking is one of the five basic disciplines of a learning organisation and it can be adopted as a problem solving approach. The purpose of this paper is to consider both the systems approach to problem solving and the traditional mechanistic reductionist approach and decide which if any is more advantageous particularly when applied to the military decision making process. This paper outlines the inherent differences between the reductionist and systemic approaches to problem solving. It outlines how they can and cannot address the dynamic environment of the present day and future management challenges. These approaches are considered with respect to the Irish Defence Forces Military Decision Making Process (MDMP). In the complex and uncertain environment facing the contemporary military commander, a holistic and all encompassing approach to problem solving acknowledging external and internal influences and considering emergent properties must be embraced.

Introduction

“There is certain relief in change even though it is from bad to worse; as I have found in travelling in a stage-coach, that it is often a comfort to shift ones position and be bruised in a new place.”

We are currently in a time of change; environmental, social, political, global and even geographical change. Now more than ever before the world is in a state of flux. Global movement of people is greater than ever and changing cultural influences are experienced worldwide. It is therefore inevitable that changes within work environments are also being experienced. This is not a new or unpredicted phenomenon. Toffler describes social and industrial change in terms of three historic waves. The first wave began 8,000 – 10,000 years ago creating an agrarian civilization. This was followed in Europe between approximately 1650 and 1750 by the second wave that nurtured mechanical inventions.

producing a strong urban industrial economy, symbolized by the factory. The current third wave, which appeared in the US around 1956, signaled the rise of the knowledge economy. Humanity faces the greatest social upheaval and creative restructuring of all time. It is no longer a factory age; tele-working, commuting and online business dominate the working environment. There no longer exists a large predictable, interchangeable ‘don’t ask why’ workforce. Innovators, entrepreneurs, risk takers, dynamic thinkers and questioners are the new workforce.

This time of change also impacts on the military sphere. It is envisaged that over the next several decades the world is destined to experience a revolution in the character of warfare. A Military Revolution occurs when the application of new technologies into a significant number of military systems combines with innovative operational concepts and organizational adaptation in a way that fundamentally alters the character and conduct of conflict. It does so by producing a dramatic increase—often an order of magnitude or greater—in the combat potential and military effectiveness of armed forces. Military revolutions comprise four elements: technological change, systems development, operational innovation, and organizational adaptation. Each of these elements is in itself a necessary, but not a sufficient, condition for realizing the large gains in military effectiveness that characterise military revolutions. It must be noted that while advances in technology typically underwrite a military revolution, they alone do not constitute the revolution. The phenomenon is much broader in scope and consequence than technological innovation. Krepinevich outlined ten military revolutions since the fourteenth century; Infantry Revolution, Artillery Revolution, Revolution of Sail and Shot, Fortress Revolution, Gunpowder Revolution, Napoleonic Revolution, Land Warfare Revolution, Naval Revolution, Interwar Revolution and Nuclear Revolution. This record of revolutions is presented over seven centuries and some general observations can be made:

- Emerging technologies only make military revolutions possible. To realise their full potential these technologies typically must be incorporated within new processes and executed by new organisational structures.
- Competitive advantages of a military revolution are increasingly short-lived.
- Historical record suggests that war and revolution in warfare are quite separate entities.
- Most militaries will be quick to recognize a competitor’s advantage, but there are no certainties. Not even war will guarantee that all military organizations will recognize and exploit a military revolution, or understand a revolution in all its dimensions.
- The technologies that underwrite a military revolution are often originally developed outside the military sector, and then ‘imported’ and exploited for their military applications.

Through these observations and the in depth progression through the military revolutions which Krepinevich portrays, it is evident that it is typically those military organisations that are highly innovative and adaptive that compete best in periods of military revolution. Innovation and adaptation incur change, and change can only be brought about through a learning process.

---

4 Ibid.
As with the Military, the civilian world also becomes more interconnected. As business becomes more complex and dynamic, work must therefore become more ‘learningful’. Today’s workforce can become stifled within traditional organizations and needs to be embraced by learning organizations. Senge states that learning organizations will be distinguished from other traditional organizations by excelling in 5 basic disciplines; systems thinking, personal mastery, mental models, building shared vision and team learning.5

The first of these disciplines – ‘systems thinking’ can be adopted as a problem solving approach. This holistic approach is currently experiencing increasing popularity. Is this systems approach more advantageous than the traditional, mechanistic and reductionist approach? Is it constructive to argue for and against either approach? Is it not more prudent to match the correct approach with the nature of the problem, interests and priorities of the stakeholder? For example, within the military sphere problem solving occurs at various levels of war – strategic, operational and tactical. At the operational level, a systems approach (termed operational art) is employed as opposed to a more reductionist approach at the tactical level. This paper will outline the inherent differences between the reductionist and systemic approaches to problem solving. It will outline how they can or cannot address the current dynamic environment and future management. Focusing particularly within the military realm of operational art, it will show the obvious superiority of a systems / systemic approach.

Reductionism has been employed within the sciences and associated disciplines as a problem solving approach for generations. This traditional scientific approach finds its roots in Fredrick Winslow Taylor’s work at the turn of the last century.6 He advocates reductionism, where problems under consideration are broken into isolated parts as a way of obtaining better control and attaining a solution. For example, a student is given a problem to calculate the sum of all numbers between 1 and 101 that are not divisible by 3. Working a direct solution for this will be tedious so it is solved reductively. The required solution is the difference between the sum of all numbers between 1 and 101 and the sum of all numbers between 3 and 99 that are divisible by 3. Both sums can be calculated as arithmetic series. Thus the original problem is subdivided into sub problems of calculating arithmetic series. This is actually nothing but reductionism.7

The term systems or systemic approach derives its base from holism or holistic thinking. South African philosopher Jaan Christiaan Smuts coined the term holism. He argues “a unity of the parts could be so close and intense as to be more than the sum of its parts.”8 Systems thinking usually deals with complex systems. A complex system, unlike a conventional single feedback system comprises of numerous subsystems and the overall behaviour of the system relies on the interaction of these systems. So the system output is not as simplistic and is not merely a sum total of the constituent entities. Note that system is derived from a Greek word meaning “to combine.” A systemic understanding means combining components of a system in a context and

---

establishing the nature of their behaviour and relationships. Systemic is not equivalent to systematic. For instance, during the mid 19th century the British philosopher John Stuart Mill argued that the properties of a molecule could not be derived from the properties of the constituent elements. He postulated “… the chemical combination of two substances produces, as is well known, a third substance with properties different from those of either of the two substances separately or of both of them taken together. Not a trace of the properties of hydrogen or of oxygen is observable in those of their compound, water.”9 Stuart Mill spoke of what later came to be known as emergence. Because systems operate as a whole, they have emergent properties; these are above and beyond the properties of the parts that comprise the whole. Therefore the system approach spans a broad spectrum, which might help anticipate emergent behaviour or at least take every precaution against any undesired emergent behaviour. Reductionism at times can give a reduced picture of a problem and would rather ignore any emergent property.

However, reductionism must not be overlooked as it has been successful in engineering and the sciences. Quantification and a quest for precision can be facilitated through its application.10 Since all the physical forces are quantified, engineers require measurable parameters and want that the underlying entities add to a sum total. This approach is underlain by a belief of objectivity of figures and it is a common refrain that ‘figures can’t be wrong’ A lot of trust is attached to raw data, facts and figures. In spite of the widespread success of scientific reductionism, the systems approach is now preferred in the sciences and in solving practical problems, because modern problems are more complex and dynamic for any reduction to be possible. Dividing and giving each quantity a unit and variable might not be feasible. It can be tedious, expensive and might not give a clear picture.

The wisdom of scientific reduction may be flawed. A good example is the performance of a football team. There are teams consisting of excellent athletes and players having high number of championship goals yet they are ranked low because they lose crucial matches. In general the quantity of goals an individual footballer has scored is not a definitive indicator of the character of the team. The development in science and technology after the industrial revolution has been fast and unrestrained. The research domains have expanded and the mechanism of breaking down the problem via scientific reduction has, in part become redundant. To deal with modern problems certain existing theories and beliefs must be adapted:

- Not all things can be decomposed or reduced to its elements, and elements cannot always be replaced.
- The elements do not always add up to the original complete body. The whole is not always equal to, but may be larger or smaller than the sum of its parts.
- The whole cannot always be understood by dividing or reducing it into its parts and understanding those parts.

Reductionism and analysis are not as useful with interactively complex systems because they lose sight of the dynamics between the components. The study of interactively complex systems must be systemic rather than reductionist, qualitative rather than quantitative, and must use different heuristic approaches rather than analytical problem solving.

It now appears that stable systems with regular, simple, predictable dynamics are in fact exceptions in nature rather than the rule… They suggest that the world as a whole does not work in a mechanistic, deterministic fashion… The process of innovation within military institutions and cultures, which involves numerous actors, complex technologies, the uncertainties of conflict and human relations, forms a part of this world and is no more open to reductionist solutions than any other aspects of human affairs.11

Since warfare represents a clash between societies or cultures, most military operational problems are both structurally and interactively complex. The way that adversaries are organized, adds to the complexity of the operational environment. In many cases, the adversaries are indistinguishable from the rest of the population. The speed with which even irregular forces learn and adapt adds a temporal dimension to complexity. The ability to learn and adapt while fighting, marks future adversaries and the societies from which they come as complex adaptive systems. During operations against Hezbollah in Lebanon in the summer of 2006, the Israeli Defense Forces (IDF) formed a Center for Army Lessons Learned, which collected, analyzed and dispersed operational knowledge and lessons learned in real-time amongst fighting forces. The center gathered knowledge gained from each day’s operations, printed digests, and distributed these down to company level by the next day. However, the Israelis were not the only ones learning and adapting. Gil Ariely, the Chief Knowledge Officer of the IDF Ground Forces noted; “The need to learn while fighting was initially derived from [Hezbollah's] intuitive ability to learn in short cycles.”12

The wider environment and friendly systems, such as domestic public opinion, also adapt in response to operations and perceptions of operations. The ability of all these systems to change makes it essential for armies to learn while operating. As the enemy and other elements in the operational environment have adapted to earlier actions, a commander may discover that his original understanding of a problem is no longer valid. This dynamic facet of war and conflicts reinforces the need that Senge advocates for Learning Organisations.13

Complexity is significant to commanders as a characteristic of operational problems. An operational problem is a discrepancy between the state of affairs as it is and the state of affairs as it ought to be that compels military action to resolve it. Soldiers are problem solvers, and the complexity of operational problems range from tame, well-structured problems to those that are extremely complex and ill structured. Like other professions, soldiers prefer structured and linear phenomena. Such problems are easy to

13 Op cit.
control through technical reduction and a systematic method-based solution; this can be adopted at lower echelons of military structure. Medium-structured problems are more interactively complex (Fig 1). There is a manual that describes how a battalion task force should conduct a defence, but there is no single correct solution. The difference between success and failure in this case is a function of interactive complexity, rather than a structural or technical difference between the two enemy forces.

In the past, dealing with complexity was the writ of generals and admirals, usually performed by strategic leaders down to the commander of a theatre of operations in charge of a campaign. Today, commanders at much lower levels must master these skills within operational art. From a problem solving perspective, operational art is really the art of taking an unstructured problem and giving it enough structure so that further planning can lead to useful action. It involves considering the problem from a holistic viewpoint. In order to appreciate how this ought to be done, it is useful to consider the conceptual distinctions between designing and engineering as these terms are used in industry and business (Fig 2). Both activities devise ways to bring about a desired future, but they are cognitively different. Designing focuses on learning about an unfamiliar problem and exploits that understanding to create a broad approach to problem solving. The work of the designer complements the work of the engineer in that it establishes the conceptual approach, or paradigm, for the solution to the problem. The engineer’s work is very detailed and physical whereas the designer’s is more conceptual.

Fig 1. Types of Problems and Solution Strategies.¹⁴

Military planners perform the cognitive functions of both designers and engineers. Military planning normally includes some elements of both, but the degree of one or the other depends upon the complexity and structure of the problem. Thus, the application of operational art to solving complex problems contains more of the cognitive elements of design, whereas the detailed planning for execution relies more heavily on the cognitive functions of engineering.

In other words, planning processes used today assume that there exists an optimal solution and that we can find this solution by applying the established rules and techniques of our profession. These rules and techniques are based upon historical experience, research, and a clear understanding of our own capabilities. Detailed planning is heavily analytical and requires more independent and functionally specific work. The military staff works on the functional components of the plan—manoeuvre, fires, engineering, transportation, close air support, medical, naval gunfire, and so forth—in relative independence, guided by the commander, chief of staff, or chief of plans, and in coordination with other functional staff sections as required. On a large staff, the planning process has greater structure and rigidity because it serves to choreograph the activities of many different functional
teams. This natural linearity is reinforced since the outputs of one step are the input for the next. However, the characteristics of modern warfare demand that campaigning forces have the ability to perform the cognitive functions of designers. When the hardest part of the problem is identifying and describing the problem, engineering functions alone are inadequate and design is essential. Otherwise, in the absence of a design process, military planners will default to doctrinal norms, building plans based upon familiar patterns rather than upon an understanding of the particular situation and how individual actions contribute to the overall goal. A holistic and systems approach is required by military commanders/planners. The Irish Defence Forces (DF) uses the Military Decision Making Process (MDMP). This process is considered as both a science and an art. A Commander must know, if he needs to make a decision, what the decision is about and when to make the decision. Martin Von Creveld states in his historical study of command, Command in War, that traditional armies did not possess specialized planning staffs. The commander himself conducted the planning until the middle of the nineteenth century, when the traditional coup d’oeil gave way to the German derived Estimate of the Situation. This development was primarily a result of the increased complexity of warfare and the advent of technological advances. The first modern staff development was the Prussian General Stab. Most armies including the Irish DF have adapted variations of the Prussian staff forms and procedures. Most of the development of this MDMP or ’Estimate of the Situation’ process continued within the US army from 1901 to present day. The 1997 version of FM101-5 Staff Operations (the manual outlining the commander’s estimate) described the MDMP in a complex 38-step procedure. Paradoxically it recognized the need for synthesis during the MDMP even though it provided the most detailed linear step-by-step planning procedures to date. As Handy outlines; “…the acceptance of paradox as a feature of our life is the first step towards living with it and managing it … it is like the weather, something to be lived with not solved.”

The Irish DF MDMP termed the ‘Estimate of the Situation’ is a logical and orderly examination of all factors affecting the accomplishment of the mission in order to arrive at a sound decision. Though the terms orderly and logical are stated, this approach is primarily a systems approach. Commanders must approach operational problems from a holistic systems perspective. US Military JP 3-0 defines a system as “a functionally related group of elements forming a complex whole.” The Estimate of the Situation has five main stages: Mission, Situation and Courses of Action (COAs), Analysis of Courses of Action, Comparison of Courses of Action and Decision (Fig 4).

For the purpose of this paper, the most notable stage is the first, Mission stage. This stage embraces the systems approach; it takes the given problem/mission from higher command and views it holistically. All Staff members conduct a combined mission analysis and an initial preparation of the battle space (IPB). Ultimately this holistic view allows the commander deliver his Commander’s Intent, a Restated Mission and Planning Guidance.

---

A Commander’s Intent is a clear and concise statement of how he views the operation. It states a purpose, method and end state. It provides the staff with a ‘why’ and ‘how’. It ensures a unity of goal and defines an end state. A shared vision or goal is essential in the systems approach. Senge lists it as one of the five disciplines and states “one is hard pressed to think of any organization that has sustained some measure of greatness in the absence of goals, values, and missions that become deeply shared throughout the organization.”

Even though the military can be considered a dictatorial environment, Senge explains that the practice of shared vision involves the skills of unearthing shared “pictures of the future” that foster genuine commitment rather than compliance. In mastering this discipline leaders learn the counter productiveness of trying to dictate a vision, no matter how heartfelt. The end state describes the relationship between the friendly force, the enemy and the terrain at the end of the mission and includes a vision of transition to future operations.

The second, third and fourth stages consider the given situation, produce potential courses of action (COAs), both enemy and friendly, and analyse and compare these

---

**Fig 4. Format for the Commanders Estimate of the Situation**

(Command & Staff School, Military College)
COAs. By considering the given situation all potential external and internal influences are examined, i.e. enemy and friendly strength and weaknesses, and oversights are prevented. Rather than looking into the problem, one adopts an outward looking vantage point and can envisage these influences. Potential COAs are developed, both enemy and friendly, using a form of rich picture situation summary which depicts the complicated situation utilizing military symbols, key words and sketches. These pre-analysis tools are followed immediately by group analysis in the format of war gaming in which role-playing occurs and all eventualities enemy and friendly are presented. This allows identification of any emergent behaviour or at least take every precaution against any undesired emergent behaviour, i.e. enemy potential usage of CBRN (Chemical, Biological, Radiological & Nuclear) capabilities. This negates spiralling problematic outcomes and potential situations in advance such as those outlined by Senges' ‘Beer Game’ in which future vision and communication was lacking and therefore failure was imminent. Following feedback, a critical element to the systems approach, the COAs are adjusted to enhance feasibility and potential success and then compared. The comparisons are either straight or weighted based on the commander’s intent criteria.

The final decision rests with the commander and he delivers a decision and concept statement. From this process a detailed operational order is produced where the tactical detail is given. Within this order each specialized area has a specific plan i.e. communications or engineer plan, so from the untrained eye it may appear like a reductionist solution but all interactions between these areas have been exhaustively considered and planned for within a whole systems approach.

Toleration for error, ambiguity and above all diversity backed up by a sense of humour and proportion are survival necessities as we pack our kit for the amazing trip into the next millennium. Get ready for what could be the most exciting ride in history.

The work environment has changed, is changing and will continue to change. Whether it continues to move through a third wave and even onto a fourth, managers must identify and embrace change through learning organizations. Future management problem solving will occur in a progressively more dynamic, complex and uncertain environment. This type of environment requires a holistic and all encompassing approach to problem solving, acknowledging external and internal influences and considering potential emergent properties. The systems (systemic) approach to problem solving is more pertinent to this type of environment. Through the example of the Irish Defence Forces MDMP the ‘Estimate of the Situation’, it has been outlined that Commanders may have difficulty agreeing on the structure of a complex operational problem, but they must agree on a shared starting hypothesis before they can develop solutions. In other words, leaders and commanders at all levels must have a shared understanding of the situation. A systems approach must be the first step to understand the whole. System thinking is therefore required. The systemic approach to problem solving will become the leading approach of future successful organizations.

---

23 Ibid, p. 52.
24 Toffler, op cit, p. 15.
Civil-Military Relations: Contested Knowledge in a Community of Practice?

ABSTRACT
Viewing military and non-military actors as a community of practice, this paper analyses contested knowledge in civil-military relations. In order to give context, the key theorists in civil-military relations are examined, together with the ‘strategic space’ in which military and non-military actors work to accomplish key mission objectives. The paper then assesses military pedagogy in an Irish Defence Forces context examining the contest between the organisation’s commitment to lifelong learning, military doctrine as a body of knowledge derived from practice, and the organisation’s role when deployed overseas. Within the community of practice contested perspectives are further assessed through the lens of the human security paradigm, concluding that to achieve best effect, appropriate education programmes should include input and engagement from all actors and where possible, all curricula developed should facilitate accreditation with external institutions.

Background
Writing in the 1950’s Samuel Huntington recognised that the military institutions of any society are shaped primarily by two forces: “a functional imperative stemming from the threats to the society’s security and a societal imperative arising from the social forces, ideologies, and institutions dominant within the society”.1 He also posited that the Officer Corps, as the active directing element of the military structure, is responsible for the military security of society. However, in a functioning democracy, the State is considered the active directing element of society and is responsible for the allocation of resources to amongst others, the military. The social and economic relations between the military and the rest of society normally reflect the political relations between the Officer Corps and the State.2 Huntington’s perspective remains “the dominant theoretical paradigm in civil-military relations”3 and is based on three primary positions; “that there is meaningful difference between civilian and military roles... that the key to civilian control is professionalism... that the key to professionalism is military autonomy”.4 Janowitz5 however, took a different stance with his civic-republic theory that contested the “liberal notion that the first priority of the democratic state is to protect individual rights”.6 Janowitz’s theory proposed a “system of universal public service”7 that

2 Ibid.
7 Janowitz, Op Cit, p. 421.
centred on a citizen’s engagement through public service, while Abrahamson\(^8\) argued that it was necessary to establish control mechanisms facilitating policy options in defence and international relations. While taking contested positions, Huntington, Janowitz and Abrahamson presented theoretical perspectives regarded as seminal in civil-military relations. Their contested perspectives were summarised by Burk when he stated “Huntington’s theory focuses on the matter of protecting democracy but neglects the matter of sustaining democratic values and practice. Janowitz’s theory focuses on the matter of sustaining democratic values, but neglects the problem of protecting the democratic state”.\(^9\) Analysis and consideration of both perspectives indicates that the very nature of the civil-military relationship represents a contested position between functional and societal imperatives, and this contested position informs practice in a number of areas within the wider professional arena through emerging theory and practice, and the tensions between the different positions and knowledge claims.

**What is The Strategic Space?**

For the purposes of this enquiry, the Strategic Space is the space in which military and non-military actors work to accomplish key mission objectives. Barry and Jefferys\(^10\) and Eriksson\(^11\) indicate that non-military humanitarian actors include: NGOs, UN Agencies, Human Rights bodies (Amnesty International), Legal bodies (International Criminal Court) and political actors (States, European Union, United Nations). Within this space, international crises of increasing complexity require improved co-ordination of all assets; military and civilian, international and local, to maximise utility and effectiveness. This co-ordination or more ‘Comprehensive Approach’ has evolved within international organisations such as the EU and NATO, as well as within governments and non-governmental agencies, leading to efforts to restore security, governance and development in crisis situations through an inter-agency, inter-ministerial or inter-organisational approach.\(^12\) As a consequence, Civil-Military Co-operation (CIMIC) has become a key characteristic of crisis management operations in the twenty first century. Rintakoski and Autti capture the essence of this concept outlining that:

> The Comprehensive Approach is not an end in itself but a means to an end. The aim is not to build new structures and hierarchies, but to achieve better outcomes and to resolve a crisis in a sustainable way. The Comprehensive Approach is all about developing mechanisms and cultures of understanding, sharing and collaboration, both vertically between nations and international organisations and horizontally between nations and between organisations.\(^13\)

---


However, what are the pedagogical models that inform and underpin engagement in the strategic space and is there contested knowledge between what the military educates and trains its personnel for, and its actual role within the comprehensive approach?

Education and Training in an Irish Defence Forces Context
The Irish 1999 Qualifications (Education and Training) Act led to the establishment of the National Qualifications Authority of Ireland, The Further Education and Training Awards Council (FETAC) and The Higher Education and Training Awards Council (HETAC). The Act focussed on issues such as the establishment of consistent standards in education and training, the promotion of quality, increasing access, transfer and progression opportunities and being able to recognise and compare qualifications at home and abroad.14 In 2003 the National Framework of Qualifications (NFQ)15 was introduced in Ireland and in November 2007, following the introduction of a formal Defence Forces Human Resource Strategy policy, an Internal Review Board was tasked with assessing the integration of Irish Defence Forces training and education into the NFQ.

The current Irish Programme for Government underlines the State’s commitment to education having a central role in protecting and growing Ireland’s prosperity, as well as ensuring greater social inclusion.16 This commitment to a lifelong learning society is articulated through policies aimed at nurturing and developing the education of all citizens, providing employment relevant education and training opportunities, and facilitating gateways to higher education. This sentiment is also echoed in current Irish Defence policy literature.

The primary focus of the Defence Forces, when not engaged on operations, is training… all personnel will be provided with the opportunity for personal development and associated professional experience in order to realise their full potential during their service in the Defence Forces… to ensure… that members… have qualifications which will enhance their job prospects on leaving the Defence Forces… building a service in which people are proud to serve is an important objective of this White Paper. 17

Military Training and Education
The key driver of Defence Forces capabilities is conventional military training and education. Once trained in conventional operations, individuals can quickly adapt to meet the requirements of peace support operations or humanitarian operations with conventional capabilities created over time through the integration of military doctrine and training. However, it is first necessary to distinguish between training, education and doctrine in a military context. Military training can be categorised as “preparing people, individually or collectively, for given tasks in given circumstances; education is developing

---

15 The National Framework of Qualifications (NFQ) provides a way to compare qualifications, and to ensure that they are quality assured and recognised at home and abroad.
their mental powers and understanding”,18 while doctrine prescribes how the military plan and conduct operations. Essentially, military doctrine is a body of knowledge and understanding that is primarily derived from study and analysis of practice, and outlines the most effective way of using military assets on the basis of this practice in order to achieve success. All training and doctrinal perspectives though, must be grounded in education. If they are not, the “practitioner is liable to lack the versatility and flexibility needed to adapt”.19 Education develops the capacity to conceptualise and has a training dimension that prepares “practitioners to exercise good judgement in their profession…. over the duration of their career”.20 Additionally, without considerable education, learning is likely to be experiential, often based on a doctrinal perspective, with an associated risk of transposing inappropriate lessons from one campaign to the next.

Doctrinal change is governed to a large degree by the context of operations. In line with this, the Defence Forces stays abreast of international best practice and keeps up to date with modern technologies and developments through courses and seminars and by computer and desktop exercises. External accreditation and verification of capabilities are central to ensuring that the outputs of the Defence Forces are in line with international best practice, and this interoperability with other armed forces and agencies has been exercised through engagement in international training exercises. These have been based on crisis management, disaster relief and peace enforcement and have been conducted either under the auspices of Individual Partnership Programmes or in conjunction with other neutral country forces.21

The ultimate aim of all Defence Forces education and training is to ensure success in military operations. Integral to this, and a key component of human resource policy within the Defence Forces is training and continuous professional education. Education and training of Defence Forces personnel is conducted both within the training establishments of the Defence Forces, and externally in non Defence Forces institutions both at home and abroad. Courses within the Defence Forces focus on core military skills, career courses, management training and induction training. Where expertise or skills are required within the Defence Forces, but the organisation lacks the capacity to train or educate personnel accordingly, training is conducted externally. Defence Forces personnel through a number of undergraduate courses, post-graduate courses, conferences and seminars acquire a wide range of skills, military, academic and technical. At home or abroad, personnel proactively seek, and are facilitated in, obtaining the necessary skills, qualifications and external validation in accordance with international best practice. Essentially, the Defence Forces is a learning organisation.

**Learning Organisation**

“A learning organisation is one that works to facilitate the lifelong learning and personal development of its employees while continually transforming itself to respond to changing demands and needs”.22 Within the Defence Forces, members continually expand and

---

19 Ibid, p. 15.
20 Ibid, p. 15.
21 Individual Partnership Programmes exist within the Partnership for Peace (PfP), which is a programme of practical bilateral cooperation between individual Euro-Atlantic countries and NATO.
build on both individual and organisational capacity to create new results. In order to respond to dynamic operational situations, new and expansive patterns of thinking are nurtured and developed. This is particularly evident on career courses where members are continually learning to see the strategic picture. As a result, there is total engagement in directing towards shared values and principles crystallising the Defence Forces commitment to providing lifelong learning opportunities.

In line with the organisation’s lifelong learning philosophy, the Defence Forces is currently engaged in accrediting professional military education and training with external education institutions. Officer career courses such as the Officer Cadet Course, Junior Command and Staff Course and Senior Command and Staff Course are currently accredited within the NFQ and the focus had now shifted to career courses for enlisted personnel. The ambition is that this initiative will contribute towards the ongoing progression and development of critical thinking among all individuals in addition to providing opportunities to analyse, synthesise and evaluate key organisational issues. Examples include Project Management as it applies to procurement and lessons learned from overseas deployments. This critical thinking ability could be applied to a wide range of relevant organisational issues including the Defence Forces itself, its position in Irish society, and its role internally or externally in support of national or international objectives.

**Research and Scholarship**

At a strategic level there is a continued requirement for a comprehensive training and education programme to equip Officers to contribute more effectively to the accomplishment of the Defence Forces mission. Increasingly, Officers are serving in appointments at home and abroad that require elements of political, diplomatic and economic assessment and formal structured professional training and education programmes contribute in a positive way towards achieving this. By embedding a formal research component into Officer training and education programmes, the organisation can contribute to increased intellectual awareness, facilitate the acquisition of new skills and knowledge, and feed the intangible, but nonetheless vital, quality of intellectual curiosity.

However, this can present significant challenges from a contested knowledge perspective in a military context. Military organisations are normally viewed as very hierarchical in structure, with formal lines of communication and accepted formalised behavioural norms. Allied to this is a doctrinal perspective that knowledge acquired from practice is more useful than other more formal types of education. In a conflict situation or in the humanitarian space, lives are at stake and as a consequence, professional practice is valued more than an accredited pedagogical model. However, when considering education in its broadest sense, society has given “legitimacy to knowledge that is formal, abstract and general while devaluing knowledge that is local, specific and based in practice” (Cervero, 2006 p.170). 23 In a military context therefore, a balance must be reached between the organisation’s operational readiness demands; which are achieved through special knowledge and competence and benchmarked against international best practice, and the stated government policy of lifelong learning and equipping personnel.

---

for wider engagement outside the organisation through recognition for all training and education received while serving as a member of the Defence Forces.

This contest is also evident in military pedagogical models, particularly as they apply to career courses. The Irish Defence Forces, as a conventional military organisation, focuses its education and training programmes on operating in a conventional warfare environment. However, under the current United Nations Standby Arrangement System (UNSAS), Ireland is committed to providing a total of 850 personnel to serve in UN-mandated peace support operations. All Defence Forces overseas deployments are subject to a ‘triple lock’ and this commitment to the UN as a cornerstone of Irish Foreign policy is reflected in the Irish Department of Defence and Defence Forces Strategy Statement which lists as a high level goal

To contribute to the maintenance of international peace and security through participation in approved UN-mandated peace support, crisis management and humanitarian relief operations.

This places overseas deployments of the Irish Defence Forces firmly in the ‘humanitarian space’ rather than in the ‘conventional war fighting space’ and as a consequence underlines the contested position between what it educates and trains its personnel for, and what it actually deploys them to do. This contested position is further highlighted when examining the interface between military and non-military actors within the ‘humanitarian space’ and assessing how education programmes equip them for this purpose.

Contested Knowledge – The Humanitarian Space

Before going any further, I will first unpack the terms ‘humanitarian intervention’ and ‘humanitarianism’, as these concepts are central to the tensions that exist between military and non-military actors and inform the different positions and contested knowledge in the civil-military relationship. In his moral argument on Just War theory, Walzer argues that humanitarian intervention is justified when it is a response to acts that “shock the moral conscience of mankind” and acknowledges that while the language and expression in this phrase may be dated, there is a deep and valuable commitment to human rights contained within the sentiments expressed. Slim refers to “the use of international force to stop the massive abuse of human rights in another state” and this supports Wheeler’s assertion that military interventions must meet specific criteria to qualify as humanitarian; first amongst these being that the only hope for saving lives in a humanitarian emergency is outside intervention. This perspective is further developed by Cuny who believes that there are a number of distinct types of deployment into humanitarian operations, which can be identified for foreign military forces, each with its own set of prerequisites,

---

24 The ‘Triple Lock’ mechanism requires that in order for Irish Defence Forces personnel to be deployed operationally overseas, the mission must be subject to UN Security Council approval, Government approval and Dail (Irish parliament) approval.


The Human Security Paradigm
This divergence in position within the community of practice is further evident through consideration of the concept of ‘humanitarianism’ and the emerging paradigm of human security. This paradigm emerged in the early 1990s as the UN attempted to capture...
a post Cold War peace dividend and focus its resources more on development. This approach suggests that;

The concept of security must change from an exclusive stress on national security to a much greater stress on people's security, from security through armaments to security through human development, from territorial security to food, employment and environmental security.33

This approach continued to evolve and in 2003 the UN Office for the Co-ordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA) published the Oslo Guidelines setting out core humanitarian principles which were ratified by a UN General Assembly Resolution (46/182).34 The core principles defined humanitarian assistance as “aid to an affected population that seeks, as its primary purpose, to save lives and alleviate suffering of a crisis-affected population”,35 and also specified that humanitarian assistance must be provided in accordance with the principles of humanity, neutrality and impartiality.

**Theoretical Perspective - Culture**

Bourdieu's Theory of Practice36 provides a detailed examination of the contested knowledge that exists by pointing towards the need to consider “the nature of contemporary identities in ways which are not premised on simplistic contrasts...but are attentive to their inter-meshing.”37 This in turn points towards an analysis of culture to help explore the differences with and between the various civilian and military actors.

In their analysis of cultures and organisations, organisational anthropologists Geert and Gert Jan Hofstede define culture as “the collective programming of the mind that distinguishes the members of one group or category of people from another.” 38 This definition, while capturing the essence of culture, does not sit well with the perspectives of other anthropologists who exhibit a degree of discomfort with the concept. Brightman citing Bourdieu, argues that with this culture construct “the issue would appear to be whether….culture can articulate with a theory of conduct that takes account of improvisation and interested strategy.”39 Porter builds on this, linking culture from an anthropological perspective with strategic culture theory, placing it in a conflict context and noting “cultures at war contain rival and clashing narratives, taboos that can be enforced or ignored, and porous borders across which new ideas and practices are smuggled” 40 He goes on to posit a definition of culture as “an ambiguous repertoire of competing ideas that can be selected, instrumentalised, and manipulated, instead of a clear script for action”.41 Relating this to the cultural contest that exists between

---

34 Text of Resolution 46/182 is available from http://daccess-dds-ny.un.org/doc/RESOLUTION/GEN/NR0/582/70/IMG/NR058270.pdf?OpenElement
35 Ibid.
41 Ibid.
military and non-military actors, any ambiguity in perceived roles or clashing narratives, or internal competition for resources within the strategic space, can impact negatively on an achievable comprehensive approach and significantly diminish mission effectiveness within the community of practice.

In order to maximise effectiveness within the strategic space, it is essential that actors fully appreciate their role within the comprehensive approach. From a military perspective this includes the development of doctrine that captures the emerging theory and practice within civil-military relations and supporting its integration with appropriate education programmes. Drew and Snow define military doctrine as “what we believe about the best ways to conduct military affairs” and within the Irish Defence Forces, a key driver from a doctrinal perspective is the 2000 White Paper on Defence. Para 6.3.7 of the White Paper specifies, “an important continuing element of the Defence Forces contribution overseas is in a humanitarian context. Humanitarian tasks go hand-in-hand with military tasks in many crisis situations”. The following UN graphic that captures the core business of multi-dimensional UN peacekeeping operations illustrates this concept:

**The core business of multi-dimensional United Nations peacekeeping operations.**

**Conclusion and Roadmap**

At this point, having reviewed the multi-dimensional model of UN peacekeeping operations, it is appropriate to recap on the nature of contested knowledge as it applies to Civil-Military relations before examining a roadmap to address it. At the beginning I examined the key theorists in civil-military relations as a means of giving context to further analysis. This facilitated an examination of the ‘Strategic Space’ in which military and non-military actors now operate, leading to an analysis of military education in an Irish Defence Force context. Current Irish defence policy literature underlines a learning organisation perspective, which strives to equip members to add more value to society by making better citizens through organisational education programmes. However, analysis of education in a professional military context highlighted the contested positions that exist, primarily between balancing the organisation’s operational needs
and the individual’s expectations in respect of marketable qualifications. Organisational operational demands however, must focus on developing the most effective military force possible, while providing value for money for citizens. In the Irish context, this often means training and education programmes that are contingent rather than exclusively formal or sustained, that are practical rather than theoretical, process driven rather than exclusively assimilation of content, particular rather than universal and within the social domain rather than the cognitive (Beckett and Hager, 2006). As a consequence, workplace learning in an Irish military context focuses on a ‘conventional warfare’ scenario, yet using the Von Clausewitz (1832) maxim of war as an extension of policy by other means, from a political perspective, Ireland’s neutral position, reinforced by the ‘triple-lock’, ensures that the Defence Forces, while retaining a robust posture, are primarily deployed overseas in the ‘humanitarian space’. Military operations as part of the comprehensive approach within the ‘humanitarian space’ further add to the organisation’s internal contested knowledge and contribute to contested positions at a more strategic level particularly as the military and non-military actors relationship evolves in a non-linear way.

In conclusion, from a military perspective, this layering of contested knowledge and contested positions from the tactical level through to the strategic level presents significant challenges in structuring appropriate education programmes. At the strategic level, the military, as an instrument of national power must be given clear unambiguous planning guidance, based on sound theoretical positions, through White Papers on Defence and associated Strategy Statements outlining what is expected of them in an operational sense. At the operational level, the military organisation must then assess the implications for its education and training models. All programmes must equip personnel for the reality in which they expect to be deployed, not accepted historical models. Programmes for engagement in the ‘humanitarian space’ should focus on the practicalities of the ‘comprehensive approach’, the multi-layered nature of its application and particularly, the nexus between policy and strategy. It is also appropriate that education programmes in support of the comprehensive approach should include input and engagement from all actors expected to function within that community of practice. Finally, at the tactical level, where possible, all curricula developed should facilitate accreditation through the NFQ, therefore harmonising the ‘better citizen’ model with military pedagogy and reducing the contested knowledge and dissonances between military service and military education.

Improving Civil Military Coordination in Humanitarian Supply Chains

ABSTRACT
Within the emerging field of humanitarian logistics, the civil-military logistical interface has achieved only minimal attention in academic literature even though most western nations have a civil-military division within their defence departments. Due to fundamental differences between international military forces, humanitarian and development agencies in terms of the principles and doctrines guiding their work, their agendas, operating styles and roles, the area of civil military logistical coordination in humanitarian relief has proven to be more difficult than other interagency relationships. The purpose of this article is to investigate where and how civil-military involvement can be most effective and efficient across all phases of humanitarian aid. We show that the greatest impact of military involvement is most beneficial in the initial crucial life sustaining days immediately after natural disasters. In contrast, in man-made complex emergencies, military assistance to the logistical provision of aid is more beneficial when widespread military expertise is provided.

Keywords
Humanitarian logistics, Civil Military cooperation, Coordination, Natural disasters, Complex emergencies.

Military Involvement in Humanitarian Logistics
There has been a shift in military logistical roles over the last decade to incorporate their involvement in humanitarian logistics. Military involvement in humanitarian supply chains falls under the term, Military Involvement in Operations Other Than War (MOOTW). The parallels are striking between military and humanitarian logistics. Weiss and Campbell discuss the historical context of military involvement in humanitarian aid.1 They suggest military responsibility should be used for rapid deployment of supplies and provisions but also question the appropriateness of military involvement. Increasingly the military has become a key element in immediate disaster relief (Barber, 2011).2 It has expanded

---

2 Barber, E. (2011). Military Involvement in Humanitarian Supply Chains (Chapter 8), in Relief Supply Chain Management for Disasters: Humanitarian Aid and Emergency Logistics, Kovacs, G and Spens K, IGI Global, Hershey, US.
from providing rapidly deployed transportation and logistical requirements and assets and is now involved with the more complex tasks of refugee protection, repatriation and peacekeeping. The military is also often involved in medical advancements, rehabilitations and reconstruction of facilities.

According to Jahre, Jensen and Listou, humanitarian supply chains are seen as temporary entities in which activities can be completed in an *ad hoc* manner. Their resources, personnel, procedures and processes are often the results of fast and urgent planning. Military involvement in humanitarian supply chains provides many of the capabilities that address these shortfalls. The nature of humanitarian aid delivery, peace-making and peace-keeping has become more complex over the past few decades impacting on the complexities and nature of military involvement in assisting the provisioning and support of logistical aid. The request for military responses to a natural disaster can depend upon the scale and urgency of the disaster, the level of preparedness, the prior established relationships between the affected host and assisting nation; the politics and policy of the host nation; geographical proximity and whether the assisting country has military assets available for assistance.

*Jahre et al.*, by referring to the immediate relief humanitarian supply chains, have narrowed the popular perception of the challenge to short natural disasters of relatively minor proportions. However the empirical context suggests the challenge is more complex. The natural disaster of massive flooding in Pakistan is still undergoing huge humanitarian relief and redevelopment, involving enormous international logistical support from government agencies, NGOs and the military in civil/military roles. The complex conflict in Afghanistan has been going on for over a decade. Although planning for an unknown ‘end state’ is difficult, the strategic coordination, planning and delivery of aid throughout both the northern and unsettled southern regions incorporate civil/military support from NATO troops to ensure safety, security and sustainment of security of the population. NATO is working closely with the host nation’s civil organisations, private contractors and transportation. Security for the transportation flows involved a major re-routing in 2009 from entering through Pakistan to entering via the Northern Distribution Network (NDN) through Russia.

**Military Doctrine**

The end of the Cold War re-oriented military doctrines to include potential contributions to disaster relief operations. Although strictly adhering to doctrine may reduce flexibility in chaotic humanitarian operations, it greatly contributes to institutionalisation, resulting in less inconsistency, less duplication and smoother rotations in both global aid agencies and the military. Doctrine of all large organisations involved in humanitarian provision from the United Nations (UN), UN-CMCoord (United Nations Civil-Military Coordination) forms part of the process aimed at creating a better capacity. Doctrinally the acceptance of Army and other defence personnel working among the civilian population and providing health, education, infrastructure and engineering aid is demonstrated by the recent doctrinal changes to the ADF Army Doctrine:

---


The battle for the hearts and minds of domestic and international audiences is a decisive element of warfare. Infantry, working among the people, is uniquely placed to influence perceptions through respect for the people, adherence to the laws of armed conflict and the sparing use of force (lethal and nonlethal, kinetic and non-kinetic) with the greatest possible discrimination.\(^5\)

The use of applied force concepts in a tactical counterinsurgency environment, i.e. the COIN approach used in Afghanistan, is supportive of the humanitarian logistical modelling. Its phases are shape, clear, hold and build. The ‘shape’ phase is a strategic planning phase; the ‘clear’ phase requires the ISAF (International Security Assistance Force) troops to clear the area of insurgents; the ‘hold’ phase demonstrates the overlap of phases as it incorporates both the maintenance of security and ensuring that the area remains clear of any insurgent action whilst concurrently assisting with the ‘build’ phase. The ‘build’ phase includes establishing the basic services, basic law and order, supporting the indigenous forces of the host nation to take over and let the people acknowledge their support for their own resources and military and civilian cohorts. In such fragile states the fluidity of the COIN stages are forever transitioning. Military staffs are becoming adept at adjusting rapidly to the fluidity of COIN phases and it is a clear lesson to be learnt by the humanitarian logisticians. The fluidity of these COIN phases also make it extremely testing for the international aid agencies working in areas of conflict, not only in Afghanistan but across Africa, and there is often very close coordination of the logistical flows and reverse flows as the fluidity of conflict surges and ebbs in fragile environments. The next section attempts to keep separate the civil/military and humanitarian supply chains. The debate for military involvement in natural disaster relief and the provision of humanitarian aid in other than emergency conflict situations is discussed.

**The Call For and Against Military Involvement**

There is often a lack of effective coordination mechanisms to promote linkages and collaboration between diverse supply chain participants in humanitarian supply chains. The need for better coordination according to Whiting and Ayala-Ostrom is particularly compelling due to the fact that logistics expenditure consumes up to 40 percent of the total humanitarian aid budgets.\(^6\) Reitjens, Voordijk and De Boer argue that conflicting objectives between military and humanitarian organizations often leads to resource wastage as relief agencies and military units undertake similar operations.\(^7\) This duplication is not only prevalent between military and NGOs but also between different NGOs. To ensure optimal resource usage they argue that the military involvements should adopt a subordinate role to the humanitarian lead agency. Nevertheless they acknowledge that the humanitarian agency needs to be present to provide appropriate guidance and this is often not possible as the military forces are the units first to reach the disaster area with air support and relief provisioning.

---

Duplication and competition for donor funding and media attention between NGOs have led to UN CMCoord institutions and OCHA in particular adopting greater logistical integration. The sheer number of agencies responding to disasters has led to inefficiencies: for example following the 2004 SE Asia tsunami, Banda Aceh held 72 coordination meetings per week. OCHA recorded over 900 NGOs operating in Haiti. The presence of military in the mix is argued to lead to conflicts of the Humanity, Impartiality and Neutrality (H-I-N) principles; culture clashes; and lack of trust. Tatham & Kovacs argue that the key ingredients to improving trust are those of dialogue and communications. Tatham expands this notion further by arguing that two areas are particularly challenging, namely development of robust and ‘swift needs’ assessment, and achieving good coordination via improved communication links. This is most important in the logistic space to develop appropriate processes that will ease the integration of technology thus reducing duplications or failure of appropriate support to victims.

In the 1990s, Kelly was a critic of military involvement. A decade later Smith raised slightly different concerns arguing that NGOs often arrive before external military forces because they are frequently already on the ground of the host nation. Furthermore they tend to stay longer and provide lasting stability. Smith argues that military involvement should complement rather than ‘override’ these aims and in particular should complement their supply chains; “To the greatest extent possible, commanders try to complement and not override their capabilities. Building a complementary, trust based relationship is vital.”

**The Role of Power in Humanitarian Logistics**

Given that military should complement rather than override humanitarian supply chains we now shift to the need for controlling the coordination and sustainability of them. Smith expands on the ‘hard’, ‘soft’ and ‘smart’ power of militaries being the war power, the support to humanitarian aid power and the intelligence superiority power to assist in aid delivery respectively. The abilities of OCHA and the military to forecast relief needs have improved markedly with improved intelligence capability. The military are the dominant player in humanitarian relief situations of complex emergencies but how they incorporate and transition control to NGOs is a delicate and sometimes dangerous call. The military are often not the dominant player in natural disaster situations with the host nation or OCHA and UN agencies taking the lead in most disasters in underdeveloped nations. (Note that the Japanese government took the lead in the rescue and subsequent...
development activity following the tsunami of March 2011). World Food Programme (WFP) is the global nominated leader for food issues.

Military ‘Smart Power’ can lead to a dominant position but once the aid transitions start to rehabilitation and reconstruction, the dominant roles may fall to the host nation, the NGOs or the UN. The preparation stage is where the military can take a less dominant role, leaving the UN to lead and co-ordinate. The UN has already taken the lead in establishing clusters and inventory contracting and stockpiling. In situations where some nations will refuse aid from a particular country the use of the UN central stockpiles can be used. Management of these inventories is complicated and requires sophisticated control of the storage. Locations, outgoing demand flows, incoming supply flows, transportation, obsolescence management and security all come at a cost. The military can assist in the preparedness phase by sharing their excess capacity in their warehouses which may be needed in times of war but not in peace time. Oxfam International is also critical of military assistance in emergency relief phases, claiming that military logistical aid is typically in the form of ‘rapid impact’ activities that are undertaken without proper ‘needs’ analysis for the victim’s wellbeing. This does not seem to have been the case during the period 2005-2008 in Afghanistan, but since then the ‘secure and hold’ strategy has seen military working with NGOs who are filtering into the secure regions.

The host nation’s military in natural disasters often provide the initial response along with domestic emergency teams. All teams typically fall under the control of the local or central government organisation. Examples of this action occurred during the recent natural disasters in Samoa, Haiti and New Orleans. Military transport was utilised to evacuate victims and to transport aid workers and aid into the area. They respond quickly with supplies located within country or from allies’ stores located in the region.

Sometimes, as in the case of the of the Iraqi Kurds after the First Gulf War, military organizations are the only option to provide aid relief. The US military rescued the Iraqi Kurds by combining relief operations with host nation civilian aid organizations and subsequently handed over control to them. Together with UK, French and Dutch forces they were the only agencies competent to undertake the hazardous task and to sustain operations in such a difficult and complex environment. Logistics have become more critical and challenging with humanitarian supply chains extending into politically unstable regions which need military protection. Gourdin argues that militaries involved in multi-national support operations are well placed to evaluate the environmental and cultural aspects of the aid area and then develop the most suitable logistical system that meets what may potentially be radically different sufferer’s needs. Gourdin’s argument seems to have been vindicated in the Afghanistan COIN spectrum.

---

Practical Implications and Examples of Military Involvement

In 1999 around a million refugees fled or were expelled from Kosovo. The UNHCR was, in common with most Western decision makers and commentators, unprepared for the scale and speed with which the crisis deteriorated. As the situation worsened, the then High Commissioner (Mrs Sadako Ogata) invited NATO forces to construct a series of refugee camps with the result that five were built in 96 hours in order to house over 60,000 people who were stranded on the Kosovo-Macedonia border. Whilst her decision to invite NATO to enter the ‘humanitarian space’ was criticised by some NGOs at the time, the reality is that these camps were built in record time and, arguably, this could only have been achieved by the military. In the context of this paper, this example provides an excellent demonstration of the core logistic capability of many armed forces which have the appropriate people, processes and technology to be able to move swiftly and effectively to achieve such tasks in support of the UN and wider humanitarian community.

The donation and delivery of hospital supplies during a storm in Haiti, the reconstruction of the power grid in Najaf, the distribution of blankets to orphans in Afghanistan, and the construction of a new maternity ward at a Basra hospital all represent humanitarian and reconstruction work that is conducted by the international community. Projects such as these are easily associated with the work of United Nations agencies, government development agencies like USAID, and NGOs such as the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC), CARE, Médecins Sans Frontières (MSF) and Oxfam. However, these projects, and hundreds of others like them, were, and continue to be, delivered by American, Australian, British, Canadian, Dutch and many other militaries involved in humanitarian operations.

Inevitability and Increased Cooperation of Military Logistics Support

The main reasons cited for increased military involvement in humanitarian interventions are varied. The United Kingdom in their Defence White Paper and Australia in its Strategic Defence Review included humanitarian aid as a military role. It is not surprising, with the Asia-Pacific being the most natural disaster prone region in the world, that the ADF recognised this and that when afflicted, its residents are also the most vulnerable to the impacts of disasters. In 2009 it altered its doctrine to specifically include details on logistic support requirements. The doctrine acknowledges that military and international humanitarian organisations will be working ‘side-by-side’ with many overlapping and coordinated logistical efforts.

Collaboration can take place at different stages along the relief chain, e.g. during contingency planning, need assessment, appeals, transportation management, or last-

---

mile distribution.\textsuperscript{29} While collaboration during an actual disaster,\textsuperscript{30} especially at field level, seems to be more common, and has been enhanced through the setup of the UN Joint Logistics Centre,\textsuperscript{31} there is a specific need for better, continuing collaboration after an operation, in preparation for the next one.\textsuperscript{32} Particularly, only limited cooperation is reported or documented during the preparation phase of the disaster relief lifecycle. The continual change and inevitability of military involvement in humanitarian aid is due to the increase in natural disasters and complex emergencies. NGOs are training more frequently with military forces and becoming acclimatised to military involvement in humanitarian aid.\textsuperscript{33}

In the preparation phase military forces excel. Their preparation and training is consistently practiced and updated. They have consistent cash flows, procedures, protocols, doctrine and processes all of which enable setting up of supply chains in harsh environments—a well-oiled practice. Coupled to these human resources are the capability assets and superior technologies. Within the preparation phase the military’s ability to train on and develop reliable communications and information systems is superior to that of the humanitarian community. Communications and information systems are as important for the military in war and conflict situations as they are for humanitarian supply chains.\textsuperscript{34} Significant training and equipment is dedicated to enable both formal and informal communications to be received in harsh environments. The information systems are well suited for global reach and personnel are well trained in its use. Lessons learnt from the Indian tsunami in 2006, suggest that relief efforts were severely hampered by excessive and costly reliance on wireless telephones for information. It was viewed that information is a life saving resource in disaster situations and needs urgent UN attention to coordinate a global reach communication service.\textsuperscript{35} Military forces are accustomed to operate in conditions of limited information and demand uncertainty. They are trained to secure and support provisions based on broad estimates. The capabilities and infrastructure assets owned and operated by military forces are suitable for harsh terrain and green field sites.\textsuperscript{36} Military forces have dedicated air assets specifically designed to transport large quantities of supplies into areas of operation. These planes are highly valuable in the early stages of disaster relief.\textsuperscript{37}

Nevertheless, military operations cost public money and military contributions are only conducted at the will of the national government. The accountability and numerous processes, doctrinal conditions and procedures can significantly slow the military involvement (Weeks, 2007).\textsuperscript{38} Petit and Beresford argue that the use of military in humanitarian aid operations

\begin{footnotes}
\footnotetext{31}{Heaslip, G. (2011a). Challenges of Civil Military Cooperation / Coordination in Humanitarian Relief (Chapter 9), in \textit{Relief Supply Chain Management for Disasters: Humanitarian Aid and Emergency Logistics}, Kovacs, G and Spens K, IGI Global, Hershey, US.}
\footnotetext{32}{Heaslip, G., (2011b), Humanitarian Aid Supply Chains (Chapter 7), in \textit{Global Logistics and Supply Chain Management}, Mangan, J., Lalwani, C., and Butcher, T., Wiley, New Jersey and Chichester.}
\footnotetext{33}{Thomas & Kopczak, op cit.}
\footnotetext{34}{Tatham and Kovacs, op cit.}
\footnotetext{35}{ADDP (2009), op cit.}
\footnotetext{36}{United-Nations (2007). \textit{Towards A United Nations Humanitarian Assistance Programme For Disaster Response And Reduction: Lessons Learned From The Indian Ocean Tsunami Disaster. Report To The Secretary-General To The General Assembly.} New York.}
\footnotetext{37}{Ibid.}
\end{footnotes}
can carry unwanted perceptions and can compromise the neutrality of NGOs working in the disaster relief areas. Nevertheless, the military have a wide range of logistic capabilities, which are self sustaining and have rapid deployment capabilities as invaluable stop-gap measures until the civilian capabilities can take over the relief supply chains. Petit and Beresford see some vital needs for military in roles such as: the protection of NGO personnel, aid supply, distribution hubs, enforcing peace and restoring order. Military organizations can also provide assistance with refugees and displaced persons. They see the lines between humanitarian and military operations blurring although the military should still be employed very much in their original role, as a security and combat force.

Proposed Model

The unpredictable nature of the majority of disasters calls for quick deployment and constant reconfiguration of staff and resources at the disaster site. Emergencies are subject not only to the dynamics of knowledge but also distance, criticality and time pressure during both the planning and response phases. Planning relies on access to large volumes of information, especially up-to-date logistics-related information. Throughout a crisis, information is distributed unequally between humanitarian organisations and between the military and humanitarian organisations. As each humanitarian organisation occupies a specific node in the information chain, access to sources of information varies significantly between organisations. More importantly, OCHA, the UN logistic clusters, and partnerships among global logistics companies have addressed the issue of continuous evolution and flow of a vast category of logistics-related information across geographies and actors.

Given all these confounding variables it is not surprising that many disaster management models have appeared in the literature. Asghar, Alahakoon and Churilov separate the various models into four categories, namely, logistical, integrated, causal and ‘other’ models. For the purposes of our research we concentrate on the logistical models. The traditional logistical models were sequential in nature. Kimberley uses the four traditional phases of mitigation, preparedness, response and recovery and emphasises the response phase as the biggest phase that will be more effective with appropriate mitigation and preparedness. It was limited to hospital preparedness but the emphasis on preparedness and the longevity of response and recovery is easily adapted to any support organisation.

Very early works such as the Asian Disaster Preparedness Centre training books and the South African Provincial Affairs and Constitutional Development Disaster Management programs (DPLG-2, 1998) reflected the overlap or paralleling of these phases. The integrated development plans of the South African Republic reflect this paralleling as well as the complexities of integrated support across many provinces. The importance of integrating the preparedness stages with the immediate relief and redevelopment stages is not demonstrated by the minimal transition stages as shown in Figure 1. In a complex conflict situation, such as Afghanistan, within three weeks of the NATO forces

---

entering, the civil-military command were moving into the development stage with the host nation. The overlap in the humanitarian phases and the product flows through the associated civil/military and humanitarian supply chains, especially in complex conflicts such as East Timor (2000, 2005) and Afghanistan (2000-2011), was extensive across all phases of the conflict/disaster management.

Figures 1 and 2 show minimal overlap between the different sequential phases as currently viewed by the humanitarian logistics models. Figure 3 expands this traditional model to show the various organisations and leadership types involved in the logistical flows.

It attempts to demonstrate the added complexities associated by integrated logistics requirements in disaster management across all phases. The final phase of transfer to host nation responsibility is included. With further development, this diagram shows the transition of logistical support to the host nation extending fully along the spectrum, beginning in the disaster relief phase and gaining involvement and influence over time. The current logistical models only consider the physical infrastructure and physical product flows and ignore the importance of governance, cultural processes and the host nation’s governmental involvement. Regardless of whether it is a complex conflict such as Afghanistan or a natural disaster like the massive floods in Pakistan massive or the Indonesian tsunami in 2004, the peculiarities of the host nation must be (and in practice are) taken into account even before the initial entry.

**Conclusion**

Civil military logistical cooperation truly is evolving, and the process has gained momentum in recent years. Simply providing security will not be enough for military forces in an environment where perceptions and ideas are centres of gravity in the conflict. Evolution will continue as more lessons learned are incorporated from more theatres, and ideally projects can find a less controversial niche. Theatres of operation in complex fragile states are dynamic environments, and a universally applicable model to civil military logistical cooperation is therefore difficult, if not impossible to obtain. Civil military logistical cooperation will therefore remain in a state of evolution.
This article demonstrates that there is a need for those involved in humanitarian logistics to reflect on the lessons learnt from civil military humanitarian assistance. In particular the greatest impact of military involvement is in the initial, crucial life sustaining days immediately after natural disasters. In contrast, in manmade complex emergencies, military assistance to the logistical provision of aid is more beneficial when widespread military expertise is provided. Current logistics models are not showing the transition overlaps either between the various sequential phases or the overlapping stages across the phases. The proposed model expands this traditional model to show the various organisations and leadership types involved in the logistical flows. It demonstrates the added complexities associated by integrated logistics requirements in disaster management across all phases and shows the interdependencies of the military and humanitarian agencies.
In the Cross-Hairs: Targeted Killing in Contemporary Conflict

Over the desert near Sara, Yemen, a CIA controlled Predator UAV tracked a SUV style vehicle containing six men including Qaed Salim Sinan al-Harethi, believed to be a senior al Qaeda lieutenant who played a major role in the bombing of the US Navy destroyer USS Cole in 2000. The United States and Yemen had tracked al-Harethi’s movements for months. Now, away from any inhabited area the Predator fired a Hellfire missile at the vehicle. Its occupants including al-Harethi were killed.¹

ABSTRACT

The continuing “global war on terror” is remaking conventional war at the outset of the twenty-first century. The ongoing war against non-state actors and their organisations, the demise of interstate conflict, the lack of confinement of hostilities to an identifiable battlefield, the lamentable growth of civilian combatants and the evolving use of newer military technologies are combining to question the efficacy of the law of war for such conflict. With an increasing frequency, remotely piloted drones track suspected terrorists, even across State borders with the ultimate aim of launching a precision missile strike against the tracked target. Capturing the suspected terrorist is invariably ruled out due to operational exigencies; the use of the unmanned drone represents a cheaper and more effective means of targeting. The practice continues to become more widespread despite extensive disagreement about whether suspected terrorists should even be considered as combatants subject to the risk of lawful killing or whether they remain civilians with the ensuing protections of international humanitarian law. Almost forgotten in the complex legal and moral arguments is the fact that innocent bystanders are often killed or injured in these attacks, brushed aside under the term ‘collateral damage’. States justify targeted killing by placing reliance on the use of national self defence as a right of response to previous attacks by terrorists. The laws of war are accused of being outdated for “Star Trek” style technological targeting that has become the tactic of choice in the war on terror. This article outlines the academic debate currently being waged about the concept of targeted killing and demonstrates that the law of armed conflict remains ever relevant in assisting the commander stay on the correct side of the very fine line between lawful and unlawful targeting.

Targeted Killing by Remote Control – ‘Wired for War’

The evolving nature of conflict at the outset of the Twenty-first century has seen States adopt policies that permit the use of targeted killings, including in the territories of other States. The justification used for such policies is that targeted killing is a necessary and legitimate response to “global terrorism” and “asymmetric warfare” and, in particular, to attacks previously perpetrated on that State. Closer examination of the use of targeted

killings demonstrates the blurring and expansion of the boundaries of the applicable legal frameworks. In essence, the war on terror is in effect reshaping conventional warfare. The concept of targeted killing has entered the lexicon of contemporary military operations as it has become an ever more prevalent tactic of choice in the fight against terrorists. High tech warfare juxtaposed with constant and incessant global news coverage has made us accustomed to viewing, almost without question what we are led to believe are precision strikes on carefully selected legitimate targets. The conduct of these types of military operations at the commencement of the new millennium has also highlighted traditional tensions in international humanitarian law. These are primarily focused on the application of that law to conflicts between state and non-state actors and whether the law of armed conflict is actually in step with contemporary warfare. The 2011 raid in Pakistan by US Navy Seals against Osama Bin Laden’s compound represents arguably the highest profile use of the strategy of targeted killing to date. Nonetheless, the public condemnation that this and similar attacks have generated, coupled with the legal and moral issues created by the continuing use of targeted killing demonstrate that the use of this method of warfare is problematic and far from being widely accepted.2

Whether it is a missile fired from an unseen drone against an alleged high ranking terrorist leader in Afghanistan or against a suspected bomb maker in Gaza, targeted killing remains essentially a targeting issue under the law of armed conflict. From the outset it is important to consider the subtle but crucial differences in what constitutes lawful targeting. A lawful combatant sniper targeting a uniformed enemy combatant through the telescopic scope of his rifle before engaging him is not what is meant by the term ‘targeted killing’. This is despite the somewhat contradictory fact that the sniper ‘targeted’ the enemy combatant. The killing of combatants, uniformed members of the armed forces of one of the parties to the conflict by opposing combatants on the battlefield is lawful. The sniper, a lawful combatant, kills a lawful enemy combatant during the course of armed conflict between two high contracting parties to the Geneva Conventions. The Hague Convention of 1907 established clearly that all members of the armed forces can participate directly in hostilities, i.e., attack and be attacked. The 1977 Additional Protocol I, which supplements the 1949 Geneva Conventions, repeated this critical formulation. In essence the status of “combatant” is crucial because of the consequences attached to it. Under the international law of armed conflict, the killing of combatants on the battlefield who are uniformed members of the army of one of the parties to the conflict by their opposing combatants is lawful. In contrast, rebel fighters shooting and killing the political leader of their State are not engaging in targeted killing. Instead, under the domestic law of their State they are committing the domestic crime of murder. While assassinations were expressly prohibited as early as Article 148 of the Lieber Code in 18633 there is no generally accepted definition of targeted killing. This lack of accepted definition has added to the complexity of what is a targeted killing as opposed to extra judicial murder. This complexity is exacerbated when one considers that while there are many definitions of “assassination,” none of them have been universally accepted. The term does not feature in The Hague Conventions, Geneva Conventions, United Nations Charter, or the Statutes of the International Criminal Courts for Yugoslavia or Rwanda. The term is also used differently in times of peace and in armed conflict. Article 23(b) of the 1907 Hague

---

Convention provides that in times of war it “is especially forbidden... to kill or wound treacherously individuals belonging to the hostile nation or army.” Walzer opines that in the domestic criminal law of most states, assassination is considered murder: “Political assassins are simply murderers, exactly like the killers of ordinary citizens. The case is not the same with soldiers, who are not judged politically at all and who are called murderers only when they kill noncombatants.”

Targeted killing is an integral part of warfare but must be distinguished from assassination in peacetime. The precise use of language and an understanding of the underlying legal reasoning should prevent the use of other terms with which “targeted killing” has sometimes been interchangeably used, such as “assassination” and “extrajudicial execution”. The lex specialis nature of law of armed conflict recognizes the non-culpable homicide of members of an opposing force during armed conflict, in effect, it provides for lawful killing. Lawful combatants may be targeted whether they are unarmed or out of uniform provided they are not hors de combat. Combatants remain valid targets even when in retreat or not posing an immediate threat to the attacking armed force.

**Targeted Killing – Defining the Practice**

In an attempt to bring legal clarity to the issue Solis posits a definition of targeted killing as “the intentional killing of a specific civilian or unlawful combatant who cannot reasonably be apprehended, who is taking a direct part in hostilities, the targeting done at the direction and authorisation of the State in the context of an international or non international armed conflict.”

Alston defines it as “the intentional, premeditated and deliberate use of lethal force, by States or their agents acting under colour of law, or by an organised armed group in armed conflict, against a specific individual who is not in the physical custody of the perpetrator.”

Yet another definition proposed is “Premeditated killing of an individual by a government or its agents.”

A senior legal advisor with the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) defines targeted killing as “[T]he use of lethal force attributable to a subject of international law with the intent, premeditation and deliberation to kill individually selected persons who are not in the physical custody of those targeting them”.

Melzer admits that the comprehensive ICRC Study on the Customary Law of International Humanitarian Law included no definition of the term targeted killing largely because it remains much disputed. Nonetheless, Melzer’s Targeted Killing in International Law starts from the premise that the only two possible paradigms for addressing even the concept of targeted killing are judicially monitored law enforcement and armed conflict under IHL. This is indicative that despite reservations about the concept, contemporary law of armed conflict may be willing to recognise and subsequently govern the practice – subject naturally to strict conditions. Solis focuses on the adherence to the principles of the law of armed conflict by stating that for a targeted killing to be lawful, “an international or non-international conflict must be in progress. Without an ongoing armed conflict the targeted killing of a civilian, terrorist or not, would be assassination — homicide and a

---

domestic crime.”10 Green states that it was usually considered inappropriate to seek the assassination of any individual leader of the adverse party.11 However, contrast this with the UK Manual On the Law of Armed Conflict which holds that whether or not the killing of a selected enemy individual is lawful depends on the circumstances and that there is no rule dealing specifically with assassination.12 The ICRC Model Manual13 concedes that an enemy individual combatant may be targeted; including a head of state also acting as the commander-in-chief, provided perfidy is not used.14 Hays Parks develops the interpretation of Article 23(b) of the Hague Regulations opining that it does not necessarily preclude attacks on individual soldiers or officers of the enemy provided it is not carried out ‘treacherously’.15 In essence, the technique employed, not the targeting of the individual would appear to be the determining factor.

**Justifying Targeted Killing – Self Defence?**

The justification put forward for States engaging in targeted killing rests primarily in their assertion of self defence as a sovereign right, including *inter alia* reliance on Article 51 of the United Nations Charter. Dinstein argues that “the right of self-defence is inherent not in *jus naturale*, but in the sovereignty of States.”16 Kasher and Yadlin go further to state “it is the prime duty of a democratic state to effectively defend its citizens against any danger posed to their lives and well-being by acts or activities of terror.”17 Post 9/11 the United States has taken an aggressive strategic approach relying on military engagement as opposed to law enforcement means against suspected terrorists irrespective of their geographical location. The use of self defence as a justification for engaging in targeted killing has not been without its critics who claim that such practice is simply expediency masked as self defence. Critically assessing the targeted killing of the wheelchair bound Sheik Ahmed Yassin, Anthony Dworkin argues that targeted killing is incompatible with international law and tantamount to declaring that no quarter will be given, which is contrary to the Hague Conventions: “[T]o kill under these circumstances is simply execution—but carried out without any trial or proof of guilt.”18

In a law enforcement capacity the European Court specifies three requirements for employing lethal force against terrorists: there must be a strict and compelling necessity test; the threat and the targeting state’s response must be proportional; and the targeting state must consider nonlethal alternatives.19 The growing utility of targeted killing and the ensuing academic criticism led the ICRC to publish the *Interpretive Guidance on the Notion of Direct Participation in Hostilities under International Humanitarian Law* in 2008. This guidance document re-emphasised the prohibition on targeting noncombatant civilians that is considered as customary law. The shift by states such the United States, Russia and Israel to using military means in targeting terrorists as opposed to law enforcement methods of detaining them has created a call for the latter to be re-instigated.

---

14 Article 37(1) of Additional Protocol I prohibits killing an adversary by resort to perfidy.
15 Hays Parks, W. *Memorandum on the Law: Executive Order 112333 and Assassination, DAJA-IA (27-1A)*
However, Kretzmer argues that the employment of a law enforcement model in combating terrorists is irrelevant to targeted killing, which employs military means to target enemy civilian combatants, albeit unlawful combatants, during an armed conflict. “The problem with the law-enforcement model in the context of transnational terror is that one of its fundamental premises is invalid: that the suspected perpetrator is within the jurisdiction of the law-enforcement authorities in the victim state, so that an arrest can be affected.”

The ICRC Interpretive Guidance on the Notion of Direct Participation in Hostilities sought to build on and clarify the accepted customary law set out in Article 51.3 Additional Protocol I to the Geneva Conventions. Article 51.3 states “Civilians shall enjoy the protection afforded by this Section, unless and for such time as they take a direct part in hostilities.” Solis feels that the plain wording of the section means that terrorists and associated technical accomplices cannot lawfully be targeted unless at the precise time of their targeting they are directly engaged in hostilities: “Those who argue against such a constraining limitation urge that terrorists should be lawful targets whenever and wherever they can be positively identified and their locations positively confirmed.” The ‘revolving door’ argument as to when civilians are protected is vigorously debated between those with both a humanitarian and utilitarian approach to the law of armed conflict. The ICRC Guidance states that, “the kind and degree of force which is permissible against persons not entitled to protection against direct attack must not exceed what is actually necessary to accomplish a legitimate military purpose in the prevailing circumstances.” Critics of this perspective interpret this statement as requiring the use of a law enforcement paradigm in the context of armed conflict.

Cassese argues that “when civilians taking a direct part in hostilities lay down their arms, they reacquire noncombatant immunity and may not be made objects of attack although they are now amenable to prosecution for unlawfully participating in hostilities.” A converse approach focusing on the reality of modern terrorism is that Cassese’s point is too simplistic and that the civilians who lead terrorist groups seldom actually pick up arms and so in reality never subsequently lay them down; “It is not just the fighters with weapons in their hands that pose a threat.” The ICRC Interpretive Guidance on the Notion of Direct Participation in Hostilities remains a guidance document, it is not accepted law and accordingly it is not binding on States. There remains division in opinion as to when terrorists may be targeted and whether it is only when actually engaged in terrorist activities. If applied narrowly the ‘revolving door’ theory allows terrorists enjoy the optimum of worlds; they only endanger their protection as civilians while actually in the process of carrying out a terrorist act. This literal approach means that if international terrorists “are civilians who may only be targeted while taking a direct part in hostilities, the right of self defence under Article 51 of the UN Charter may become meaningless.”

---

21 Emphasis added.
23 ICRC Guidance at 17 and 77.
27 Kretzmer (2005), op cit, p. 193.
While academics may disagree there is no disputing that the practice of targeted killing is gathering momentum in contemporary military operations. Operation Desert Storm in 1991, Operation Allied Force in 1999 and Operation Enduring Freedom, for example, have all had targeted killing strikes conducted as part of their effects based operations. The US Predator strike in Yemen on the 3rd of November 2002 which killed six people, including a senior member of al Qaeda, Qaed Salim Sinan al-Harethi, in a vehicle on the open road, was considered lawful killing of an enemy combatant by the US. However, the action was not without its critics. Amnesty International stated that it does not matter whether the targeted killing takes place in armed conflict or not, nor how the United States justifies it legally, because international human rights law continue to apply and obliges governments involved to arrest, rather than to kill.28 It is not forbidden, however, to send a detachment or individual members of the armed forces to kill, by sudden attack, a person who is a combatant. Defining who is a combatant is critical in the developing use of targeted killing; a phrase more in vogue than assassination in the justification for such attacks. The latter tends to connote murder, whereas targeting, with its concepts of distinction and proportionality is a military term, which arguably lends more legitimacy to the use of force. Proportionality and distinction are critical in any act of targeting under the law of armed conflict. The Israeli targeted killing of Salah Shehadeh, alleged head of the military wing of Hamas, in Gaza in 2002, killing not only him but also his wife, three of their children and eleven others, mostly children, illustrates where targeted killings can go awry. The Israeli targeted killing of wheelchair bound Sheik Ahmed Yassin, co-founder of Hamas and its spiritual leader, along with two bodyguards and eight bystanders led the then Bush administration to say that it was deeply troubled by the act. The Israeli Supreme Court held that one cannot determine in advance that targeted killing is always illegal, just as it cannot be determined in advance that every targeted killing is permissible according to customary international law.29 Post 9/11 Solis claims that targeted killing, once an anathema to America, became tolerated and then latterly embraced. To support his claim Solis uses as an example the targeted killing of Abu Musab al-Zarqawi in June 2006 which “was celebrated as an American strategic and political victory”.30 The continuing reports of missile strikes from UAVs in Afghanistan and the border regions of Pakistan indicates that targeted killing has become an attractive means of warfare. Undoubtedly part of the attraction stems from the zero exposure to risk of personnel that the UAV offers and the effectiveness of the missile strike compared to the cost. Whether proportionality, compliance with Article 51.3 of Additional Protocol I and the risk of collateral damage are factored into this reasoning is unclear. What is clear however is that “…targeted killing is in the process of escaping the shadowy realm of half legality and non accountability and is gradually gaining legitimacy as a method of counter-terrorism and ‘surgical’ warfare.”31

The status of the individual in hostilities remains the thorniest issue to be decided in any potential targeted killing operation. In reality the devil is in the detail. Is he/she a combatant or a civilian who has by their actions foregone their protected status? Can the individual be captured and subsequently tried? Do the perceived advantages of targeted killing justify the military necessity element tipping the balance away from humanitarian concerns?

31 Melzer, op cit, pp. 9-10.
What is the anticipated collateral damage? This requires careful resolution on a case-by-case basis. It is operationally seductive to think that targeted killing of, for example, an elusive senior terrorist leader\(^{32}\) may subsequently spare countless noncombatant victims while simultaneously reducing the risk to friendly forces. However, the status issue of the target remains critical. Schmitt argues that the further the activities performed by a leader move from the strategic and closer to the tactical level, the more convincing the assertion of combatant status.\(^{33}\) If the potential target is directly involved in hostilities and cannot reasonably be apprehended, previous noncombatant immunity is forfeited and he becomes a lawful target. Dinstein states that a civilian taking a direct part in hostilities risks his life like any combatant and is exposed to a lethal attack; a strike targeting such a person and killing him is permissible when non-lethal measures are either unavailable or ineffective.\(^{34}\)

The Geneva Conventions are silent on targeted killing and who may be lawfully targeted. While Article 51.3 of Additional Protocol I would appear on first reading to prohibit targeted killing, the practice is undoubtedly increasing in frequency by governments in their desire to thwart insurgent and/or terrorist activities. There is no outright prohibition of the practice and the ICRC has to date been able only to offer guidance due to lack of agreement on the concept. Article 51.3 of Additional Protocol I is being interpreted in a manner that results in a terrorist being targeted despite not being actively involved in an action such as a firefight. Targeted killing raises complex targeting issues such as what constitutes direct participation in hostilities and whether there needs to be a constant combat function of the actor before he can be lawfully engaged? Just as in any carefully considered targeting action, each proposed targeted killing raises complex moral dilemmas before targeting can be sanctioned. Solis maintains that the principles of the law of armed conflict should be relied on when considering the characteristics that make up a targeted killing and that when using these principles, certain requirements must be met. To begin with, an international or non-international conflict must be in progress because it is this conflict which gives the combatant the legal right to target and kill an enemy. The victim of a targeted killing must be targeted based on his activities during the armed conflict considered in progress. Dinstein cautions that “A person cannot (and is not allowed) to be both a combatant and a civilian at the same time, nor can he constantly shift from one status to another”.\(^{35}\) For targeted killing to be lawful, Solis introduces human rights concerns to hold that the individual targeted who has engaged directly in hostilities must be beyond a reasonable possibility of capture or arrest. The question of at what level and who actually authorises the targeted killing must also be resolved. Blumenfeld claims that in Israel such decisions must be approved by “senior cabinet members”\(^{36}\). In 2006 the Russian Duma passed a law permitting the Russian security services to kill alleged terrorists overseas, if authorised to do so by the President.\(^{37}\) For the military commander, the initial consideration must be military necessity: is the planned action indispensable for securing the submission of the enemy? The commander must also consider collateral damage with proportionality and the avoidance of unnecessary suffering of the civilian population. While civilians are protected by Article 51 of Additional

---

\(^{32}\) The UN Security Council held that terrorist attacks could justify use of armed force post 9/11.
\(^{37}\) See Aliston, op cit, for discussion on USA, Russia and Israel.
Protocol I in that they shall not be made the object of attack this protection is enjoyed “unless and for such time as they take a direct part in hostilities.” The determination of when such persons who are without lawful combatant status take a direct or active part in hostilities is the key challenge facing both practitioners and legal scholars alike. This is not a new phenomenon where persons not having a claim to lawful combatant status take part in hostilities. However, contemporary military operations directed against terrorists, the proliferation of non-international armed conflicts and latterly situations of occupation have brought into stark relief the targeting of non-state actors. The challenge facing such targeting stems from a myriad of operational issues such as; when hostilities stray beyond an identifiable battlefield or specific geographical area; the distinct lack of visible distinguishing characteristics for irregular forces such as the wearing of uniforms; the deliberate integration of opposing forces within the civilian population and the ‘revolving door argument’ of when direct participation in hostilities actually occurs. Legal arguments focusing on the lawfulness of such targeting is stuck in the convergence between international humanitarian law or law of armed conflict and human rights-based law enforcement normative norms governing the use of force in such complex and evolving operational situations.

Lawful Targeting – ‘The Devil is in the Detail’

Confronting contemporary international humanitarian law or law of armed conflict issues is as challenging for countries that have ratified Additional Protocol I as for the countries, such as the United States, who have not yet ratified the Protocol. What is clear for all states concerned is that even the more broadly accepted treaty law such as the 1949 Geneva Conventions does not always provide clear or definitive answers to contemporary operational challenges which, relying on new technology, are in effect creating new pressures points for international law. Garlasco claims that “You will be trying to apply international law written for the Second World War to Star Trek technology”.38 Targeted killings have occurred in a variety of contexts with varying means and methods of killing including sniper fire, shooting at close range, missiles from helicopters, gunships, drones, the use of car bombs, and poison. The underlying common element is that lethal force is intentionally and deliberately used, with a degree of pre-mediation, against an individual or individuals specifically identified in advance by the perpetrator. The singular most common criticism leveled against the concept is that in a targeted killing the specific goal of the operation appears to use lethal force. However, while targeted killings may violate the right to life, in the exceptional circumstance of armed conflict, it is accepted that they may be legal.39 In essence the lawfulness of targeted killing turns on the degree of interpretation of the term “direct participation in hostilities.” Additional Protocol I specifies that civilians are not lawful targets “unless and for such time as they take a direct part in hostilities.” Direct participation undoubtedly remains the most troublesome issue to be resolved in any targeted killing decision. Nonetheless, it was never the intention of the drafters of Additional Protocol I, Article 51.3 that terrorists and non-state actors should be able to hide behind a narrow interpretation of what is considered directly participating in hostilities to give them a shield of immunity. The commander must at all times remain conscious that his targeting decision is subject to review. To remain lawful under the

---

39 Melzer, op cit, pp. 4-5.
law of armed conflict the act of targeted killing may be permitted if conducted within the specific limitations as discussed here. It is readily apparent that there exists a very real potential for operational seduction into the area of targeted killing and the issue surfaced for Irish consideration during a recent Nordic Battle Group Exercise involving Irish troops. In that realistic operational exercise scenario the head of enemy forces presented a clear target for a period of time to a deployed Irish Defence Forces’ sniper team. For the Irish Defence Forces the issue is not whether targeted killing may be justifiable under international law of armed conflict but also whether it is legal under Irish domestic law. There is no residual authorisation for Irish Defence Forces’ personnel to unilaterally transition to ‘war-fighting’ while involved in UN mandated peace support operations. Article 28.3 of the Constitution expressly prohibits the State from participating in any war save with the assent of Dáil Éireann. Clearly, there is no Irish law which permits targeted killing and as such, the concept is not permitted under Irish law and is also contrary to the European Convention on Human Rights as implemented in Irish domestic law. The operational law expertise of the Legal Advisor or ‘Legad’ remains available to the deployed commander and it is essential that briefings to units deploying overseas continue to inform Irish Defence Forces’ commanders as to the legal authority and mandate under which they deploy. There is a very fine line between lawful and unlawful targeting. The inescapable stark reality of compliance with the law of armed conflict in dynamic contemporary warfare is that ‘the devil is in the detail’. The Legad is tasked with advising the commander on compliance with the law of armed conflict, not solely the operational restraints but also on the legality of employing force. As conflict continues to evolve and interpretations become blurred, access to accurate, robust and timely legal advice has never been more relevant to the commander.
Embedded Reporting; History, Security, Objectivity, and War

ABSTRACT
Despite claims of media bias, objectivity and credibility, many of us consume, without questioning, partisan coverage of international affairs. Never more so than the embedded coverage of the Iraqi and Afghan conflict, produced in vast quantities in the last decade. This essay questions the legitimacy of such reporting against the background of expected media norms, and concludes that while embedded reporting is undoubtedly flawed – it still has a part to play in contributing to our overall understanding of war.

Introduction

‘Embedding’ – its origins and divisive nature

At the start of the 20th century, war reporting was a highly sanitised, uninformative medium, largely bereft of the standards and ethics that form the basis of modern journalism. The wider public were kept up to date on how wars were progressing via the government sanctioned ‘despatches from the front’ and the ‘Pathé Cine-reels’ broadcasting one-sided versions of war developments, so not to hinder morale at home or jeopardise the war effort. State censorship was a common practice, with even personal letters from participating soldiers screened before posting, lest they jeopardise any future operations. Today many would believe that we have entered a new era in media–public relations, guided by transparency, openness and objectivity. Developments in modern technology have ushered in a new era where mobile phone footage, blogs and social media sites can portray events as they happen, contrary to Gil Scott Heron’s acid jazz polemic—the revolution can indeed be televised.1

Increasingly, these realities are brought home to us via ‘embedded reporting’ which was defined quite recently in the Oxford English Dictionary as; ‘embed. V. » trans. Orig. US Mil. To attach (a journalist) to a military unit to report on a conflict.’2 Its use has certainly increased of late; one has only to look at the success of the Ross Kemp in Afghanistan and Ross Kemp Returns to the Frontline series, broadcast by BSkyB, documenting the experiences of British soldiers in Helmand province in 2008/2009 and 2011 respectively. These series captured the imagination of the British public, attracting record viewers and even the BAFTA award for factual programming for its presenter.

2 From Oxford English Dictionary online, last accessed 08 Dec 2011
As a concept, and as a term, ‘embedding’ or ‘embedded reporting’ emerged from the February 2003 decision of the then US Secretary of Defence Donald Rumsfeld to permit journalists to be attached to frontline units during the second Gulf War. Media strategists such as Margaret Belknap felt that ‘the fourth estate offer[ed] a superb mechanism for strategic leaders and warfighters to transmit operational objectives and goals, as well as to reinforce policy objectives.’ Rumsfeld did not hide the obvious propaganda reasons for permitting such a move, and in a disingenuous statement that would later fuel criticism of embedding as a genre of war reporting, said:

> We need to tell the factual story–good and bad–before others seed the media with disinformation and distortion, as they most certainly will continue to do. Our people in the field need to tell our story–only commanders can ensure the media get to the story alongside the troops.4

The term ‘embedding’ stemmed from this era, but the concept of sending scribes to war to recount the epic battles is not new; one only has to look at the famous Bayeux Tapestry, or Celtic lithographs to view illustrated accounts of war as told by a bystander, and recorded for the settlements the soldiers departed from. Stephen Farrell recounts in The New York Times ‘Embedistan’ series that ‘embedding’ as a term is something that has come into the public consciousness from the coverage and media saturation that the Gulf War received, to the extent that military based acronyms and tactical terms entered the household vocabulary:

> ‘Embedding’ is one of the words that emerged from the jargon of soldiers, diplomats, politicians and spin doctors involved with the 2003 invasion of Iraq, and entered the public discourse alongside “shock and awe,’ ‘weapons of mass destruction,’ ‘insurgent,’ ‘hajji,’ ‘Green Zone,’ ‘blast wall,’ ‘tipping point,’ ‘contractor,’ ‘Blackwater,’ ‘death blossom,’ ‘Abu Ghraib,’ ‘IED,’ ‘MRAP,’ ‘awakening’ and ‘surge.’ It was not in fact a term born in Iraq—the practice of chroniclers traveling with soldiers is as old as war, and even the word “embedding” itself was in use in the 1990s. But Iraq was certainly where it crossed over into the wider lexicon.5

Geoff Dyer, a novelist writing for The Guardian, believes that we have entered a golden age of war reporting and that embedded reporting whets our insatiable appetite for information and real life drama.

> Writers are not obliged to deal with current events, but it happens that the big story of our times—the al-Qaida attacks on New York and the Pentagon, and the subsequent wars in Iraq and Afghanistan—is being told in some of the greatest books of our time.6

---

4 Ibid.
He cites Steve Coll’s ‘Ghost Wars’; Lawrence Wright’s ‘The Looming Tower’; George Packer’s ‘The Assassins’ Gate’; Rajiv Chandrasekaran’s ‘Imperial Life in the Emerald City’; Evan Wright’s ‘The Killer Elite’ and Dexter Filkins’s ‘The Forever War’ as examples of well written tomes to the wars that have shaped the past decade, citing their exemplary characterisation and detailed depiction of combat as the records of these past few turbulent years.7

However, given the close relationship that will have to ensue between the embedded journalist and the military—how different is ‘embedding’ as a medium from the government approved columns and tedious cine-reels the public were subjected to over a hundred years ago? A recent editorial in a British broadsheet felt that;

to many, the embedded journalist is a grisly throwback to First World War-style reporting, when appalling butchery in the trenches was presented as a series of judiciously planned advances by…Generals.8

How independently do these journalists operate from the scrutinising eyes of government officials? Are we being manipulated to advance a point of view?

This essay will discuss how embedded war reporting, while entertaining, can distort our overall perceptions of war in that it can be highly subjective, and fails to acknowledge the larger scale strategic picture. However, this essay will also argue that while these criticisms stand in some cases, embedded journalism also grants the public access to areas that would otherwise remain undocumented, and can paint a more visceral picture of the practical events in a war than distanced ‘bigger picture analysis’ cannot provide for.

The argument will be presented in two parts. First, under the heading of ‘Security, Morale and Media ethics in a war zone,’ the paper looks at security from both the journalist’s and soldier’s perspective. The second part, ‘Objectivity and Strategic Analysis,’ identifies that although embedding may be subjective in its method, it can be objective in its delivery should the journalist wish to make it so. The conclusion suggests that pragmatism is required when viewing embedded reporting, as with all media content, and while some of the criticisms levelled against embedding as a medium hold true, that does not mean it should be dismissed as irrelevant to our understanding of war—when if anything it increases our understanding at the practical level.

Security, Morale and Media Ethics in a War Zone
Security is key to understanding embedded reporting, and it merits discussion from both the media and military’s respective points of view. Pulitzer Prize winner, Dexter Filkins, recalls time spent embedded with the US Marine Corps in Iraq, where one can see the evident security concerns affecting reporters in war-torn countries, both from the perspective of the reporter, and the potential security baggage a reporter can be to an

---


accompanying unit. When he was deployed in July 2003, aside from the areas where fighting was conducted, Iraq was sufficiently safe to ensure freedom of movement throughout the country, thus facilitating open unilateral reportage. Filkins was able to mingle with the locals and run on the streets in the evenings; ‘in the beginning, Baghdad wasn’t that threatening…the French embassy and the BBC were around the corner, and the Iraqis in the neighbourhood were friendly, waving whenever we passed.’

Filkins returned in 2006 and observed that as the war dragged on, and the death count rose significantly, some of the Iraqi population became weary of the U.S. forces occupation, and the atmosphere changed from one of hospitality to one of hostility and suspicion of all foreigners;

It was madness. I was courting death or at least a kidnapping. The capital was a free for all; it was in a state of nature. There was no law anymore, no courts, nothing—there was nothing at all. They kidnapped children now; they killed them and dumped them in the street. The kidnapping gangs bought and sold people; it was like its own terrible ecosystem. One of the kidnapping gangs could have driven up in a car and beat me and gagged me, and I could have screamed like a crazy person, but I doubt anyone would have done anything.

While critics of embedded journalism are quick to point out that embeds lack objectivity, or have an over-familiarity with the subject, one uncomfortable truth is that many of the areas that the journalists operate in are anarchic and not safe for media to operate. Often, the criticisms levelled at embeds reflect the imposition of western expectations of media ethics on areas of the world that do not share modern secular values, or these values’ manifestation in media ethics and Western journalistic practices. As Patrick Cockburn points out;

Many allegations against the system of “embedding” journalists, mainly with the American or British military, are unfair. Accompanying armies in the field is usually the only way of finding out what they are doing or think they are doing. Nor is there an obvious alternative way for correspondents to operate today. Given that al-Qa’ida and the Taliban target foreign journalists as potential hostages, it is impossible to roam around Iraq or Afghanistan without extreme danger.

In most Western countries the power of the press is accepted, and in many cases preserved in legislation such as the First Amendment of the US Constitution that facilitates the Right to Freedom of Expression, or Article 40.6.1.i of the Irish Constitution (Bunréacht na hÉireann) that reserves a place for the power of the media in a functioning democracy, ‘the right of the citizens to express freely their convictions and opinions,’ whilst at the same time reserving the right to restrict it in certain circumstances.

10 Ibid.
11 Ibid.
12 Cockburn, Op Cit.
13 Bunréacht na hÉireann, 2009 Edition (Dublin, 1937) 36
Many of the countries to which embedded reporters travel have no such acknowledgement of the media, and to attack or kill a reporter will not meet the same backlash expected in Western countries. The assassination of The Sunday Independent’s crime correspondent Veronica Guerin, in Dublin on June 1996 by the criminals that she had been writing about, prompted not only public outcry in the form of street protests and the widespread signing of books of condolences, but also the enactment of legislation that hoped to prevent any future threat to a free and inquisitive press.¹⁴

In certain parts of the world the media is not feted as it is in Western countries. No such outcry occurred in Iraq or Afghanistan despite the fact that 139 journalists were killed in Iraq between 2003 and 2009,¹⁵ and a surprisingly lesser number of 24 journalists have been killed in Afghanistan since 1992 to the time of writing.¹⁶ In some cases they were beheaded, in other cases they were violently tortured and used as propaganda, but in countries where a free press never existed, where the value of media enquiry in holding elites to account for their actions has never been experienced to be appreciated, the journalists’ deaths became just another statistic along with the many other deaths occurring amidst the ongoing chaos.

Stephen Farrell contrasts the danger that journalists face in certain countries, against the benefits that embedding with a unit gives to a journalist to manoeuvre through conflict zones and report on events that otherwise would be lost to the world, or reported post event by witness testimony, or by a government spokesperson. He states

proponents of embedding argue that in asymmetric conflicts—especially those in countries with a high risk of kidnapping and murder—embedding allows reporters, photographers and cameramen to go to areas that they could not do otherwise.¹⁷

However one story recounted by Dexter Filkins relating to his time spent with the U.S. Marine Corps in Baghdad illustrates the problems an embedded reporter can cause to the unit tasked with escorting media personnel. In one instance, Filkins and Ashley Gibertson, a photographer from The New York Times, requested marines with whom they had built up a personal relationship to accompany them into a nearby minaret to get a photograph of a body of an insurgent that the marines had just killed. Filkins recounts;

It seemed as if finding that body was the thing to do. I was a reporter and I needed a corpse for the newspaper. Ashley asked Captain Read Omohundro, Bravo’s commander, and he gave us a dozen guys. They liked us now; we had been through hell with them, seen their buddies die. They wanted to help us.”¹⁸

---

Such a statement breaks journalistic norms in that it is an admission by the author that he and his accompanying photographer have become too familiar with their subject, and also rather glaringly, highlights how they failed to explore the motives or opinions of the recently deceased Iraqi that they wished to photograph, literally showing a ‘one-sided portrayal’ of an event.

In the process of bringing Filkins and Gibertson to photograph the body, Lance Corporal Demarkus Brown was shot and Lance Corporal William Miller was fatally wounded, ‘his face was opened in a large V, split like meat, fish maybe, with the two sides jiggling.’ From this episode we can also see that the decision by Government Defence Departments to allow journalists embed with frontline units may compromise the safety of the soldiers that are accompanying these journalists. Given the danger in the areas where these soldiers have to operate, (to date there has been 4801 Allied casualties in Iraq, and 2825 in Afghanistan since 2003 and 2001 respectively) from a tactical sense it is somewhat unreasonable to ask soldiers to carry the extra burden of being responsible for the safety of journalists that are not militarily trained for the circumstances they wish to report on.

So why do it? This subject will be returned to later under the heading of ‘Objectivity,’ but one can state at this point, that despite the danger that escorting a tactically unaware journalist around a war zone poses for military personnel, the embed’s use to higher command obviously outweighs the burden.

With regard to the welfare of the media; war reporting is a dangerous occupation, working in areas of the world where acute violence and death are everyday occurrences. While soldiers are trained over a prolonged period to prepare themselves for the violence they may witness, it is even customary for armies to conduct ‘battlefield inoculations’ that will prepare their soldiers for the noise and dangers of combat—journalists will seldom conduct such training, and will never conduct any more than a peripheral introduction to combat. One only has to look at the infamous South African photojournalists ‘The Bang Bang Club’ to see the effects of posting vulnerable people to volatile areas. The group of friends, who covered the South African ‘Township Wars,’ the Yugoslav civil wars and the conflicts in famine stricken Sudan and Rwanda, consisted of four likeminded individuals who pledged to bring coverage from the most harrowing of areas. They started in the early 90’s, but within three years, two of their number were dead; Ken Oosterbroek was killed by a stray bullet while covering a fire fight between rival South African gangs, and Kevin Carter committed suicide a matter of weeks after he won a Pulitzer prize for a photograph of a vulture towering over a starving child in Sudan. The two surviving members of ‘The Bang Bang Club’ have had ongoing personal problems with alcohol and drugs, having witnessed assassinations, bombings and people being burned and stabbed to death—always taking pictures of the event to expose it to the greater public, rather than stopping it from occurring in their immediate presence;

We discovered that one of the strongest links among us was questions about the morality of what we do; when do you press the shutter release and when do you cease being a photographer? We discovered that the camera was never a filter through which we were protected from the worst

19 Ibid.
of what we witnessed and photographed. Quite the opposite—it seems like the images have been burned on to our minds as well as our films.\textsuperscript{21}

While the potential for physical and psychological damage is high with embedded reporters, the risk is even higher with unilateral/unembedded reporters. Marc Santora worked in Iraq as both an embedded and unilateral reporter. While Santora acknowledges the freedom which unilateral reporting affords a journalist, he is also eager to highlight the increased danger that comes with it, and the huge risks that unilateralists are taking with their safety;

The truth is that without the resources or support of the military, survival was always foremost on our minds. The dangers that come with being embedded are real, but largely out of your control. If your patrol gets blown up by an improvised explosive device, there is little you can do about it. The military is running the show. As unilateralists, our choices were our own. And I quickly learned about what veteran correspondents called it the one-percent risk. You pushed a little further each day, and when you made it to the next day, you pushed a little more.\textsuperscript{22}

That is not to say that the risk of death was any less with embedded reporters, who will obviously witness developments as they progress from the perspective of the Unit accommodating them. In most cases the military accompanying the embedded reporter will impose some ground rules so that the journalist does not compromise the unit’s operational mission or future intentions. Stephen Lee Myers recounts a time when he had to keep silent regarding his unit’s future deployment, and in the process illustrates some of these ground rules that embeds are asked to adhere to, some in the name of the security, others in the name of ethics;

Embedding then, as now, imposed restrictions on reporters. We were not allowed to report exact location and size of units, their planned operations or the names of those killed. While we were still in Kuwait, the brigade’s commander, Col William F. Grimsley, showed a group of us the exact attack plan on Baghdad’s airport. I kept my end of the bargain and only wrote about it when the issue was moot and the division was already there. It was the same with the soldiers killed, nameless until their kin could be told the news.\textsuperscript{23}

The existence of such ground rules is a step too far for many journalists who feel that their work should not be encroached upon and should remain free from any external interference. For other journalists it is a necessary compromise to facilitate access to combat areas that otherwise would be inaccessible, and to remain alive in countries where a press card carries little currency by way of security.

Objectivity and Strategic Analysis

Embedded reporting can attract strong criticisms from those that hope to preserve the function of independent inquiry in journalism, many of whom feel that embedding is merely facilitates the government bodies’ views being drip fed through the filter of known journalists. Speaking at the Global Investigative Journalism Conference in Geneva, Seymour Hersh—the distinguished American journalist that gained acclaim for his exposés of the Mai Lai massacre in Vietnam and the Abu Ghraib prison torture scandal was forthright about the entire concept, pronouncing that:

Embedding is the worst single thing that has happened to journalism in the last decade and a half, and it began with the First Gulf War. It is a brilliant strategy. And it has really curbed and hurt journalism. Ultimately, we are not partners of the government. And this is what happened too much after 9/11. Too many of the American reporters became jingoistic, they joined the team. We were embedded. We were embedded with military units. I’m very much against embedding, because that’s not our job—to be embedded. Our job is to report on them with no obligations, none whatsoever. 24

The Handbook of Mass Media Ethics recognises the importance of objectivity and truth in journalistic practices, stating that;

modern journalism ethics was built upon the twin pillars of truth and objectivity. By the early 1900’s, journalism textbooks, associations and codes of ethics cited truth and objectivity as fundamental principles of the emerging profession.25

One of the problems encountered by embedded journalism is that;

Journalists cannot help reflecting to some degree the viewpoint of the soldiers they are accompanying. The very fact of being with an occupying army means that the journalist is confined to a small and atypical segment of the political-military battlefield.26

The fact that embeds share intimate quarters with their subjects, and literally rely on them for their safety, will obviously colour their writing. It is human nature that we are influenced by those that we communicate with regularly. This fact has been acknowledged in psychological studies from its early beginnings in the Aristotelian ‘theory of associationism,’ right up to the modern day notions of ‘folk psychology’ or ‘shared collective thinking’ 27 that can inform peer pressure through interaction in our formative years, and influence political opinion polls and even societal attitudes. That is not to say that all influence is positive, and people can react against, or even with indifference to those around them. Obviously how one chooses to incorporate this influence is very much dependant on the person covering the story, and how they react to the group they are dealing with.

24 Farrell, Op Cit.
26 Cockburn, Op Cit.
Similarly embedded reporters can react towards or against the group that they interact with. While ‘Pfau et al, found that the embedded journalist coverage of the 2003 war in Iraq was framed more favourably toward the US military than non-embedded (unilateral) reporting, thus confirming what many would see as the overarching influence the military has over their guests, what this research survey does not articulate is that in the times when an embedded reporter reacts against the group to which he/she is reporting on, the accessibility gained to their subjects, combined with first hand experience of a given situation, can make the criticism raised by an embed all the more damning. One only has to look at the PR fallout the US Dep of Defence felt after the publication of Jim Frederick’s ‘Black Hearts’ (an account of disintegration of discipline within the US 502nd Regiment deployed in Iraq in 2005 – 6 which culminated in the rape and murder of a fourteen year old girl and the execution of her family) to see that just because a journalist is embedded with a unit, does not necessarily mean that the unit will be treated delicately.

Another embedded journalist Stephen Lee Myers has been keen to point out that his work was never censored, nor did he feel the need to embellish the truth to portray his hosts in a good manner, regularly writing acerbic pieces that illustrated the Unit’s failings as well as accomplishments;

I never encountered an effort to restrict anything I wrote, though an officer complained that I described how two American tanks had been destroyed (missiles from the rear). I felt I never compromised my obligation to be fair and honest. And some of what I wrote as a result was hardly flattering to the American war effort.

He goes on to state that embedding as a method is not a threat to objectivity. The problem, or potential problem, lies rather with the individual journalist in question who can decide to maintain objectivity throughout and continue to write well researched pieces that analyse both sides, or can choose to portray everything they are told from official sources in an unquestioning manner, without any further investigation or enquiry;

The problem with embedding, if any, belongs to reporters, those who lose their objectivity and cheer, those who accept what the military says without a necessary dose of skepticism, those who presume what they write is the all-encompassing truth and not just one slice of it.

Information Operations (or Info Ops) are operations undertaken by militaries to positively influence the outcome of a war through targeting public perception and engaging with key leaders in society. The official NATO definition of Info Ops is;

enabling operations that support offensive and defensive operations, stability operations, and support operations. Consequently, they are primarily shaping operations….the ability to collect, process, and disseminate an

---

30 Lee Myers, Op Cit.
31 Op Cit.
uninterrupted flow of information while exploiting or denying the adversary’s ability to do the same.\textsuperscript{32}

It is arguably propaganda by a different name, but even if embedded reporting is a venture in Info Ops—the militaries that implement them do not place a gun to the head of the journalists that take part in them. Any influence exerted, is purely done so through delicate measures such as basic hospitality and protection – any journalist worth their salt will see through such measures and report what he/she sees irrespective of the line fed by official sources. As such, the potential media manipulation that exists can be easily circumvented.

New York Times embed Steven Lee Myers feels that many of those that criticise embedded reporting miss the reasons behind embedding, and highlights the fact that embedded reporting does not market itself as objective, or facilitative to wider discussions of a given war. It aims to portray what life is like for the troops that are on the ground. For British or American audiences, this can mean highlighting to the public what is being carried out in their name, what their taxes are financing, and also it allows families to appreciate the work that their soldiers are involved in. With this in mind it can be said that the documentation of the ‘war experience’ for those that it affects ‘on the ground’ is as valid a pursuit as the strategic analysis of a war;

Embedding has been called a “soda-straw view” of war—usually derisively and generally unfairly—or much worse, a tool of the Pentagon’s war propaganda. That it has been fodder for the seemingly endless debate over how to report on war misses the point. My assignment wasn’t to cover the war or its disputed rationale, the strategy of the generals or the effects on the Iraqis. The New York Times and other news organizations had plenty of reporters doing various pieces of that, and no one doing it all at once. I was there to report on the experience of American soldiers invading a foreign land, enduring war at its most visceral: exhaustion, hunger, thirst, tedium, fear and death. To fail to do that would be as egregious a lapse of journalism as not covering the experience on the other side.\textsuperscript{33}

Stephen Farrell counters the criticisms of embeds by stating that the access gained by embeds amplifies what would otherwise be dismissed as small or irrelevant in the grand scheme of the war.

These very legitimate qualms and criticisms [against Embedding] also ignore the highest utility of embeds: Reporting the perspectives and emotions of the troops on the ground, who, despite risk to their careers, go well out of their way to bluntly describe the failings and mistakes that have so often plagued the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan. Their comments often impeach the official line from Washington, serving as an important check on the influential opinions of others—including politicians and politically-

\textsuperscript{33} Lee Myers, Op Cit.
appointed officials, and many commentators—who, taken as a group, have tended to be more optimistic, and incorrectly so, than troops doing the actual fighting34

Nearly all embedded reports contain criticisms leveled by combat troops at their senior command or political sponsors; Evan Wright’s ‘Killer Elite’/‘Generational Kill’ showed troops on the ground that were logistically ill-equipped for combat but when their criticisms were passed to higher command their pleas were ignored and they were simply told they would have to make do. In many cases they were seen mocking the people they believed to be responsible for their plight, in this case a Company Quarter Master Sergeant (CQMS) that failed to provide them with oil for their weapons or a sufficient number of batteries for their Night Vision Equipment (NVE.).35

In Elizabeth Rudin’s ‘Battle Company is Out There’ (the same unit is also portrayed in the documentary film ‘Restrepo’) we are shown a unit operating in the isolated Korengal Valley in the Northeastern Province of Kunar, Afghanistan that due to their vulnerable position, and the regular casualties they were incurring were becoming increasingly unhinged, so much so, that a psychologist had to be flown out to assess their mental welfare. Rudin laid bare many of the uncomfortable truths that caused this deterioration;

It didn’t take long to understand why so many soldiers were taking antidepressants. The soldiers were on a 15 month tour that included just 18 days off. Many of them were “stop-lossed,” meaning their contracts were extended because the army is stretched so thin. You are not allowed to refuse these extensions...As Sergeant Erick Gallardo put it; “We don’t get supplies, assets. We scrounge for everything and live a lot more rugged. But we know the war is here.36

Furthermore—Rudin was able to illustrate the disparity between senior commanders and the troops deployed to the Korengal Valley, who appeared to be thinking on such a strategic level that they appeared indifferent to the developments at grass roots level that were costing their own forces dearly. Rudin recounts how the junior officer in charge of the Korengal Valley outpost, Captain Dan Kearney would recoil in horror when he heard the views expressed by senior officers of their area of operations;

[In] over five months, he had gained about 400 hundred yards of terrain. When some generals and colonels had flown in for a quick tour, and Kearney was showing them the lay of the land, one officer said to another, as Kearney later recalled it, “I don’t know why we’re even out here; I don’t know why we’re even out here.” Another officer jumped in to talk up the logic of the operation. Kearney told me he thought; Sort your stuff out before you come out here. My boys are sucking it up and dying.37

34 Farrell, Op Cit.
37 Elizabeth Rudin Battle Company is out there
Seow Ting Lee, a media analyst in Illinois State University, feels that incidents recounted in embedded reporting, similar to the one just recounted by Rudin, essentially amount to inter-personal stories that are too narrow and too minute to facilitate the level of discussion that conflict deserves;

Through a here and now perspective, the war journalism stories confined a conflict to a closed space and time, with little exploration of the causes and long-term effects of the conflict. Reporting only on the here and now is a common journalistic practice, focusing on only what is happening in the battlefield, the military clashes and the casualties, with very little background....Dichotomising between the bad guys and the good guys involves casting simplistic moral judgements about the parties involved, and [often] assigning blame to the party who started conflict.38

While strategic analysis is necessary to give a fully rounded view of a conflict, for a journalist to ignore the plight of those at grass roots in a war and pass it off as objective is as reprehensible to the narrative of that war, as the ignorance of senior American officers to their own troops in the Korengal Valley. Indeed to simply analyse a war at a strategic level could be more damaging to journalism and its efforts to truthfully portray the war, in that media manipulation is all the more focused at strategic level—through spin doctors, press advisors, sound bytes and press releases. To completely ignore the achievements of embedded reporters would be tantamount to a return to the World War I style of war reporting that has been dismissed as damaging to the historical record of that period.

Conclusion
For those that dismiss embedded reporting as digging too much in the weeds, one should remain cognisant of the fact that one of the most significant strategic turning points in the US occupation of Afghanistan has been the forced retirement by the Obama administration of General Stanley McCrystal, which was as a result of an article called 'The Runaway General,' by an embedded reporter for Rolling Stone Magazine. 39

This, along with many of the previously mentioned criticisms raised by embeds against senior command and political office, has prompted many in the US State Department to question the wisdom of attaching journalists to frontline units and granting them access to truly portray events in a war. As Farrell points out;

Within the military there may now be some debate about whether embedding survives in its current form, after a journalist granted close access helped bring about the downfall of a four-star general within the very military system which spawned it.40

Much debate has raged among journalists and academia about the objectivity of embedded reporting, and how much of what the journalist reports is the image that the accompanying military wish to project to the wider world, and to the taxpayer back home.

40 Farrell, Op Cit.
While some embeds have stated that they felt uncomfortable in the position they found themselves in; in that they felt it hard to criticise a force that is protecting them, or that the military have asked them to refrain from reporting a certain issue—several others have remained steadfast to their profession and reported facts as they see them. In the fallout from the General McCrystal incident;

some of the commentary afterward suggested that the reporter, Michael Hastings, was doing something embedded reporters don’t do: reveal damaging or critical information about the military. In fact, he was doing what the best of them often do: writing what he saw and heard, not only the sophomoric and insubordinate comments of the general’s inner circle, but also the more striking doubts of soldiers in Afghanistan whom the general was failing to persuade of the wisdom of his strategy.41

In other words—the reporter did his job to his full potential, as all reporters should aspire to do. Some of the criticisms of embedded reporting are entirely legitimate; reporters often get too close to their guardians, it frequently only portrays one side of a story, it often focuses on small local issues rather than the wider world view, etc. Despite how one feels about embedded reporting, as with all media, much of the responsibility lies with the reader who should be aware that he/she is being given one side of the story. In a world where the media have often become unashamedly biased in its support for a given stance, usually reflecting the views of ownership, to submit a piece to a jaundiced appraisal should be a given for a consumer that values the delivery of their news in an objective and transparent manner. Embedded reporting should be no different. Better still, one should view embedded reporting alongside media outlets that provide strategic analysis of a war so that one can achieve a truly informed perception, rather than one that smacks of elitism and academic snobbery.

41 Lee Myers, Op Cit.
The Strategic Private in the Virtual Sphere: Social Media’s Omnipresent Moral Gaze on the Defence Forces

ABSTRACT
Where Krulak spoke of the ‘Strategic Corporal in the Three Block War’ this paper examines the potential for the strategic private in the virtual sphere. It examines the potential implications of social media’s omnipresent moral gaze on the Defence Forces and how the individual decisions of our members at a tactical or even personal level can have a strategic impact on the organisation. It examines the approach taken by different militaries to inculcate ethical decision making into members to instill a moral compass that influences their actions, before examining the Irish Defence Forces’ approach. The papers suggests that there is a deficit of formal training on ethical decision making in the Defence Forces and that other nations have learned from experience of the need to have a formalised approach. In order to protect the reputation of the Defence Forces as it operates within social media’s omnipresent moral gaze it should consider including a formal ethics training programme as a cornerstone of all training courses from tactical to strategic levels within the Defence Forces.

In any healthy democracy, public opinion influences the direction of policy decisions and this public opinion is informed and influenced by the media. Being judged, praised, criticised or otherwise by the media was once a matter for the ‘morning papers’ but now with the omnipresent moral gaze of social media, this judgement occurs 24/7 and is facilitated easily by the mere access to a Smartphone. The traditional media see this judgement as their societal function, the Fourth Estate, but now that function can be shared and, importantly, magnified by any member of the public. After The Vietnam War the BBC correspondent Sir Robin Day noted: “One wonders if in future a democracy which has uninhibited television coverage in every home will ever be able to fight a war, however just.” One wonders what Sir Robin would have thought if he had foreseen the emergence of the omnipresent moral gaze of social media and how the military, along with all state functions, are forced to operate within its purview?

Notwithstanding the risk posed by social media engagement the Defence Forces welcome the public glare from the media, both traditional and social, and embrace it through a proactive communication strategy in order to “demonstrate its value and relevance” to the Irish people.

3 DF PR Guidelines (2011-2013) Lt Gen Sean McCann, p.1
The Defence Forces is a very well regarded and disciplined force with an outstanding tradition of overseas service through the United Nations as noted by An Taoiseach Enda Kenny TD: “We truly have a world class Defence Force which makes a vital contribution to the daily lives of our citizens at home, and brings great honour and influence to the State through its contribution to International Peace and Security on overseas missions.”

The Defence Forces also takes very seriously its responsibility to prepare its soldiers to act in accordance with international law and best practice. All soldiers receive comprehensive training and briefings prior to overseas deployment in the United Nations Training School (UNTSI) based in the Defence Forces Training Centre. Minster for Justice, Equality & Defence Mr. Alan Shatter TD noted that:

> The Defence Forces ensures that its personnel deploying on active service to missions throughout the world receive detailed instruction in the areas of human rights afforded to minorities and women, cultural awareness issues and codes of conduct and behaviour, both for the conduct of their respective missions and also their individual behaviour.

Such detailed preparations were justified in the light of the recent highly sensitive UN deployment to Syria, UNSMIS, where Irish Military Observers (Milobs) found their activities being filmed and broadcast on the web through social media platforms such as YouTube. These clips were then aggregated by professional journalists and presented for the world to judge and see what the UN, and Ireland, were doing about the situation in Syria. In previous UN deployments, meetings between Milobs and key leaders in the operational environment would have been in private; now the Milobs’ actions and performance were open for the world to critique, open to the omnipresent moral gaze of social media and thus transforming the individual member of the Defence Forces into an online brand ambassador.

If we consider the media to be the public’s watchdog, it is the ethical actions, or otherwise, of that society's actors that the media must report, comment on and about which they must stimulate debate. Neil Nolan wrote the seminal thesis on Ethical Leadership in the Defence Forces on which I will draw heavily to explore the potential ethical implications of social media on the Defence Forces. Ethics are an integral constituent of any democratic society, reflecting societal and universal norms, a moral compass pointing to what is ‘right’ and what is ‘wrong.’ In most Western democratic societies the application of violence is deemed ‘wrong’ unless applied within a very specific context, however, the nature of the military profession may require the controlled and legal application of the most destructive violence, which would otherwise be considered morally repugnant. Being a soldier, regardless of legal right to apply violence in certain circumstances, does not absolve moral responsibility, no matter how difficult or benign the decision and action might be. General Charles Krulak (1999) recognised the challenges posed by modern operations.

---

4 An Taoiseach, Mr Enda Kenny TD, Speaking at Cavalry Corps Day, DFTC, 03 September 2011
5 Shatter, A. (2011) In response to a Parliamentary question in the Dail from Deputy Sandra McLellan, 24 May
9 Ibid.
in his signal article *The Strategic Corporal: Leadership in the Three Block War.* Krulak argues that the complexity of modern military operations are such that a junior soldier at the tactical level may be confronted by a wide spectrum of challenges that could have strategic implications on the force or even nation state, if mishandled. This assessment is echoed by the British Army: "soldiers of all ranks" will have increasing responsibility, influence and significance in battle and other operations." A primary implication of this observation is that the responsibility placed on soldiers in contemporary times transcends rank, and soldiers must be prepared to exercise an exceptional degree of judgement in making timely and ethical decisions. The consequences of not doing so, Krulak posits, may influence wider strategy. The Abu Ghraib event in 2003 is abhorrent proof of his thesis. The improper actions of soldiers can sit anywhere along a wide spectrum from the abhorrent treatment of some prisoners in Abu Ghraib to videos of soldiers singing pop songs in the shower while on overseas service. Despite the breadth of the spectrum of actions, the potential strategic impact of individual soldiers on the perception of an organisation must be considered. Social media can now instantly hold up those soldiers’ individual moral decisions to public scrutiny which in turn can affect how key decision makers and the general public view the organisation as a whole. It is accepted that overseas military deployments for Western Nations have become more complex. The individual soldier can now operate in a theatre which includes a myriad of other political and non-governmental civil actors alongside warring parties. Added to these factors are complex and sometimes ambiguous mandates, asymmetric threats and an unprecedented level of media scrutiny, all of which coalesce to generate more frequent and intense ethical dilemmas for soldiers. The omnipresent moral gaze of social media increases the strategic risk to an organisation’s reputation even in what would previously have been considered a more benign operational environment i.e. operations in Aid to the Civil Power (ATCP) and in Aid to the Civil Authority (ACA).

When the scale of the risk of social media exposure is considered it is also important to analyse the potential rewards that social media can provide. By combining proper planning, the integration of social media into an organisation’s overall strategic communications and the management of risk through training, policy and oversight, there is an increased likelihood that organisations and publics will better understand each other because an open, interactive means to dialogically communicate exists outside the realm of established media. The alternative to organisational engagement with social media must also be considered during the risk analysis as noted by Denis Hanly, Defence Forces Press Officer:

> Just because you don’t have a social media presence doesn’t mean the conversation won’t go on without you, at least by being there you can try and lead the agenda, it’s much harder to try and change the agenda once it has been set.

---

12 United States (US) Army Prison guards engaged in degrading and torturous treatment of inmates in the Abu Ghraib detention facility in Iraq, the images of which were transmitted worldwide, resulting in significant strategic implications for the conduct of operations by US forces.
13 Krulak, op cit.
14 Nolan, op cit.
15 Dialogical communication “is characterized by trust, openness, spontaneity, caring, sensitivity, sincerity, and empathy. In a sense, it is the “stuff” of which ideal interpersonal relationships are made. As we move toward deeper, more honest forms of interpersonal interaction, we are also moving toward dialogue.” Thomlison, T. Dean (1982). Toward Interpersonal Dialogue. New York: Longman.
The military idiom of ‘Train hard, fight easy’ has been adopted as an informal motto for physical and tactical training of soldiers. Perhaps this same idiom should be applied when the ethical or moral training of soldiers is being considered in a time of unprecedented scrutiny from the Public. The potential for individual soldiers to have a strategic impact on the perception of the organisation, not just in overseas deployments but even in benign domestic activities must be addressed. Therefore, perception management is not only a matter for PR/PA staff, it must be inherent in every soldier’s training.

The Public and Virtual Sphere
The topic of social media and its impact on political communications can not be considered without looking at what Habermas amongst others, calls the Public Sphere. Throughout Western civilization, places such as the ancient Greek agora, the New England town hall, the local church, the coffee house, the village square, and even the street corner have been arenas for debate on public affairs and society. Out of thousands of such encounters, “public opinion” slowly formed and became the context in which politics was framed. Although the Public Sphere never included everyone, and by itself did not determine the outcome of all democratic actions, it contributed to the spirit of dissent found in a healthy representative democracy. Today the Public Sphere can be found in newspapers and television, but also increasingly in the realm of social media.

The internet has created a new virtual public space where the Habermasean ideal of freedom to express opinions with equality is observed. “The Virtual Sphere” is a term that has been coined for the concept of the online Public Sphere. I believe it is impossible not to see social media communication within the Habermasean vision, or at least the infrastructure to create it.

Social media is the latest frontier in the free world of the internet. Traditionally the Web has been regarded as an egalitarian world where all are free to interact, publish and create, but this is clearly not the reality. Prior to social media the Web required a relatively high level of technical expertise to create content i.e. coding, programming, etc. Now social media and mobile technology are removing the barriers to content creation and publishing by making easy to use software freely available online. A gold-rush mentality is occurring with hundreds of millions of people rushing to stake their corner of cyberspace.

Social Media and The Military
Social Media forms part of full spectrum communications strategy for any modern military today, and whilst it replaces none of the existing media it does augment traditional methods of communication, particularly dialogical communication. If an organisation has a key message to deliver to a target audience it must first establish how best to reach that audience. For certain demographics this is increasingly through social media. Modern militaries now engage with social media for the purpose of reaching and engaging with both internal and external audiences. The projected growth in social media use

suggests that this new form of interactive, dialogic communications will only increase. Therefore, its impact on how organisations behave, its omnipresent moral gaze, must be considered at all levels of planning. Social Media could be seen in a Habermasian context as the democratisation of the internet and of news. It allows individuals to have their say, to have their opinions heard and shared regardless of their base knowledge or background. Organisations are no longer dealing only with professional journalists.

Frank Lawless, in his 2012 paper on ethical decision making in the face of social media\textsuperscript{24} pointed out the lack of checks and balances that exist regarding online content:

\begin{quote}
Mainstream media has trained its reporters and editors to have a high level of anxiety about defaming individuals. It's also surrounded by checks and balances: the Press Council and the Press Ombudsman for the print media and the equivalent for TV/radio.\textsuperscript{25}
\end{quote}

The same does not currently apply to the internet. The speed of transmission of information on the internet puts increased pressure on organisations if they want to correct misinformation or to maintain their good name. Once the decision is made to respond in this time pressured environment and posted on the internet it then comes under even greater scrutiny from the multitudes that constantly trawl the net. In turn, this omnipresence or almost continuous public, and by extension, media gaze imposes a greater degree of transparency on the process and on the validity of information exchanged. This has led to an increased need to ensure that your organisation’s activities are positively perceived. The US Army Chief of Public Affairs states “in the world of social media, the perception of truth can be just as powerful as truth itself.”\textsuperscript{26} Closer to home the Irish Defence Forces Social Media Guidelines for individual soldiers states that “in social media the lines between public and private, personal and professional are blurred. Simply by identifying yourself as a member of the Defence Forces can create perceptions about your expertise and about that of the Defence Forces.”\textsuperscript{27}

Gavin Young in his thesis examining the Defence Forces use of social media found that social media provides a previously impossible means of engagement through public, interactive dialogue for large organisations such as the military and their publics. The desire for dialogic communication is implicitly positive and is harnessed in order to provide for ethical and long-term communications goals. In the 21st Century the drive for corporate responsibility, transparency and relevance all underpin this open, western, pluralist approach to dealing with the public.\textsuperscript{28} Paramount to this transparency is the requirement to maintain and develop ethical leadership and to embrace a culture of shared identity among leaders in order to ensure appropriate standards are employed whilst communicating by this means.

\begin{flushright}
27 Defence Forces, (16 May 2011) Social Media Policy, issued by the Chief of Staff.
\end{flushright}
Values Based Leadership

The basic tenet underlying the concept of values-based leadership is that it provides guidance based on core values in uncertain situations or when operating under pressure with competing demands. Similarly it provides guidance when orders issued may not entirely reflect the situation in hand. These core values are based on the organisation's values and are intended to provide guidance for leaders' behaviour.29 "A value is a belief about what is centrally important and hence what should take precedence in guiding decisions and actions."30 Therefore, within the context of the military, values-based leadership is about truly understanding and living by the organisation's values. Canadian Forces' doctrine suggests that “effective leaders manage to reconcile the pressures to achieve the desired military outcomes with their legal, moral and professional obligations… and that integrity is the essential link between these value domains." It is this values based leadership that must be inculcated into every individual soldier, all of whom are leaders, all of whose actions can have a strategic effect on the parent organisation. Models for ethical decision-making may have their function and role in the formation of an individual's conscience. It is not the state's task to function as a moralist, however, as an employer, the state can and should inform its military employees about their legal obligations—for example with regard to the Geneva Convention—and it should help its employees to shape their own conscience. A humanitarian ethos is not by definition part of a soldier's mind set, however, the need for compliance with humanitarian rules and to be seen as an ethical, humane organisation is now higher than ever.31

How to Train

General Krulak's 'Strategic Corporal' operating in a highly complex environment is rapidly discovering that the environment is becoming even more complex with the advent of social media's omnipresent moral gaze. This increasingly complex environment suggests that soldiers at all levels require a degree of analytical sophistication with regard to ethics. But how is this level of sophistication inculcated by military organisations?32

Gabriel argues: “…no member of the military profession…can be expected to make pragmatic ethical decisions without an understanding of the philosophical foundations of those decisions."33 Robinson34 agrees and argues that military organisations must include some form of ethical leadership training for all of its members. Mileham and Willett35 are even more unequivocal about the need to formalise ethical training for soldiers and its importance to military operations, citing it as a matter of “supreme international significance.”36

The Canadian Forces (CF) established the Defence Ethics Programme (DEP) in the wake of the Somalia atrocity of 1993.37 The DEP is a value-based programme38 concerned

---

29 Lawless, op cit.
30 Canadian Forces (2005) Leadership in the Canadian Forces, Conceptual Foundations, Chief of Defence Staff,
31 Verweij, op cit.
32 Nolan, op cit.
36 In Nolan, op cit.
37 During an operational deployment to Somalia in 1993, members of the Canadian Airborne Regiment were involved in a number of atrocities, including the beating, torture and subsequent murder of a sixteen-year-old Somali, Shidane Arone.
38 A value-based programme is one which states in general terms, behaviour which is desirable, based on values which are constitutive of democracy. Beauchamp, D. (2002) Defence Ethics Program: Fundamentals of Canadian Defence Ethics, Ottawa, Department of National Defence.
with ethics training, ethics awareness and ethics risk mitigation. It is underpinned by a *Statement of Defence Ethics* comprising three guiding principles (respect for dignity of all persons, serve Canada before self, obey and support lawful authority) and six obligations designed to provide a foundation for the ethical behaviour of CF members (integrity, loyalty, courage, honesty, fairness, responsibility).

The approach adopted by the US military is compliance-based, and founded on Aristotelian virtue ethics. “The US Military Academy takes great pains to instill essentially Aristotelian virtues into the cadets in order to build a character worthy of trust”. 39 Central to US Defence Ethics are the seven Army Values which “are fundamental to helping soldiers and army civilians make the right decisions in any situation.” 40

The Royal Netherlands Army (RNLA) has also adopted a compliance-based approach to military ethics, which is anchored by an explicit code of conduct. In order to apply the code in practical situations, the RNLA has developed an Ethical Awareness Model (EAM), which is a decision support tool taught to service personnel at all levels and is designed to provide the basis for well-considered and morally responsible decisions. 41

Unlike the previous examples, the British Armed Forces conduct little by way of formal ethics training, relying primarily on historical tradition, the force of the institution and general atmosphere to mould trainees into the desired form. 42 British Defence Ethics are not without doctrine, however, as evidenced by the publication *Values and Standards of the British Army* 43 which details the core values of the Army, in addition to standards of conduct required of all personnel.

**The Way Forward**

Research conducted by Neil Nolan on the need for ethical training for soldiers leads to the conclusion that ethical decision-making is not necessarily a rational or analytical thought process. 44 Nolan’s findings suggest that moral reasoning can be inculcated, and therefore it should be taught, but with the ultimate task of a soldier always kept in mind i.e. the fundamental task of military institutions is to train proficient purveyors of organised and legal violence, a task which demands robust psychological and physical preparation. His findings suggest that an over-developed sense of empathy can undermine a soldier’s professional responsibility, implying that moral emotions in the military context must be carefully managed. 45 Social Media, as with traditional media, must not limit what it is a soldier does, it must merely be one medium through which the myriad of publics, with their vastly differing expectations, can obtain information, engage and at times pass judgement on a fundamental institution of the state.

A consideration of ethics and ethical issues can be both intensely practical and intensely abstract. Military ethics seek to provide a degree of order

---

39 A compliance-based approach emphasises compliance with rules and tends to acquire a strong legalistic tendency, ibid.
40 The seven Army values are: “Loyalty, duty, respect, selfless service, honour, integrity and personal courage” United States Army (April, 2006) *Ethical Decision Making*, Précis issued to the US Army Command and General Staff Course, p. 2.
41 Nolan, op cit.
42 Robinson, op cit.
44 Nolan, Op cit.
45 Ibid.
to the inherent tension between personal conscience, professional duty and constitutional authority. Whereas ideally, a near-Pavlovian response is desirable to cope with all ethical challenges, this is neither realistic nor practical in the contemporary operating environment. Therefore, military organisations have an obligation to enhance the moral judgement skills of soldiers in order to prepare them to address ethical dilemmas.46

It is clear that we must examine the differing approaches to ethical leadership training in order to prepare our soldiers to conduct their increasingly complex operations under the omnipresent moral gaze of social media. Social media must now be considered as an environmental factor in any planning process either in an overseas or home environment. With the omnipresent moral gaze of social media, one that is multi-faceted and includes all parts of the political and public spectra, soldiers must be prepared to have their decisions, actions and even personal lives judged by the world, a judgement which in turn can affect the perception of that soldier's parent organisation and even Nation State.

46 Ibid.
"That damned infernal Green Flag!"\(^1\)

**ABSTRACT**

On the 150\(^{th}\) anniversary of the Battle of Fredericksburg (13 December 1862) this essay provides an introduction to Irish participation in the American Civil War (1861–1865), it also reflects on the performance of the Union Irish Brigade as part of Sumner’s Corps in the Army of the Potomac at the battles of Antietam (17 September 1862) and Fredericksburg. This work also considers the impact of the leadership of the commanding generals of the Army of the Potomac, General McClellan at Antietam and General Burnside at Fredericksburg, on the outcomes of these battles.

**Introduction**

The American Civil War began with the attack on the federally-controlled Fort Sumter in South Carolina, leading to the fort’s surrender on 13 April 1861. President Lincoln called for volunteers to join United States government forces to protect and restore the Union. During the course of the war approximately 144,000 Irishmen joined the Union Army.\(^2\) An often overlooked element of the Irish contribution to the war is that of the Irish who served the Confederacy. At least 30,000 Irishmen fought for the Confederate cause.\(^3\) The Irishmen who wore grey often served in ethnic sub-units or as scattered individuals. This was due largely to the dispersed nature of the Irish population in the southern states.\(^4\) Although there appears to be a growing body of research concerning Irish soldiers in the Confederacy, the dispersal of these men and the lack of primary source material concerning their service in the war makes the inclusion of an assessment of their performance and that of their leaders impractical in this essay. However, it should be noted for the context of this work that numbers of Irishmen did fight in various Confederate units from Georgia at Antietam, and particularly in the Twenty-Fourth Georgia Infantry Regiment at Fredericksburg. This unit was commanded by Col Robert Emmet McMillan, Sr., who had been born in Antrim in 1805.

It is somewhat easier to assess the performance of Irish soldiers for the Union Army. There are considerably more primary sources available, due in part to their significantly greater numbers. The much larger cohort of immigrant soldiers available to the Union also

---


4 An example of a southern unit with a perceived strong Irish connection was the Tenth Louisiana Infantry Regiment. Troops from Louisiana, and particularly those from the docks of New Orleans, were nicknamed Louisiana Tigers. Many of the dock and river workers were recent Irish immigrants. They were often seen as being the lowest level of white society as many of the jobs they were given were deemed too dangerous for valuable slaves. These men were seen as rough and aggressive. They were often very good in a fight and became well known as shock troops in the Army of Northern Virginia. The strength of the Tenth Louisiana was approximately 26 per cent Irish and ‘they were considered to be the best and hardest fighters in the unit’. Suggested proof of the willingness of the Irish tigers to face risk was the fact that they suffered 36 per cent of the regiment’s total battlefield fatalities. See Tucker, P.T. (2006), op cit, p. 43.
made the formation of ethnically-based regiments and brigades much more feasible. The creation of ethnic units generally occurred after strong influence was brought to bear by local politicians representing that particular population. Consequently approximately twenty-five per cent of Irish, German and Scandinavian recruits fought in exclusively ethnic based units.\(^5\)

The majority of ethnic soldiers served in ‘American’ units that simply recruited a variety of men from a particular county or town. Often ethnic units appeared to gain more attention, for both positive and negative reasons, as they were perhaps more easily identifiable. Possibly the most famous ethnic formation in the American Civil War was the Irish Brigade in the Army of the Potomac, and this brigade will be the focus for the remainder of this work, specifically its service at the battles of Antietam and then Fredericksburg. The Irish Brigade was commanded by Brigadier General Meagher throughout this period as part of the Army of the Potomac, which was led first by General McClellan and then by General Burnside.

**Who/What was the Irish Brigade?**

In the 1850s it became very popular to establish and join so-called militia units in the eastern cities of the United States. One of these militia units was the entirely Irish 69th Regiment New York State Militia (NYSM). For a variety of reasons Irish community politicians began to believe that Irish participation in the militias, military service generally and, once war broke out, loyalty to the cause of the Union could reap political dividends for the Irish immigrant community. The position of Irish immigrants in the United States, their political outlook and attitudes to the war are beyond the scope of this essay. Suffice to say that volunteering for the Union Army, particularly for service in identifiable ‘Irish’ regiments, was encouraged in the Irish community at the outbreak of hostilities.

When war broke out a lot of new units were quickly raised, including ‘Meagher’s Zouaves’, which was an infantry company and a self-styled ‘elite’ unit. It would quickly join the 69th NYSM as ‘Company K’; in time for the first battle of Bull Run (21 July 1861),\(^6\) the first major engagement of land forces in the war.\(^7\)

**Thomas Francis Meagher\(^8\)**

Meagher formed his company of Zouaves after the attack on Fort Sumter to fight with the 69th NYSM, which they did at First Bull Run. The 69th NYSM was led by Michael Corcoran who was captured by the Confederates at the battle. In Corcoran’s absence command of the 69th Regiment fell to Meagher. Thomas Francis Meagher was probably the officer most associated with the formation and leadership of the Irish Brigade. Meagher was politically astute, a good organiser, and apparently an excellent orator.

---


\(^6\) The battles of the American Civil War were often named differently by the Union and Confederate forces. The Union nomenclature of engagements is used in this work.


\(^8\) Thomas Francis Meagher was born in County Waterford in 1823. He became a leader of the revolutionary Young Ireland party and was transported to Australia for a seditious speech made at the time of the failed revolt against British Rule of 1848. After escaping from the prison colony in Tasmania he made his way to New York where he became a success in a number of ventures and by 1861 was an acknowledged leader in the Irish community. See Kohl, L.F. (ed.) (1986). *Irish Green and Union Blue: the civil war letters of Peter Welsh colour sergeant 28th Regiment Massachusetts Volunteers*, Fordham University Press, New York, p. 9.
However, his reputation has been somewhat diminished by accounts of heavy drinking. Private William McCarter, Meagher’s clerk in the period before Fredericksburg, describes an incident where Meagher was drunk. He also observed that ‘I am sorry to state here that “drunkenness” in the army, especially among its officers at this time, was alarmingly prevalent’. McCarter further suggests that some of the lack of success of the Union Army could be traced to this issue. Despite Meagher’s taste for alcohol he was highly regarded by his men. McCarter describes him;

Meagher presented an exceedingly neat and clean soldierly appearance, marked and admired by all. He was a gentleman of no ordinary ability. In thorough military skill and in courage and bravery on the battlefield, he was second to none in the Army of the Potomac ... In kindness and thoughtfulness for his men, he was the shining light and bright star of the whole Union Army ... [In danger] Meagher was first to lead the way ... his many acts of kindness, bravery and heroism will long be remembered.

At First Bull Run, although the Union Army was fairly routed by their Confederate opponents, the 69th Regiment did reasonably well. Meagher reasoned that if one regiment of Irishmen could do well how much better would a whole brigade of Irishmen perform.

The Irish Brigade
The first three regiments to form the Irish Brigade were the 63rd, 69th and 88th volunteer infantry regiments from New York City. At a distance regiments of the Irish Brigade could be identified by their flags which were a brilliant green. When Confederates faced the Irish Brigade they were in no doubt about who they were fighting. On 26 July 1861, days after the defeat at First Bull Run, a reorganisation of Union forces took place and the Army of the Potomac was formed by Major General George McClellan.

Early Stages of the War/Build up to Antietam
When McClellan arrived to organise the new army he found ‘no army to command—only a mere collection of regiments cowering on the banks of the river Potomac.’ He immediately worked on establishing discipline in the troops and weeding out incompetent officers. McClellan had excellent organisational and administrative skills and he brought these talents to bear for the benefit of the army. McClellan brought an extremely professional approach to the training of his soldiers and units and this, coupled with the freshly developed discipline, instilled pride in his men. They 'in turn repaid him with an admiration they felt toward no other general. McClellan forged the Army of the Potomac into a fighting machine second to none.
Under McClellan’s overall command the Irish Brigade fought at a series of engagements in 1861/62 where the Brigade’s reputation as a tough and hard-fighting formation was developed. In the bloodbath of the Seven Days, at Fair Oaks, Chickahominy River, Savage Station and Malvern Hill, the reputation of the Irish Brigade was enhanced by the fighting spirit it displayed and the military prowess it developed during a whole series of bloody encounters. However, it was the performances of the Irish Brigade at Antietam and Fredericksburg that would immortalise the memory and reputation of the Irish men who soldiered in the regiments of the Brigade.16

**Antietam, 17 September 1862**

The war in the eastern states had been focussed along the border area between the Union state of Maryland and the Confederate state of Virginia. The battle of Antietam was the first major battle to occur on Union territory and was part of the effort to destroy Lee’s Army of Northern Virginia, which had invaded Maryland on 6 September 1862.

At Antietam the daring Confederate Commander, Robert E. Lee, would be confronted by the much more cautious Union General George McClellan. Even though McClellan had come into possession of a copy of Lee’s orders on 13 September which disclosed the dispositions of Lee’s major formations and which revealed McClellan’s local numerical superiority, he continued to move slowly, despite declaring “Here is a paper with which if I cannot whip “Bobbie Lee”, I will be willing to go home”.18

---

Antietam was one of the few battles where both commanders had selected their tactics and the field of battle beforehand. However, McClellan's caution and tardiness compared to Lee's excellent tactical appreciation and decisiveness meant that the chance for a Union victory was let slip. On 16 September McClellan had up to 75,000 troops available but believed himself outnumbered. In fact Lee had about 30,000 troops and was desperately manoeuvring to concentrate more forces to save his army. The delay until the action commenced on 17 September helped Lee to do this. Once action commenced McClellan had a good plan and if properly executed it might have worked. However, this was not to be. The responsibility for this lay with McClellan and one of his key subordinate commanders—Burnside. McClellan failed to co-ordinate the activities of his attacking forces and missed an opportunity to win when his Union forces had some success in Lee's centre. McClellan's mistakes and Burnside's lack of vigour allowed Lee to manoeuvre his units to give his men, who were fighting with 'desperate courage', the chance to save their army and possibly even defeat the Union Army.19

The fighting at Antietam was some of the most ferocious of the war. Perhaps the most infamous part of the battle concerned the events at a sunken farm road that was a key position in the centre of the Confederate line. This road would become known as the 'Bloody Lane' because of the number of men killed and wounded in it and its environs and it was where the Irish Brigade was committed to battle.20

The Irish Brigade at Antietam, 17 September 1862

The Union Army, commanded by McClellan, pursued the Confederate force until 16 September 1862 when it became clear that an engagement would take place in the vicinity of Antietam Creek. On 17 September the preliminary activities to the main event took place. Union patrols and probing actions were conducted to try to ascertain the strength and disposition of the Confederate force and also to check the bridges and to find possible fords over the creek. These activities revealed that the rebels occupied a crescent-shaped ridge that looked down on the Antietam and which was higher than any position available to Union forces.21 However, McClellan outnumbered Lee and the Confederate defensive position was not strong.22

Once battle commenced on 17 September a number of Union divisions moved against the Confederate lines, suffering heavy casualties. Eventually the division of General Israel Richardson, which included the Irish Brigade and was part of Sumner's Corps, was committed to the fray. The division was deployed with the Irish Brigade on the right, Caldwell's brigade to their left and Brooke's brigade in reserve.23 Within the Irish Brigade the 69th New York Regiment was on the right, then the 29th Massachusetts,24 the 63rd New York, and finally the 88th New York Regiment formed the left of the Brigade.25 At this time a Confederate force was advancing towards a possible gap in the Union line. The Irish Brigade moved to close the gap. The Confederates took up firing positions in

---

19 Ibid., pp 538–539.
20 Ibid., pp 540–543.
23 Ibid., p. 303.
24 The non-Irish 29th Massachusetts joined the Brigade in the spring of 1862 but was replaced after Antietam by the Irish 28th Massachusetts, see Irish Brigade History accessed at: http://irishvolunteers.tripod.com/irish_brigade_history.htm on 22 April 2012.
25 Conyngham, op cit, p. 304.
a number of locations. Conyngham describes how ‘The musketry firing at this point was the severest and most deadly ever witnessed before,’ General Meagher led his troops in person as they went uphill towards the Confederates. The men were cheering as they advanced into the Confederate fire. The Irish Brigade was receiving fire from a number of Confederate units in a variety of locations. The ground of most significance in this part of the battle was the sunken road that would later be known as the ‘Bloody Lane’ it formed a natural trench and an excellent firing position for its Confederate defenders. The Irish advanced over the crest of a small hill only to become completely vulnerable to fire from the sunken road. The fight for the sunken road became the most hotly contested point in the battle. Heavy casualties were suffered by the Irish. The green regimental colours of the 69th Regiment, which were closest to General Meagher, had been completely riddled with bullet holes as eight successive bearers of the flag had been shot down. Shortly afterwards, Meagher, whose uniform had several bullet holes in it, had his horse shot from under him and, stunned by the fall, the general had to be carried from the field. The volley of fire that the Irish had received on cresting the hill had killed or wounded all the colour bearers across the brigade’s front and also caused many other casualties. Seeing the flags and many men fall, one of General McClellan’s staff officers exclaimed his fear that the Irish had been defeated and were fleeing the field, only for McClellan to respond ‘No! Their flags are raised again, they are advancing’.

Conyngham cites Dr Ellis’s description of events, ‘As the Irish Brigade, led by the gallant Meagher himself, charged the enemy’s lines, their cheers rose in one great surge of sound over the noise of battle, over the roar of a multitude of artillery, and was heard far down the lines to the left.’ He further quotes McClellan’s report that Meagher’s brigade had advanced steadily. ‘It continued to advance under a heavy fire… [when facing the Confederates in the sunken road] Here the brave Irish Brigade opened upon the enemy a terrible musketry fire… The Irish Brigade sustained its well-earned reputation. After suffering terribly in officers and men, and strewning the ground with their enemies as they drove them back, their ammunition nearly expended, and their commander, General Meagher, disabled… [they were relieved by Caldwell’s brigade and moved to the rear] … as steady as on drill.’ Although another Union brigade eventually captured the sunken road, it is believed the damage inflicted by the Irish Brigade on the road’s Confederate defenders was essential to this Union success. Conyngham states that ‘The loss of the Irish Brigade was out of proportion high’ and lists approximately twenty-five officers killed or seriously wounded along with four hundred NCOs and men. The New York regiments suffered up to 50 per cent casualties.

Aftermath of Antietam, Dismissal of McClellan
On 18 September battle was not renewed and eventually General Lee withdrew his army without difficulty. Despite the sacrifice of the Irish Brigade and the rest of the Union Army, Antietam was not the complete success that McClellan proclaimed it to be.

26 Ibid., p. 304.
27 Ibid., pp 305–306.
29 Conyngham, op cit, p. 307.
30 Ibid., p. 308.
31 Cosgrove, op cit.
32 Conyngham, op cit, pp 312–313.
When battle commenced, although McClellan had missed the opportunity to destroy the Confederate force in detail and allowed it to concentrate, he still had an opportunity to win the contest. As the battle reached its climax and the Confederate lines were on the verge of being pierced 'McClellan had victory in his grasp … He was at the crisis of his career and he fumbled the moment completely. He did not send in the reserve.' McClellan halted the attack. The next day the two armies monitored each other and then Lee retired in good order. Before the battle McClellan had been unusually positive and actually attacked the enemy, but as the crisis of battle mounted he returned to being cautious, fearful and inactive.

Eventually Lincoln removed McClellan on 7 November 1862. He was replaced by General Burnside, one of the subordinates whose lack of dynamism had contributed to McClellan’s missed chance and subsequent dismissal.

**Prelude to Fredericksburg**

Lincoln wanted a dynamic commander to seize the initiative from Lee and begin the process of winning the war. General Ambrose E. Burnside was not that man. The immediate impact of his promotion was to send Burnside into a state of nervous depression for days after his appointment. He was convinced that he was not competent to lead a large military force and actually became physically ill because of the stress. However, he understood Lincoln’s demand for action and almost immediately proposed a plan to move to Falmouth on the Rappahannock river, opposite the city of Fredericksburg, cross the river and from there drive on to Richmond, Virginia, the capital of the Confederate government. Lincoln and his military advisors were not enthusiastic about this plan, however the President gave his assent to Burnside to conduct it but pointed out that Burnside could only be successful if he moved rapidly. It was now 13 November.

Lincoln’s assessment had been correct—speed was the essential factor in Burnside’s plan. To cross the Rappahannock at Fredericksburg and march on Richmond, Burnside would have to cross the river without allowing Lee to comprehend the Union plan, and so before Lee could concentrate his forces in opposition. Once Lee understood the scheme and gathered his forces in a prepared defence Burnside’s army would be faced with an assault river crossing against a prepared foe, which would be a very difficult undertaking. For a variety of logistical reasons and due to a lack of personal aggression and audacity, delays crept into Burnside’s operation. Troops, including the Irish Brigade, arrived at Falmouth, opposite Fredericksburg, on 17 November. Burnside’s army did not actually cross the river until 12 December and then assaulted the Confederate defences on 13 December. By that time Lee’s defences would be almost impregnable.
The Irish Brigade at Fredericksburg

Preparation for Battle

After the heavy losses suffered at Antietam routine operations continued through October and into November 1862.37 On 17 November, after a series of marches, the Irish Brigade reached the area of Falmouth opposite Fredericksburg. On their arrival, at General Sumner’s direction, General Meagher quickly prepared the Irish Brigade to ford the Rappahannock and to capture a Confederate artillery unit on the far side. Just as the first elements of the Brigade were about to cross the river a messenger arrived from General Burnside with an order that countermanded General Sumner’s order and told Meagher to pull his troops back from the river.38 The Brigade now prepared what the troops thought would be winter quarters and got into the routine of duties and fatigues associated with being in camp in enemy territory close to a known enemy position. On 21 November General Sumner sent a demand for the surrender to the mayor of the town of Fredericksburg, and gave the inhabitants twenty-four hours to leave before bombardment would commence.39

As well as the build-up of Union artillery to support the infantry assault, pontoon bridges were required to get the Union army across the river instead of the bridge that had been destroyed earlier in the war. General Burnside had hoped that the pontoons would arrive concurrently with the arrival of the troops in November, but this did not happen. The speed that General Burnside’s plan needed for a successful crossing of the Rappahannock and march on Richmond had been lost. Instead it had been made abundantly clear to General Lee where the next Union blow would fall. He was able to concentrate his forces and prepare for battle at Fredericksburg over almost four weeks. As Private McCarter describes Confederate preparations;

The Confederates … daily and nightly busily engaged in fortifying the town [and its surrounds] against the anticipated Federal advance and attack … we witnessed them mounting battery after battery [of artillery] on Marye’s and Fredericksburg Heights … hundreds of rebel soldiers busily plied the spade, shovel and pick, throwing up breast works and rifle pits in broad daylight under our very noses … The enemy plainly had determined to contest every inch of ground when our army advanced.40

After surveying the almost impregnable Confederate position the general mood amongst Union troops became one of ‘gloom and great depression’. McCarter further cites one officer who remarked, ‘No competent, sane commander would attack that place from this side of the river.’41

37 These operations included General McClellan’s farewell parade by the whole Army of the Potomac, about 100,000 men. O’Brien, op cit, p. 67.
38 Ibid., pp 81–82.
39 Ibid., pp 83–84.
40 Ibid., p. 85.
41 Ibid., p. 85.
Meagher's Assault on Marye's Heights

The Irish Brigade in the Battle of Fredericksburg
In the days before the battle many on the Union side hoped that some act of generalship by Burnside might allow him to outflank Lee and so remove the need to defeat the extremely well-prepared defences with simple frontal assaults. It was not to be. Reflecting on Burnside’s decision-making process and planning for the battle, Lt Col S.A. Mulholland, Commander of the 116th Regiment, recalled how ‘A painful uncertainty and vagueness of

42 Source: O’Brien, op cit, p. 177.
purpose hung over these meetings. The only cunning displayed at Fredericksburg was by General Lee. On the night of 12 December the Irish Brigade crossed the pontoon bridge and took up positions ready, for their part in the battle on 13 December.

After spending the night of 12 December mostly in the open in the precincts of Fredericksburg the Irish Brigade was told to ‘Fall in!’ at nine o’clock the following morning. Then they stood in line in a street until about noon while the battle for the heights overlooking the town raged and a constant stream of wounded men passed them moving to the rear. While waiting in line as the opposing artillery fired over or at the town shells frequently struck buildings around them, ‘many were injured … [but] the silence in the ranks and the perfect order maintained was most admirable.’ As the Irish waited General Meagher addressed each regiment with inspiring words about upholding the military prestige and adding to the glory of their native land in the coming struggle. As only one of the five green regimental colours was available, the rest having been sent for repair having been literally shot to pieces in previous engagements, Meagher directed that every officer and man should fix a sprig of green box-wood in his cap. There would be no doubt which brigade was advancing up Marye’s Heights.

When the time came for the Irish to advance, the 1,200 men of the Brigade had to attempt what General French’s division and General Zook’s brigade had failed to do in a series of earlier assaults. When the order came to advance ‘with a bound and yell characteristic of perhaps Irish soldiers only’ they advanced over the human debris of the previous assaults. They remained under constant artillery fire as they formed up for the advance. Once the brigade advanced it moved steadily towards the first Confederate position, which was along a sunken road and a stone wall at the foot of Marye’s Heights. This position was crammed with Confederate infantry men, among them General Cobb’s Georgia Brigade that included the 24th Georgia Infantry Regiment, which, as mentioned earlier, contained many Irish immigrants.

As the Irish advanced their resolve was obvious to the defenders. They passed the limits of Zook’s advance, marked by the bodies of Zook’s men, and swept forward. The Confederate Colonel Miller, who had replaced the now dead Cobb, ordered his men to hold their fire while their artillery devastated the Irish ranks. At one hundred and fifty paces from the Confederates the Irish stopped to fire a volley into the Confederate position and then resumed their advance. They were now in a position where the Confederate artillery on the high ground could no longer depress their guns to continue firing at the Irish. A cheer came from the Irish ranks as they prepared for the bayonet charge into the Confederate positions.

Suddenly, a sheet of 1,200 [Confederate] rifles … concentrated a murderous fire upon the advancing line … [despite heavy casualties] the ever-thinning
ranks dashed on … but no mortal men could long face that terrible fire [and the remnants of the brigade fell back] … Forty yards from the wall, where the charge was stayed, the dead and dying lay piled in heaps, and one body … an officer was found within fifteen yards of the parapet.48

The Confederate General Ranson reported that the assault was made 'with the utmost determination', while the Special Correspondent of the London Times who was present with the Confederates declared;

Never at Fontenoy, Albuhera or Waterloo, was more undaunted courage displayed by the sons of Erin; the bodies lie in dense masses within fifty yards of the muzzles of Colonel Walton’s guns are the best evidence what manner of men they were who pressed on to death with the dauntlessness of a race which has gained glory on a thousand battlefields and never more richly deserved it than at the foot of Marye’s Heights, on the 13th day of December, 1862.49

Only twenty minutes had elapsed between the defeat of Zook’s brigade and the repulse of the Irish Brigade. In one area of approximately two acres six hundred and eighty Union bodies were found after the battle. Great credit was given to Confederate Colonel Miller for his coolness and the fire-discipline and steadiness of his men as it was their withering rifle-fire delivered into the Irish ranks that won the engagement for the southerners.50 Of the 1,200 men of the Irish Brigade who started the action approximately 50 per cent were killed or seriously wounded. On the morning of 15 December only 280 men were able to parade as fit for duty.51

Aftermath of Fredericksburg, Removal of Burnside
General Burnside had made a whole series of mistakes before and during the battle of Fredericksburg. The logistical problems and the consequent loss of momentum before the battle were mentioned earlier. His tactical conduct of the battle has been described as ‘inflexibly imbecilic’ as he continued to launch uncoordinated and inefficient attacks against the wrong places and at the wrong time.52 By committing his forces piecemeal he had allowed the numerically inferior Confederate force to destroy a number of Union divisions and brigades, including the Irish Brigade, in detail. Over 12,000 Union casualties were suffered. ‘Burnside’s repulse was complete, and Lee still had in hand two-thirds of his force intact.’53 Burnside’s behaviour before and during the battle was disgraceful. Before the engagement he went into a state of nervous depression. Many of his officers openly doubted him and criticised him. During the battle he broke down almost completely; he was in agony over the fate of the men being slaughtered on the Heights; he started to blame his officers for the situation and then he ‘talked wildly about leading his old corps in a suicidal charge’ but was talked out of it.54 The

---

49 Ibid., p. 83.
50 Ibid, pp. 84–85.
52 Ibid., p. 29.
54 Williams, op cit, p. 200.
most commendable part of Burnside’s performance was his willingness to take full responsibility for the disaster. Lincoln commented that ‘Burnside was the first general he had found who was willing’ to actually take responsibility for his actions. Later Burnside was replaced but was allowed to continue to serve with troops in the struggle with the Confederacy.

The Performance of the Officers and Men of the Irish Brigade

The sources for this work demonstrate that the men of the Irish Brigade were generally seen as cheerful, reliable soldiers who shirked no duty and were aggressive and determined fighters when committed to battle. Bartlett reflects that ‘In the American Civil War, Irish units gained a reputation for their fighting qualities at desperate (and forlorn) struggles such as that at Marye's Heights, in Fredericksburg, where the Irish Brigade in the Union army took shattering casualties.’ Later Burnside was replaced but was allowed to continue to serve with troops in the struggle with the Confederacy.

The Performance of the Officers and Men of the Irish Brigade

The sources for this work demonstrate that the men of the Irish Brigade were generally seen as cheerful, reliable soldiers who shirked no duty and were aggressive and determined fighters when committed to battle. Bartlett reflects that ‘In the American Civil War, Irish units gained a reputation for their fighting qualities at desperate (and forlorn) struggles such as that at Marye's Heights, in Fredericksburg, where the Irish Brigade in the Union army took shattering casualties.’ Later Burnside was replaced but was allowed to continue to serve with troops in the struggle with the Confederacy.

Conclusion

There is little doubt that the units of the Irish Brigade were largely composed of men who became very effective soldiers. These men were in the main well led at sub-unit, regimental and brigade level. Brigadier General Meagher was much loved and respected by his troops for his kindness out of battle and his heroic leadership in battle. The Irish Brigade, officers and men, did everything that was asked of them at Antietam and Fredericksburg, suffering approximately 50 per cent casualties of dead and seriously wounded at both engagements. Unfortunately, this sacrifice was largely in vain due to the poor leadership and command qualities of Generals McClellan and Burnside.

---

55 Ibid, p. 201.
57 Kefer, op cit, p. 117.
58 Ibid, p. 131.
59 Ibid., p. 131.
A Flawed Doctrine:
The Descent into Stalemate on the Western Front in 1914

ABSTRACT
As a new generation of weapons was being deployed on the First World War battlefields, it seemed its impact came as a complete surprise. It would be wrong however to believe that the military leaders of 1914 were unaware of the problems posed by modern technology. So why did the conflict descend so quickly into a gruelling war of attrition? Although the generals must have known the effects of machine guns and quick firing artillery, they still believed the consequent losses would not change the outcome of an attack or impact on the primacy of the infantry arm. While it is difficult to understand why this belief was so universally accepted, the Russo-Japanese War of 1904/1905 had encouraged the impression that a human solution had been found to the problems raised by technological developments on the battlefield. Victory would come to those who had the most disciplined and best-trained army, led by men of iron resolution. There were problems with this doctrine and they revealed themselves in a divide within the major European armies between reformers and traditionalists on how wars should now be fought. The huge casualties that emerged bled the belligerents white and left them exhausted. The rate of attrition, the pace and intensity of the fighting and its related logistical demands were unsustainable. Trenches offered stability and protection. The three armies that found themselves in Flanders in late 1914 now had to grapple with the demands of a type of warfare that included an extraordinary level of ammunition expenditure, heavy casualties and stagnation on the battlefield.

‘Good-morning: good-morning!’ the General said
When we met him last week on our way to the line.
Now the soldiers he smiled at are most of ‘em dead,
And we’re cursing his staff for incompetent swine.

Siegfried Sassoon1

The opening of the First World War in the west held with it great hopes by all sides for an early victory. In August 1914 there was no thought of the possibility that it would last four long and bloody years, no thought of the more than nine million soldiers, sailors and airmen that would lose their lives in the conflict. The image we have from that first year of the war is of a military establishment that failed to realise the consequences of the technological developments in weaponry that were going on around it. As a result, when a new generation of weapons was deployed on the battlefield, their impact came as a

complete surprise. It would be wrong however to believe that the military leaders of 1914 were presented with something totally unexpected and by implication, were unaware of the problems posed by new weapons and modern technology. Far from being oblivious to the lethality of firepower, general staffs were hearing so little else at the time that many became sceptical of the incredible claims being made for these advances.

So why did the conflict descend so quickly into a gruelling war of attrition where defence held the advantage? Why didn’t the Germans sweep to victory with the assistance of modern military technology and a brilliantly conceived operational plan? Why didn’t the French achieve similar victories with theirs? This short paper will re-examine the factors that led to stalemate on the Western Front in 1914.

During the early months of the war the huge casualties suffered by both sides demonstrated that it would be a long and bloody affair. The legacy of this realisation has coloured the attitude of successive generations to the conflict and especially to those who were responsible for its conduct on the battlefield. The losses suffered during 1914 were especially heavy and indeed unexpected. In the first six weeks alone the French suffered 385,000 casualties. This figure would rise to 995,000 within five months. The Germans casualties for the same period were 750,000. The British Expeditionary Force suffered 31,709 casualties by 4 October.

The basis of the belief in a quick victory was a misplaced confidence that good infantry could capture enemy defensive positions and then hold them against counter attacks. In reality the capture of an enemy position turned out to be a rare event in that year. Although the generals must have been aware of the havoc that could be caused by the combination of mud, barbed wire, magazine rifles, machine guns and quick firing artillery, they still believed these losses would not change the outcome of an attack or impact on the primacy of the infantry arm. The argument at the beginning of the war was that an enemy would realise the hopelessness of its position after a number of successful attacks and would then retreat. It was also believed the losses suffered by the attacking force could be sustained if its will to win was high enough.

It is difficult to understand why this mistaken belief was so universally accepted across a generation of military leaders from both sides. These were generals who operated within a reasonably technical environment and had the benefit of a wealth of staff studies and expert advice on the advances and consequences of this new military technology. They also had close contacts with an armaments industry that was bombarding them with their products. The accepted wisdom is that they were stupid and obstinate; reluctant to change doctrine in the face of the realities that confronted them on the battlefield and grounded in the romance of a way of war fighting that had seen its day. It could also be argued that these were leaders who were far removed from the changes that were going on around them by virtue of their social backgrounds and political interests. However valid these conclusions may be, they represent only part of the argument.

The Russo-Japanese War of 1904/1905 encouraged the belief that a human solution had been found for the problems raised by technological developments on the battlefield. Victory would come to those who had the most disciplined and best trained army, led

---

by men of iron resolution who were prepared to maintain the offensive irrespective of losses. As a result, the opening battles of the war had more in common with those of the Napoleonic period than with the latter half of the war. By the end of 1914, which culminated with the First Battle of Ypres, there was a realisation by all sides that throwing well trained, highly disciplined soldiers into battle was not achieving its pre-war assumptions. The human cost was immense and the results disappointing.

The debate on firepower had been raging within the military profession since at least Waterloo and anyone involved in the formulation of doctrine could not but be aware of the impact this had on the conduct of warfare. The generals examined all the options available to them and choose the one that relied on human qualities rather than on firepower. That they stuck to this formula was born, not out of misguided stubbornness, but out of a belief there was no other viable solution to the problem. The dilemma they confronted was that with the improvements to firepower, infantry could no longer show itself in large formations within range of the enemy. The solution was for it to deploy in skirmish lines and to use terrain for cover and concealment. The enemy was now engaged at greater distances with a consequent emphasis on individual marksmanship. Gone were the tightly packed charges so beloved by Victorian artists. The battlefield had now taken on the appearance of an empty field rather than that of a parade ground. The consequent advent of massed skirmishers led to the development of infantry as a science. Skirmishers required skills the traditional infantryman had never possessed or needed. Marksmanship was stressed as the individual soldier was now involved in deciding his target and the range he would engage it at. Skirmishers needed to be agile as bodies of troops were no longer moved around the battlefield at marching pace. They also needed to be able to think for themselves as they were frequently outside the tight and close control of NCOs and officers. The infantry thus became a progressive, scientific and apparently battle-winning arm where junior leaders could aspire to more than just endless barrack square drill.

From a political point of view it made sense to support a doctrine that emphasised light mobile forces, which relied on human qualities, rather than on expensive technology. There were problems however with this doctrine that went beyond cost considerations. These revealed themselves in a divide between reformers and traditionalists. The failure to agree on reform in the cavalry arm is an example of this. In France, de Négrier believed that cavalry should be used primarily for mobility, dismounting to engage the enemy with rifle rather than sword or lance. The old school, however, won the argument and did likewise in Germany, where the cavalry looked on the charge as its primary duty. In Britain the traditionalists reintroduced the lance in the 1907 Cavalry Manual, contending that the rifle could not replace the terror of cold steel. Haig maintained that the morale of British cavalry would be damaged if it were forced to engage in dismounted training. Inaction within field artillery was equally harmful. Here it was argued that indirect fire was bad for morale, so technical as to render it impractical, and of course unsporting. None of the European armies made any real attempt to create strong divisional artillery or to bring guns under a unified command. And so, in the lead up to 1914, many believed the answer to

---

the problem lay in manipulating human nature rather than in learning to understand the technology and the tactical possibilities it presented. It would take three long and bloody years for armies to come to terms with the harsh realities this war brought with it.

Germany's pre-war strategic planning rested on the premise that the war in the west would be short and this would allow it to then deal with Russia to its east. In 1914 it had a large conscript army of some five million. The short war anticipated meant two million reservists were not recalled. Thirty-one first line reserve divisions were mobilised to join fifty-one active divisions. There were great difficulties in equipping these reserve formations, with basic items such as helmets and rifles in short supply. Ten divisions of second line reservists were also mobilised. Up to seventy-five percent of these second line units were made up of volunteers or under-age and over-age men. Their training consisted of just fourteen days in a recruit depot followed by ten days platoon level and even shorter periods of company and battalion level training. Reserve officers lacked tactical knowledge and too readily manoeuvred their troops in massed formations with little regard for their vulnerability to fire power. German infantry was in fact trained to attack in closely packed waves, each about 500 yards apart, to create a shock effect. Although a more dispersed formation had been in vogue up to the late nineteenth century, by 1888 there had been a reinstatement of the close order formation in the belief the open order system presented too many command and control difficulties. Heavier casualties were an acceptable price to pay for adequate control. Even the 1906 drill regulations still held the expectation of forming a single line within 400 to 500 yards of the enemy position to execute a final bayonet charge.8 In practical terms there was little consensus among German officers on what method of attack should be utilised with some units adopting open skirmish lines and others clinging to the traditional close formation.

The French army had a field strength of just over one million men at the beginning of the war. When the order to mobilise was issued, this number swelled to almost four and a half million. The French army, like other European armies, was trained for offensive action. It came as little surprise therefore that French officers reacted negatively to new infantry regulations, introduced in 1904, which abandoned the old elbow-to-elbow attack formations. These regulations drew on British experience in South Africa, but to French officers their effect both on battlefield morale and on command and control was far more dangerous than modern firepower. Thus in 1913 a return was made to the traditional doctrine that recognised no law but the offensive. Essentially it was the speed of the attack that mattered rather than how it was organised.9 This obsession is reflected in the fact that French infantry continued to carry colours into battle up to 1916. The offensive spirit of the French army could not however hide the unresolved doctrinal issues brought about by the advent of modern firepower.

The British army of 1914 was a relatively small, professional volunteer army. Behind these regulars stood the reservists and the part-time Territorial Force. The dramatic expansion of the army that the war would bring about lay in the future and the war of 1914 was fought for the most part by the old regular army and its reservists. Direct fire support to the infantry was provided where required by the artillery. But there was a shortage of

heavy guns and communication between observers and the gun line was difficult. The infantry advanced in small groups to build a firing line some 200 yards from the enemy. This would be reinforced steadily until the volume of fire being laid down permitted a bayonet charge. Individual marksmanship was preferred to the old system of collective fire and this allowed for greater initiative by section and platoon commanders. Although following the Anglo Boer War there had been a move towards a mounted infantry role for British cavalry, by the beginning of the war a reversion to shock action had occurred. Training in both mounted and dismounted action did, nevertheless allow British cavalry to adopt a much greater dual role than French or German cavalry.¹⁰ At the beginning of the war the British strategic plan envisaged the deployment of an expeditionary force of just six divisions, some 120,000 men.¹¹ This was an army that didn’t have the strength and was neither armed nor supplied for a major or protracted war. British war strategy was subordinated from the outset to the needs of its ally France with the result it was forced to fight largely on land rather than at sea where its greatest strength lay.

At the beginning of the war the French and their British allies suffered a series of reverses, one more serious than the last. In less than two weeks northern France had been occupied and Paris threatened. Luck turned for the French however when the German First and Second Armies, instead of advancing on Paris as predicted, began to move to the southeast in an attempt to envelop the retreating French armies and, as a result, exposed their right flank to the allies. Joffre judged that now was the time to halt the French and British withdrawal and he attacked through a thirty-mile gap that had developed between the two German armies. By 9 September the Germans had conducted a general retreat and were dug in north of the Aisne River (See map at Annex A).¹² Although the possibility of a war of manoeuvre still remained, a number of factors were entering the equation that reduced the possibility of this. Not least were the huge casualties that bled the belligerents white and left them exhausted. What was even more worrying to both sides was the lack of munitions, especially for artillery.

Germany now found itself in the position that if was still to achieve a quick victory it needed to secure its position in France while also remaining on the offensive. However Falkenhayn, who had replaced Moltke as chief-of-staff, failed to build up sufficient forces to give him the required strength and depth. During the ‘Race to the Sea’, that followed the Aisne, (See again map at Annex A) this was to prove critical in the battles to find an open flank. Some of the reasons for this were largely outside his control. The railway system, for instance, was incapable of supplying the troops already in the area, not to mind bringing in reinforcements.¹³ Other factors such as poor intelligence and the inferior and expensive tactical use of troops meant that his defensive needs always maintained a priority over his need to gain the initiative. Although the French conduct of the campaign was no more distinguished, they had the advantage of not being under pressure to achieve a quick victory.

The culmination of operations during the early months of the war reduced both sides to a state of exhaustion. The casualties for 1914 were the highest for the war in proportion

¹⁰ Ibid, pp 37-44.
to the numbers participating. It had been thought the fighting would consist of big battles interspersed with quiet intervals. The rate of attrition that emerged however, was simply unsustainable, as was the pace and intensity of the fighting and its related logistical demands. Trenches offered stability and protection to the exhausted combatants. The First Battle of Ypres, which marked the culmination of the ‘Race to the Sea’, witnessed a transition in the conduct of the war and it would seem that a new form of warfare had come to the battlefield. In reality, many of its features were familiar: artillery employed direct fire against infantry and cavalry dismounted to protected the flank; the machine gun had yet to be deployed in any great numbers and rapid rifle fire dominated the battlefield, particularly on the British side. What was really new was not so much the way the battle was fought as that it raised the possibility of confrontation on a continuous basis.\(^\text{14}\)

The construction of a solid, trench based defensive system confirmed that a quick victory was no longer a possibility for the Germans. In any event they had neither the shells nor the men to exploit a breakthrough. Soldiers might live for a time off the land but neither the countryside nor the supply system could support the masses of horses that armies still required. As a result, horse drawn artillery fell behind the troops it was intended to support and cavalry lost its mobility. Field guns could fire four times as fast as they did in 1870 but ammunition for them could not be improvised.\(^\text{15}\) Army Corps, swollen by artillery and ammunition wagons, had become a blunt instrument occupying so much road space they could not deploy and fight on the same day. The sheer weight and insatiable demands of the fighting machine over a protracted campaign had not been anticipated and this prevented the strokes of operational brilliance that had marked Napoleon’s quick victories. The three armies that found themselves in Flanders in late 1914 grappled with the demands of a type of warfare that included an extraordinary level of ammunition expenditure, heavy casualties and stagnation on the battlefield.

The exhaustion on the Western Front in late 1914 brought about a new frontier. It was of a type that had not been seen since Roman times but would be seen again at the outbreak of the Cold War. The frontier was in essence two parallel ditches, usually two to three hundred yards apart, which were deep enough to shelter a man but narrow enough to make it difficult to target by artillery. The construction of the trench system confirmed the existence of a series of problems that were to lead to its institutionalisation. These included the inadequacy of artillery support, the lack of flexibility in planning, the inability to properly position reserves, the lack of delegation in command, the immobility and vulnerability of infantry and the problems of communication at and across all levels.\(^\text{16}\) Some of these were overcome in time, but others persisted, in particular the vulnerability of infantry.

Despite the fact that during almost a century of debate it was acknowledged that firepower was continuously improving, it was still maintained that leadership, morale and the spirit of aggression would always overcome it. The First World War brought about a realisation that these traits weren’t the preserve of just one army but had been built up in all of the

\(^{14}\) Ibid, pp 270-80.
armies engaged in the conflict. They were so strongly imbued that in some cases they
never broke.\textsuperscript{17} This flawed doctrine, along with its attendant logistical problems, brought
stalemate to the Western Front and the recognition after the first few months of the war
that the defence side of the argument had won the debate. It also brought about an
acceptance that a style of warfare had arrived on the battlefield that carried with it a level
of intensity that had never been experienced before.

I think the battle of the Aisne is very typical of what battles in the
future are most likely to resemble…. The spade will be as great
a necessity as the rifle.

\textit{Field Marshal Sir John French\textsuperscript{18}}

Annex A to A Flawed Doctrine

German retreat to the Aisne River and the 'Race to the Sea'

Source: http://www.dean.usma.edu/history/Atlases/WorldWarOne/WWOneGIF/WWOne10.gif
The Importance of the Military Contribution to the Prosecution of a Counter-insurgency Campaign: An Algerian Case Study

ABSTRACT

Insurgency and counter-insurgency are dominant features of post-modern conflict with the character of recent and current conflicts in Iraq and Afghanistan dominating military thought. It is now widely accepted that purely military solutions to insurgency are unlikely to succeed and that a ‘Comprehensive Approach’ is required. COIN campaigns such as that in Algeria in the late 1950’s and 60’s demonstrate the enduring theme that a purely military approach to countering an insurgency is most likely doomed to fail. Using the French experiences in Algeria, this paper examines and puts into perspective the limitations of a purely military contribution to the prosecution of a counter-insurgency campaign.

Contemporary Counter-Insurgency (COIN) operations in Iraq and Afghanistan have been dominant features in the world media. As the US led coalition struggles to come to terms with the high tempo insurgency in Afghanistan, one might think that the recent events in Iraq and Afghanistan herald a new type of conflict, one peculiar to those countries and a creation of the modern world. But even a superficial examination of history will demonstrate that insurgency as a form of warfare is as old as warfare itself. The siege of the Jewish city of Messada by the Romans in 73 AD was an early example of a COIN, while more recent history is littered with examples of both insurgency and counter-insurgency operations. Ireland, for example was in an almost continual state of insurgency for almost five centuries, while other examples of insurgency can be found in the French Vendee in the early 1790’s, and Spain in the early 19th century. The eventual withdrawal from Empire by the major colonial powers post 1945 served as a catalyst for insurgency campaigns, as different groups attempted to hasten the departure of the Europeans and to fill the resulting vacuum. Some of the best known examples of COIN operations occurred in the aftermath of World War 2 (WW2) and include British operations in the Middle East, Africa and Malaya, French experiences in Indo-China and Algeria, subsequent American experiences in Vietnam and now a major insurgency against Coalition forces in Iraq and Afghanistan.

This paper will assess the importance of the military contribution to the prosecution of a counter-insurgency campaign with particular reference to Algeria. It will define insurgency
and counter-insurgency, consider COIN in the post-war environment, identify what factors shaped the French approach to COIN in Algeria, outline the steps taken by the French to achieve counter-insurgency success and consider the eventual outcome. The paper will conclude by reflecting on the limitations inherent in any military contribution to COIN as demonstrated by the French experiences in Algeria.

Insurgency is defined as an “organised movement aimed at the overthrow of a constituted government through the use of subversion and armed conflict”.1 COIN is in turn defined as “those military, paramilitary, political, economic, psychological, and civic actions taken by a government to defeat insurgency”.2

Insurgencies can be classified as falling into two broad categories.3 National insurgencies occur between insurgents and national governments, with the insurgents claiming legitimacy and support from the national population. Many Maoist style insurgencies, such as Shining Path in Peru, fall into this category. Secondly, liberation insurgencies are conducted against a foreign power in occupation of a state or nation. The activities of the Resistance in France during WW2 would be a classic example of a liberation insurgency. When occupying powers withdraw and are replaced by a national government, the insurgents may switch their attention from the former occupiers to the new government which may not be to their liking. While it would be convenient to be able to classify insurgencies as either National or Liberation, many insurgencies can contain elements of both and can change as the military and political situation evolves.4

Different states have approached COIN in a variety of ways and indeed, many countries have seen their approach to COIN evolve over time. The British experienced insurgency in Kenya in 1953-55, Malaya in 1957-60, Cyprus in 1962-64 and Northern Ireland from 1969 until relatively recently. British COIN doctrine evolved through hard won experience in a variety of theatres and eventually recognised that a military approach in isolation was unlikely to bring about success. While an insurgency has armed action as a key component of its strategy, any response from the government must be multi-faceted if the insurgency is to be successfully countered. Simply meeting fire with fire will not in itself succeed in dealing with the root causes of an insurgency. Undermining the popular support on which insurgency relies is as important as securing military victories over the insurgents themselves. But learning such lessons proved to be a painful experience for the French, who suffered major defeat at the hands of the Viet Cong in Indo-China in 1954 which caused considerable soul searching post-bellum. This defeat forced the French to reconsider their entire approach to COIN in an attempt to understand what went wrong in the Far East. It became apparent to them that taking a one dimensional approach to countering insurgency without adequate domestic political support, would fail. They also re-learnt many of the lessons identified by the British from their experiences in Malaya, but were ultimately to prove less adept at the application of those lessons when faced with the deteriorating situation in Algeria.

1 FMI 3-07.22 (2004), p 1-1.
2 Ibid, p. vi.
4 Ibid.
It is now accepted that the successful defeat of an insurgency is dependant on the adoption of a multi-faceted approach which is not exclusively reliant on the military line of operation. In particular, it is necessary to weaken the control of the insurgents over those elements of the population from which they draw their support. It is also necessary to establish political primacy, to build a co-ordinated response, and to plan for the long term, ensuring that the fundamental causes of the insurgency are dealt with as military success is being achieved. In dealing with the root causes of an insurgency, the adequate provision of the basic needs of the population such as food, water, shelter, health care and human rights is essential to a successful counter-insurgency campaign. The French had recognised many of these issues early in the development of their “Guerre Algerienne” approach to COIN in the 19th century. The realisation that they were dealing with a hostile people rather than just a hostile army led to a shift from a purely military to a joint military – political response to early Algerian insurgencies. This led the French to create the Bureaux Arabes in 1844 in an early attempt to regulate the activities of settlers and the conduct Arab affairs. The French developed the ‘tache d’huile’ approach which shifted the emphasis to military and political efforts working in tandem with a focus on the spread of peace, prosperity and justice. In this doctrine, the French saw their forces ‘not so much an occupying army but rather an organisation on the march which employed economic, political and diplomatic tools’. However, as we shall see in Algeria in the 20th century, the French were ultimately not prepared to compromise in order to take this doctrine to its logical conclusion. The one million Colons, those European settlers who controlled Algeria, were not prepared to share power with the native Algerians and therefore social, economic and political control was to remain in French hands until the Algerian declaration of independence in 1962.

The French military response to the growing insurgency in Algeria was shaped by a number of factors. France had recently undergone the trauma of losing its war in Indochina to the Vietcong and the Indochina campaign was seen as but one element of a global struggle against communism. This struggle was evident everywhere. The expansion of communism in the Far East, the recent Korean War, the communist inspired anti-colonial wars in Africa and the possibility of war with the Soviet Union in Europe all served to heighten French fears of the spread of communism. The insurgency in Algeria was seen therefore as one element of a world wide communist conspiracy. The French decision to fight in Algeria was also shaped by their belief that Algeria, unlike Morocco and Tunisia, was not a colony but an integral part of metropolitan France. ‘Algeria is France’ went the popular expression. For the French to agree to independence for Algeria would be to cede part of France itself to communist control. The presence of the ‘Colons’ ensured that the defeat of the insurgency and the retention of Algeria as an integral part of France would remain the aim of France’s Algerian campaign. But while Algeria was very much seen as an integral part of France, not all its citizens were seen as French. Power in Algeria was monopolised by the French settlers at the expense of the native population. The continual refusal of the ‘Colons’ to agree to change the naturalisation laws, despite for instance

---

8 Ibid.
the payment of the “impot du sang” or “blood tax” by the native population in two world 

wars, was indicative of the inherent contradictions that underpinned post war Algeria. It 

should have come as no surprise therefore that the rising tide of nationalism that swept 

the colonial world in the aftermath of World War 2 found fertile ground in Algeria.

France’s defeat in Indo-China led to the creation of a new counter-insurgency doctrine 

called “Guerre Revolutionnaire”. Described as “one of the most coherent and detailed 

analysis formulated in the West of what may be called unconventional, sublimited 

warfare”, it recommended a multi-faceted approach to the defeat of an insurgency. Using 

what today might be called a Comprehensive Approach, it utilised a military response in 

addition to economic, political and administrative action in order to undermine the root 

causes of the insurgency. In this way, not only would the insurgents be targeted but 

the culture and conditions that created the insurgency would also be attacked. It was 

therefore necessary to utilise a number of lines of operation, defeating the insurgent 

militarily while also carrying out such reform as were needed to deal with the root causes 

of the dissent. To create the conditions for military success, it was necessary to separate 

the population from the insurgents while attacking the root causes of the disaffection. 

Therefore, the French developed an approach that incorporated Constructive, Destructive 

and Psychological lines of operation to achieve success.

With the eventual outbreak of a fully blown insurgency in Algeria in 1954, military measures 

were soon taken to ensure the separation of the population from the insurgents, thereby 

denying the insurgents support. The removal of large swaths of the population allowed 

the French to conduct unimpeded military operations against the insurgents. The French 

also aimed to separate the insurgents from their bases outside of Algeria. The creation 

of physical barriers such as the Morice Line along the border with Tunisia did more than 

inhibit the cross border movement of men and materiel; it created divisions between the 

insurgents and their political leaders in Egypt, Tunisia and Morocco. In addition to these 

military measures, the French utilised their Section Administrative Speciale or SAS in 

an attempt to win over the population. Through the provision of local medical services, 

the running of schools, the improvement of infrastructure and by the creation of an 

efficient administrative system at every level, the French attempted to offer the population 

of Algeria the benefits of being part of France, hoping to entice them away from the 

insurgent movement. However, the positives associated with the SAS programmes were 

often undone by the activities of the Army and in particular by its 5th Bureau. The torture 

and brutality associated with many of the internment and prison camps operated by 

the French undermined the work of those adopting a softer approach to winning the 

campaign. The abuse of prisoners and innocent members of the population not only 

drove many native Algerians to support the insurgents but also became extremely divisive 

within France itself.

While we can identify a more diverse approach to fighting COIN in Algeria than in Indo-

china, the social, economic and political lines of operation were conducted in support of 

the military rather than as independent but parallel lines of operation. The ‘Colons’ were


11 Paret, Op Cit, p. 5.

12 Paret, Op Cit.
not prepared to accept any diminution of their power within the country while the Army remained fixed on the military defeat of the insurgents. The worsening security situation in Algeria eventually led to the French government granting absolute power to the French Army, ordering it to “re-establish order using every means at its disposal”. The crackdown by the French Army and in particular by elite formations such as the 10th Parachute Division in Algiers led to the virtual destruction of the Front de Libération Nationale (FLN). Its leaders were arrested, killed or driven into exile, and its cell structure dismantled, all in a matter of weeks. However the French government now recognised that military actions alone were not the long term solution to Algeria’s problems and that reform at every level was necessary. They therefore attempted to negotiate with the Algerian nationalists from a position of strength following the success of military operations. This brought a furious reaction from the ‘Colon’ who created a “Committee for Public Safety”, effectively rejecting the government’s authority. Ordered by the Government to deal with this new insurgency, the Army refused to obey, choosing instead to join the Committee for Public Safety. This crisis in civil – military relations saw the Army demand (among other things) the abdication of the Government, a new constitution, and the adaptation of a new Pro-Algerian policy. The actions by the military led to the fall of the Fourth Republic and the return of Charles De Gaulle to the centre of the French political stage. Ultimately, De Gaulle recognised that self-determination for Algeria was the only means of bringing the conflict to an end, de facto recognising that the struggle within Algeria was about national self-determination rather than the spread of communist ideology to the outer borders of metropolitan France. It was also de facto recognition that the military contribution to the COIN campaign could not in itself achieve success. The desire of nationalist Algeria for independence could simply not be defeated by the military and that the failure of the French to adopt a truly comprehensive approach to the struggle simply fuelled the growing desire for national self-determination. The withdrawal of the French from Algeria in 1962 was a stark demonstration of the limitations of adopting a COIN campaign dominated by the military line of operation.

This paper has considered the importance of the military contribution to the prosecution of a counter-insurgency campaign and has identified the limitations of the military contribution to COIN within the Algerian campaign. It is apparent that any COIN campaign must adopt a comprehensive approach if the underlying causes of the insurgency are to be defeated. An over reliance on military force within the COIN campaign plan, as in Algeria, is unlikely to bring about success. It is apparent that successive COIN campaigns have identified a number of truisms in relation to post-war counter-insurgency warfare; the need for political primacy, the requirement for a co-ordinated government approach, the need to plan for the long term and the requirement for the moral, ideological and physical separation of the insurgents from the population. While it remains to be seen if these truisms continue to apply to current COIN campaigns such as Afghanistan, they may yet once again prove that a purely military approach to COIN is ultimately doomed to failure.

13 Martin, Op Cit, p. 53.
14 Ibid.
ABSTRACT
The sensitive nature of Special Force Operations poses challenges for academic analysis because sources are typically restricted and frequently official accounts of events deny their involvement. Nevertheless, lessons can be drawn by studying historical cases. This article looks at the 1972 defence of Mirbat in Oman by a force led by the SAS. It examines the background to the conflict, the actual scene of the engagement, the factors underlining both the offensive and defensive plans in the operation before outlining the conduct of the battle using an array of secondary sources as well as primary source material from the UK National Archive at Kew. The study finds that the SAS were a vital force multiplier in this engagement who achieved a strategic effect in the campaign. While their conduct of the defence was by no means flawless, they made better use of the opportunities provided by ‘friction’ in the battle. Their independence, superior technical fighting skills, leadership and courage far exceeded what could be expected of a larger conventional fighting force and this proved decisive in the battle.

Introduction
In the early hours of 19 July 1972 the port of Mirbat in the Dhofar province of Southern Oman was attacked. The garrison stationed there consisted of a small detachment of troops from the Special Air Service (SAS), officially designated the British Army Training Team (BATT), and around ninety other armed troops loyal to the Sultan. They were attacked by a rebel force of approximately two hundred and fifty Marxist guerrillas from the Peoples Front for the Liberation of the Occupied Arabian Gulf (PFLOAG) commonly known as the Adoo. The battle that ensued is regarded by some as one of the regiment’s finest hours1 and a number of subsequent accounts would even seem to suggest that the SAS were solely responsible for the successful defence of Mirbat.2 Matt Warman, writing in the Daily Telegraph, described the battle as where ‘just nine Special Forces soldiers overcame three hundred Communist guerrillas’.3

An analysis of the Battle of Mirbat may be of some benefit in the study of Special Operations Forces (SOF). James D. Kiras claims that ‘strategic effect results from success in overcoming improbable odds to accomplish a difficult, but important mission.’4 While many books have been written on the daring exploits of special operations soldiers; ‘for a variety of reasons special operations and how they achieve strategic effects have not been well understood.’5 SOFs for their part will claim it is the unique characteristics of their individual soldiers or ‘operators’ as they are called, that distinguishes them.6 Yet, outside of the popular press or ghost written autobiographies it is usually the actions

---
5 Ibid.
of a unit or group as a whole that is examined rather than the individual operators themselves. Even when the actions of units are discussed, it is often as a footnote to a campaign and predominantly in an offensive or direct action role. Whilst during any action it would be hard to quantify the effects of SOF versus conventional troops, this would especially prove difficult in a direct action role. This is the case as their tactics and desired consequences are often very different, however this effect should be largely negated in a defensive action.

Using previously classified ‘secret’ British Army reports, memoirs, first person accounts, and secondary source material, the build up to the events at Mirbat will be reviewed before analysing the attack from both the attacker’s and defender’s perspectives, in an attempt to discover how the attack was repelled and to what extent this success can be attributed to the BATT. In addition, while recognising that any analysis is hampered by the secrecy that surrounds them, this paper will attempt to address the lack of research on SOF by focussing in on this small action involving a small detachment of SOF operators. To enable this analysis, the actions of individual operators will be discussed while hypothesising whether regular forces could have behaved in the same way.

**Background**

While America and the world watched newsreels of the war in Vietnam, the British Army was engaged in a lesser known, but highly successful counter insurgency campaign of their own in the Dhofar region of Oman. A key turning point in this campaign came on the 23 July 1970 when the ultra conservative Sultan Said Bin Taimur was deposed by his Sandhurst trained son, Qaboos Bin Said. Sultan Qaboos proved to be progressive, decisive and importantly, was also willing to spend the country’s substantial oil revenues on the military and on civil infrastructural development. He implemented a highly successful strategy of securing restive areas militarily so that development could take place. Concurrently the British government considered their options to contribute to the campaign. Subsequently it was recommended that the SAS would support on five fronts, providing ‘an intelligence cell, an information cell, a medical officer supported by SAS medics, a veterinary officer, and when possible, the raising of Dhofari soldiers to fight for the Sultan.’ This latter role was achieved by the SAS (through the BATT) raising Dhofari soldiers, many of whom were former rebels, and forming them into fighting units known as ‘Firqats’. Since February 1971 the SAS had retained one to two squadrons in Oman on a four-month tour of duty. Their impact on the campaign far outweighed their numbers, as one SAS planner commented, “it was not our numbers, but our ideas that made the difference.”

A document captured in late 1971 gave a clear indication that the SAS influence was being acutely felt by the Adoo. It contained observations written by the First Political Commissar of the Ho Chi Minh Unit of the Central area, and described the disarray caused by the BATT-led Firqat operations. It identified the need to counter the BATT information cell and went on to recommend that medical training among the Adoo should be improved so they could, like the BATT, offer medical aid to the civilian population.\(^7\)\(^8\)\(^9\)\(^10\)

---

\(^7\) Gardiner, Ian. (2006). In the service of the Sultan; a first hand account of the Dhofar insurgency Barnsley, p. 52.

\(^8\) Ibid.


The five front plan was not only winning the ‘hearts and minds’ of the civilian population, but the military successes against the Adoo were also gaining momentum. ‘Operation Jaguar’ in October 1971 saw two squadrons of SAS, alongside six hundred and fifty troops loyal to the Sultan, establish two firm bases, Jibjat and White city on the Jebal - a mountainous area previously controlled by, and considered a stronghold of the Adoo. It was an example of a good counter insurgency operation with the British troops acting as enablers for the indigenous forces. Furthermore it demonstrated to those on the Jebal and plain alike that, whereas only a few months ago the Adoo were supreme in the highlands, the government was now gaining the upper hand. The resultant exposure it received on the bush telegraph was as productive as any broadcast. The support for the government and belief that they could provide security grew. The Adoo decided that a major victory was required to regain the initiative. It was a high stakes offensive that insurgents can often be tempted into, especially as their fortunes begin to ebb during a strategic plateau phase.

**The Scene**

The Adoo planned to achieve this victory by mounting, according to British army reports, ‘the largest, most determined and best-planned attack that they have launched in the whole campaign’.

It certainly had sufficient resources; it contained some 250 guerrillas armed mainly with AK47 assault rifles supplemented by six 82mm mortars, medium and heavy machine guns, an 84mm anti-tank weapon, and at least one 75mm recoilless gun.

Facing them at Mirbat were 30 Askaris from Northern Oman who served as the Sultans gate keepers to the town and who were armed with .303 inch rifles. They were housed in a building known as the Wali’s Fort. Across from this and just inside the North East corner of the wire perimeter fence, approximately 25 Dhofar Gendarmerie (DG) armed with Fabrique Nationale (FN) rifles were housed inside the DG Fort. They also had a light machine gun and an old British twenty-five pounder field artillery gun. Around sixty Firqat mainly armed with FN rifles and light machine-guns usually stayed with their wives inside the town itself. The SAS men were housed in a building known as the Batthouse; on the roof of this they had sand bag positions containing a browning .5-inch heavy machine gun (HMG) in one corner and a 7.62mm general-purpose machine gun (GPMG) in another. They also had an 81mm mortar located just outside the Batthouse on its eastern side.

While different accounts put the strength of the BATT at either eight or nine personnel it is likely that there were nine. The SAS usually operated in teams of four at the time, and two of these teams would have constituted the BATT. The ninth person was most likely an intelligence operative whose presence there was even more sensitive than that of the SAS. Finally, outside the wire to the North on the high ground of the Jebal Ali hill, nine Dhofar Gendarmes stood watch in a small outpost that served as an early warning system. The garrison in Mirbat was a fragmented affair. To compound matters, the Askaris

---

11 Jeapes, Op Cit, p. 130.
12 Ibid., p. 141.
14 National Archives, Kew, WO/373/172, Recommendations for honours or awards; Trooper Sekonata Takavesi (27 September 1972), image reference: 577.
15 Ibid.
17 Ibid.
and gendarmes were tribesmen brought down from the North under the reign of the old Sultan whereas the Firqat were indigenous to Dhofar. ‘While most northern Omani share a common Arab, Muslim, and tribal culture, the people of Dhofar remain culturally distinct and often feel culturally closer to neighbouring regions in Yemen to the west. These cultural differences were exacerbated further as the Dhofari were mountain men and the Northern Omani resided on the plains. The cumulative effect of these differences resulted in an enmity developing over centuries encapsulated in the Northern Omani saying, “If your path is blocked by a snake and a Dhofari, kill the Dhofari first”.

The Attacker's Perspective

An analysis of the Adoo attack initially suggests that it was well conceived, particularly at headquarters planning level. In the days running up to the attack the Adoo mounted deception operations on the Jebal that had been successful in luring the Firqat out. The timing was also significant; it happened during the Khareef (season of mist), a time of incessant rain and low cloud. This could benefit the attackers in a number of ways. Firstly, it would reduce visibility up in to the mountains, which would mask the enemy and significantly reduce the effectiveness of the defenders counter mortar fire. Secondly, and more importantly, it restricted the Sultan of Oman’s Air Force (SOAF) ability to fly - an asset the defenders relied on both for air support and re-supply. The attackers had also anticipated the Dhofar Gendarme outpost and had intended to seize this silently during darkness to allow them to occupy their positions before launching their attack on the town. However, further analysis exposes a number of flaws. In particular there seemed to be a disconnect between the planners and the Adoo who actually carried out the attack. Interrogations of captured enemy personnel revealed that ‘had they captured the town they intended to occupy it permanently and establish a seat of communist government in Dhofar.’ It is unlikely that the higher echelons of the Adoo actually believed they could hold Mirbat for any protracted period. It is more likely that they were after a moral victory, occupying the town for a number of hours before retiring back to the relative safety of the mountains. This in itself would have been a propaganda coup and ‘had they achieved it the effect on government plans would have been disastrous.’

The plan was also over complicated and while it does not appear that they underestimated the towns defences, it seems that they overestimated their own capabilities. The Adoo approached the town directly from the South with the majority of their troops abreast in a skirmish line. The remainder ‘…broke into carefully-organised combat groups, each of about ten men, which spread out in a wide arc around the town.’ An important consideration for all offensive operations, no matter the scale, is achieving a right angled flaking approach in order to allow fixed fire support positions to offer direct fire support to the assaulting force for the longest possible duration, while also making command and control easier. It is the least confusing approach in execution. The fixed firing positions of the Adoo were well placed high up on the Jebal, but their main manoeuvre elements

---

20 Jeapes, Op Cit, p. 47.
22 National Archives, Kew, WO/373/172, Recommendations for honours or awards; Trooper Sekonata Takavesi (27 September 1972), image reference: 577.
and the thrust of the attack came from directly in front of these positions, thus restricting
the ability of the machine guns to offer fire support. Furthermore, the decision to have
troops circling around behind the town would only make sense if they thought they could
capture the forts and town quickly. This was unlikely based on their conduct of operations
over the previous months. With the confusion of battle, this over-complication of the
plan isolated the attacking troops, made command and control extremely difficult, and
increased the likelihood of the attackers being caught in their own fire. Perhaps even
more telling was the performance of the mortars. After only a small number of ranging
shots, a trained crew should have been able to bring very accurate fire down to bear
on any of the positions in Mirbat. Yet over a period of hours, a mortar barrage from six
mortars firing from fixed positions scored no direct hits.

Fig 1. The dispositions at Mirbat as sketched by the members of the BATT
after the battle.25

25 National Archives, Kew, WO/373/172, Recommendations for honours or awards; Trooper Sekonata Takavesi (27 September 1972), image
reference: 580.
The Attack from the Defender's Perspective

While the Adoo plan was not orthodox, the organisation of the defences in Mirbat were not exactly a textbook affair. The BATT personnel were in a precarious position. British army reports state that their commander, Captain Michael Kealy 'held full responsibility for all aspects of the defence of the town.'26 In reality the BATT commander was only an advisor. Tony Jeapes, who commanded the SAS in Dhofar and raised the first of the Firqats described it as ‘a curious and often frustrating position to be in because he could advise but he had no executive authority; he had to persuade the man with power to issue the order.’27 Furthermore, the BATT rotated through on four-month tours of duty, meaning Captain Kealy probably inherited the layout of the defence from his predecessor. Nevertheless the defences were poorly disposed and could have been improved dramatically with some minor alterations. The wire fence that surrounded the town was a slight hindrance and little more than a cattle fence rather than a proper obstacle.28 There were no re-supply trenches dug between the forts. This should have been considered a requirement given the relative isolation and open ground between them. This oversight resulted in different members of the BATT making courageous runs across five hundred metres of open ground. This should have been considered a requirement given the relative isolation and open ground between them. This oversight resulted in different members of the BATT making courageous runs across five hundred metres of open ground. Also, the location of the 25 pounder gun was puzzling. This gun replaced an old 90mm French tank gun brought down from Muscat the previous year to counter shelling from a 75mm gun. It was now located at the DG Fort and was deployed to cover the main gate and offer fire support across the open ground to any returning patrols that where being harassed by the Adoo.29 Yet, with the 25 pounder's range, it could have still carried out these tasks if sited much further back. By locating it so close to the fort, everything to the East of the fort was out of arc, whilst simultaneously offering an attacker a perfect blind spot and covered approach from which to seize it. It also meant that the main source of firepower for defence was in actual fact the first line of defence. This elementary mistake meant that if this first line fell it would offer an attacking force a highly valued source of firepower to turn on the rest of the defences. Not surprisingly this aspect had not escaped the attention of the Adoo and as the battle progressed it became clear that this is what their firepower was concentrated on. ‘Subsequent debriefing of captured enemy personnel confirmed this impression and made it clear that the enemy intended to capture the gun, man it with their trained crews and turn it on the town’30 It is likely that the local Wali had given the 25 pounder to the DG as their asset. With minimal training they had deployed it as best thought to carry out their taskings, rather than as part of an overall defence strategy. This type of thinking was evident throughout the battle as each of the forts defended bravely and ferociously but ultimately, independently of each other. As mentioned earlier, historically there were frictions between the different groups that could have hindered cooperation. Nevertheless, one of the roles of the BATT commander should have been to implement a coordinated defence plan and proper siting of weapons with interlocking arcs of fire. There is no evidence to show that Captain Kealy had attempted this but in any case, it had not been achieved.

27 Jeapes, Op Cit, p. 58.
28 Ibid. p. 148.
30 National Archives, Kew, WO/373/172, Recommendations for honours or awards; Trooper Sekonata Takavesi (27 September 1972), image reference: 577.
The Attack

As the Adoo silently tried to seize the DG outpost on Jebal Ali they were spotted and a shot rang out. On hearing this, the mortar men, assuming surprise was lost, immediately began firing. They need not have been so hasty, according to SAS Lance corporal Austin Hussey, who manned the defender’s 81mm mortar, the first rounds they heard were from the mortars and even then Corporal Labalaba had said to ignore them as “they were just testing the fort”.

In any event, by now it did not matter, the attack had begun and within moments it became apparent that this was a little more serious than just checking the defences. Just how serious or what exactly was happening was still unknown. Even when Captain Kealy saw the first Adoo advancing over the open ground between the wire perimeter fence and the Jebal Ali, he initially told his men to hold their fire, as he thought it could be the Firqat patrol returning. The defence, however, as previously mentioned, was a fragmented affair and the defenders in the Wali's Fort had other ideas. They began to fire at the approaching figures prompting Captain Kealy to now order his troops to do the same.

Trooper Winner was manning the .5 HMG on the roof of the BATT house. He was now directed by Captain Kealy to send a message to headquarters (HQ) in Um al Gwarif. Normally all radio transmission was coded, but he took the decision to send it in clear to save time, enabling him to return to man the .5 HMG. So he simply sent “0A, 0A, this is 82. Contact. Under heavy fire. Wait out.”

This in turn started a chain of events that arose as much from luck, as the organisational culture that exists in a SOF which allows quick decision-making and reactions to an ever-changing environment. The BATT stationed at Mirbat were part of B Squadron and, as coincidence would have it, were due to be relieved by G Squadron which had arrived in theatre in the previous days. That morning, G Squadron had been preparing to go to the range to zero weapons, but instead, were now told to draw extra weapons and ammunition before moving to the Sudanese Armed Forces (SAF) HQ at RAF Salalah where they would remain on standby in case they would be needed.

It is not clear how or why, but at some stage, as this was happening Corporal Labalaba had made his way over to the 25 pounder position and was now manning it single handed, a task that would normally have been carried out by a gun detachment of six personnel.

Official records suggest that Corporal Labalaba and Trooper Takavesi had responsibility for manning the gun and were sent there by Captain Kealy. However, in subsequent interviews, Trooper Takavesi and the surviving members of the BATT have contradicted this version of events. Trooper Takavesi had made his away under heavy fire and on his own initiative only when he had heard that a round to the chin had injured his colleague and fellow Fijian. Together they then both manned it, sometimes having to aim the weapon using the barrel such was the close proximity of the encroaching enemy. In the same vein as Trooper Winner, deciding to send the radio message in clear, it was this type of individual

---

31 Chancellor and Marengo, Op Cit.
33 Ibid., p. 89.
35 Kennedy, Op Cit, p. 89.
38 Chancellor and Marengo, Op Cit.
initiative and quick decision making that would distinguish the BATT actions at Mirbat. An Omani gunner had left the fort to help man the gun at the request of Trooper Takavesi but was subsequently shot and no other Gendarme had replaced him. That is not to say that the Dhofar Gendarmes were not involved in the battle, their fort was bearing the brunt of the enemy attack, but such was the layout of the defences that it now seemed there were many independent mini battles in motion. Trooper Takavesi was then hit with two bullets, one ‘entering his right shoulder and passing through both lungs and finally lodging in his left shoulder, while a second bullet gave him a nasty wound to the back of the head.’ In excruciating pain he somehow managed to prop himself up against the sandbags so he could still fire his personal weapon. Soon after, Corporal Labalaba, noticing that they were nearly out of ammunition for the 25 pounder, decided to crawl out of the gunpit to retrieve a 60mm mortar that was close by. It would unfortunately be his last heroic action, and as he broke the cover afforded to him by the gunpit, he was shot and killed.

Fig. 2 Graphic depicting the Battle.

40 National Archives, Kew, WO/373/172, Recommendations for honours or awards; Trooper Sekonata Takavesi (27 September 1972), image reference: 577.
41 Ibid.
42 SAS Dedication Website (http://home.hccnet.nl/22.sas/) (02 April 2010).
The lull in firing from the 25 pounder was noticed over at the Batthouse and when Captain Kealy could not raise either Corporal Labalaba or Trooper Takavesi by radio he decided he would take Trooper Tobin and go over to the gunpit to find out what was happening.\textsuperscript{43} This went against conventional military doctrine that requires that the commander should never leave his men. However, in this instance, enabled by the fact he was commander of a SOF team, Captain Kealy did not have to rely on orthodox means and his decision to expose himself in perhaps the most dangerous location can be considered as an outstanding example of command and leadership. To understand this and why Captain Kealy may have made this decision, knowledge of the BATT disposition is required.

There had been a slight lifting of cloud and hoping that this would be enough for helicopters to fly, Captain Kealy had called for a casualty evacuation and re-supply of ammunition by helicopter. He had dispatched Corporal Cole down to the beach to guide this in. (However, as the helicopter was approaching the Adoo concentrated their fire on it and Corporal Cole threw a red smoke grenade to warn it off)\textsuperscript{44} Out of the six remaining members in the Batthouse, Corporal Hussey and Trooper Tobin were loading and firing the mortar, normally carried out by a crew of four. Trooper Winner in addition to manning the .5 HMG, a task normally carried out by a crew of three was also operating the radio back to HQ. Trooper Taylor operated the GPMG in the sustained fire role, again normally the responsibility for a crew of three. That left only Corporal Bennett and Capt Kealy. Corporal Bennett was not only controlling the fire of the machine guns but more importantly, he was directing the mortar fire from the roof of the house. Mortar fire control, especially counter bombardment is a job requiring a high degree of training and expertise. As outlined above all the BATT personnel were not only employed in highly skilled tasks but between them were carrying out actions normally expected from a regular force four times their size. The only person that could even be considered as spare was Trooper Tobin as although his absence would slow down the firing of the mortar, Corporal Hussey could manage this on his own. Additionally Tobin was a medic and Captain Kealy must have known that they would likely find casualties over at the gunpit so it made sense to take him. The decision to go himself was harder; above all else his job was to lead and command his men. The roof of the Batthouse provided him with the perfect command position as it gave him a good viewpoint of the battle and a direct link back to HQ. This would not be the case at the gunpit. Yet sending anyone else would remove a skilled and integral part of his defence. He was only 23 years old and as an officer only recently posted into the unit, the likelihood is that he would have received little or no training on any of the weapon systems now being skilfully employed by his soldiers.\textsuperscript{45} An officer in charge of regular troops would not have had a choice but Captain Kealy knew his men could perform without him. The decision was made and he left Corporal Bennett in charge.

Under heavy fire the two men fired and manoeuvred their way to the gunpit as the rest of the BATT provided covering fire. Although reaching it unscathed, moments later, Trooper Tobin was shot and seriously injured. (He would die some months later from these injuries.)\textsuperscript{46} That left just the badly injured Trooper Takavesi and Captain Kealy.

\textsuperscript{43} Geraghty, Op Cit, p. 128.
\textsuperscript{44} Ibid. p.129.
\textsuperscript{45} Geraghty, Op Cit, p. 126.
alone at the gun position.\textsuperscript{47} Although they fought ferociously the Adoo kept coming and were now close enough to throw grenades. A number of them actually landed in the gunpit but failed to explode. Trooper Winner believes this was because the Adoo had failed to service them properly, resulting in the fuses becoming damp in the monsoon air.\textsuperscript{48} Trooper Takavesi who was at the gunpit, while not disagreeing, is sure that some of the grenades were thrown with the firing pins still in.\textsuperscript{49} Either way, while it was a stroke of luck for the defenders, it is another indication of the Adoo’s poor execution of the attack. Even with the grenades failing, the position at the gunpit was becoming untenable. To try and alleviate the pressure Corporal Bennett provided close support by directing the mortar to within a few metres of his own troops.\textsuperscript{50} It was a particularly technical proposition not to mention risky as the killing range of an 81 mm mortar is 50 metres and was made all the more complicated as it was not Corporal Bennett’s sole focus of concentration. A description of his other roles and subsequent actions made possible by the skill set acquired in a SOF unit offer an insight into how the individual operators contribute to SOF being described as force multipliers.\textsuperscript{51}

As previously mentioned, up to this point Corporal Bennett was controlling the fire of the BATT’s three main weapons. Normally, each of these would require a separate detachment commander for fire control. Additionally, he was now in charge of the vital radio link back to headquarters and would act as the senior liaison officer for the BATT.\textsuperscript{52} He had handheld communications with Captain Kealy but these were not reliable and besides, due to the intensity of fighting and restricted vision at the gunpit Captain Kealy was not in a position to command. Therefore much of the responsibility rested on Bennetts’ shoulders.\textsuperscript{53} Therefore, in essence, although he was a junior Non Commissioned Officer (NCO) he was now in charge of the BATT defences. Soon after Captain Kealy left for the gunpit the cloud began to lift around Mirbat and Corporal Bennett radioed HQ at Salalah requesting air support and reinforcements. When two strikemaster aircraft appeared he now assumed responsibility of Forward Air Controller (FAC) and directed their strafing runs against the enemy. This culminated in the second wave of strikemasters dropping a 500lb bomb into the wadi behind the DG Fort were many of the Adoo had sought cover from the strafing runs.\textsuperscript{54} This had great effect and relieved the pressure on the fort, at least temporarily.\textsuperscript{55} The relief in pressure could not have been synchronized better as the first wave of helicopters carrying eighteen troopers from G Squadron were approaching just above sea level.\textsuperscript{56} From his position Corporal Bennett now directed them to a safe area to organise themselves before coordinating the counter offensive.\textsuperscript{57} His actions are perhaps best described in the citation for the Military Medal he received.

\textsuperscript{47} National Archives, Kew, WO/373/172, Recommendations for honours or awards; Trooper Sekonata Takavesi (27 September 1972), image reference: 577.
\textsuperscript{48} Ashcroft, Op Cit.
\textsuperscript{49} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{50} National Archives, Kew, WO/373/172, Recommendations for honours or awards; Corporal Bob Bennett (27 September 1972), image reference: 579.
\textsuperscript{52} National Archives, Kew, WO/373/172, Recommendations for honours or awards; Corporal Bob Bennett (27 September 1972), image reference: 579.
\textsuperscript{53} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{54} Jeapes, Op Cit, p. 151.
\textsuperscript{55} Kennedy, Op Cit, p. 106.
\textsuperscript{56} Geraghty, Op Cit, p. 131.
\textsuperscript{57} National Archives, Kew, WO/373/172, Recommendations for honours or awards; Corporal Bob Bennett (27 September 1972), image reference: 579.
Bennett’s cool, decisiveness as a leader and his control of supporting fire and aircraft undoubtedly contributed, in no mean fashion, to the defeat of the enemy and to many of the casualties incurred during their withdrawal.\(^{58}\)

The counter offensive gave a demonstration of the offensive advantages of SOF. Although only numbering around 20 men in all they were armed with nine GPMGs and four M79 grenade launchers, equivalent to the fire power of an entire Infantry company.\(^{59}\)

This, coupled with the attributes previously described, allowed them to break down into smaller, faster moving units and fight their way inland to relieve the BATT. The Adoo they encountered were no match for the fresh, heavily armed troopers and were quickly disposed of. The remaining Adoo, seeing that the tide of battle had completely turned, began to retreat back up into the Jebal Ali. With that the defenders consolidated and began to tend to their wounded. But Captain Kealy still was not content. He now wanted to lead a patrol into the Jebal after the Firqat patrol sent out in the previous days whom he felt could now run into the retreating Adoo.\(^{60}\)

It was another gallant example of his selflessness, but perhaps more so, it was a quite calculated demonstration of his leadership. The Batthouse had become the centre of attention and all the townsfolk and surviving defenders had begun to gather there. Leading out a patrol at this stage demonstrated that they were all in this together as part of an important partnership and it ‘contributed greatly to the esteem and respect with which the Firqat subsequently held the British troops.’\(^{61}\)

**Conclusion**

When the war ended four years later, one authority concluded: “The rebel forces never recovered from this defeat and were never able to deploy sufficient forces to mount a similar attack elsewhere”.\(^{62}\) The guerrillas had not only lost their much needed victory but also a significant number of their fighters. They had left behind around 30 bodies and ten wounded,\(^{63}\) with subsequent reports putting the toll much higher.\(^{64}\) Their morale and faith in their leaders had also been shattered and their leaders now had to resort to terror to try and re-assert their authority.\(^{65}\) In the final analysis the BATT had achieved strategic effect, inflicting moral and material attrition while operating in conjunction with conventional forces.\(^{66}\) An analysis of any battle rarely points to one single event or circumstance to explain its outcome but usually results from a culmination of a number of factors. Mirbat is no different, failure on the part of the attackers, the performance of the defenders and the Clausewitzian concept of friction all had their part to play. If the Adoo plan had been better executed then it is hard to believe that the defenders could have been triumphant. The BATT positions, for example, could never have survived an effective mortar barrage. The evidence would seem to suggest that while the Adoo may have been brave fighters they lacked training. This would explain the poor performance of

---

58 Ibid.
60 Ibid p.156.
62 Geraghty, Op Cit, p. 131.
63 Ibid.
64 National Archives, Kew, WO/373/187, Recommendations for honours or awards; Captain Michael John Anthony Kealy (27 September 1972), image reference: 1353.
65 Jeapes, Op Cit, p.158.
66 Kiras, Op Cit, p. 112.
the mortars, the grenades not going off and the wide dispersal of their forces into small groups negating concentration of effort. From the defenders perspective, while they all made a contribution, the BATT were certainly the key element in the overall success. While there is no doubt that the SOAF air strikes made a significant contribution, their effectiveness was made possible by the BATT calling for and then directing their fires. The evidence further indicates that a large portion of this success can be attributed to the BATT belonging to a SOF team. The members carried out functions designed for larger teams; while not suggesting that regular soldiers have never done the same, what stands out is that they did (and do) this as a matter of course. The skill set and multiple roles played by each operator demonstrate the force multiplication nature of SOF. The advantages of SOF in an offensive role could also be seen in the actions of G Squadron back in Um al Gwarif and on arrival at Mirbat. Yet their very presence in the region at all reflects Clausewitz’s concept of friction. As does the lifting of the cloud base, without which the SOAF would have been unable to play any role.

Ultimately this paper has shown that the most significant factor in the successful defence of Mirbat was the performance of the BATT. Furthermore this work has demonstrated how the individual operators were able to contribute to this success. Fittingly their actions did not go unnoticed. Although kept secret at the time, the awards made public a number of years later included two Distinguished Conduct Medals, a Distinguished Service Order, for the BATT commander, the Military Medal and posthumously, a Mention in Despatches for Corporal Labalaba.
ABSTRACT
This paper draws lessons on the recent peacekeeping intervention in Syria to examine the challenges posed by contemporary complex peacekeeping operations and argues that despite widespread criticism of the UN, the organisation can continue to play an important role in conflict resolution. As well as open documentary sources the author also utilises personal experience from three and a half months service throughout the duration of the UNSMIS mission.

Introduction
Few could have predicted that the reported self immolation of Mohamed Bouazizi, a Tunisian street vendor, in December 2010 would provide the inspiration for protest movements across the Arab world, leading to regime change in Tunisia itself as well as in Libya, Egypt and Yemen and shaking the foundations of power in the remaining Arab states.1 This article analyses the situation in Syria where peaceful opposition demonstrations to the Bashaar Al-Assad regime provoked a brutal and violent government response engendering a bloody conflict that continues to this day. The struggle for power in Syria is a highly complex matter involving not only national, but regional and global actors as well. The ethnic, religious, social, historical, economic and international dimensions of this complex crisis pose multiple challenges for international community efforts to resolve it. For its part the UN has been variously critcised for its inadequate response, raising inevitable questions regarding its ability/suitability to deal with complex contemporary crises.2 This article based on open sources as well as the author’s experience during service with the United Nations Security Mission in Syria (UNSMIS), analyses the situation in Syria and posits that despite the lack of progress in reconciliation efforts between the parties to the conflict, the UN has and will continue to play a role in reducing suffering and ultimately facilitating the creation of a basis for peace in the country.

Background to the Conflict
The Assad dynasty (Bashaar Al-Assad assumed power on the death of his father Hafez in 2000) has governed Syria since 1968/9.3 While their rule endured periodic challenges to their authority there was no precedent for the nationwide revolt that began in the Spring of 2011. Inspired by the Arab Spring that swept across North

Africa and into the Arab Gulf states, the spark of protests in Syria against the regime quickly turned into a conflagration engulfing the urban centres across the country. Protests in Daraa, Damascus, Homs, Hama, Aleppo and Der Az Zour, amongst other cities, drew extremely violent responses from government security forces. The regime also responded by introducing a number of unilateral political reforms including the creation of a new constitution followed by fresh elections and the appointment of a new government. However these activities failed to meet the demands of the opposition. Armed opposition groups emerged throughout the country, many of whom identified themselves as the Free Syrian Army (FSA). These groups operate independently on the ground with the leadership initially based abroad. However, recent media reports claim that the FSA commander, Col Riad Asaad (not to be confused with the president), a former Syrian Air Force officer, has moved into opposition controlled parts of Northern Syria in an attempt to unify the opposition groups and bolster his credibility amongst the various factions. Simultaneously, political opposition began to find a voice both at home and abroad. The Syrian National Council (SNC), based in Istanbul, acts as an umbrella group for seven different political blocs: the Muslim Brotherhood, the Damascus Declaration, the National Bloc, the Local Coordination Committee (as representatives of the grassroots movement), the Kurdish Bloc, the Assyrian Bloc and Independents. Within Syria, political opposition manifests itself through the National Coordination Committee (NCC), a Damascus based organisation favoring a negotiated as opposed to violent approach to resolving the conflict, and the Syrian Revolution General Commission (SRGC), the largest grassroots coalition representing approximately 70 per cent of the revolutionary councils and local coordinating committees that have emerged across the country. Opposition to the regime has been hampered by the inability or unwillingness of the various political and military groups to cooperate. This did not make it any easier for the government to assert itself and levels of violence continued to spiral out of control.

On 23 Feb 2012 in response to the continuing high levels of violence the UN and the League of Arab States appointed former UN Secretary General, Kofi Annan, as Joint Special Envoy (JSE) to Syria. He drew up a six point plan which called for all parties to cease violence and commit to a political process. The Syrian Government was to immediately end the use of heavy weapons in urban centres and to withdraw large concentrations of military forces from within and around population centres. The plan called for a Syrian led process to determine the future of the country as well as a series of other measures to be taken by the government to alleviate the crisis such as guaranteeing humanitarian access to those in need, access to and release of detainees, access and freedom of movement for journalists, and guarantees for the freedom of association and the right to peaceful protest. All parties agreed to the deployment of UNSMIS with 300 military observers to supervise the implementation of the six point plan. UNSMIS observers began to deploy on 16 April 2012 and reached full operational capability within approximately five (5) weeks. Although the establishment of mission was accompanied by a hiatus in the levels of violence, it became apparent very quickly that

---

7 Ibid.
the parties to the conflict were not fully committed to the process and the levels of violence began to rise again. By 15 June 2012 the situation became so dangerous that UNSMIS decided to temporarily suspend its operational activities. The 90 day mandate of the mission provided for in UNSCR 2043 was extended for 30 days on 20 July 2012, however with no progress achieved in terms of cessation of violence the mission was terminated on 20 August 2012. Kofi Annan resigned as JSE and was replaced by the veteran Algerian diplomat, Lakhdar Brahimi, who at time of writing, with a small support team, continues to seek ways to a negotiated settlement to the conflict.

**Syria the Archetypical Modern Complex Conflict**

This paper proposes that the Syrian conflict represents an archetype of a contemporary complex conflict. It encompasses levels of complexity far beyond a simple territorial dispute. As mentioned in the introduction this conflict has implications at local, regional and global levels. It has historical depth that defies characterisation as post-cold war, post-colonial or even post-Ottoman. It has geographical breadth, because despite not being a major oil supplier, Syria is of importance to the major global powers and not just to states in the region. It is therefore inappropriate to level simplistic criticisms at the UN for its inability or unwillingness to act decisively on the matter. This section examines how the complexity of the conflict plays out over three levels; national or local, regional and global.

In terms of national or local considerations, while Syria is a predominantly Muslim state it is ethnically and religiously diverse, something that has engendered historical tensions. Despite the fact that almost 70% of the population are Sunni Muslim, the Assad regime, drawn from the Alawite minority (approximately 12% of the population) has held power through forging alliances with other minorities, Christians (14%), Druze (3%) as well as with elements within the Sunni community to create a nominally secular, nominally socialist (Ba’athist) state. These divisions are exacerbated by deeper regional, tribal and historic-cultural ties. The author’s experience in Syria affirms the assertion made by Van Dam, that despite the fact that state (and indeed opposition) leaders deny the importance of sectarianism, regionalism or tribalism in the conflict, these factors have played a role in the creation of the contemporary state and continue to play a role in the current crisis. Another important local factor has been the attempts made by Bashar Al-Asad to modernise the authoritarian state since his assumption to power in 2000. He inherited a state governed by bureaucratic and party corporate institutions dominated by multiple intelligence agencies who tolerated inefficiencies and corrupt practices all of which contributed to economic stagnation. The loss of Soviet sponsorship in the early 1990s and the resultant increase in military spending added further impetus to the need for reform. Bashar’s attempts to modernise the economy created further tensions, by creating unfulfilled expectations of systemic reform, and highlighting divisions between sects, regions, urban and rural as well as between the majority poor and the minority ruling rich elite. Finally and ironically, the improvement in telecommunications which accompanied the drive for modernisation, created a platform around which grievances could coalesce into active opposition to the regime.

---

8 Van Dam, op cit.
9 Ibid.
11 Ibid.
On the regional level, all of Syria's neighbours watch nervously in dread of the spread of instability that will accompany an escalation of the conflict. All neighbouring states, with the exception of Israel, currently have to cope with an exodus of refugees escaping the violence. The latest UN estimate puts the number of Syrian refugees at 311,500.\textsuperscript{12} The Syrian crisis ominously resembles the Lebanese civil war that broke out in the 1970s and raged for nearly two decades. The complex ethnic and religious divides on the Levant transcend the Lebanese/Syrian border creating a complex network of relationships and alliances. In the North, Turkey, a predominantly Sunni state, a member of NATO and home to a large Kurdish minority, is equally concerned with the destabilising effects of the Syrian crisis. At time of writing, tensions run high between both governments with artillery fire being exchanged across the border. In the gulf the Sunni states of Saudi Arabia and Qatar, have been accused by the regime of supporting the opposition. Shiite Iran has long been a supporter of the Assad Alawite regime as well as having close links with Lebanon's Hizbollah. Israel is concerned at the implications of increased instability not merely in terms of its relationship with Syria but also within the wider region. It is also concerned with any development that would increase the influence of Iran or Hizbullah in the region. All of these states have competing interests in Syria making agreement on progress difficult at the local level. All however fear the instability that would accompany the emergence of a fundamentalist extremist regime in lieu of the current government.

At the global level differences have emerged at the UN Security Council on negotiating a settlement. The US, supported by western allies, has continuously adopted a more confrontational approach towards the Syrian government. On the other hand two key members of the Security Council, Russia and China, are profoundly reluctant to interfere in the internal affairs of a sovereign state. Both are suspicious of what they see as the manipulation of security council mandates to conduct such interference. For example, in their eyes, UNSCR 1973 which called for a no-fly zone in Libya to protect innocent civilians, was hijacked by NATO to effectively provide air support for the rebel fighters.\textsuperscript{13} In addition Russia has legacy links with Syria from Soviet times and has its only mediterranean naval base in the Syrian town of Tartous. Syria is also an important, 4.5 Billion dollar, market for Russian military exports.\textsuperscript{14} Russia is unlikely to back any initiative that will involve either loss of its influence or an increase in western influence in the region. Furthermore, it is wary of the emergence of any form of islamic fundamentalist regime and is suspicious of both Saudi and Qatari support of the Syrian opposition because it blames these states for exporting wahhabism into the Southern Caucasus region.\textsuperscript{15}

Two additional factors contribute to the complexity of this crisis. The first is the admission by the Syrians that they have chemical weapons and are prepared to use them if invaded.\textsuperscript{16} This has implications on all levels. The use of chemical WMD on domestic


soil would be a cause of concern for all parties to the conflict with spillover concerns in
the neighbouring countries. Further afield there are concerns for the consequences of
such weapons falling into the hands of terrorists or hybrid groups such as Hizbullah in
the event of the Syrian government losing control of the situation. Thrown into the mix, a
second factor is the pervasive presence of electronic media in the form of either formal
news organisations or through citizens empowered by the technologies of social media.
Instantaneous broadcasting of every alleged clash or alleged breach of human rights has
created a nightmare for adherents of Clausewitzian warfare. 17 The paradoxical triangle of
warfare in this complex conflict is heavily weighted towards the ‘passion’ of the people
making it very difficult for the ‘rational’ policy makers to act.

These multi-level dimensions to the conflict make it very difficult for the UN to address
the challenge of negotiating a peaceful settlement. A robust enforcement intervention
was never likely, given all the competing agenda in the country. The UNSMIS mission
was effectively a last roll of the dice for local actors to come to some compromise, or
at least provide the basis for finding that compromise. Despite the withdrawal of the
mission there are a number of positive aspects for which the UN can take some credit.
Firstly, the mission deployed sooner than most expected and established Team Sites in
seven locations within a couple of weeks. The full complement of UN Military Observers
was flown in, trained, equipped and deployed within a month. Over the duration of the
mission the team sites established valuable local liaison networks amongst government
and opposition groups. This was no mean feat as prior to this, foreign access to the
interior of the secretive police state of Syria was extremely limited. Furthermore it was
evident on deployment, no matter how frustrated the parties were, that they all craved
the legitimacy that a relationship with the UN conferred. The mission also succeeded in
raising the profile of human rights issues such as detention and access to aid. Finally the
mission was able to provide a truly independent perspective of what was going on in the
country, challenging the propaganda of both sides in the conflict.

Whither Syria?

Unquestionably there can be no return to the status quo ante bellum. The effects of the
Arab Spring suggest that change is inevitable. Specific indicators in Syria reinforce the
inevitability of change. The first is the scale of the revolution. The Assad dynasty, over its
fifty year history has coped with geographically isolated challenges to its authority. These
have been swiftly and ruthlessly put down by the government as in the infamous case of
the 1982 Hama uprising. 18 However, now the scale of opposition spans the country with
centres of revolt to be found from Daraa in the South, through Damascus, Homs and Hama
in the central spine of the country, to Der Az Zour strategically located near the Iraqi border
in the East and to Idlib and the commercial hub of Aleppo in the North. While ethnic Alawite
homegenity in the West has denied the opposition focal points for revolution in the region,
nevertheless there have been outbreaks of violence in key villages and towns there.

The levels of violence also suggest that there can be no return to the pre-conflict status quo.
The conflict death count is fast approaching 30,000 at time of writing and multiples of this

have been injured in the conflict. The high levels of civilian casualties, especially women and children, has exacerbated the situation. Many have been killed either indiscriminately, with the use of aircraft or heavy weapons such as tanks and artillery, or worse have been deliberately targetted in a series of provocative massacres such as those of Al Houleh, El Kobair and Al Ha’afa, to name but a few. These dreadfully high levels of casualties have been accompanied by at best wanton, at worst deliberate, destruction of Syria’s urban areas. This includes the destruction of culturally significant locations. Over the summer the author observed the systematic reduction of areas of the city of Homs by government tanks and heavy artillery. The ancient ‘Crac des Chevliers’ Syria’s best preserved 12th Century Crusader castle, located near Talkalach, approximately 40 km West of Homs, was occupied by opposition forces and subsequently attacked by the government in July. It is not proposed to apportion responsibility here for casualties or the damage caused. The point is that opposition groups apportion the blame for the death and destruction to the government forces fueling further opposition and rendering reconciliation more difficult. The violence has also provoked massive population displacement both internally within Syria as well as creating refugee crises in neighbouring Turkey, Iraq, Jordan and Lebanon.

Finally the scale of government defections further lessens the chances of a return to the former status quo. Throughout the conflict the regime has haemorraged support both at the political and military level. Diplomats and senior political figures have gone over to the opposition in large numbers. The military also continues to lose a continuous stream of personnel and most alarmingly for the government is the defection of senior officers. At time of writing nearly thirty senior members of the regime, including President Assad’s inner circle member, Brigadier General Manaf Tlass, and prime minister Riad Hijab, have broken ranks and joined their opponents. At the tactical level, thousands of members of the army have gone over to the opposition. On any visit to opposition controlled areas, the author was repeatedly struck not just by the numbers of defectors but also by their willingness to be identified and photographed. A constant element of any such visit was the insistence on photographing their identity cards to demonstrate exactly who they were (i.e. not foreigners) but also in doing so demonstrated that there could be no going back to the way things were.

The UN and the Way Forward
So how does Syria transition to accommodate the aspirations of the opposition groups? As a starting point, as long as the conflict continues along the current lines the possibility of external military intervention is ruled out, due mainly to there being no obvious answer to the question ‘who will intervene?’ Despite the humanitarian and ‘responsibility to protect’ concerns a non negotiated military intervention would more likely exacerbate the situation than improve it, contravening a commonly held tenet of just war theory. It is unlikely that any regional state will take unilateral action for fear of escalating the conflict and increasing the potential for their own domestic stability. Unilateral action by a major power risks triggering a more serious global conflict. A possible exception may occur if chemical weapons are brought into use. However any intervention triggered by such a...
scenario is likely to limit itself to controlling these weapons rather than committing to a long term resolution of the Syrian conflict.

The withdrawal of the UNSMIS mission and the resignation of JSE Kofi Annan have left the UN open to criticisms of impotence in its failure to solve or at least contain the conflict. But this is perhaps an over simplistic view of both the problem and the UN response. It is suggested that the newly appointed JSE, Mr Brahimi, has acted responsibly rather than pessimistically in playing down the chances of success of his mediation efforts. This pragmatic approach, paradoxically enhances the UN’s reputation by not generating expectations that cannot be met and passes the responsibility back to the actors at the different levels to seek some working compromise. As mentioned above, the Syrian conflict is a multi-layered crisis involving both national, regional and global actors. It is not susceptible therefore to quick fix solutions and will require a complex multi–layered approach. Such multi-layered approaches are beyond the capacity of individual states and even large regional organisations such as the Arab League, for financial as well as practical political concerns. (Although they may play a role in a complex action with other actors). For all its critics the UN is the global body most capable of addressing the crisis on the different levels required. For example apart from providing peacekeeping forces, agencies such as the World Food Programme and UNHCR have the expertise and capacity to address some of the macro challenges within Syria. Because of the complexity of the problem, Syria is too important to be let drift. The groundwork made by the UNSMIS mission will provide a useful base for what will be an inevitable follow on intervention.
Abstracts

67 Senior Command and Staff Course

MA in Leadership Management and Defence Studies
The celebrated Prussian military theorist, Carl von Clausewitz (1780-1831), in his seminal work *On War*, likens war to a game of cards. This thesis draws upon his analogy, using it as the inspiration for a contemporary investigation of the doctrine of military decision making. Clausewitz’s analogy is tested by considering military strategies in the context of game playing strategies in order to ascertain whether optimal military strategies can be determined by enhancing our understanding of the risks and choices that are inherent to both war and games of chance.

The seminal theorems of human behaviour characterising risk and choice lie in the field of behaviour economics. It is, however, axiomatic that the rules of microeconomic behaviour remain extant in a myriad of other fields including military decision making and this thesis draws upon this hypothesis by using behavioural game theory as a framework for the investigation of military command decisions.

Game theory is a microeconomic theorem which is predicated upon the hypothesis that game playing opponents are locked in a zero sum game of chance, where the participants share the spoils of the game. The central tenet of game theory relates to the notion that optimising strategies cannot be determined without consideration of one’s opponent’s choices in the game. Drawing upon these classical foundations, behavioural game theory adds the psychology of human behaviour under risk to establish the most erudite game strategies.

The efficacy of behavioural game theory, when applied to military engagements, was tested in the context of an historical case study, commonly referred to as the Avaranches-Gap situation. As the Allied Armies broke out of their Normandy beachhead through a narrow gap adjacent to the town of Avaranches in August 1944, the decision dilemmas faced by the Allied and German commanders ostensibly resembled a zero sum game. By using a computer simulation of the Avaranches zero sum game, the research sought to identify whether the theory of games could be used to identify optimising military strategies.

By analysing the game theoretic solution to the Avaranches game, it became evident that military command decisions are determined by a congruence of rational maximising strategies and the heuristics and biases of economic behaviour. The research and findings conclude, therefore, that behavioural game theory can help to inform the commander;
ensuring that he gains a better understanding of his optimising strategies in the context of the enemy’s influence on the outcome of the game.

Arising from the research findings, the author recommends that the theory of behavioural games should be used as the foundation for a reconsideration of the Defence Forces’ doctrine for military decision making. By recognising the two-player zero sum nature of military games, a new doctrine of decision making would ensure that the military commander stacks the deck in his favour as he plays his Clausewitzian games of cards.
One of the Irish Defence Forces primary operational commitments is Crisis Management Operations, such as Aid to the Civil Power or Aid to the Civil Authority on the occasion of natural or other disasters. In this environment military personnel are obliged to interact with many different agencies at strategic, operational and tactical levels. Organisational culture is often referred to as the way we do things around here. This thesis is to examine whether organisational culture can be leveraged to improve the effectiveness of multi-agency operations at an operational/tactical level in an emergency management scenario.

This study explores the complex relationships that exist when members of different agencies come together to work with one purpose. Particular areas examined include, Emergency Management Theory, Multi-Agency Planning and Organisational Culture.

Thesis methodology was based on a post-positivist philosophy underpinning a case study, with a mixed methods approach. The data collection tools selected for primary research were semi-structured interviews, and a survey of stakeholders involved at the operational/tactical level of crisis management operations. The case study facilitated an examination of multi-agency operations as a phenomenon, within the context of the Cork flooding crisis of November 2009.

Findings indicate the important role culture plays in multi-agency operations. They highlighted the fact that an awareness and knowledge of cultural dimension and one’s own organisational culture is necessary before developing an understanding of others. Issues such as ethnocentrism and planning were highlighted, as were elements within both the decision making process and the communication and collaboration conducted between agencies. A systemic understanding of the relationship between actors themselves and the actor / environment interface is vital and success demands a holistic approach.

Arising from the findings, it is recommended that more comprehensive interagency training be carried out requiring improved communication and collaboration and overseen by an appropriate Governmental agency.
Performance appraisal has a significant impact on the career development and promotion of non-commissioned officers in the Irish Defence Forces. In recognition of the importance of non-commissioned officers to the organisation, this thesis critically evaluates the present appraisal system and asks whether it reflects best practice.

The examination of key literature, in academic, business and international military communities, provides a comprehensive analysis of performance appraisal themes, theories and procedures. The research identifies traditional and modern approaches to appraisal and reveals a best practice framework through which non-commissioned officer performance appraisal can be critiqued.

A post-positive, qualitative research methodology is employed to accommodate the human interactions and personal experiences associated with performance appraisal. The use of semi-structured interviews and a focus group allows the knowledge held by key participants, within the organisation, to inform the debate.

The findings suggest that an appreciation of best practice, non-commissioned officer appraisal does exist in the Irish Defence Forces but is, as yet, not delivered through a structured or meaningful framework. Despite the objective of the current appraisal system meeting the criteria to be considered as modern in approach, performance appraisal is undertaken in a traditional and conservative manner. The system is undermined by the absence of a clearly defined policy as to what constitutes best practice which, in turn, leads to inconsistency in application.

The implications of this research for the Irish Defence Forces suggest that a review of the non-commissioned officer performance appraisal system is necessary. To enhance the current process the organisation needs to acknowledge the modern approach to appraisal and formally adopt a best practice framework, through which performance can be consistently and equitably evaluated.
Peacekeeping Intelligence and the Integrated Mission Concept: A Cultural Bridge too Far?

ABSTRACT

The Irish Defence Forces regard the provision of intelligence as essential to the success of its operations and the protection of its personnel, whether at home or on peacekeeping operations under the blue flag of the United Nations. Historically, the UN has shown an explicit aversion to intelligence, while tolerating its practice under the euphemism information. This attitude has shown signs of improving over recent years, with the introduction of Joint Mission Analysis Centres, and their inclusion in the 2008 Capstone Doctrine on integrated peacekeeping operations. These initiatives suggest that intelligence is now embedded in the values and practices of the UN.

However, the UN remains divided in its attitude to intelligence despite these formal changes. It continues to face cultural opposition from within its own structures, and from the broader humanitarian community with which it shares the space of its peacekeeping missions.

This study posits that conceptualising the UN as a differentiated rather than a homogenous culture allows an exploration of the complex relationships that exists between peacekeeping intelligence and the disparate sub-cultures which it is intended to embrace. A review of literature suggests an examination of peacekeeping intelligence in the wider context of the Integrated Mission Concept and similar cohesive approaches adopted by NATO and others in Afghanistan. It also reveals a number of gaps in current knowledge and themes such as transference, direction, formalisation and the impact of change are utilised throughout the study. The author contends that the use of these concepts from organisational culture theory is necessary to fully understand the barriers to effective peacekeeping intelligence.

A qualitative research methodology coupled with the use of semi-structured interviews allows analysis of perspectives from within three distinct sub-cultures: military peacekeepers, UN humanitarians, and the broader humanitarian community. The MINURCAT mission is chosen as an exemplary case study location, and findings from there provide insight into the unique circumstances of that mission while simultaneously exploring the topic in a general way.

The findings indicate that the core values underpinning the UN’s formal provision of intelligence to its fielded forces are not universally espoused. Despite this, alternative informal mechanisms continue to provide actionable solutions based on pragmatic flexibility.

Arising from the findings, the author recommends that the Defence Forces continue to provide an autonomous intelligence function in support of its commanders overseas.
A Qualitative Study of Irish Defence Forces Officers Returning from Overseas Assignment

ABSTRACT

Although increased internationalisation has brought greater scholarly attention to the issue of adjustment to overseas assignments, comparatively little research has been focused on the topic of adjustment back to the home country and home culture. Despite being one of the most important phases of an international assignment, the repatriation process is probably the stage to which most organisations pay least attention. The Irish Defence Forces have been sending Officers on missions to the far-flung corners of the world since 1958, yet, no study has been conducted to investigate the difficulties experienced by these Officers on their return home.

Against the backdrop of the literature on the phenomenon of repatriation adjustment, the aim of this study is to investigate if Officers of the Irish Defence Forces encounter readjustment difficulties on return from foreign assignment.

Black et al’s (1999) framework for repatriation adjustment, using their three primary dependent variables or dimensions of readjustment, was identified as a basis for this study. Given the nature of the issue being researched, a qualitative approach was used, to generate a wider outlook of respondents’ viewpoints. Semi-structured interviews were conducted with seven Officers who have recently returned from overseas assignment and with an expert in the field of repatriation stress. Analysis of these interviews revealed several sub-themes which illustrated the complexity of the repatriation experience.

The findings highlighted feelings of depression, stress and frustration experienced by the Officers on their return home. Some felt a disenchantment towards the Defence Forces while others expressed a desire to leave the organisation. Research also highlighted the difficulties experienced by returning to spouses and children. Officers expressed a general reluctance to speak to Personal Support Services on their return, preferring instead to confide in family and colleagues. Duration of adjustment period did not appear to be consistent with length of mission but prior experience seems to have been an important variable in assisting adjustment.

On the basis of these findings, a number of recommendations are proffered for consideration to prepare future repatriates for the return phase of their assignments. These include introduction of better procedures and advice for returning Officers and their families, information to be placed on the Defence Forces website and greater coordination between Defence Forces Human Resource Management and Personal Support Services sections. Greater communication is required between Personal Support Services and the Officer body in general.
Are We Well Prepared? 
Psychological Aspects in Mission Preparation of the Federal Armed Forces

ABSTRACT

This study concerns psychological characteristics required for coping with stressors and stress reactions in the hazardous environment of an overseas mission. It explores how stress reactions occur and explains what kind of psychological preventive measures should be introduced during the preparation phase for an overseas mission to develop stress coping strategies appropriate for handling stressful situations.

The research was carried out to deduce possible improvements in current pre-mission training for army personnel in staff, combat support and combat service support functions of the Federal Armed Forces in the context of a lengthy and complex preparation process.

The methodology employed was post-positivist in nature. The research strategy was to extract themes of psychological preventive measures based on relevant literature and to analyse their relevance in current training based on a review of concepts and manuals combined with interviews with psychologists and instructors who are responsible for particular training modules.

The findings reflect mission preparation as a long-term process with its own inherent complexity. They reflect the difficulties of transferring the theory of psychological preventive measures into practical execution based on limitations such as time, equipment or contingent size.

The following recommendations are made for the entirety of mission preparation, which arise from the findings and conclusions:

Concepts and manuals need to include more comprehensive psychological elements, with an increased emphasis on practical training in order to improve skills and capabilities. Tests at the beginning of each training phase will support practical training by ensuring that personnel have the necessary foundation to enable assimilation of material; physical fitness should be included as a key test element. A capstone exercise in module form should conclude the training phases, and include both worst-case scenarios and unexpected situations. Details on these need to be incorporated more
substantially into method manuals. Development of an individual’s ethical and moral reference system is realized from the point of education based on the concept of civic education and leadership. This must continue to be implemented after suspension of conscription and transformation of the Federal Armed Forces. Finally, a more effective and standardized review system is required. This should be focused on both, training and content, in order to ensure continued development in the context of rapidly changed environment.
Muslim Radicalisation in Ireland
The Coming Jihad or a Moral Panic?

ABSTRACT

The European Security Strategy of 2003 identified terrorism as a key threat to Europe while the follow-up 2008 report specifically cited the increasing role of Muslims radicalised in Europe. Ireland has not suffered a terrorist attack by violent Muslim extremist groups nor, on the surface at least, does it appear to have experienced the overt manifestation of Muslim radicalisation such as public demonstrations, major public meetings or the emergence of Irish-based ‘radical Muslim’ figures.

This thesis attempts to ascertain if the possibility of Muslim radicalisation in Ireland is likely to become a moral panic. It examines the radicalisation phenomenon, particularly in the UK and the Netherlands, to see if there are key lessons that we can learn from their experience in dealing with the radicalisation phenomenon and to examine if radicalisation may lead to moral panic. This study is not attempting to prove that Muslim radicalisation is occurring within the state. Rather, the research is concerned with investigating if moral panic is likely to occur as a reaction to real or perceived instances of radicalisation. The methodology employed is a combination of two short case studies, a content analysis of specific media coverage from 2006 and a series of semi-structured interviews.

The findings indicate that the theory of radicalisation is highly contested and that there is a pressing need for states to precisely conceptualise what they understand it to mean so that they can effectively counter it. The findings also indicate that effective immigrant integration is necessary to avoid the conditions in which radicalisation can take place and that this will aid in the prevention of a moral panic occurring. While the role of the propagandist is, of itself, insufficient for radicalisation, the presence of such individuals should be monitored, identified and prevented if possible. Without explicitly recognising that they were doing so, the actions of certain state bodies may have forestalled an incipient moral panic about this issue. Moreover, the data suggests that the prospect of a moral panic about Muslim radicalisation is less likely to occur amongst the Irish general public than amongst members of the Irish Muslim community.

On the basis of the findings it is suggested that the Defence Forces continue with and expand if possible its cultural awareness training. It is further suggested that the state continues to promote effective immigrant integration as a bulwark against extremism and to ensure that there are government departments or bodies in a position to understand the potential for moral panic and the authority to take action to mitigate or prevent it.
Integrated Border Management
Catching Up with Europe
Georgia: A Case Study

ABSTRACT

As the European Union continues its expansion, the necessity to establish effective and secure borders is as important as ever, particularly for those countries neighbouring the EU. Georgia is such a case. In 2005, Georgia, was an emerging democracy with many security challenges. One such challenge was the management of its green border and development of its border guard service, still a military orientated organisation. The Organisation for Security and Cooperation in Europe mandated its Mission to Georgia to address the short and medium term needs of the Georgian government through transferring the skills developed in border monitoring to the Georgian Border Guards.

The study sought to addresses the question, ‘How has the OSCE Training Assistance Programme addressed the short and medium term needs of the Georgian Government through transferring the skills developed in border monitoring and from that basis to explore the broader theoretical question of how best practices in border management are defined currently in an OSCE context?’. The research identified a gap in the literature specific to the best practices in border management in relation to the green border. This is of particular relevance to a case study such as Georgia, in receipt of international assistance in developing its border management capabilities.

The methodology applied to this thesis is qualitative in nature. It involved reviewing the available literature and interviewing the ‘experts’ from the main participants in the training of the Georgian border guards along their border. I have also drawn on my own personal experience as Deputy Head of the OSCE Border Monitoring Operation and Programme Manager of the OSCE Training Assistance Programme for the Georgian Border Guards (2004/6).

The significance of this study is its findings and particularly the identification of the best practices relevant to the case study, Georgia. These could provide a framework for international organisations assisting state border services manage their green border through the implementation of training programmes. The study also highlights the finding that the European Union concept for Integrated Border Management and the Schengen codes are not appropriate for OSCE member states such as Georgia, an emerging democracy with a complex security environment. The citing of these best practices could represent the initial step to developing a comprehensive catalogue and in-depth understanding of best, necessary for international organisations assisting state border services in managing their green border, through the implementation of training.
How can Knowledge Management be used More Effectively in Mission Preparation for Overseas Service?

ABSTRACT

While researching this thesis the government announced that the Defence Forces (DF) would return to Lebanon as part of United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon (UNIFIL) in the second quarter of 2011. The DF has gained a vast amount of experience and knowledge from previous overseas missions. The formal application of Knowledge Management (KM) can be used to better prepare for overseas deployments by harnessing such experiences and knowledge. This thesis explores how KM can be used more effectively in mission preparation for overseas service.

During research relevant literature on KM in militaries and civilian organisations were critically examined. Consequently, a KM conceptual framework was analysed and identified that can be employed during mission preparation for overseas service. The SECI knowledge creating model was used in this study to address the thesis question.

A quantitative and qualitative research methodology was employed to determine the degree to which the DF was using KM processes and where deficiencies occur. The data was collected by conducting a review of DF documentation in relation to mission preparation, training and doctrinal concepts. To progress the research, semi structured interviews were conducted with individuals who participate in doctrine design and training policy in relation to mission preparation.

The significance of this thesis emerges from the findings that the DF formally endorses the use of KM practices through its policy documents on doctrine, training, and planning. KM is being practiced by the DF in mission preparation through complementary formal and informal processes. However, this occurs without the organisation fully realising it, as KM practices are undertaken without a fully integrated approach. For KM to be used more effectively in mission preparation a more integrated approach in tandem with a cultural shift is necessary to ensure its full acceptance and implementation.
lt cdr Gerard Menihan

Energy Security: Ireland’s Internal Risks

ABSTRACT

The 1970s saw Ireland exposed to a significant oil crisis. Almost 40 years later increased energy costs and security of supply concerns are again a significant concern with the spread of unrest across the Arab countries of North Africa and Middle East. Energy security has come back into focus. As a small open economy on the Western periphery of Europe, Ireland’s energy security is vulnerable not only to the external twin threats of increased fuel costs and security of supply but also to internally generated risks. This thesis provides a perspective on these risks through the interlocking themes of social non-acceptance of energy initiatives and government energy policy. The thesis explores these themes in the context of nuclear power generation and hydrocarbon exploitation.

The thesis firstly asks why communities oppose energy projects, if they are generally in society’s best interests. It analyses opposition in the context of NIMBYism (Not in My Back Yard), environmentalism or genuine concern about development. Secondly, the thesis examines the impact of Government policy on Ireland’s energy security. It examines the Government’s 2007 Energy White Paper and argues that in certain cases it acts to restrict Ireland’s energy security. Furthermore, the non-implementation of aspects of the energy policy reduces the State’s energy security.

A qualitative research methodology analyses the Corrib gas development and Fukushima nuclear accident, both of which are naturally suited to both the exploratory nature of the research question and contemporary energy issues. The research methods used include semi-structured interviews, which sought opinion from experts in the thesis areas of interest. To achieve balance, journals, official documents and media reports were analysed and experts’ opinions and observations were analysed.

Although the State cannot eradicate these threats, it can mitigate them by accepting that energy security is a concept that it must address proactively and continuously. This can be achieved by creating and implementing a robust energy security policy, incentivising industry to exploit fossil fuel resources for the energy and financial benefit of the State, addressing the nuclear power issue with a long-term perspective and by treating its citizens as partners during the development of energy initiatives. This increased energy security will contribute to Ireland’s overall security as a sovereign state.
The scourge of maritime piracy has been occurring since before the building of the Egyptian pyramids. It is a universal crime and unfortunately it is on the increase again in the past five years. This escalation of pirate attacks has taken place predominantly off the Horn of Africa and is being perpetrated mainly by Somali nationals. The pirates are motivated by money and they have succeeded in demanding ransoms of up to $9.5 million for one vessel. The lives of many merchant sailors have been put in danger by these pirates and recently they have killed hostages in an effort to deter anti piracy forces from bringing them to justice.

The effects of piracy are far reaching and it is estimated that between $7 and $12 billion are added to the cost of shipping worldwide each year, as a result to this crime. However, the cost implication of piracy is not the only consideration, there are currently in the region of 700 hostages being held by pirates off the coast of Somalia. This study sets out to examine the costs associated with modern contemporary piracy and therefore the effects on Ireland’s economic security. United Nations Security Council Resolutions have given legitimacy to counter piracy operations and resulted in the first European Union maritime operation focussed on anti piracy efforts, namely Operation Atalanta. The thesis establishes why Ireland, as an island nation, has decided not to contribute to European anti piracy operations.

The research suggests a number of themes that were identified in the Irish authorities’ decision not to contribute and analyse these themes following semi structured interviews with political, military, academic and merchant navy experts. The thesis also assesses the way in which the economic effects of piracy off the Horn of Africa are perceived by these interviewees. The study uncovered a number of ways in which the contributors felt it would be possible for Ireland to make a measured contribution to anti piracy operations and asks if any of these responses may be considered in the future.

The investigation highlighted the fact that there is no significant awareness about how piracy affects Ireland’s economic security. This thesis also makes recommendations about how Ireland could be better informed regarding the effects of maritime piracy so that decisions in the future can be made from a well informed perspective.
MAJOR PAT MOFFETT

Winning Wars with Words: Which Negotiating Skills are Critical to Success at the Tactical Level?

ABSTRACT

In the current international environment soldiers deploy to theatres of operations where their missions span the full spectrum of warfare. Inherent in this environment is the need for tactical level leaders to negotiate on nearly a daily basis with local military forces, political leaders, and citizens. Although expected and required to negotiate, limited training and resources are provided to soldiers in preparation for these negotiations. The aim of this thesis is to examine which negotiating skills are critical to success at the tactical level.

The current research on tactical level military negotiations is limited and focuses solely on short term fixes to an organisational challenge and struggle. The author explores how a change in military doctrine regarding negotiations will facilitate the required changes in training to improve this critical skill. This study explores the negotiation situations faced by tactical leaders in operations that cover the full spectrum from peace keeping to high intensity conflict to determine the range of negotiating skills required for success. That range includes distributive bargaining, integrative negotiations and cross cultural negotiation. Theory is drawn from primarily the field of sociology and tied into current military doctrine.

A post-positivist philosophy is utilised coupled with a qualitative research methodology utilising a mixed method of information extraction followed by semi structured interviews. These interviews were conducted with serving members of the US, Irish, and Canadian military, who have experience with negotiations in counterinsurgency, peace keeping, peace enforcement, and high intensity conflict.

The findings confirmed that a lack of foundation and training in negotiations limited the success junior leaders were able to achieve during overseas deployments. Stories of successful and failed negotiations were studied and the most challenging negotiations were highlighted, as were the reasons for the challenge. Furthermore, discrepancies in the theories currently trained and those which soldiers face on the ground were identified along with conflicting priorities with respect to pre-deployment training.

Arising from the findings the author recommends development of negotiation doctrine that covers the broad range of negotiations tactical leaders may face in conflict. The study argues that the development of this doctrine will compel future training in developmental courses and thus facilitate more efficient prioritisation of pre-deployment training tasks and requirements.
Peer assessment is recognised within the field of education as having a positive effect on learning and development. However, in the military field, it is not used for developmental purposes and this is reflected in the lack of literature. In 2009, a peer assessment protocol was introduced into the Irish Defence Forces’ Cadet School, in order to maximise learning opportunities and enhance the development of cadets. The aim of this thesis is to investigate whether peer assessment has military developmental utility and is addressed by asking the question; is peer assessment an appropriate tool for training in the Cadet School?

A post-positivist perspective was adopted to explore the research question, with the Cadet School as a case study. Focus groups were conducted with cadets and young officers who had experience of peer assessment and this was augmented with a semi-structured interview with a key stakeholder. The lack of literature on this topic was overcome by conducting initial research, which served as a platform for the primary research that followed.

The findings confirmed the utility of peer assessment because it enhanced the overall picture of the cadet. It also highlighted the complex communication pathways that were in operation between the cadets and the student counsellor - the appointment holder who oversees the operation of the protocol. The existence of a strong perception that the process is unfair was highlighted. Similarly, friendship or loyalty biases were proposed as reasons why the process is thought to be inaccurate. The research also confirmed that peer assessment develops self-awareness and enables both reflection and feedback. Finally, attention was drawn to the invaluable role played by the counsellor in ensuring that the protocol ran effectively and facilitated the development of cadets. Interestingly, and contrasting the claims of unfairness and inaccuracy, the majority of participants claimed to have benefited directly from the process.

In spite of the difficulties identified, the Cadet School should continue to utilise peer assessment because of its developmental utility and the added value it brings to the training.
COMDT SEAN MURPHY

Dereliction of Duty: Is ‘Devotion to Duty’ an Essential Core Value for the Professional Military Officer?

ABSTRACT

Officers are the key leaders in the Defence Forces (DF) and, indeed, in all military forces. As Napoleon said “there are no bad soldiers only bad officers”. The author has observed many officers performing very well, but unfortunately not all. Poorly performing officers appear to share one common denominator – a lack of devotion to duty. The leadership of the DF is the most crucial element in the generation of the capabilities that are required in the service of the state. At home or on Peace Support Operations conducting routine tasks or in hazardous situations, the devotion to duty of its officers remains a key element of the success of the DF. However the DF neither defines nor specifically includes ‘duty’ in its list of espoused values.

This study explores the relationship between values, organisational culture and leadership and the implications of this for military leadership. The review of literature suggests an examination of the attitudes of officers to duty as a concept. It also identifies gaps in the understanding of leadership in hazardous situations. The extent of doctrine devoted to this area by other military forces in contrast to the lack of DF doctrine in this area is also revealed. The themes that emerge for exploration include officers’ values and understanding of duty, the importance of officer behaviour, and the central importance of devotion to duty in leaders and leadership in hazardous situations.

The DF was found to be a most suitable case study which enabled a qualitative research methodology through the use of semi-structured interviews allowing analysis of the views of a variety of DF officers. For this study the focus was on officers, as they have the premium responsibility for leadership in the DF. The findings provide insights into the key role of officers as leaders in the DF and the central importance of the devotion to duty of those officers.

The findings indicate the centrality of the concept of duty to everything the DF does. The interviewees unanimously identified the positive impact that officers with devotion to duty can have on their peers and subordinates, and consequently the units in which they serve. However, they all described experiences of weak officers and the negative effect that they can have particularly on junior ranks. A reluctance to deliver criticism to other officers was described and a consequent weakness in the process of mentoring and
developing subordinate officers was identified. An unexpected finding was the difficulty faced by officers who are mothers in the DF. A most interesting finding was the belief that officers occupy a unique position in society and the implications of this. The importance of devotion to duty in hazardous situations came across powerfully.

Arising from the findings, the author recommends that the DF define and espouse duty as an essential core value. It should be included in the Oath of Allegiance, as it already appears in the officer's commission.
COMDT EARNAN NAUGHTON

Defence Forces Executive Decision Making – How can Dialectical Theory Enhance the Military Decision Making Process?

ABSTRACT

The Military Decision Making Process (MDMP) is currently the sole formal decision making process employed by the Defence Forces (DF) and is used as a guide rail to reach valid, complete and reliable decisions. One of the three pillars underpinning the Senior Command and Staff Course is the development of the DF leader’s use of the MDMP to reach balanced outcomes. This study explores the subject of executive decision making in the DF questioning the suitability of the MDMP as the sole decision making process applicable to the range of decision making to which DF leaders are exposed. It explores the applicability of Dialectical Theory as an alternative formal decision making model for DF leaders while evaluating if dialectical theory can enhance the effectiveness of the MDMP.

Dialectical theory is a decision making process employing constructive conflict or dissent as a catalyst for debate. Academics believe that through application of this formal process of debate that purposefully draws out the views of either participant thus facilitating deeper analysis of assumptions and decision recommendations. Within dialectical thinking, knowledge evolves through the interplay of conflict and its resolution. Formalised argumentation and debate amongst top managers allow assumptions and recommendations to be systematically evaluated and the strengths and weaknesses of each to be made explicit.

The methodology employed was based on a single organisation case study and series of semi structured interviews with executive leaders of the DF. The research data provided a wealth of rich information as these interviewees were organisation leaders who have had considerable experience both nationally and internationally in leading complex and dynamic decision making environments. This study revealed an insight into the character and style of leadership which were central in gaining a greater understanding of their epistemology and decision making approaches.

The findings indicate that dialectical theory is appropriate both as an alternative executive decision making process and a means by which to enhance the effectiveness of applying the MDMP. The significance of the role of the leader in the development and creation of a constructive decision making environment is identified as a dominant factor in
effective decision making. Findings from this study establish the relationship between the application of dialectical theory and development of a leader's critical thinking which is considered essential for a better depth of analysis and consequential decision recommendation.

Proposed recommendations based on the thesis findings and conclusions suggest the professional development of DF leaders in dialectical theories of Devil's Advocacy and Dialectical Inquiry. Where group decision making environments necessitate an alternative to the MDMP, dialectical theory offers a proven alternative executive decision making model with which to conduct formal and effective decision making.
Cognition and Decision Making: New Lessons for the Defence Forces

ABSTRACT

This thesis is to examine the effects of cognition on the decision making process. Do the mental limitations people possess disrupt their ability to make rational decisions? The problem faced by all organisations is that they depend on leaders to make decisions. Can organisations be sure these decisions are the best that can be made given the particular circumstances which exist at that time?

This study will explore the effects training and experience have on the decision making ability of leaders. The DF depends on individuals to make decisions. To assist leaders in decision making the DF teaches all its leaders the Military Decision Making Process (MDMP). A formal decision making process which enhances the leader’s ability to make sound decisions. The purpose of experience and training is to increase the skill set of individuals by deepening and expanding their knowledge in a domain area. History has shown that some of the worst decisions have been made by the most experienced people.

The findings indicate that experts take mental short cuts, heuristics, in order to react to situations in an efficient manner. This allows Captains, experts, to get the job done. However, this can lead to a situation where thoroughness is sacrificed over efficiency to get the job done. The Cadets, novices, on the other hand are more reserved and seek to come up with various courses of action before settling on one. The process of being transformed from novice to expert causes changes to the cognitive process of individuals which allow them to make decisions faster by pattern matching and familiarisation. If the situation is not first modelled mentally this can lead to an error. This is the basis of the thesis—can there be the efficiency of the expert with the reserve of the novice?

In order to inform leaders of the tendency to use heuristics to make decisions, the following recommendations are made: Cadets should be aware, as they become more proficient in their area they will be prone to use heuristics; awareness programmes to be conducted on why individuals produce incorrect heuristic responses; the teaching of the MDMP should be introduced to junior officers much earlier in their career. If adopted by the DF, these measures will help leaders to understand the effects of heuristics when they make decisions.
Are Simulation Systems an Effective Learning Tool in the Irish Defence Forces?

ABSTRACT

Modern military operations are becoming more and more complex with decision making being devolved down to lower levels in the chain of command. There is an onus on military organisations to provide the best possible training to personnel to prepare them for the multi-faceted, multi-dimensional operational environments they will face into the future. One of the tools being used by military forces to educate their personnel is simulation. The Defence Forces (DF) has been using modern, computer based simulation for over ten years as a training tool.

The aim of this thesis is to examine the use of simulation by the DF in order to ascertain if simulation is being used as an effective learning tool by the organisation. The study explores the experiences of DF personnel involved in the delivery of training using simulation and also elicits the views of personnel who had participated in military courses as students using simulation as one of the training tools. The use of simulation was examined through the lens of the accepted learning theories of education.

The methodology employed was a qualitative research model in order to generate rich data and go beyond the operation of the various systems and explore the experiences of the personnel in using simulation systems.

The findings indicate that simulation systems are an effective learning tool and the experiences of operators and students are generally positive. However, other themes that emerged during the research indicate: that the frequency of usage of some of the systems is low; there is a difficulty in assessing the effectiveness of learning involving higher-order cognitive skills; the involvement of Subject Matter Experts (SME) is vital in extracting the maximum benefit from using the systems; and the necessity for military instructors to ground training using simulation in reality, especially with a user population with a background in computer gaming.

It is recommended that the DF continue to provide training using simulation but the frequency of that training be increased. More usage allows the maximum number of students to benefit and also contributes to the retention of the knowledge and skills of the instructors.
‘The Sky is Falling Down’
What is the Dominant Irish Policy Paradigm on Cyber-Attack?

ABSTRACT

The cyber-attack problem is perceived as a direct national security and economic threat. Whilst most countries have developed cyber-security policy responses and cyber-operations centres, Ireland has not developed a cyber-security strategy to date. There is a dearth of research on Ireland’s cyber-security policy position.

The policy paradigm dimension of regime theory is employed to understand how cyber-security policy stakeholders define and understand the cyber-attack problem in the Irish context. The dominant policy paradigm shapes the way problems are defined, the types of solutions offered, and the kinds of policies proposed (Wilson, 2000). This thesis asks what is the dominant Irish policy paradigm on cyber attack?

A qualitative case study methodology is employed incorporating the expert opinions of the key constituents of the Irish cyber-security community including Defence, Justice, Communications, Enterprise Ireland, Academia, the Information Security Industry, Cyber Security interest bodies and other private sector IT services consumers.

A number of paradigms are employed in Ireland to understand the cyber-attack issue; a cyber-defence paradigm, an education paradigm, a political paradigm, a vulnerability paradigm, an information sharing paradigm and a strategic opportunity paradigm. This research finds that Ireland does not however have a dominant cyber-attack policy paradigm. Lack of coordination, common purpose and an absence of unifying forces between stakeholders best characterises Ireland’s current management of the cyber-attack problem.

The implications of this research are far reaching for Irish society. Irish cyber-security policy needs to be centrally managed and coordinated in an effort to develop a shared understanding, a common purpose and a synthesised national strategic response to the problem.

Employing a strategic opportunity paradigm to characterise the cyber-attack problem, the development of an Irish national cyber-security operations centre would encourage employment in and the promotion of Ireland’s cyber-security industry.
MAJOR KARL SAMMUT, AFM


ABSTRACT

As a non-military threat, illegal migration is one of the most contentious issues in contemporary security studies. In recent years, Malta has experienced mass migration of sub-Saharan Africans departing by boats from the Libyan coast towards Europe. The aim of this thesis is to understand the constructivist nature of security using the Copenhagen School securitisation theory to study the securitisation of migration in Malta. It seeks to determine the extent by which the issue has been securitised in Malta as a threat to national security.

The theory of securitisation developed by the Copenhagen School underpins this thesis. Securitisation is based on the premise that an issue is discursively articulated as constituting an existential threat. This concept has changed the nature of security from an objectivist towards a social constructivist framework.

The study investigates the role of discourse in the social construction, shared meanings and understanding related to the issue of migration. For this reason, a critical discourse analysis on documentation central around the issue of migration in Malta was carried out. Documents published in 2009 were deemed the most suitable to research this subject matter.

The findings indicate that the representation of migration in Malta falls short of a securitising move because the issue has not been discursively constructed as an existential threat in accordance with the Copenhagen School securitisation theory. However, the presence of non-discursive practices, in the form of the automatic detention of arriving migrants in Malta and the use of the Armed Forces of Malta for border control constitute a partial securitisation of migration in Malta. This indicates a type of securitisation that goes beyond the Copenhagen School’s concept of securitisation.

On the basis of these findings, the study makes recommendations towards addressing the issue of migration in Malta.
COMDT RONAN VERLING

To the Rattle of a Thompson Gun: Crossbarry Truth or Myth? Revisiting the Narrative of the Irish War of Independence

ABSTRACT

The period of Irish history from 1918 to 1922 was a tumultuous time in the development of the Republican State. Emanating from a failed rebellion in 1916 the following years were characterised by dramatic elections, war of independence, truce, treaty and finally civil war. The presentation of British policy in Ireland during this time remains, even today, as brutal and inept. This is perhaps a testament to a successful Irish Republican Army (IRA) propaganda campaign.

The work of academic historians revisiting the history of the War of Independence has often generated much bitterness and hostility in Irish historiography. Revisionism in the Irish context has often been criticised as not a genuine attempt to write value-free history, but a politically loaded project.

This study explores the multiple narratives surrounding the period from 1918 to 1922 in an effort to revisit and reconcile them. The Crossbarry ambush provides an ideal research opportunity to analyse the issue. The author’s epistemology contributes to the work as a result of familial connections to the Crossbarry ambush.

The researcher carried out a review of literature pertinent to the Crossbarry ambush to determine the dominant perspectives prevailing. Included in this selection were newly discovered personal testimonies, British regimental journals as well as local and regional British newspapers. These sources offered key information on various personnel and events in the campaign including Crossbarry. More importantly they offered a very different perspective on events at Crossbarry and, indeed, on the War of Independence in general.

The methodology employed was qualitative in nature given the social and cultural aspects of the subject. The author wanted to gain an insight of the attitudes and motivations of the period. For this reason a hermeneutic methodology was chosen, focusing on a case study of Crossbarry and employing semi-structured interviews. These interviews were conducted with a cross section of individuals who have an in-depth knowledge of the historiography of the period.
The findings indicate that despite the increasing availability of historic material outlining the British perspective the popular perception of the period has remained distinctly anti-British. The popular narrative surrounding Crossbarry has continued to emphasise the heroic victory of the IRA against vastly superior numbers. However appreciating and giving voice to all narratives can achieve a more nuanced view of the events.
COMDT NIALL VERLING

Are the Espoused Values of the Irish Defence Forces Congruent with the Enacted Values of the Members of the Organisation?

ABSTRACT

The activity of training and planning for operations forms the majority of the professional soldier's time, thus requiring a high level of discipline. The modern operational environment is volatile, uncertain, complex and ambiguous. The Irish Defence Forces has committed to conducting operations in these challenging environments. Such environments require the individual and the organisation to have a strong and disciplined value system to equip the professional soldier for the decisions he/she may face.

The thesis primarily intends to examine the level of awareness of the espoused values and what values are enacted by the members of the organisation.

In the literature review relevant theories from the social science disciplines of organisational culture and organisational behaviour were examined in order to develop a framework with which to explore values in the context of the Irish Defence Forces. The theories established the central role of values in an organisation's culture and their influence on behaviour.

A qualitative research methodology was employed with a flexible design to facilitate the exploration of the research question. The thesis provides a case study on values in the Defence Forces. A shared-understanding model of collecting data was utilised as it had the greater potential to reduce formality and explore members' perceptions of enacted values in the organisation. Semi-structured interviews and focus groups were used within this model to collect data.

The findings suggest that the value foundation of the members of the organisation is based on an intrinsic level of traditional military values but the espoused values of the Defence Forces, its prioritised values, as a prescribed list, are not widely known. The research also demonstrated that there was a desire to see a codification and promulgation of Defence Forces values in order to ensure there was a benchmark for standards and behaviour within the organisation.

The implications of this research for the Irish Defence Forces suggest that the organisation should instigate a formal process to instil and embed the organisation's espoused values. This process should be linked to an overall strategic doctrine that combines the Defence Forces codified values with leadership training.
1. **James C. O’Shea** is an employee of the Department of Foreign Affairs, currently stationed at the Permanent Mission of Ireland to the OSCE in Vienna and working during Ireland’s OSCE Chairmanship on protracted conflicts. His previous overseas assignments include service at Ireland’s Embassy in Moscow and Permanent Mission to the United Nations in Geneva, as well as with Finland’s Ministry for Foreign Affairs during that country’s EU Presidency in 2006. He is a Lieutenant in the Reserve Defence Force.

2. **Dr. John Doyle** is Executive Dean of the Faculty of Humanities and Social Sciences. The Faculty hosts approximately 25% of DCU’s students, and a range of internationally linked research projects within its five academic schools and four research centres. John was previously, Head of the School of Law and Government and before that, founding co-Director of the Centre for International Studies in Dublin City University. His research interests include comparative nationalist and ethnic conflict; Northern Ireland, conflict in South Asia and Irish foreign policy. John has taken part in a number of studies of comparative peace processes, including two EU funded projects with colleagues in South Asia, which brought academics from India, Pakistan, Sri Lanka, Bangladesh and Afghanistan together for a series of workshops, in New Delhi, Brussels and at DCU, examining both European examples such as Northern Ireland and the Balkans and South Asian cases including Kashmir, Sri Lanka, Nepal, the Indian North East and Afghanistan. He has been a visiting professor in conflict resolution in both India, at the Nelson Mandela Centre in Jamia Millia Islamia, New Delhi and in Pakistan, in the School of Social Sciences in Lahore University of Management Sciences (LUMS). His recent publications include: Policing the Narrow Ground: lessons from the transformation of policing in Northern Ireland, Royal Irish Academy. 2010 and Irish Foreign Policy (Gill and MacMillan, 2012), co-edited with Ben Tonra, Michael Kennedy, John Doyle and Noel Dorr.

3. **Comdt Ian Byrne DSM** is an Infantry Officer with 28 years experience in the Defence Forces. He has worked in command and staff appointments both at home and abroad and is currently in his third year of secondment to the Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade, working in the Permanent Representation in Brussels as the Assistant Irish Military Representative to the European Union. Having completed the 62nd Senior Command & Staff Course, he returned to serve as an Instructor in the Command & Staff School and while there he also completed the UK Advanced Command & Staff Course held in the Joint Services Command & Staff College, Shrivenham. He holds a B Comm (UCD), MA Technical Communications (UL), MA LMDS (NUIM) and an MA in Defence Studies (Kings College London).

4. **Comdt Con Barber** is an Air Corps officer with 17 years service in the Defence Forces. He holds a BEng in Aeronautical Engineering from Queen’s University Belfast, a MSc in Technology Management from the Michael Smurfit Graduate School of Business (UCD) and a MA (LMDS) from NUIM. He is a graduate of the 67th Command and Staff Course. He has served in a variety of appointments, originally serving as an Infantry Officer before transferring to the Air Corps as an Aeronautical Engineer. He has served with the 101st Infantry Battalion in Chad.
and as a logistics planning officer in the Nordic Battle Group Force Headquarters (2008). He is currently serving in No1 Operations Wing.

5. **Comdt Liz O’Neill** was commissioned in 1995 and has served in the Air Corps and the Artillery Corps before transferring to her current role as a Technical Officer in the CIS Corps. She has served overseas as the CIS Platoon Commander with the 29th Infantry Group in KFOR in 1995/6 and as DACOS G6 with MNTF(C) KFOR in 2009. She has a B Tech in Information Technology & Communications at the University of Limerick in 2000 and is currently completing a Masters in Project Management at the University of Limerick.

6. **Lt Col Niall Connors** is Base Commander of Casement Aerodrome and Officer Commanding No 5 Support Wing. An operational pilot, he has held type-rating examiner, instrument-rating examiner and instructor rating examiner status on a number of aircraft types in addition to holding a variety of both Command and Staff appointments. He has also completed overseas tours with NATO in Afghanistan and the United Nations in Cote d’Ivoire. From a broader education and training perspective, Lt Col Connors has completed the Defence Against Terrorism and Intelligence Analyst Courses at the NATO School in Oberammergau, Germany and has also lectured in Peace Support Operations in the United Nations Training School Ireland and at the Canadian Forces Peace Support Training Centre in Kingston, Ontario. He is a Chartered Member of the Institute of Logistics and Transport, holds a first class honours BSc in Management and Aeronautical Studies from Dublin Institute of Technology and an honours MA degree in Leadership, Management and Defence Studies from the National University of Ireland Maynooth. He is currently studying for a Doctorate with the University of Nottingham focusing on Capability Development.

7. **Dr. Graham Heaslip** retired from the Defence Forces in 2004. He is currently course director of the MSc in Humanitarian Logistics and Emergency Management in NUI Maynooth, and a previous supervisor on the MA (LMDS) run in conjunction with Military College. He obtained his BE and MEngSc degrees in Industrial Engineering from the National University of Ireland Galway and completed his PhD studies in the area of Civil Military Cooperation / Coordination at the Logistics Institute, University of Hull. Graham’s research interests are broadly in the intersections between global logistics/supply chain management, humanitarian logistics and organisational management development. Graham is widely published in various logistics journals and conferences over the past few years.

8. **Ms. Elizabeth Barber** is Course Coordinator for the Masters level Logistics courses including a Humanitarian Logistics Course that comprise the Masters of Business from the University of New South Wales at the Australian Defence Force Academy. She began her academic career as a transport economist and has since transitioned to supply chain management and logistics areas of research. Elizabeth’s research interests encompass domination in supply chains, defence logistics, humanitarian logistics and warehouse management processes.

9. **Commander Pat Burke** is a serving professional officer with 26 years service. Commissioned into the Naval Service, he held a number of appointments ashore
and afloat, including command at sea, before becoming the Navy’s first full time legal officer. He holds honours BCL and LLM Degrees in Law from UCC, a Barrister-at-Law Degree from The Honorable Society of Kings Inns and a first class honours MA (LMDS) from NUIM. He was awarded the Lt Gen Tadhg O’Neill Award for Best Military Student on the 63rd Senior Command and Staff Course. He was the legal advisor during Operation Seabight which resulted in the interdiction at sea of the largest consignment of cocaine in the history of the state by the Naval Service. He has completed professional courses with the Royal Navy, the US Navy War College, the International Institute of Humanitarian Law and the University of Liverpool. In addition to serving as a Courts-Martial Prosecutor, he has lectured in law of armed conflict and maritime law enforcement in UCC and the National Maritime College. He has deployed as Legal Advisor to the Force Commander in EUFOR HQ, Sarajevo, during Operation Althea and has also served overseas as Legad to Battalion Commanders deployed in Chad and Lebanon.

10. Capt Dónal Gallagher joined the 79th Cadet Class in 2002 and was posted into the 2nd Infantry Battalion in 2004 where he has spent most of his commissioned service. He served as G3/ 5 Info Ops in the Multi National Battle Group Centre (MNGBC), KFOR in 2010. He is currently the S3 with the 2nd ISTAR Company of the EU Battle Group. He has completed a BA in Legal Science, Sociology and Politics at NUIG, an LLB at NUIG and a Post Grad qualification in Conflict Dispute Resolution at Dublin University, Trinity College where he was awarded the James Haire Memorial Prize for best essay. He is currently completing an MA in Media and International Conflict at the Clinton Institute, UCD.

11. Captain Pat O’Connor is currently serving as an observer with UNTSO in Syria. Prior to that he worked in the Irish Defence Forces Press Office since 2008 as a Press Officer where he played a key role in the establishment of the Defence Forces Social Media platforms, Smartphone app development and redesign of the Defence Forces website www.military.ie. This work contributed to the Defence Forces receiving the 2011 Social Media Award for ‘Best Use of Social Media by a Government Organisation’ and the 2011 Irish Web Award for ‘Best Government or Council Website’ for their website www.military.ie along with being shortlisted for a number of awards in 2012. Capt O’Connor completed a BSc in Communications at DIT Aungier Street and an MA in Political & Public Communications at DCU where his thesis focused on the use of social media as a political PR tool. He is currently researching a PhD to examine the impact social media engagement can have on large organisations. He has completed Crisis Communications courses with both the UK Armed Forces and Swiss Armed Forces and has spoken at National and International Social Media Conferences as a subject matter expert. He has also provided advice and training to numerous Government Departments, Public Sector bodies, the NATO Center of Excellence and Private Sector agencies. He has twice served with the United Nations mission in Liberia as well as conducting media liaison with the EU mission in Chad and the UN mission in Lebanon.

12. Comdt Seán Murphy is an Infantry Officer with over 25 years service in the Defence Forces. He holds a BA from UCG and an MA (LMDS) from NUIM. He is a
graduate of the 67th Senior Command & Staff Course. He is currently completing an MA (Military History & Strategic Studies) in NUIM. Comdt Murphy has held a wide variety of appointments at unit, formation and DFHQ level and has served overseas in the Middle East, Africa and the Balkans. Comdt Murphy has just completed three years as an instructor in the Officer Training Wing of the Infantry School and currently serves as a staff officer in the Operations Section of HQ DFTC.

13. **Comdt Billy Campbell** was commissioned into the Cavalry Corps in 1974 and posted to 2 Cavalry Squadron. He served as Personal Staff Officer to the Adjutant General from 1985 to 1989. He was Officer Commanding 2 Cavalry Squadron from 1990 to 1993 and Officer Commanding 11 Cavalry Squadron from 1993 to 1996. He graduated from the Command and Staff School in 1997 and then worked as an instructor there until 2000. He has served abroad in Lebanon and in Iran. He holds a BA from UCD in History and Geography, an MA in Military History and Strategic Studies from NUI Maynooth and has lectured widely on military history. Comdt Campbell retired from the Defence Forces in 2007 and is General Manager of the Irish Farm Centre Limited in Dublin.

14. **Lt Col David Dignam**, an infantry officer with 31 years experience has held a wide range of appointments throughout the Defence Forces and overseas. At home he has served as Platoon Commander, Company Commander, Battalion 2 i/c and OC 28 Infantry Battalion. He has also served in DFHQ and has been an instructor in both the Infantry and the Command and Staff Schools. He has served in Lebanon as a Platoon Commander and Assistant Operations Officer and currently serves as Officer Commanding the 107 Irish Battalion. He has also served in Afghanistan, Kosovo, Croatia and Chad. He is a graduate of the Irish Command and Staff School, the Joint Services Command and Staff College in the UK and holds Masters Degrees in Leadership, Management and Defence Studies from NUIM and in Defence Studies from Kings College London.

15. **Lt. Conor Mac Carthy** is a serving professional military officer with 18 years service in the Defence Forces. He has served overseas with the 78 Inf Bn Lebanon (UNIFIL), the International Force East-Timor (INTERFET), 1 SOTG Liberia (UNMIL) and with the Irish Battalion HQ in Chad (MINURCAT). He holds a first-class honours Master of Arts degree in Military History and Strategic Studies from National University of Ireland (Maynooth). He is currently serving with the European Union Battle Group.

16. **Comdt Mark Hearns** was commissioned in 1985. He has served in the Eastern Command / Brigade, the Military College and is currently serving as a Staff Officer in the Directorate of Operations. He has completed a BA at UCG, a Higher Diploma in Russian Studies at Dublin University, Trinity College, an MA in International Relations at DCU, a Diploma in Russian Language at the University of Westminster and an MA in Leadership Management and Defence at NUI Maynooth. He is a graduate of the Defence Forces Command and Staff School and of the US Command and General Staff College at Fort Leavenworth, Kansas. He has served seven tours of duty overseas and has recently returned from service with UNSMIS in Syria. This is his third year as editor of the Defence Forces Review.