

Óglaigh na hÉireann



DEFENCE FORCES IRELAND

Defence Forces Review 2007

- Lugard's Legacy
- The Wren of the Curragh
- Easter 1916 in Cork
- Burning of the Custom House
- The Strategic Corporal



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Preface

It is my pleasure to launch the Defence Forces Review in 2007 and to thank those associated with it whether through contribution of articles or as part of the production team. The Review provides a forum in which, contributors can inform and facilitate discussion on a wide range of defence related matters within the wider defence community. Its success depends on the willingness of the reader to engage with the subject matter as much as on the willingness of authors to contribute articles. The richness of the Defence Forces' military tradition is apparent in this issue of the review and I hope that everybody is included in the diversity of articles reproduced here.

Lt Col John Joe O'Reilly Director of Public Relations

Editor's Note

Included, alongside original works, is material previously published elsewhere, but which, by reason of readership or rarity, might have had a limited circulation and we include abstracts drawn from the dissertations submitted by students of the Command and Staff Course, in part fulfilment for the masters qualification in Leadership, Management and Defence Studies [MA(LMDS)].

Col. Richard Heaslip's article on Ireland's first engagement in United Nations Peacekeeping Operations is reproduced by kind permission of the Royal Irish Academy. The Wren of the Curragh was written in 1867 by James Greenwood. It was first published in the Pall Mall Gazette and the language is of its time. The publication was taken over by the Evening Standard and subsequently by the Daily Express Group. There were no objections to its republication in this Review.

Comdt M. O'Kelly, in 1935, delivered a lecture to the Infantry School on the Burning of the Custom House on May 25th, 1921. A copy of this lecture, discovered in the Defence Forces Library, is of sufficient interest to warrant its re-publication. This account was submitted, as a witness statement, to the Bureau of Military History in 1956. Comdt Brendan O'Shea and CQMS Gerry White have carried out extensive study into the period referred to in their article on Easter 1916 in Cork. Comdt David Dignam's study of The Curragh Incident of 1914 was submitted in part fulfilment of his Masters Degree in the Combined Services Command and Staff College in Shrivenham, United Kingdom. Comdt Ian Byrne discusses the 'Strategic Corporal' challenge facing the Defence Forces in modern peacekeeping missions while Comdt Jerry Lane's article dealing with command responsibility deals with the issue of being in command and the actions of subordinates. These are reworked from dissertations originally submitted in part fulfilment of the requirement for the MA(LMDS) and we are very grateful for the work done.

Col H. W. Lugard oversaw the building of the first permanent encampment on the Curragh in 1855. Lt Col Dolan's article, originally prepared for a seminar 'The Curragh of Kildare: Ancient and Modern', draws on the work of Lt Col Con Costello and is reproduced by kind permission of the County Kildare Archaeological Society.

Articles submitted in electronic format should, ideally, be between 3-5,000 words long, properly researched and annotated using footnotes. Submissions are invited from all contributors and we are especially anxious to receive relevant submissions from DF personnel pursuing academic qualification. The academic review their work will have received will aid publication in the Defence Forces Review.

Lt Col Mick Dolan MA (LMDS)

The fact that an article appears in this journal does not indicate official approval of the views expressed by the author.

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Lugard's Legacy – A Stratified Society on Long Hill¹

Lt Col Michael Dolan

INTRODUCTION

Lt Col H. W. Lugard, Royal Engineers laid out the first permanent Camp on the Curragh between March 1855 and January 1856 and told the story of the construction in his *Narrative of Operations in the Arrangement and Formation of a Camp for 10,000 Infantry on the Curragh of Kildare*². This will be known from here on as Lugard's Narrative. However, just as a home is more than the bricks and mortar from which a house is constructed, so the Curragh Camp comprises more than the buildings. There is no doubt but that a society exists there. One need only have attended at the Mass in St Bridget's Parish Church on Christmas Eve, 2006 to be aware of the size and diversity of the congregation. For reasons of health and safety, a second mass was considered necessary on the night. Even then, the church was full – with over two thousand five hundred attending³. There were those who work on the Curragh, those who returned from overseas for Christmas and those who had generational links with the Curragh.

James Douet, in his work on British Barracks asserts that, in terms of architecture, nothing would appear to be duller than barracks and that because of this prejudice, 'this large and complex subject – overlapping many other areas of military, urban, social and architectural history – has remained unexplored'⁴. Colleagues, reflecting on why little enough had been written about the Curragh, ventured the opinion that their first – and lasting – experience of the Curragh Camp was on entry to the Defence Forces. This was a traumatic episode in the life of young people from diverse backgrounds. Few would admit to having enjoyed this first exposure. Most would admit to being delighted when their initial posting on commissioning was to a unit distant from the Camp and many wanted never to relive this period of their lives. A few – Col Dan Bryan in the 50s, Des Swan⁵ in the 70s and, more recently, Con Costello – looked at a bigger picture and produced enduring works on the camp. Others⁶ have based works on their experience within the Camp over a number of years. These are personal reminiscences, which have a social importance insofar as they describe elements of the society. Whatever the reason, we can be especially thankful to Con Costello for producing what is, to date, the definitive work on the early years of the Curragh Camp⁷.

^{1 (}This paper was originally delivered at the Seminar 'The Curragh of Kildare: Ancient & Modern' Sat 3rd March 2007. Gratitude is expressed to Journal of the County Kildare Archaeological Society for permission to reprint the article here)

² Lugard, Lt Col H. W., Narrative of Operations in the Arrangement and Formation of a Camp for 10,000 Infantry on the Curragh of Kildare, Dublin 1858

³ Rev P.J. McEvoy, Chaplin to the Defence Forces, DFTC

⁴ Douet, James British Barracks 1600-1914: Their Architecture and their Role in Society, English Heritage Series, The Stationary Office, 1998, p.xi

⁵ Swan, Desmond, Curragh Commemorative Issue, An Cosantóir May 1972

⁶ O'Farrell, Michael, Tough at the Bottom...., MacDonough, Michael, Sheep, Shite and Soldiers, Published by Author, 2003

⁷ Costello, Cornelius, The British army on the Curragh, 1855 – 1922: environmental, social and economic aspects of the making and occupation of the camp. Thesis submitted for the degree of PhD to the National University of Ireland (1994),

This paper is not meant to be a sociological study of the Curragh Camp to the present day. Rather, it is an attempt to demonstrate the manner in which the provision of a particular infrastructure facilitated the development of a society in a particular fashion. The Curragh is unique in Ireland. In all other military concentrations, the garrison forms the lesser population. In the Curragh, the military was, effectively, the population.

The Curragh without the Camp is illustrated on Walker's Map (1807) of 'the Curragh of Kildare showing The Race Course, Gentlemen's seats, accurately described'⁸' (Plate 1). It shows a long ridge, running from west to east. The Curragh Race course lies to the north and the race circuits are outlined. The uncultivated nature of the plain is obvious from the depiction of fenced fields at the edges.



Plate 1: Walker's Map 1807

THE CONCEPT OF BARRACKS

A discussion of the Curragh Camp cannot ignore the history of the 'barrack concept' and the context in which the decision to lay out the Curragh was taken. Barracks are an instrument of war. They are built because they make better soldiers, and better soldiers form more effective armies. 'No less than good generals or strong forts, barracks confer on states which have them a clear military advantage over those which do not'⁹. They first began to appear in Roman times. Used throughout history by the Papal Swiss Guards and the Household Guard of English sovereigns, they became more widely used in the early modern period as battlefield tactics underwent a revolution, requiring highly trained and disciplined soldiers for whole armies. Various methods were employed in respect of maintaining these bodies of troops. Traditional methods of scavenging, looting and free quartering became unsustainable as the numbers grew and so the building of barracks was a logical development from a force protection and control/discipline perspective.

⁸ Walkers Map

⁹ Douet, James, op. cit.

The concept of professional armies is relatively new, and the first units camped on the Curragh in the early part of the nineteenth century were bodies of local militias, brought together for specific campaigns or for collective training as greater armies of regulars and auxiliaries needed to practice coordinated, combined manoeuvres. This was the norm throughout Europe. Initially, the level of comfort afforded those in barracks was extremely basic. Later in the century, as the industrial revolution forced the military to compete with other agencies for recruits, barracks became more comfortable, less austere and even barrack architecture became more attractive. This is certainly true of the Curragh, which evolved greatly between 1855 and 1922. In addition to this role, referred to by one writer as a 'kind of discipline factory'¹⁰ barracks performed a more specific military function as low-level strongholds. They were used to hold and stabilise captured territory, as evidenced by Spain's army in Flanders or by the British army in Ireland. On a smaller scale, worldwide, they have been built as part of counter-insurgency campaigns where mountainous terrain granted an advantage to irregular forces. The barracks along the military road in Wicklow are good examples of the latter role.

POLITICAL CONTEXT

'The evolution of barracks in the British Isles has been uneven in terms of their architecture, planning and geography, but it has always been propelled by the State's perception of its need for coercion to apply its policies, at home and abroad, and to protect itself against the policies of rival powers'.¹¹ Britain's standing army has traditionally been for three main purposes: foreign war, defence of the realm and upholding civil order. To fully appreciate the undertaking of Lugard's Camp, the political context of the time must be appreciated. When an army was fighting overseas, there was usually a financial backwash effect on barracks at home, which benefited from the increased funding allocated by Parliament in wartime estimates. Peacetime inevitably brought retrenchment. At the start of the Crimean War (1853-56), Prince Albert pressed the government to embark on the first permanent training camp at Aldershot, before popular opinion waned. The Curragh Camp was a beneficiary of spending.

CONSTRUCTION CONSIDERATIONS

Lugard's primary considerations were more logistical than operational and his Narrative reflects his initial difficulties:

"... on receipt of the instructions, the face of the country was covered with snow, rendering it doubly difficult to select a site for a camp, which could not, like one of canvas, afterwards be shifted at pleasure – and further, that the instructions came at a period requiring the utmost departmental exertions over the whole command, both for ordinary duties, and extraordinary, consequent on the embodying of the militia – and also, that the contractors experienced considerable difficulty in obtaining the requisite force of artificers and labourers, as well as the means of transport for their the materials...^{'12}

¹⁰ Jones, C. (1980) 'The Military Revolution and the Professionalism of the French Army under the Ancien Regime' in Roger, C. (1995) The Military Revolution Debate: Readings on the Transformation of Early Modern Europe (London), Cited in Douet (1998)

¹¹ Douet, James, op.cit

¹² Ibid P.11

However, like all good stories with a happy ending, he feels that '... much credit is due to all concerned, that by the 18th of March 1855, work commenced, and by the 9th of July, 1855, accommodation, to the extent of 5,000 men, was fit for the occupation of troops'. Given the constraints outlined, this would appear to have been a well-run project. Two thousand men were employed. Unlike tactical and strategic considerations afforded modern military constructions in a hostile environment, little thought would appear to have been given to force protection. Any visitor to the Curragh Camp, would have realised how open and undefended it was. This is not surprising, as up to the beginning of the nineteenth century, Irishmen made up the majority of the British army¹³. While this balance shifted as the century progressed, the Irish contribution would still have been significant. In this context, although the construction of the camp took place a mere eight years after the aborted Fenian Rising of 1848 the Crown Forces must have felt protected by the invincibility of the Empire.

LIFE'S ESSENTIAL

Water was foremost in Lugard's considerations. 'One of the most important features in the requirements of a camp, and to be considered in taking up a position for the occupation of troops, beyond a halt of a most temporary duration, is a plentiful supply of pure and wholesome water. The general impression, from careful enquiries, was, that water could not be readily obtained – that the difficulty in procuring a sufficient supply of that necessary for life caused very great inconvenience in former encampments on the Curragh, and finally led to its abandonment as a site for the assemblage of troops'¹⁴ Divergent opinions were entertained in respect of water provision. Advertisements for tenders for the supply of water to the camp, together with the quantities required, were inserted in the newspapers, while, at the same time, plans for obtaining it from the Liffey two miles distant, were being sketched out. This plan envisaged raising and filtering the Liffey water into a large reservoir, from where it would be 'forced into the camp, and received in 10,000 gallon tanks, thirteen in number'¹⁵. The actual contract was awarded to Messrs. A. and G. Holme, who intended 'to gain the supply by means of a deep and extensive shaft to be sunk on the Curragh in the vicinity of the camp'.¹⁶ (Plates 2 & 3)



Plate 2: Curragh Waterworks



Plate 3: Current Waterworks

¹³ Soldiers and Chiefs, Military Exhibition, National Museum, Collins Barracks, Dublin, 2007

¹⁴ Ibid, P. 14

¹⁵ Ibid, P. 15

¹⁶ Ibid, P. 15

The site selected, in a natural hollow to the north, in front of the camp, seemed most promising. At a depth of fifty-four feet, water was obtained and 'tested by continuous pumping at a rate of 200,000 gallons a-day for three consecutive days, and it has since proved inexhaustible...'¹⁷

Once water was assured, the future of the camp was secure and the plans for huts, the same as those proposed for Aldershot were analysed and the appropriate contracts advertised for tender on 27th February, 1855. The first tender was awarded, to Messrs Courtney and Stephens, on 13th March. Work began on 18th March, 1855.

SOCIETY - BACKGROUND

The society, which evolved on the Curragh, stemmed from this moment and to understand the layout, it is necessary to look, again briefly, at the evolution of barrack construction. (Plate 4) shows a woodcut of the planning of an enclosed encampment¹⁸ containing houses for officers across the top, rows of soldiers' huts, and store buildings along the bottom. The artillery park was along the right. Mathematical precision was to be employed in its construction – streets between the rows of huts to be ten feet across. The huts themselves, fifty per row would be eight feet square and housing two soldiers each. It is clear that clean lines were favoured and this required shaping rather than accommodating nature in construction. Lugard's camp was no exception. (Plate 6) shows how closely Lugard's squares followed this general system. Only the amount of space varied. (Plate 5) shows the general layout of the camp and its use of the dominant terrain along Long Hill shows elegance in construction. 'The huts are distributed in a series of squares, ten in number, for 1,000 men each, placed thirty yards apart ... These squares have an interior space of 380 by 360 feet, on which the regimental training of recruits, and company drills take place'.¹⁹ The officers' quarters are on a line advanced 120 feet in front of each square and the outbuildings are fifty feet to the rear.



Plate 4: Early Plan for Encampment

¹⁷ Ibid, P. 15

¹⁸ Robert Ward, Animadversions of Warre (London 1639), in Douet, James British Barracks 1600-1914: Their Architecture and their Role in Society, English Heritage Series, The Stationary Office, 1998, p. 3

¹⁹ Lugard's Narrative P. 11

Plate 5: Lugard's Squares



Plate 6: Lugard's Squares

Because the camp was to be constructed almost entirely of wood, care was given to the avoidance, as far as was practicable, of the risk of excessive loss from fire. An eight-foot high earthen bank separated the squares and some huts were clad in corrugated iron to give a degree of security from fire. Other considerations in laying out the squares were, '... the separation of regiments in their discipline, recruit and punishment drills, good regimental police arrangements and facilities for the assembly of the troops on ordinary occasions and general parade.'²⁰ No mention is made of consideration for other than the military at this time. Effectively, the society being catered for comprised, officers, Staff Sergeants and soldiers. Not only that, but every effort was being made to isolate regiments from each other by effectively providing ten distinct barracks within the overall scheme.

SHAPE OF THINGS TO COME

The general lay of the camp is east and west, fronting to the north. The sunnier aspect to the south might well have been forfeited in favour of the vista to the north, which included the racecourse and the elevated position from which the manoeuvres might be reviewed. It is divided into two divisions.

The left division for 5,000 men occupies Long Hill – the site of encampments some fifty years previously. The squares are in regular line and distance and are placed on the southern slope. The officers' quarters are on the brow. 'The ground in front of the officers' huts, and extending for a considerable distance to the west, forms a splendid and nearly level general parade of about a mile in length, immediately in front of the division.'²¹

The space between the left and right divisions was slightly more elevated and 'of uneven surface'²² so Lugard sited 'the staff officers huts, brigade offices, churches, clock and water tower, military police, post-office, and other requirements for general purposes' here. Today, only the clock tower remains. (Plates 7 & 8)



Plate 7: Clocktower Today

Plate 8: Lugard's Clocktower

²⁰ Ibid. P. 11

²¹ Ibid. P. 11

²² Ibid. P. 11

The right division was slightly less regular, accommodating to an extent, the terrain. Three squares were parallel to the left division and were advanced 250 feet to the front. The other two are off line and the natural slope forced the squares to occupy the northern slope. They are separated from the other three by a small valley. As the square are named alphabetically from A to K (excluding I) it can be seen that the original K lines occupied the ground on which the Curragh Golf Club now stands.

The headquarters and staff of the General Commanding was located on a gentle elevation in about 300 yards in front of the two easternmost squares and commanded a view along nearly the whole of the front. Rather than dwell on the physical construction of the camp, which is dealt with in detail in Lugard's Narrative²³, consideration will now be given to the evolution of the social fabric of the Camp.

SURVIVAL OF THE PROJECT

In the introductory letter of his Narrative begun in 1857, to General Sir John F. Burgoyne, Inspector-General of Fortification, Lugard offers the opinion that 'On the establishment of peace with Russia and the disembodiment of the Militia, the immediate objects for which the camp was apparently formed ceased to exist, but as a camp of instruction, and as a means of accommodating a large force of Infantry for the purpose of being trained and manoeuvred in conjunction with Cavalry and Artillery, its value is undiminished, and for that purpose it is admirably situated, having the extensive Cavalry Barrack of Newbridge contiguous and 5,000 acres of Curragh as a drill-ground'²⁴. No doubt, he was extremely anxious that the two years invested in planning and construction would not be wasted.

PREVAILING LIVING CONDITIONS

Conditions for the soldier in Victorian times showed little improvement between the 1790s and the 1850s. Douet cites Parliamentary Papers²⁵, which indicate that in Ireland at that time, ninety per cent had no ablution house and eighty seven per cent has no washhouse for clothes. This was not unusual, as at the same time, soldiers in the Channel Islands were expected to wash in the sea. Conditions for soldiers in Britain were not much better. WCs were rare, even for officers' use. However, systematic collection of medical statistics in the early years of Victoria's reign provided a stimulus for improvements in both civilian and military living conditions. Just as Lugard began laying out his camp, reports of inquiries into the conduct of armies in the Crimea were coming on stream.

²³ A copy of this is held in a special collection in the Defence Forces Library.

²⁴ Lugard's Narrative, Introductory Letter, 1858

²⁵ Parliamentary Papers (House of Commons) 1847, xxxvi, p. 321, A Return for Each Barracks in the United Kingdom.

Captain Sir William Denison, who was Superintendent at Woolwich Dockyard from 1837 to 1845, wrote, in 1848:

'The soldier is usually taken from the least cultivated portion of the community; he brings with him the feelings and habits of his class, and those feelings are coarse and the habits gross. He is usually illeducated, if at all, when he joins; he is then thrown into forced everyday companionship with great numbers of men equally uncultivated as himself; his temptations to idleness and vice are many and close at hand; the inducements to an opposite course of life few and remote; he is instructed in little else than mechanical duties, and is regarded in that respect as a thing rather than as a person; he is controlled more by fear than by hope or sympathy, and his virtues are and must be the result rather of accident than acquirement. If human beings so circumstanced are, as a class, ignorant and vicious, where is the wonder?'

Prompted by the gross wastage of men and money caused by disease, Denison wanted better living conditions to improve the health of the soldier. He felt that "much greater separation of the different ranks and classes of soldiers should be made, in particular of married soldiers and their families, and NCOs so that the distinction and authority of their rank should not be eroded"²⁶. He also felt that a laundry and drying house should be made available for the use of wives of married soldiers. The soldier needed to have much wider access to education, both for himself and his children. The subjects taught in the regimental school should include moral and religious knowledge, as well as the mechanical details of the soldier's professions. In order to retain the soldier 'within the square', he proposed that separate reading rooms and libraries for NCOs and men be provided along with racquet courts, bowling greens and space for cricket and football. His views, resisted by sceptical senior officers in the Wellingtonian army, were vindicated in reports from the Crimea.

THE PLANTING

It was in this social context that the construction of Lugard's Camp was undertaken. To this point, I have dealt only with the physical infrastructure of the camp. If, to use a gardening metaphor, we refer to this as the 'hard landscaping', we now move on to the planting, or the introduction of the inhabitants. Denison would appear to have encapsulated the image held of a soldier in early Victorian times. Lugard gave consideration to those issues raised by Denison and provided churches – Catholic and Anglican – school, post office and recreation areas. His Squares included married soldiers' huts, washhouses and women's privies – all innovations. His narrative describes the sanitation measures taken, both toilets and drainage. All in all, the planning of the camp was as modern and forward thinking as was possible at the time. But he obviously did not fully satisfy the inhabitants.

²⁶ Denison W.(1848) 'Observations on Barracks, and on Moral Condition of the Soldier' Royal Engineer Corps Papers, paper 25, pp. 246-61, in Douet, p123

One might easily dismiss the words of Lt Alexander Bruce Tulloch, as the whinging of a young officer, when he said 'A more dreary quarter for a lot of young fellows than the Curragh could hardly be imagined...I for one wished the regiment was back in the Crimea and I fancy many others also did'.²⁷

If we accept that the physical infrastructure facilitated the development of a society along certain lines, we must now look at that society in the overall context of the time. Societal interaction is complex and varied. In the camp laid out by Lugard, things were no different, except that the military authorities exercised control over everyone – military and civilian alike. One might consider the society to be composed of two distinct groupings – those inside the barracks and those outside. Within the camp there was a physical division between regimental squares to assist discipline, ease policing arrangements and to minimise risk of serious loss from fire. This segregation of units allowed for tension between rivalling units occupying different barracks in the camp and sometimes facilitated physical confrontation between different regiments in camp. Difficulties surfaced between the military and the locals population as locals resented the military manoeuvres, claiming that sheep were being killed and buildings damaged by the artillery practice. The Turf Club initially welcomed the officers but this welcome soured with the damage done to the racecourse by cavalry charges carried out with no regard to impending race meetings.

Prostitution, facilitated by the imposed presence of large numbers of unattached males was a particular problem. Locals saw the prostitutes as debased and diseased, a scandal to everybody. Shopkeepers would not serve them and farmers, afraid of being denounced from the pulpit, would not allow them shelter in outbuildings.²⁸ The census of 1861 lists that there were 1,057 prostitutes in Ireland, of which 590 resided in Leinster. Of these, Roman Catholics accounted for 568, Established Church, 68 and four were Methodist. The Pall Mall Gazette in 1867 carried an article on the Wren of the Curragh²⁹. The Lock Hospital, which opened in the face of local opposition in Kildare in 1868 and closed in 1886, catered for these 'unfortunates', as they were known³⁰.

These issues are common to all garrison towns. However, by simple weight of numbers, those inside the Curragh Camp impacted significantly on all aspects of the lives of those outside. A market was established at the edge of the camp. This supplied goods not available within the camp. Because the local population also used this market, it was an occasion of social interaction between the agricultural community, the local community and the military community. Lugard's plan allowed for the awarding of permission to four traders – one for each brigade area – to erect premises for retail trade. These suttlers did not have to pay rent 'but agreements were entered into, embracing such regulations as were deemed requisite to due command over their occupation, and the discipline of the troops.'³¹

²⁷ Sir Alexander Bruce Tulloch (1838-1920) was a soldier and military intelligence officer. He joined the 1st Royal Scots in 1855 and served in the Crimea, India, China and Egypt. He worked in the Intelligence Department of the War Office, was in charge of the Intelligence Department in Egypt, being sent on missions to Belgium, Crete and elsewhere. He commanded the Welsh Regiment in South Africa and Egypt. As a Major General he commanded the Victorian military forces and acted as military adviser to the Australian colonies. He was awarded the KCB (Knight Commander of the Order of the Bath) in 1902. Tulloch wrote various books and articles on military matters. (http://www.archivesnetworkwales.info/) accessed 04 Feb 2007 28 Costello p. 149

²⁹ This article is reproduced in its entirety elsewhere in this review (ed.)

³⁰ Crawford, H. The Kildare Lock Hospital, in Journal of County Kildare Archaeological Society, Vol. XIX (Part III)

³¹ Lugard's Narrative, p.14

In addition, each square had a small regimental canteen erected at a cost to the government and manned by canteen managers appointed by the commanding officer and forbidden to sell spirits.

It is reasonable to assume, given the attitude to soldiers at the time, that socialising was done, for the most part, on the camp. Rudvard Kipling, in his Barrack Room Barracks (1892),³² writes of the lot of a soldier in 1892. One of his most quoted poems, capturing the prevailing attitude to soldiers is Tommy:

> I went into a public-'ouse to get a pint o' beer, The publican 'e up an' sez, "We serve no red-coats here." The girls be'ind the bar they laughed an' giggled fit to die, I outs into the street again an' to myself sez I: O it's Tommy this, an' Tommy that, an' "Tommy, go away"; But it's "Thank you, Mister Atkins", when the band begins to play,-The band begins to play, my boys, the band begins to play, O it's "Thank you, Mister Atkins", when the band begins to play.³³

The relationship between soldier and officer was effectively one of a master-servant nature, where the soldier, in Denison's terms was a resource. However, certain practices threw the officer and the enlisted man together in rankless interaction. Masonic lodges flourished in the Curragh/Newbridge area and evidence exists to the effect that officers and men were members of the same lodges, though officers mainly frequented the Lodge in Newbridge while the men attended at the Curragh. Cricket was a sport enjoyed by all and the Curragh Brigade Team that defeated Dublin University on the Curragh in 1886 comprised officers, non-commissioned officers and men.³⁴ Socially, the military found its own level as the 'officers joined that of the gentry, the non-commissioned officers associated with the tradesmen and contractors with whom they had contact and the men met their element of the population'.³⁵ The military was a hierarchical, men-only club. It distrusted the presence of women and always tried to discourage the men from marrying. From as early as 1685, soldiers in the British army could marry, but only with the permission of the regimental commanding officer. Because of the differing rates of pay, the number of officially married soldiers could not exceed six percent. Of course, soldiers did not always adhere to this rule and there were married soldiers not on the married list. However, the position of those wives, not on the list was highly insecure, particularly when the unit went overseas. 'Then, the women who had come to be dependent on the regiment were left behind, often with little choice between living off the parish or on the street'.36

³² http://whitewolf.newcastle.edu.au/words/authors/K/KiplingRudyard/verse/BarrackRoom/index.html (accessed 07 Jan, 2007)

³³ Full text available at http://whitewolf.newcastle.edu.au/words/authors/K/KiplingRudyard/verse/volumeXI/tommy.html (accessed 12 Feb 2007)

³⁴ Costello 179 35 ibid. p83

³⁶ Douet, p.176

TRANSITION TO PERMANENT QUARTERS

When the Army moved into permanent quarters, the position of women gradually improved, though with no improvement in the level of comfort. 'Under the "corner system", married soldiers inhabited a lightly screened end of the barrack room, usually that furthest from the door. Here, every aspect of raising the family took place short of childbirth. Old soldiers told in the 1890s how they had seen a pure girl brought straight from the marriage service to the barrack room corner, and the tremor of mortal shame that overwhelmed her.³⁷ Lugard's camp, incorporating new developments in thinking, provided the same comforts as existed for married soldiers at the new camp in Aldershot – eight families to a hut with no greater privacy than existed in the barracks. However, Lugard's planning allowed for 160 couples in the camp, which equated to 1.6 per cent as against the allowable figure of six per company of one hundred. Army policy in allowing women into barracks has been described as 'an attempt to maximise the benefits accruing to the regiments from the presence of a small number of women, without disturbing the men's primary allegiance to the regiment.³⁸ In return for being tolerated, women were expected to contribute to servicing the regiment through a number of domestic roles - washing, cleaning, sewing, nursing and teaching. The allocation of these tasks, which were also carried out by men, to women depended on the attitude of the regimental commanding officer. Married quarters and regimental education both contributed to the formation of the service family, which by the end of the nineteenth century, the army was coming to appreciate and foster for its stability and understanding of service ideals and customs, and as a valuable source of recruits.

Education of the children of men on the married establishment was done on a regimental basis, each regimental square having a school. Children outside the camp attended local schools where they were found to be below average – both in work and deportment³⁹ The majority of recruits came from the unskilled labouring class and as late as 1888, it was estimated that sixty per cent were illiterate or semi-literate. It is reasonable to assume that the women they married were of a similar disposition.⁴⁰ The high standard of medical care, sanitation and hygiene, which was part of the army system, had beneficial effects for those sections of the population that were influenced by the military. Barrack routine required that all living quarters, bath and washhouses, and cookhouses were regularly cleaned and inspected. Civilians employed in barracks observed the habits of the military while soldiers carried with them into civilian life hygiene practices inculcated by their service. Army wives and families who lived in married quarters were obliged to maintain their homes to a high standard, and, under the influence of their husbands, or of the officers' ladies if they were in contact with them, some semblance of military behaviour.⁴¹

In the rebuilding of the camp, begun in 1890, which is beyond the scope of this paper, facilities improved with the brick construction of permanent buildings. Plans for buildings already constructed in England were duplicated in the Curragh and (Plate 9) shows a building, which would be instantly recognisable to Cadets in the Military College, but which is actually located in Jelelabad Barracks, Tidworth, in England.

³⁷ ibid, p. 177

³⁸ Trustam, M. Women of the Regiment: Marriage and the Victorian Army. Cambridge, 1984 p. 68

³⁹ Costello, p. 122

⁴⁰ ibid p. 133

⁴¹ ibid p. 136

Following the original plan of Lt Col Lugard, the new camp had the same road system and open aspect, into which Victorian red-brick barracks were placed. The spacious and elegant officers' messes, imposing barrack squares surrounded by billet blocks, drill sheds, offices and guard rooms, the extensive grassed exercise areas rimmed with broad-leaved trees and the terraces of married quarters, some with verandahs, gave the Curragh camp a character unique in Ireland. The houses in the married quarters terrace shown in (Plate 10) comprised two bedrooms and a door at the top of the stairs internally connected every second house. Bigger families would be given permission to occupy a bedroom in the next house. Again, such an arrangement was at the discretion of the regimental commanding officers. These houses did not have bathrooms and communal washing facilities were provided within the barracks. Of course, the standard of the married quarters allotted depended on the rank and needs of the occupant.



Plate 9: Jellalabad Barracks



Plate 10: Married Quarters - Post 1890s

CONCLUSION

Lugard's Camp, costing a total of £192,821, employed two thousand men in its construction. Not all of these workers returned to their homes on completion of the project and many settled in the vicinity, employed in the maintenance of the camp. Costello calculated that the local economy benefited from the military presence by about £300,000 annually. This figure would have softened local opposition – particularly among the merchants and the local farmers. From 1855 until the cutting down of the flagpole in 1922, the British military presence created a society, supported a local society and brought both economic success and moral disfavour to the area. Citizens of Athy, Kildare, Newbridge and Naas cheered and wept as they saw the men go off to the Great War. They welcomed them home in an ambivalent manner. To thousands of men and women, the soldiers were heroes, but the aftermath of 1916 had changed attitudes. While the military units themselves came and went, the society, which grew up around their presence, continued to expand. In 1922, the military inhabitants of the Curragh changed, Irish uniforms replaced British ones, but the community remained. It had grown on Long Hill, either in service of the Crown or in service of the Camp. Now it would serve the Irish Free State or the Camp. The Irish military, not being expeditionary, was an altogether more settled organisation, with only the officer corps, initially, experiencing the mobility of temporary postings. However, the mere fact that ten thousand soldiers were planted in the Curragh as a result of Lugard's Camp in 1855 meant that the demographic was forever changed.

It is said that culture is composed of four components – emblems, heroes, rituals and values. The changeover from one military to another had significant consequences, but military values remained – and would evolve further over time as the Free State army asserted itself. The physical character of the camp also changed over time as the new owners imposed their mark. Usage of the buildings changed and changed again and to demonstrate this I conclude with a drawing of a Reading and Recreation Building in Keane Barracks of the Rebuilt Camp. It has gone through a number of uses since 1922, from mess to registry to map store. In 1995, the Chief of Staff opened it in its present form as the Defence Forces Library and I have had the privilege of working there for the past three years. It has been, to quote Con Costello, 'A most delightful station'.



Plate 11: Drawing - Reading and Recreation Room



Plate 12: Defence Forces Library - Feb 2007

Defence Forces Review 2007

The Wren of the Curragh

James Greenwood, Pall Mall Gazette (1867)¹

I

For many a year mysterious little stories have been wafted to England from the Curragh - hints and glimpses of a certain colony of poor wretches who lived there as nobody else in the three kingdoms lived, and died most like people who do come within the bills of mortality - tramps and others - when they happened to perish of cold, want and whisky, upon the vast common. In these stories there was always something so shocking that comfortable people were glad to disbelieve them, and something so strange that it was reasonable enough to set them aside: they were not probable in an orderly, commonplace, police-regulated, Christian community like our own. Besides, one could not read those little stories - paragraphs in odd corners of newspapers in the great gooseberry season - without a knowing suspicion that if only half they told was true more must have been heard of them. This seemed all the more likely because the Curragh is not an unfrequented nook in some distant corner of the land, but a plain near a capital city – an encampment wherein thousands of Englishmen as well as thousands of Irishmen constantly live, gentle and simple both, and where scores of strangers, visitors who go there for no other purpose but to see what is to be seen, peer about every week of every summer season. It did not seem at all natural that things so very unlike what ought to happen in the nineteenth century as those little wandering paragraphs hinted at could go on from year to year without investigation and arrest. But out own observation is that the wildest circumstances and most incredible anomalies of life are those which lie open to every eye, and are stared at, and are not seen. Ant therefore when, a few weeks ago, other little paragraphs came wafted from the Curragh – chiefly to the effect that the poor wretches of whom we have spoken are called 'wrens', 'because they live in holes in the banks', and things are not so bad as they used to be some years ago, when it was not uncommon to find a wren (or unfortunate woman) lying dead amongst the furze of a morning, we thought it worthwhile to ask a hardy man of brains to go and look into the matter. Hardy, we say, because it seemed to us now, as on a former occasion which we need not specify, that to ask for accurate live knowledge from official persons would be answered by the gift of a stone, as it always is. Therefore we solicited someone to go to the camp, and find the wrens (if any), and visit their nests (if any), and spend time enough by day and night amongst them to let us know what peculiar people it is of which so many incredible hints have been given – and forgotten. What the nature of the task really was, and what additional knowledge it gives us of the world we live in, will appear from the following narrative:

It was on an evening before September had cooled – three weeks ago and more – that I set out to investigate the manners and customs, the habits and habitat, of a bird not unknown indeed in England, nor even in London, but reported to be on the Curragh of a seriously peculiar kind. Rumour had told us all that we had heard of the species.

¹ James Greenwood was a reporter with the Pall Mall Gazette. The Pall Mall Gazette, an evening newspaper, was founded in February, 1865 by Frederick Greenwood and George Smith. The original idea was to digest the news from the morning papers and to publish substantial articles on political and social questions. The Pall Mall Gazette was incorporated into the Evening Standard in 1923. Prior to the re-publication of the original text in the form of this article, contact was made with the Evening Standard with a view to securing permission. There were no objections.

Rumour is of ticklish veracity; but one thing may be said of her, that if she sometimes tells more lies than is tolerable, she sometimes tells more truth than is comfortable to believe. 'Before September had cooled' is not merely an ornamental phrase. It is meant to be remembered as a statement of fact; because what aspect the place of my visit would have now, what it would wear when the turf of the Curragh, so soft to the foot, is even more silent to the ear under a winter day's snow, has got to be considered as we go on. It is an important part of the lesson learned there on an autumn day, sharp enough, but very tolerable.

From London to Holyhead, from Holyhead to Kingstown, from Kingstown to Dublin – all this was within the limits of civilisation. Not that I think it a matter for congratulation that anybody in the nineteenth century should be seasick. Nor that I wish the dispensation altered. The pleasantest spectacle I have witnessed for some time was a director of a railway company (who annihilated space) and a secretary of a telegraph company (who abolished time, and used heaven's lightning as a messenger) alternate with a basin on a playful sea. Dublin – yes, Dublin is a civilised city too: there is not courage enough in the world to deny it. But Kildare, county town though it may be, one may be permitted to withhold from it the all-sufficing designation. To Kildare my steps were directed, for that town is nearer than any other to the Curragh camp: - thence I could go anesting.

From Dublin to Kildare, past much squalor that seemed less to lie upon the earth, in the shape of wretched huts of poverty and idleness, that to be born out of it naturally, as toadstools are. At Kildare station Carmen were rampant - great industry of tongue among them, and much ingenuity of speech. 'Bedad, sir', said one of them, with a snatch at my luggage, 'I'm the man to match ye! Ye're in luck today, indade. The mare I'm driving is the celebrated Scottish Queen - no less! Own sister to Achaivement, and the best blood in Ireland. And where'll I be driving yer hanner? Imperial Hotel? I'll make no mistake, sir, seein' there's no other but one, and that's a clubhouse' And so I got to the Imperial Hotel, where the guest proposes, the host disposes. 'Foive, did ye say? It's no dinner ye'll be getting' at foive, sir, nor no baife aither; it's mutton ye'll have.' And you have mutton at four. At least I did, or at any other hour when the table-cloth happened to be disengaged. But then, how do I know? More honourable guests than myself may have been there, and it was necessary for me to look rough and sink all fastidiousness, because my business was with people with whom a gentleman is never seen, and can never mingle with a hope of learning anything: at least, so I thought then, though I have reason to believe now that a gentleman and an officer may sometimes send for a wren and nourish her in his honourable bosom.

In the afternoon, Jimmy Lynch – my carman on many little expeditions afterwards – a loud loquacious carman, whose adoration was given to horses and his respect to Mr. Donnelly, who fought the great fight with Cooper in Donnelly's Hollow – called to take me on my first visit to the Curragh. As we drove along, Jimmy talked of his mare – there was never such a mare; of the fight – there was never such a fight; while I, half listening, looking away to the vast common where an army lives all the year round. 'How many men do you think, Jimmy?' I asked, breaking into his raptures about the 'Scottish Queen.' 'Well thin, tin or twelve thousand, maybe! And a mighty fine time they have of it!' 'Without their wives and sweethearts?' 'Widout their wives, shure, and what of that, yer hanner? But some of their wives is with them, I believe,

good luck to them! Though there's no sweethearts in the camp at all – divil a one! But over there' pointing vaguely with his whip across the common, 'There's many of them poor devils living in places made of furze inthirely. Winther and Summer in a bit of a bush.' 'Wrens, don't you call them?' 'Wrins! That's the name ov 'em! Wrins! – that's what they do call em, and a dridful life they lade. Most distressing, believe me!' This exclamation was not priggish in Jimmy – it was only a note caught from the mouths of other intelligent tourists. A moment of silence and his mind sought relief in the virtues of his mare, while my eyes wandered over the common where many furze bush was visible, but none which looked as if it could be inhabited by any creatures but birds of the air and beasts of the field.

On the Curragh the air is strong; an easterly wind was blowing over its miles of waste land – dead level for the most part, but with undulations here and there, and broken by mounds and raths, stretching along for a considerable distance and at a height at least distinguishable. The turf is soft and elastic everywhere. Sheep browse on it; and you may see the Irish shepherd, idler than nobody else in his green isle, and the Irish shepherdess (O Arcadia!) flustering her rags out of their natural repose in an attempt to separate the sheep marked this way from the sheep marked that. That she might have been a beauty you see well, because her head, with its abundant locks, is bare, and so are her well-shapen legs; but she isn't – the chance was lost years ago. The Scottish Queen bowls along. There are good roads from Kildare to the camp, and from time to time we meet cars upon them containing well-buttoned military men. Other military men are seen, in ones and twos and threes, lounging in one direction; they show in moving patches of red amongst the dark-green masses of furze.

Jimmy has no precise instructions; he is to drive upon the Curragh, and that's all; but he has a notion that generally we want to go to the camp, and particularly to the Hollow, the actual spot where Cooper was licked by the immortal Donnelly. In this somewhat aimless way we came to a series of block huts, extending for two miles, perhaps on either side of the road. Here and there a few groups of soldiers were seen lounging listlessly, or engaged in some athletic sport. Jimmy pointed out each object of interest as we drove along. 'And that's the Catholic chapel, your hanner. And that's the Prodestan' church. And this is Donnelly's Hollow' (strewed with canvas tents) 'where the fight was! Hould the mare, sir! Hould the Scottish Queen, and bedad! I'll show you where Cooper stood and where Donnelly stood – well I know the futmarks ov 'em!' Nor would Jimmy be denied. Fortunately, the Scottish Queen restrained the fiery impulses of her blood, and stood like any cart-horse still while Jimmy planted himself in Donnelly's footmarks, and tried to satisfy the last object of my journey by putting himself in a fighting attitude on that heroic spot. With as little shock to his feelings as I could contrive I made him aware that I didn't care extremely about Cooper or Donnelly; that the afternoon was too far advanced for a regular visit to the camp itself but that in driving back I should like to get a glimpse of the wrens' nests. Jimmy put his hands down slowly, and in silence remounted the car. The sojers he could understand as the object of a tourist's gaze and Donnelly's Hollows as an object of his contemplations; but 'thim wrins!'

However, back we went through the line of huts; the road dwindled, and we were presently driving over the common itself. By this time the air was fast growing colder and mistier. The block huts of the camp, seen only in dim outline, soon were the hints of human life in the dreary prospect. As far as the eye could distinguish within the waning limits of the light all

was barren and cheerless. The sky above looked waste as the heath itself, and drearier; for there were still those constantly recurring patches of furze to break the green monotony below, while there was nothing to break the grey monotony above. How in such solitary places at such times the mind also seems to close in from above and on all sides in a twilight sort of way, everybody knows. Mine soon got into that condition as we rolled over the noiseless turf; so that it was with a start I presently saw a bareheaded, bare-footed woman standing only a few feet distant. Had the figure sprang out of the earth or dropped from the clouds my surprise could not have been greater; true enough it was that that I had come to Ireland to see this very woman - and her companions. At the same moment, 'There's a wrin, sir!' Jimmy shouted, 'and there's a nest! And there's another!' I saw no nest. The clump of furze looked a little thicker than usual in the direction indicated, but there was nothing more remarkable about them. But when, jumping from the car, I walked a few paces onward; I understood better what nesting on the Curragh is. These heaps of furze are built and furnished for human occupation; and here and there outside them were squatted groups of those who dwelt therein - 'winther and summer in a bit of a bush.' Not one or two, but several groups - half naked, flagrant - indicating a considerable colony. I spent a long night amongst them afterwards, and believe I know pretty well all that is worth knowing of a tribe of outcasts as interesting, perhaps, as any which the scientific men of the Abyssinian expedition are likely to write book about. One thing I may as well add here. When your correspondent who inspected the casual wards of Lambeth told what he had seen there, thought it necessary to warn you readers that there was not a single word of it that could justly be called exaggerated, so I assure you that what I may have to say of the Curragh shall not have a touch of 'false colour' anywhere. But of course, in dealing with such a matter a great deal must be suppressed.

Π

When once a wren's nest is distinguished from the natural mounds of furze amidst which it is placed, after-recognition is tolerably easy; though at first glance it is so much like a mere bush that you might well pass by without dreaming that it was the habitation of human creatures. However, there are differences, of course; and thus after I had looked for a few moments at my first nest, and glanced around and beyond it, I saw that I was in fact in the midst of a little village, with as many - homes shall I say? and as many inhabitants as some English hamlets whose names are well marked on the map. Dotted about to right, and left, and onward, at intervals varying from twenty to two hundred yards, were other bushes, which bore not only certain aspects of man's constructive skill, but of woman's occupancy. Suspended against the prickly sides of one of them was a petticoat, against another a crinoline; an article so bulky and intractable that it could not be got inside. Indeed, the probability is that it never did get inside at all – never was inside; but was put on and taken off, as occasion required, at the hole that served as a door. How could three or four large-limbed women, crinolined accordingly, live in a space no bigger than the ox's crib or the horse's staff? Besides, that is exaggeration. To be particular, the nests have an interior space of about nine feet long by seven feet broad; and the room is not more than four and a half feet from the ground. You crouch into them, as beasts crouch into cover; and there is no standing upright till you crawl out again. These are rough, misshapen domes of furze – like big, rude birds; nests compacted of harsh branches and turned topsy-turvy upon the ground. The walls are some twenty inches thick, and they do get pretty compacted – much more than would be imagined. There is no chimney – not even a hole in the room, which generally slopes forward. The smoke of the turf fire, which burns on the floor, has to pass out at the door when the wind is favourable, and to reek slowly through the crannied walls when it is not. The door is a narrow opening nearly the height of the structure – a slit in it, kept open by two rude posts, which also serve to support the roof. To keep it down, and secure it from the winds that drive over the Curragh so furiously, sods of earth are placed on top, here and there, with a piece of corrugated iron (much used in the camp, apparently – I saw many old and waste pieces lying about) as an additional protection from rain. Sometimes a piece of this iron is placed on the longitudinal slit aforesaid; and then you have a door as well as a doorway. Flooring there is none of any kind whatsoever, nor any attempt to make the den snugger by burrowing down into the bosom of the earth. The process of construction seems to be to clear the turf from the surface of the plain to the required space, to cut down some bushes for building material, and to call in a friendly soldier or two to rear the walls by the simple process of piling and trampling. When the nest is newly made, as that one was which I first examined, and if you happen to spot it on a hot day, no doubt it seems tolerably snug shelter. A sportsman might lie there for a summer night or two without detriment to his health or his moral nature. But all the nests are not newly made; and if the sun shines on the Curragh, bitter winds drive across it, with swamping rains for days and weeks together; and miles of snow-covered plain sometimes lie between this wretched colony of abandoned women and the nearest town. Wind and rain are their worst enemies (unless we reckon in mankind), and play 'old gooseberry' with the bush dwellers. The beating of the one and the pelting of the other soon destroy their bowery summer aspect. They get crazy; they fall towards this side and that; they shrink in and down upon the outcast wretches that huddle in them; and the doorposts don't keep the rooms up and the clods don't keep it down:- the nest is nothing but a furzy hole, such as, for comfort, any wild beast may match anywhere; leaving cleanliness out of the question. Of course, I did not make all these observations at a fires visit. It was afterwards that I found No. 5 Bush (they are called No. 1 Bush, No. 2 Bush, and so forth by the wrens themselves) was a really superior edifice in its way – larger, better than any other; and well it should be, for it was the abode of five or six women. Other nests were smaller and fast going to decay; but even in the smallest three women were harboured, while one was tenanted by as many as eight. Altogether, there were ten bushes, with about sixty inhabitants. In them, they sleep, cook, eat, drink, receive visits, and perform all the various offices of life. If they are sick, there they lie. Brothers and mothers go to see them there. There sometimes – such occurrences do happen – they lie in child-bed; and sometimes they die.

My eyes had not taken in one-tenth of what is above described, when they were brought to bear upon the group of women, which had first arrested my attention. They were three members of the family of No 5 Bush. One was a perfectly neat-looking girl, washed, combed, and arrayed in a clean starched cotton gown, and with bright white stockings and well-fitting boots; who had evidently just completed the toilette of the day Two others squatted at the bush door, and they were foul as any Hottentots. One filthy frieze peticoat worn about the loins, another thrown loosely over their backs – that was all their clothing. Their tousled hair hung down upon their naked shoulders, and straggled upon their unwashed faces, as they sat in a full stream of gossip. All three were fine-limbed women, large and sturdy; as, indeed, are many inhabitants of this arcadian village. Now and then I came across some fragile creature, her strength broken; but these were the exceptions rather than the rule, certainly. And several of them were not only fine-looking, but well-mannered girls – when sober; and I had an

opportunity of seeing a letter written by one in as pretty and 'ladylike' a hand as if it had been traced at a davenport in Belgrave Square, instead of on the bottom of a tin pot on the Curragh.

'Good day to you, sir, and will you walk into our little house?' This greeting was addressed to me by the woman in the clean cotton gown, and that in a voice and with a manner that had nothing in them but simple civility. At the same moment her companions rose up, and one of them attacked my carman, Jimmy Lynch, with language that was absolutely appalling. Now my courage was first put to the test, no less by the civil invitation than by the astounding outburst of this black-haired young virago. To walk into the little house was what I had come for; and there was the invitation to make myself acquainted with a Curragh interior, and the domestic economics of the wren. It was not with any alacrity, however, that I bowed my head and crept into the bush – leaving Jimmy to bear with the monstrous blasphemies, the raving obscenities, of the girl of eighteen outside.

It was washing day at No. 5 Bush – with one of its tenants, at least; and she appeared to be engaged upon all her clothes at once (excepting only a single frieze petticoat which she did wear) – in a tin saucepan. Another woman squatted idly near the doorway, was bidden to get up 'and give the gintleman a sate'; when it appeared that she was sitting on another saucepan, bottom upward. This vessel was perforated all over, at the sides and at the bottom alike; the only explanation of which seemed to me at the time to be that this was an Irish device for letting the firm get more readily at the water; however, I learned the real use of a perforated saucepan afterwards. With apologies to Miss Clancy, I accepted the 'sate' she proffered, and disposing myself upon it with more or less of grace, looked about me to discover the appointments of a wren's nest.

Little observation was needed to make the inventory complete. The most important piece of furniture was a wooden shelf running along the back of the nest, and propped on sticks driven into the earthen floor. Some mugs; some plates; some cups and saucers; a candlestick' two or three old knives, battered and rusty; a few dull and dinted spoons; a teapot (this being a rather rich establishment), and several other articles of a like character, were displayed upon the shelf; and a grateful sight it was. I declare I was most thankful for the cups and saucers; and as for the teapot, it looked like an ark of redemption in crockery ware. If they were not, as I told myself when my eyes first rested on them, the only human-looking things in the place, they did give one a comfortable feeling of assurance that these wretched and desperate outcasts had not absolutely broken with the common forms and habits of civilized life. And that this feeling was not a strained or singular one I learned afterwards in conversation with a soldier. This gentleman averred to me on oath, with the air of a man who is going to startle you out of all false and maudlin sympathies, that wrens used cups and saucers 'just like other people'.

There was little furniture in the nest beside the shelf and its decorations. Beneath it was heaped an armful of musty straw, originally smuggled in from the camp stables; this drawn out and shaken upon the earth, was the common bed. A rough wooden box, such as candles are packed in, stood in the corner; one or two saucepans and a horrid old tea kettle, which had all the look of a beldame punished by drink, were disposed in various nooks in the furzy walls; a frying-pan was stuck into them by the handle, in company with stick of iron, used as a poker;

and - undoubtedly that was there - a cheap little looking-glass was stuck near the roof. These things formed the whole furniture and appointments of the nest, if we exclude a petticoat or so hung up at intervals. There was not a stool in the place and as for anything in the shape of a table, there was not room even for the idea of such a thing. Except for the cups and saucers, I doubt whether any Australian native habitation is more savage or more destitute; they can get an old saucepan or two and know how to spread a little straw on the ground. Nor were any of the other nests (and I believe I looked into them all) better or differently furnished. The only difference was in the quantity of crockery. In every one the candle box was to be found. I discovered that it was the common receptacle of those little personal ornaments and cherished trifles, which women in every grade of life hoard with a sort of animal instinct. In every one and upturned saucepan was used for a seat when squatting on the earth became too tiresome. In all the practice is to sleep with your head under the shelf (thus gaining some additional protection from the wind) and your feet to the turf fire which is kept burning all night near the doorway. Here the use of the perforated saucepan becomes apparent. It is placed over the burning turf when the wrens dispose themselves to rest; and, as there is no want of air in these dwellings, the turf burns well and brightly under the protecting pot. Another remembrance of a decent life is seen in the fact that the women always undress themselves to sleep upon their handful of straw, their day clothes serving to cover them.

While I was making the particular observations, which were afterwards expanded into the above-described generalities, I was not allowed to remain silent, of course. However, by dint of a little management I contrived to confine the conversation to tobacco and whiskey, my pouch and flask (well filled in expectation of a call upon them) furnished the primary subjects of discourse. Both topics were handled with such freedom and dexterity that in less than fifteen minutes they were fairly exhausted, I then proposed to take leave, and was not opposed by anything like the cajolery or the solicitation for money that I expected to encounter: which I found to be a common characteristic. I verily do believe that the whole world contains no spectacle of degraded humanity so complete as those unfortunate women present when they home in roaring groups from their hunting grounds, drunk. Their flushed faces, their embruted eyes, their wildly flowing hair, their reckless gestures, and above all, their strong voices competing in the use of the most hideous language depravity ever invented, make such a scene as I can believe can be matched nowhere under the sun. But the same women who in such circumstances seemed to be possessed with a determination never to be outdone in violence, or blasphemy, or obscenity, are, when sober, of civil conversation and decent demeanour. This is not true of one or two, but of many of them. So I had no difficulty in getting out of No. 5 Bush than if I had been making a morning call at home. The person who was washing her clothes in the saucepan bade me good day with an expression of her assurance that I had a good heart, while Miss Clancy simply hoped I would keep my promise to come again when they were less occupied with domestic cares. When I got outside I found that Jimmy Lynch had been less fortunate than the Saxon stranger whom he had conducted to the strange place. He was still engaged in wordy conflict, and was so completely beaten that he retreated upon the car upon my first appearance, and started off before I was fairly settled on it. 'Did any one iver hear the like ov them devils?' he roared. 'It's disghusting intirely!'

But ready as Jimmy was to 'call' on the energies of Scottish Queen, I insisted upon his going slowly through the bush village, and then I was enabled to see on a first visit that

its inhabitants at any rate were all of one kind and all looked alike. In the first place every woman is Irish. There is not a single Englishwoman now in the nest, though there were two of our countrywomen there lately; these girls, however, went away with a regiment ordered elsewhere. Then the wrens are almost all young – the greater number of them being from seventeen to five-and-twenty years old. Then they almost all come out of cabins in country places, and still seem to enjoy - most of them - some remains of the fine strength and health they brought from those wretched cots. Then there was a common look, shocking to see, of hard depravity - the look of hopeless, miserable, but determined and defiant wickedness. Fine faces, and young ones too, were marred into something quite terrible by this look, and the spirit of it seemed to move in the lazy swing of their limbs, and was certainly heard in their voices. And lastly they dressed alike. All day they lounge in a half-naked state, clothed simply in the one frieze petticoat, and another equally foul one cast loosely over their shoulders, though towards evening they put on the decent attire of the first girl I met there. These bettermost clothes are kept clean and bright enough; the frequency with which they are seen displayed on the bushes to dry shows how often they are washed, and how well. These observations apply to the cotton gown, the stockings, and white petticoat alone – frieze and flannel never know anything of soap and water at all apparently. The 'Curragh petticoat' is familiarly known for miles and miles around: its peculiarity seems to be that it is starched but not ironed. The difference in the appearance of these wretches when the gown and petticoat are donned and when they are taken off again (that is to say, the moment they come back from the 'hunting grounds') answers precisely to their language and demeanour when sober and when tipsy. In the one condition they are generally as well behaved and civil as any decent peasant women need be; in the other they are like raging savages, with more than a savage's vileness.

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A community like that which I am attempting to describe naturally falls into some regular system, and provides for itself certain rules and regulations. Fifty or sixty people separated from the rest of the world and existing in and by rebellion against society, naturally form some links of association; and when the means of life are the same, and shameful and precarious; when those who so live by them are poor as well as outcasts; and when, also, they are all women, we may assure ourselves that a sort of socialistic or family bond will soon be formed. It is so amongst the wrens of the Curragh. The ruling principle there evidently is to share each other's fortunes and mis-fortunes, and in a happy-go-lucky style. Thus the colony is open to any poor wretch who imagines that she can find comfort in it, or another desperate chance of existence. Come she whence she may, she only has to present herself to be admitted into one nest or another, nor is it necessary that she bring a penny to recommend her. Girls who have followed soldiers from distant towns and villages - some from actual love and hope, some from necessity and desperation – form a considerable number of those who go into the bush; and I also learn that the colony sometimes receives some harvester tired of roaming for field work, to whom the free loose life there has, one must suppose, attractions superior to those of the virtuous hovel at home. She walks in and is welcome; welcomes are for less eligible immigrants too. Suppose a woman with child who has followed her lover to the camp and loses him there, or is even admonished with blows to leave him alone; or suppose a young wife in the same condition is bidden by her marital lord to go away and 'do as other women do' (which seems to be the formula in such cases); they are made welcome amongst the wrens as if they did not bring with them certain trouble and an inevitable increase to the common poverty. I am not speaking what I believe they would do, but what they have done. It is not long since that a child was born in one of these nests; and wrens made for baby what little provision it was blessed with; wrens smiled upon its birth (it was a girl); and wrens alone tended mother and child for days before it was born, and for a month afterwards: - then the unfortunate pair went into the workhouse. The mother of the babe which had so strange and portentous a beginning of life had followed its gallant father to the camp from Arklow – a fishing village many a mile away; but he unfortunately diverted his benevolence into other channels, and she sought refuge amongst the bushwomen when her trouble was near. They did what they could for her, and brought her safely through without recourse to the doctor.

Although the birth of an infant is a novel event in the annals of the Curragh, the appearance of a mother with a baby in arms is by no means rare; and though a child is certainly as much an 'encumbrance' there as it can be anywhere, no objection is ever made to it. In fact, a baby is obviously regarded as conferring a certain respectability upon the nest it belongs to, and is treated, like other possessions, as common property. At the present time, there are four children in the bush. The mother of one of them is the young woman whose amazing abuse routed my carman, as previously related. Her outrageous blasphemies were uttered over the face of the unhappy little one as it lay at her breast. But even she seems to have the tenderest love for the babe; she could never bear to think of parting with the 'poor darlint,' she says, and she stays at home with it as much as possible, doing duty as watcher at night, while the others are away. The children all seem to be well catered for. We shall see that an egg is always bought for Mary Moloney's baby when the day's provisions are procured, and I found one bright curly-haired little fellow in possession of a doll. Another, a certain Billy Carson, was produced to me on a Sunday morning, in a rig of which the whole nest seemed proud. He was arrayed in a pretty light coloured stuff frock, for which, I was assured, as much as seven and sixpence had been paid. Should the children fall sick they would be taken at once to the workhouse; for the doctor is never seen in the bush. In sickness the wrens administer to themselves or each other such remedies as they happen to believe in, or are able to procure; and when these fail, and the case seems hopeless, application is made at the police barracks at the camp, and the half-dying wretch is carried to Naas hospital, nine miles off. The medical officers in the camp are, of course, kept too busy amongst the men who are the wrens' friends to have any time to spare for the wrens themselves. Something more must be said upon that subject by-and-by.

The communistic principle governs each nest, and in hard times one family readily helps another, or several help one; the deeps are not deaf to the lower deeps. None of the women have any money of their own. What each company gets is thrown into a common purse, and the nest is provisioned out of it. What they get is little indeed; a few halfpence turned out of one pocket and another when the clean starched frocks are thrown off at night make up a daily income just enough to keep body and soul together. How that is accomplished at all in winter – in such winters as the last one – which was talked of only three weeks ago as a dreadful thing of yesterday – defeats comprehension. It is an understanding that they take it in turns to do the marketing, and to keep house when the rest go wandering at night; though the girl whose dress is freshest generally performs the one duty, and the woman whose youth is not the freshest, whose good looks are quite gone, the other. And there are several wrens who have been eight

or nine years on the Curragh – one or two who have been there as long as the camp itself. At that time, and long after, they had not even the shelter of a regular built nest. I asked one of these older birds how they contrived their sleeping accommodation then. Said she, 'we'd pick the biggest little bush we could find, and lay under it - turnin' wid the wind.' 'Shifting round the bush as the wind sifted?' 'Thrue for ye. And sometimes we'd wake wid the snow covering us, or maybe soaked wid rain.' ' And then how did you dry your clothes?' ' We jist waited for a fine day.' Only four or five years ago the wrens were not allowed upon the common at all – at any rate, nowhere near the camp. They were hunted off on account of the extravagant behaviour of one of the women in the presence of a lady (related to a general officer) who was riding on the Curragh. The wretched creature's audacity cost her companions dear; they were driven from the common and their hovels were destroyed. A ditch in 'Furllane,' leading to Athy, was for some time afterwards their only home – those who would not seek shelter in the workhouse or the gaol; as to which places they have no preference whatsoever. But by degrees, they re-established themselves on the common, and there they remain, a credit to the country. I may mention here what I had nearly forgotten – which would be a pity – that there is beside the colony I have described another small hive of wrens on the other side of the camp. Their nest is pitched in the field of an intelligent Scotchman. It contains a family of seven. In consideration of the shelter afforded to these wretched creatures by the humane proprietor of the field, who holds a good deal of land round about, they keep a sharp look out for trespassers on the Scotchman's grounds. In this way they probably save the cost of a couple of men and their dogs. Indeed, the proprietor himself is said to rate their services much higher, and to boast that 'the wrens do this work better than twenty policemen.

Whiskey forms, no doubt, a very important part of these poor wretches' sustenance. Whiskey kills in the end, or it swiftly destroys all that is comely or healthy in woman or man, but it can scarcely be doubted that without it the wren could hardly live at all. She would tell you that existence would be impossible without it; and unfortunately it would be of little use to answer that 'enough' may be good for food, but 'too much' is poison. They get it easily. They get it from the soldiers when they can get nothing else; and hunger and cold and wet dispose them too readily to go home with their heads full of drink though their pockets are empty. Then at any rate they are warm; the appetite for food is drowned; they are drunk, and being drunk 'don't care,' and how not to care cannot always be an undesirable end when your lot is cast amongst the Curragh bushes. But of course even the seasoned wren cannot live by whiskey alone; and I took some pains to ascertain how she did live. Nothing in the world can be got out of the plain itself, not even water; and the nearest town or village is three or four miles off. But there is the camp within something like half a mile; and though the wrens are forbidden, under sever penalties, to appear within three hundred and sixty yards of certain defined limits of the camp, the severity of this regulation is relaxed on three days of the week, when a sort of market is held there. A certain number of wrens are allowed to approach and make purchases, 'just like other people'. But the market days at the camp are only three out of weekly seven - Tuesday, Thursday, and Saturday; and though as a rule the camp's sweethearts do find means to get their daily bread, they have to be bought; but Wednesday's food there is no money for yet. Nor can all they need be bought at the camp market; and so they pay frequent visits to a certain little store or chandler's shop. Learning of this, I also visited the store, for opportunities of observing the particular purchases of the wren. Bread and milk and potatoes were the most conspicuous articles in the shop – in fact, the only articles to be seen in any quantity; and so it was easy to discover what the nood-natured little woman behind the counter was chiefly called upon to supply. I saty good-natures little woman, for her manner to the degraded creatures who flocked to her shop was very considerate; and they seemed to be thoroughly appreciative of its spirit. Bread, potatoes, milk, candles - these were the things most in demand. Thus, one woman carried off a stone of potatoes (12 lb), twopenn'orth of milk, (in a tin can with a cross handle), a fourpenny loaf of bread, a penny candle, and 'an egg for Mary Moloney's baby.' Other women made purchases of tobacco, tea, and sugar; and when these articles are added to the others a pretty complete account is given of the wren's provender. Fresh meat is a rare luxury; though sometimes a few meagre slices of bacon give token of its presence amidst half a stone of potatoes. Nor is tobacco a luxury merely. That weed is a well-known stifler of hunger – a fact which the wren discovers for herself before long. Water is a luxury. They would have to buy every pint of it, were they not permitted (on account of a little casualty which may be mentioned by-and-by) to get it from the military train. As it is, they do buy water sometimes off good-natured Mrs. Westley. I was in her shop one day when several wrens were marketing there. All were served but one – a civil and decent-looking girl, whom she detained while she carefully unfolded a little parcel. 'There Nelly,' said she, presenting the wren with a sprig of lavender, 'put it with your clothes, my dear; it'll make 'em smell nice.' Nelly had never seen a lavender sprig before evidently; but she took it respectfully, tucked it into the bosom of her gown, and no doubt folded it in that garment when it was set aside. For, as I have said, the women put off their decent clothes immediately they have no further use for them as ornaments; for in that sense the print gown and 'Curragh petticoat' are regarded. 'Fine feathers make fine birds' is a saying as well understood in the bush as anywhere else. Thus Bridget Flanagan, who had the honour of coming from the capital, was able to put down the pretensions of one of her companions who spoke of Dublin ladies as equals, by exclaiming, 'You set yourself along wid such as thim! Where's your fine clothes? Where's your jewlree?'

From all this a fair idea may be gained, I hope, of the intolerable life of the Curragh Wren - intolerable to such of us, at any rate, as have any sense of public decency or public duty. We do not hear of women being found dead amongst the furze, as they say used sometime to happen, but surely things are terrible enough as they are to demand notice and remedy. It was the death of one of the wretches which led to the granting of water from the camp supplies. In the nest where I spent one uncomfortable night, out of desire to get my lesson thoroughly, a woman named Burns was suddenly taken ill, and in the morning was found dead amongst her companions. In this case a surgeon was brought, and there in the nest (I shuddered as the story was told to me) a surgical examination was made of the poor wretch's body. An inquest was afterwards held in the same shameful place, and evidence was taken of her companions. The medical evidence showed that the woman had perished through exposure to the weather and the drinking of foul water - collected anywhere on the common. A verdict to that effect was accordingly returned by the jury, who subscribed the handsome sum of thirteen shillings towards defraying the funeral expenses. She was buried in Kildare churchyard, to which better home she was attended by her companion. That must have been a pretty sight for the parson. No similar death has happened in the colony since Mary Burns perished. The unfortunate creatures hold out as long as they can, and then crawl to the hospital or the workhouse to die there.

IV

Visiting the bushwomen of the Curragh in the daytime seemed to be an incomplete way of ascertaining how they really lived. The wren is, of course, a night bird, and ought to be seen at night by anyone who thinks it worthwhile to learn her real characteristics and the part she plays in the economy of the universe. Therefore I ventured on a journey to the bush one evening, making myself as safe as a man can be who goes into haunts of recklessness and crime with nothing about him to tempt cupidity, and with a stout stick for the casual purposes of defence. I did not suppose I should have any extraordinary adventures, but as the Curragh is a wide place, and very lonely, and such of the Queen's troops as consort with the bushwomen are often of a dangerous character, especially when they happen to be drunk.

It was already dark when I set out from that miserable little town, Kildare, directing my steps first towards a landmark uncomfortably called the 'Gibbet Rath.' Gibbet Rath I made out without much difficulty, and from that spot made my way across the dark and silent common to the bush village, which, as I have already said, is far in its interior. I had marked the path pretty accurately on former visits; and, after passing many a bush that might have been a wren's nest, I presently discovered a glimmer of light here and there in the distance, which assured of the wrens, burning upon their earthen floors in a homelike way, which, at a distance, was pleasant enough. But arrive amongst the nests a difficulty did arise. Here were several, but how could I distinguish the one at which I could most rely, from previous acquaintance upon a civil reception? There were no means of distinguishing it at all; and after wandering between one and another in a vain attempt to make out No. 2 nest, I resolved to take my chance and enter that which was nearest at hand. This particular nest, however, needed no addition to its present company. Peeping in through the hole that is called the doorway, I observed that the bush was tenanted by six wrens, two soldiers and two little children. The women were smoking, the soldiers roasting potatoes, or 'spuds,' as they called them, at the fire; the children, poor little souls! Were huddled amongst the women, awake and lively, and perfectly contented. As soon as my presence was known, I was invited to enter. So I went in just to light my pipe; and still the women smoked, and the soldiers roasted potatoes and the children stared about them with innocent enquiring eyes, and a pretty picture of humanity they made crowded together in the low-roofed little den. But my visit was not to this nest, and therefore, after a few compliments and the circulation of my tobacco pouch, I ventured to ask my way to No 2 nest. One of the women rose to show me the way. The others put away their pipes at the same moment, and getting together the various articles of their evening attire, sallied out to dress in 'the open.' Their stockings were already outside, hanging upon adjacent bushes. These the women gathered, and then proceeded to dress in the light that streamed upon the common from their fire and one candle. Stockings, boots, the Curragh petticoat, the starched cotton gown, and with a little deft arrangement of their hair, there they stood clean and decent enough - to look at. The toilette being completed, each took a glance at herself in the looking-glass, and then they went away into the darkness, the soldiers with them, leaving my guide behind. She faithfully showed me to No. 2, and then went back to keep watch till her companions returned from one more excursion into the most dismal swamp of vice where they find their daily bread.

No. 2 nest had also a turf fire burning near the door; by the light on which I saw, as I approached it, one wretched figure alone. Crouched near the glowing turf, with her head resting on her hands, was a woman whose age I could scarcely guess at, though I think by the masses of black hair that fell forward upon her hands and backward over her bare shoulders that she must have been young. She was apparently dozing, and taking no heed of the pranks of the frisky little curly-haired boy whom I have made mention of before; he was playing on the floor. When I announced myself by rapping on the the bit of corrugated iron which stood across the bottom of the doorway, the woman started up in something like fright, but she knew me at a second glance, and in I went.'Put back the iron, if ye plaze,' said the wren, as I entered; 'the wind's blowing this way tonight, bad luck to it.' The familiar iron pot was handed to me to sit upon, my stick was delivered over to poor Billy Carson, my whiskey flask and tobacco were laid out for consumption, and I laid myself for as much talk as could be got from the watching wren. Billy Carson had not the splendid appearance he wore when last I saw him in his Sunday frock. His clothes were rags, and they few and foul. The face of the poor child was of the colour of the earth he sprawled upon; but there were his thick curly black locks and his great big eyes, so full of fun and sense, of innocence and spirit, as if he wasn't a wren's child at all. While I looked at this unfortunate little fellow, wondering what was likely to be the end of him, and what my own end might have been had I begun life as a wren's little boy, the woman still sat crouched near the fire, with her face hidden on her folded arms, in a very miserable way and despairing attitude indeed. I asked her whether the boy was hers, by way of starting a conversation; she bluntly answered me without looking up the 'it wasn't, thank God.' I tried again. 'Have some whiskey; you're cold.' 'Indade I am, but it's not whiskey that will warm me this night', said she. But next minute, she jumped up, turned some whiskey into a cup, tossed it off with a startlingly rapid jerk of hand and head, went to the looking glass (an irregular fragment as big as the palm of your hand), and wisped her hair up in a large handsome knot. Then the whiskey began to operate; her tongue was loosed. She readily answered all the trifling questions I asked of her, meanwhile putting Billy to bed, who had got sleepy. I was very curious to see how this would be done when she proposed this to Billy, but there was nothing remarkable in the process to reward expectation. The straw was pulled from under the crockery shelf, and Billy was placed upon the heap dressed as he was, with an injunction to close his eyes. He did so, and the operation was complete.

Of course I wanted to know how my wretched companion in this lonely, windy, comfortless hovel came form being a woman to be turned into a wren. The story began with 'no father nor mother,' an aunt who kept a whisky-store in Cork, an artilleryman who came to the whisky-store and saw and seduced the girl. By and by his regiment was ordered to the Curragh. The girl followed him, being then with child. 'He blamed me for following him,' said she. 'He'd have nothing to do with me. He told me to come here, and do like other women did. And what could I do? My child was born here, in this very place; and glad I was of the shelter, and glad I was when the child died—thank the blessed Mary! What could I do with a child? His father was sent away from here, and a good riddance. He used me very bad.' After a minute's silence the woman continued, a good deal to my surprise, 'I'll show you the likeness of a betther man, far away, one that never said a cross word to me—blessed's the ground he treads upon!' And fumbling in the pocket of her too scanty and dingy petticoat, she produced a photographic portrait of a soldier, enclosed in half-a-dozen greasy letters. 'He's a bandsman, sir, and a handsome man he is; and I believe he likes me too. But they have sent him to Malta for six

years; I'll never see my darlint again.' And then this poor wretch, who was half crying as she spoke, told me how she had walked to Dublin to see him just before he sailed, 'because the poor craythur wanted to see me onst more.' The letters she had in her pocket were from him; they were read and answered by the girl whose penmanship I have already celebrated, and who seems to be the only woman in the whole colony who can either read or write. I could not find another, at any rate.

From this woman, so strangely compounded, I learned, as I sat smoking over the turf fire - as the night was bitterly cold - much that I have already related. I also learned the horror the women have of the workhouse; and how, if they are found straying over the limits allotted to them, they have to appear at Naas to be fined for the offence (a half-crown seems to be the fine commonly inflicted), or be sent for seven days to gaol. There, they get about a pint of 'stirabout' for breakfast, at two o'clock in the afternoon some stirabout and about a pound of bread, and nothing more till breakfast the next day. I cannot but think this a false statement, and yet she spoke of the workhouse as a place still more unlovely. However, she had suffered so much privation last winter that she had made up her mind not to stay in the bush another such season. 'At the first fall of snow I'll go to the workhouse, that I will!' she said in the tone of one who says that in such an event he is determined to cut his throat. 'Why, would you belave it, sir? - last winter the snow would be up as high as our little house, and we had to cut a path through it to the privy, or we'd been ruined intirely.' In the way she talked, and I listened, and heard how one of the inhabitants of the place I was in had been seduced at the age of thirteen years and four months by an officer in a rifle regiment – a circumstance of which my companion seemed there was some reason to be proud. 'A rale gentleman he was.' In some spirit one woman declared to me. With a scornful air, 'I wasn't one man brought me here, but many! And that's the truth bedad!' I also heard that in winter some of the women knit stockings to sell at the camp market, adding a little money to the common stock that way; and further, that sometimes an officer took a fancy to the companionship of some particular wren and smuggled her into his quarters.

Presently the report of a gun was heard. 'Gun-fire!' cried my companion. 'They'll soon be back now, and I hope it's not drunk they are.' I went out to listen. All was dead quiet, and nothing was to be seen but the lights in the various bushes, till suddenly a blaze broke out at a distance. Some dry furze had been fired by some of the soldiers wandering on the common, and in search of whom the picket presently came round, peeping into every bush. Presently the sound of distant voices was heard; it came nearer and nearer, and its shrillness and confusion made it known to me that it was indeed a party of returning wrens, far from sober. They were in fact, mad drunk; and the sound of their voices as they came on through the dense darkness, screaming obscene sounds broken by bursts of horrible laughter, with now and then a rattling volley of oaths which told that fighting was going on, was staggering. I confess I now felt uncomfortable. I had only seen the wren sober, or getting sober; what she might be in that raging state of drunkenness I had yet to find out, and the discovery threatened to be very unpleasant. The noise came nearer, and was more shocking because you could disentangle the voices and track each through its own course of swearing, or of obscene singing and shouting, or of dreadful threats, which dealt in detail with every part of the human frame. 'Is this your lot?' I asked my companion with some apprehension, as at length the shameful crew burst out of the darkness. 'Some ov 'em, I think.' But no, they passed on; such a spectacle as made

me tremble. I felt like a man respited when the last woman went staggering by. Again voices were heard, this time proceeding from the women belonging to the bush where I was spending such an uncomfortable evening. Five in all, two tipsy and three comparatively sober, they soon presented themselves at the door; one of them was Billy's mother. At the sound of her voice the child woke up and cried for her. She was the most forbidding-looking creature in the whole place; but she hastened to divest herself outside of her crinoline and the rest of her walking attire (nearly all she had on), and came in and nursed the boy very tenderly. The other wrens also took off gown and petticoat, and folding them up, made seats of them within the nest. Then came the important inquiry from the watching wren, 'What luck have you had?' to which the answer was, 'Middling.' Without the least scruple they counted up what they had got amongst them - a poor account. It was enough to make a man s heart bleed to hear the details, and to see the actual money. In order to continue my observations a little later in a way agreeable to those wretched outcasts, I proposed to 'stand supper,' a proposition which was joyfully received, of course. Late as it was, away went one of the wrens to get supper, presently returning with a loaf, some bacon, some tea, some sugar, a little milk, and a can of water. The women brought all these things in such modest quantities that my treat cost no more (I got my change, and I remember the precise sum) than two shillings and eightpence halfpenny. The frying-pan was put in requisition, and there seemed some prospect of a 'jolly night' for my more sober nest of wrens. One of them began to sing -- not a pretty song; but presently she stopped to listen to the ravings of a strong-voiced vixen in an adjoining bush. 'It's Kate,' said one, 'and she's got the drink in her, - the devil that she is.' I then heard that this was a woman of such ferocity when drunk that the whole colony was in terror of her. One of the women near me showed me her face, torn that very night by the virago's nails, and a finger almost bitten through. As long as the voice of the formidable creature was heard, everyone was silent in No. 2 nest – silent out of fear that she would presently appear amongst them. Her voice ceased; again a song was commenced; then the frying-pan began to hiss; and that sound it was, perhaps, that brought the dreaded virago down upon us. She was heard coming from her own bush, raging as she came. 'My God, there she is!' one of the women exclaimed. 'She's coming here; and if she sees you she'll tear every rag from your back!' The next moment the fierce creature burst into our bush, a stalwart woman full five feet ten inches high, absolutely mad with drink. Her hair was streaming down her back; she had scarcely a rag of clothing on; and the fearful figure made at me with a large jug, intended to be smashed upon my skull. I declare her dreadful figure appalled me. I was so wonder-stricken, that I believe she might have knocked me on the head without resistance; but, quick as lightning, one of the women got before me, spreading out her petticoat. 'Get out of it!' she shouted in terror; 'run!' And so I did. Covered by this friendly and grateful wren, I passed out of the nest, and made my way homeward in the darkness. One of the girls stepped out to show me the way. I parted from her a few yards from the nest, and presently 'lost myself' on the common. It was nearly two o'clock when I got to Kildare from my last visit to that shameful bush-village.

This scene, which I shall never forget, gave me, so to speak, a bellyful. As I wandered over the common for good two hours, I saw that dreadful woman in imagination at every turn, and her voice disturbed my sleep when at last I did get to bed. I resolved to go no more a-nesting, but to return and write what I have now written, hoping that some good may come of it. I support it is not possible to allow such things to continue in a Christian country?
Defence Forces Review 2007

To What Extent did the British Army's Direct Involvement in Politics Impact on Effective Civil Government and Military Efficiency in the Period Prior to the Commencement of World War I?

Comdt David Dignam

'I often wonder if General Seely and Mr Churchill ever offer little candles to William Hohenzollern for restoring the officer cadre of the British Army and Navy for them, even though it died in the process.'

Sir George MacMunn¹

INTRODUCTION

Within a democracy, civil control over the military is founded on 'the supremacy of civilian institutions based on popular sovereignty, over the defence and security policy-making apparatus, including the military leadership'.² Where such control is absent or breaks down, the ability, willingness and disposition of armed forces to intervene in civil governance can have serious implications for a state. Creating and maintaining the correct balance between the military and civil government is critical to the stability of a democratic state and its institutions. Where states fail to achieve the correct balance, for example in Imperial Japan prior to the outbreak of World War 2, the military can overly influence, indeed dominate national policy and can in effect subvert the normal democratic process.

The Curragh Incident of March 1914 is a rare example of direct intervention by the British Army in the political process. It constituted a major crisis in civil – military affairs that was only overshadowed by subsequent cataclysmic events in Europe and the resulting titanic war of national survival. Through an examination of original source documents, autobiographies and biographical works, this paper will examine the events of March 1914 and will consider their effect on civil – military relations and the governance of Great Britain and Ireland. In order to place the Curragh Incident in its historic context, this essay will also consider the nature of the relationship, which traditionally existed between the Sovereign, civil government and the British Army prior to 1914. It will examine the motivation behind the British Army's intervention in the political process and will consider both the political and military implications for both Britain and Ireland. The essay will then conclude with an overview of the significance of the Curragh Incident in the wider context.

¹ Cited Anglesey, Marquess of, (1996), A History of the British Cavalry 1816 – 1919, Volume 7: The Curragh Incident and the Western Front, 1914 (South Yorkshire: Leo Cooper), p. 51.

² Kujat, H Maj-Gen (1998), The Role of the Military in a Democracy address given to officials from Bosnia-Herzegovina, at http://www.nato.int/docu/ speech/1998/s980702h.htm, p. 1.

A BRIEF HISTORY OF RELATIONS BETWEEN THE BRITISH ARMY AND THE STATE.

The relationship, which has historically existed between Britain and her army, has been based on mistrust.³ A distrust of private armies coupled with a fear of an army loyal to the King rather than to the state inhibited the establishment of a standing army until the reign of Charles I.⁴ The subsequent creation of a New Model Army was a key component of Cromwell's dictatorship and its use in the repression of internal disorder did little to endear it to the wider country.⁵ The restoration of Charles II to the throne in 1660 saw the New Model Army replaced by a much smaller royal army, which was a standing army in the service of the crown .⁶ It subsequently expanded in size during the reign of King James but parliament used its control of the purse strings to limit this expansion and to curb the King's ambitions for 'his' army.

In the 18th century, the size of the standing army fluctuated as needs dictated. The British Army was frequently engaged in Europe and later North America, where the struggle against France manifested itself. As Britain's empire expanded, an army was needed to police new found territories and this consolidated the army's position as a permanent feature of the state. During the 19th century, the British Army underwent massive change with the continued professionalisation of the force. This period saw the demise of the purchase system for commissions, and witnessed the development of the post of Commander in Chief, subsequently known as Chief of the Imperial General Staff (CIGS). It also witnessed the formalising of the relationship between the professional head of the Army and the government, and major reform of the organisation and structure of the British Army.⁷ The Crimean War and later Boer War also acted as major catalysts for change, as did the natural evolution of British society and its political institutions. However, conservative forces within the British Army often resisted such tides of change. In particular, efforts to increase the professionalism of the Army and the loss of the purchase system for commissions met with fierce resistance.

The linkage that traditionally existed between holding the Sovereign's commission and membership of the aristocracy was jealously guarded. Indeed, with some notable exceptions, possession of a commission was synonymous with wealth, prestige and influence rather than professional competence, training and ability. The concept that officers would be paid a salary in return for their service threatened to undermine the relationship which previously existed between the officer class and the state. No less a personage than the Duke of Wellington resisted proposals to professionalise the Army, wishing it to continue to be led by 'men of fortune and character, men who have some connection with the interests and fortunes of the country, besides the commissions which they hold for his Majesty'.⁸ These attitudes illustrate that the notion of professional military service, divorced from personal vested interest in maintaining the socio-political-economic status quo, was slow to take root. Indeed, even with the demise of the purchase system, the officer body continued to be largely populated by men who while increasingly professional in their duties, were never divorced from the sources of power and influence within the country. Britain had been a nation in a state of gradual transition since the restoration of the monarchy in 1660. The power struggle between the monarchy and parliament reached its climax with the English civil war but did not end with the restoration.

³ Strawson, John, (1989), Gentlemen in Khaki (London: Martin Secker & Warburg Ltd), p. 12.

⁴ ibid, p. 12-13.

⁵ id.

⁶ ibid, p. 13.

⁷ Huntington, Samuel P (2003), The Soldier and the State, (Harvard: Belknap Press of Harvard University Press), p. 46

⁸ Ibid. p. 47

The gradual redefining of Britain from an autocratic monarchy to a constitutional monarchy was fraught with political, social and economic friction. As British society transformed itself in the 18th and 19th centuries, loyalty to the monarchy and state were not as synonymous as had previously been the case. Changes within the balance of power by 1835 saw government ministers now responsible to the House of Commons and not directly to the monarch.⁹ The emergence of a strong merchant – industrial class in the aftermath of the industrial revolution, the gradual extension of voting rights to the majority of the population (culminating in the provision of full voting rights to women in 1928) and the loss of veto by the House of Lords in 1911, all furthered the concept of a nation state beyond the historic confines of Royal patronage and aristocratic dominance. While it would be overstating matters to suggest that by 1914, the concept of Britain as a state had replaced the monarchy as the object of national loyalty, much of the Army continued to see themselves as loyal first to their sovereign and not to the state in the form of its democratically elected institutions. As we shall see, this was to have important implications later. The gradual substitution of Royal authority with popular sovereignty was not therefore universally welcomed, particularly within such institutions as the Army, which had much to lose, by any transfer of power and influence.

THE BRITISH ARMY AND POLITICS

Having an officer class who had, in the words of the Duke of Wellington, 'some connection with the interests and fortunes of the country' ensured that the officer body was not divorced from political activity. If officers could identify their own interests beyond those associated with loyalty to the Sovereign and a desire to serve the nation, it could ultimately lead to a conflict of interests between what they considered to be in the interests of the state and the right of legitimate government to rule. Having an officer body that was increasingly professional did not in itself guarantee that such a body would maintain the separation of professional and personal interest that is required of the military in a truly democratic state. Huntington, in his examination of civil – military relations, suggests that increasing levels of professionalism should in turn lead to increased levels of compliance with civil authority.¹⁰ However, increased professionalism within the British Army did not guarantee such compliance. The Army could and frequently did indirectly intervene in political matters adopting an indirect approach, relying on the close and intimate relationship, which it had with the three pillars of British power and authority, the Sovereign, the House of Lords and the House of Commons.

It is generally accepted that the British Army has remained largely apolitical since the Restoration and that, in the words of Michael Howard, 'For over two centuries the supremacy of the civil power had been unquestioned.'¹¹ But the fact that the British Army has accepted the supremacy of the civil power does not, as Hew Strachan points out, mean that the British Army has always been apolitical.¹²

⁹ Webb (1969), p. 214.

¹⁰ Huntington, op cit, pp. 19-58.

¹¹ Cited in Strachan, Hew, (1997), The Politics of the British Army, (Oxford: Clarendon Press), p. 7.

¹² ibid, pp. 7-10.

Military forces can exert political pressure in many ways other than through direct intervention. Finer has identified four levels of military intervention - influence, blackmail, displacement and supplantation.¹³ Influencing politicians through appealing to reason or emotion is considered by Finer both 'constitutional and legitimate', but the use of 'blackmail' or the 'threat of sanction' can verge on the unconstitutional.¹⁴ While armies can undermine government through direct action such as by holding a *coup d'état*, a refusal by the armed forces to implement government policy can also prevent effective civil governance.

It might be argued that the British Army did not need to directly interfere in the political system in order to influence it. The British Army was so closely connected with the Monarchy, the House of Lords and indeed the House of Commons that it could frequently achieve influence over government policy without the need to resort to direct challenges to government. The close relationship, which traditionally existed between the Army and the aristocracy, ensured that members of the House of Lords would often share the views and opinions of the Army and would take such views into account when discussing and amending government policy. With members of the Royal Family holding important positions within the military and senior officers serving on the monarch's personal staff, the sovereign was always aware of and frequently shared the concerns of the Army. In this way, legitimate influence could be brought to bear on government policy. Within the House of Commons, army officers were entitled to be elected as public representatives while also holding a regular commission, thereby ensuring that Army views were heard within the elected chamber. Other MPs held commissions in the Militia or had previous service within the regular armed forces before embarking on a second career as a politician.

It was also possible to switch between careers in politics and the Army. During the First World War, Field Marshal Lord Kitchener, still a serving officer, acted as Secretary of State for War, while a major political figure central to the Curragh Incident, Secretary of State for War J.E.B. Seely, resigned his cabinet post in the aftermath of the Curragh Incident and went on to command the Canadian Cavalry Brigade in France. Winston Churchill served in a variety of political appointments in the early part of the war, and then served with the Royal Scots Fusiliers on the western front before resuming his political career in Westminster.¹⁵ It is apparent that the lines between military and political life were frequently blurred, providing many opportunities for the Army to bring influence to bear on all aspects of national policy. This 'permeability of the political and military elites in the early twentieth-century Britain'¹⁶ was a major contributing factor in creating the conditions for the Curragh Incident.

The Army was therefore able to influence government policy without the need to resort to blackmail or threaten either displacement or supplantation. We must however recognise that the Army rarely threatened to escalate any resistance to government policy and ultimately acquiesced to the decisions of the elected government. The Curragh Incident is the exception to this norm. In this instance, influence failed to achieve the desired effect over government policy, leading to some senior officers resorting to a form of blackmail in order to undermine government policy. It has also been suggested that for a small number of officers involved, the

¹³ Finer (1969), The Man on Horseback. (London: Pall Mall Press Ltd). pp. 86-87.

¹⁴ Ibid, pp. 86-109.

¹⁵ Strachan (1997) op. cit, p. 8

¹⁶ Jeffery, Keith (2006), Field Marshal Sir Henry Wilson, A Political Soldier (Oxford: OUP) p. 114.

Curragh Incident presented an opportunity to displace the Asquith government, in the hope of replacing it with a Unionist government, more in keeping with their own political views and aspirations.¹⁷

BRITISH GOVERNMENT AND IRISH HOME RULE

The Irish Question greatly taxed the minds of Asquith's Liberal government in the early years of the 20th century. The issue of how to reconcile the differing political expectations of the Nationalist and Unionist populations of Ireland was a major issue for the Liberal government of Prime Minister Asquith. Home Rule for all or part of the island of Ireland dominated both Cabinet and House of Commons time from early 1910 until 1914.¹⁸ It became an extremely emotive and divisive subject, ensnaring politicians, the King, the media and ultimately the Army. The inability of the Asquith government to find a compromise between Unionists and Nationalists led to the direct involvement of the British Army in political affairs and created a constitutional crisis that was only overshadowed by the rapidly emerging crisis that became World War 1.

The eventual abolition of the House of Lords veto in 1911 allowed the Liberal government of Prime Minister Asquith to revisit the issue of Irish Home Rule. He announced in late 1910 that his government intended to revisit the matter and to proceed with legislation to give effect to the issue.¹⁹ However, Ulster Unionist hostility to the proposal had not diminished since the previous attempts to pass Home Rule bills in 1886 and 1893. Unionists, by now led by Sir Edward Carson, made it clear that they were prepared to resist, by force of arms if necessary, the imposition of a Dublin based, Roman Catholic dominated parliament governing the island of Ireland. The Ulster Volunteer Force (UVF) was established in 1912 and began the successful importation of arms into Northern Ireland.²⁰ This gave credibility to Unionist threats of military action to prevent the imposition of Home Rule. The Unionists had the support of many distinguished former British Army officers who assisted in the creation of the UVF, including such major figures as Field Marshall Lord Roberts. It was he who nominated Lt-Gen Sir George Richardson as its commanding officer and soon former British army officers²¹ held 62% of the UVF's divisional, regimental and battalion commands. By 1913, the Irish nationalists had responded to the creation of the UVF by the establishment of a rival military organisation, the Irish Volunteers (IV), a 'hybrid military-political'²² organisation whose purpose was to 'secure and maintain the rights and liberties common to all the people of Ireland'.23 While notionally claiming to represent the interests of the entire people of the island, regardless of 'creed, politics, or social grade' the IV was established as a direct counterforce to the UVF²⁴. The later formation of the Irish Citizen's Army, a nationalist oriented militia based on the militant Irish labour movement, further complicated matters for the British government. Successful efforts by each of the armed bodies to secure importations of arms and ammunition gave substance to their threats to use force to achieve their stated objectives.

21 Strachan, (1997) Op. Cit, p. 112.

¹⁷ Beckett, Ian F (1989), Johnnie Gough, V.C. (London: Tom Donovan), p. 171.

¹⁸ Gilbert, Bentley (1992), David Lloyd George (London: BT Batsford Ltd), p. 93.

¹⁹ id.

²⁰ Lee J.J. (1989), Ireland 1912 - 1985 Politics and Society, (Cambridge University Press), p. 18.

²² Cited in, Townshend, Charles (2005), Easter 1916, The Irish Rebellion (London: Penguin Allen Lane), p. 43.

²³ ibid, p. 41.

²⁴ ibid, p. 42.

It would be wrong to assume that reservations about the Asquith government's Home Rule policy were confined to the Army. The King was greatly concerned about Ireland and saw that the determination with which the Asquith government was pursuing the Home Rule issue would inevitably see him having to sign its provisions into law. He was convinced that Home Rule for Ireland had the capacity to lead to wide scale violence over the refusal of the Protestant minority to accept the governance of a Catholic dominated parliament. The King was greatly concerned that it would lead to his Irish subjects tearing 'themselves to pieces'.²⁵ The possibility that the monarch might exercise his constitutional (but rarely used) veto and decline to sign into law the Act of Parliament strained the relationship between Asquith and the King and became the subject of much politicking between the Liberal government and Conservative opposition. Arthur Balfour, the leader of the Conservatives in 1911, suggested to the King that he consider dismissing the Liberal government in the event that they pressed ahead with Home Rule against the King's wishes.²⁶ The King was aware that the Home Rule Bill was due to come before him for his assent in May 1914 and that he faced 'a serious dilemma'.²⁷ If he signed the Bill into law, he would have been unfaithful to those in favour of maintaining the union; if he refused, he would be initiating a constitutional crisis and would never again be able to set foot in Ireland again, 'a position of affairs which would be intolerable and one to which no Sovereign has ever been exposed'.²⁸

Asquith's government was unsure how the Army might react if ordered into Ulster. There were, from an early stage, question marks about the attitude of the Army to government policy on Ireland. These doubts were clearly identified in 1912 when Lloyd George asked the question, 'what will we do about Ulster if it rebels? Can we order the soldiers in? If they go, will they actually open fire?'²⁹ King George V was also concerned about the Army and asked Asquith 'Do you propose to employ the Army to suppress such disorders? ... In doing so, you will, I am sure, bear in mind that ours is a voluntary Army ...(and) may have strong feelings on the Irish question... Will it be wise ...to subject the discipline, and indeed the loyalty of (my) troops, to such a strain?'³⁰ As both the UVF and IV continued to arm through the illegal importation of weapons into Ireland, the British government dithered on the imposition of Home Rule. Attempts at mediation and negotiation conspicuously failed to arrive at a compromise and fears of imminent crisis were heightened by the further successful importation of arms into Ireland by both the Irish Volunteers and the UVF in 1914.

THE BRITISH ARMY AND HOME RULE

Government concerns about the likely attitude of the Army towards the growing crisis were well founded. Many British Army officers had strong personal links with Ulster and had a close association with the Anglo-Irish community who in the main did not favour Home Rule.³¹ In addition, the officer body was substantially pro-Conservative in outlook and was not generally well disposed to the Liberal government of Prime Minister Asquith.³² Many officers held strong views on the matter of Home Rule and indicated that the government should not

27 ibid, p. 139.

²⁵ Rose, Kenneth (1983), King George V London: Papermac) p. 149.

²⁶ ibid, p. 138.

²⁸ id.

²⁹ Gilbert (1992), p. 94.

³⁰ Rose (1984), p. 149.

³¹ Lyons F.S.L. (1971), Ireland since the Famine, (London: Weidenfeld and Nicholson), p.307.

³² Beckett, Ian F (ed) (1986), The Army and the Curragh Incident 1914, (London: The Army Records Society)., p. 5.

presume upon their loyalty with regard to Ulster. Lloyd George's earlier question in relation to the reliability of the military in respect of Ulster was not therefore a rhetorical one. That there was considerable debate within the Army in relation to Ulster was well known. In Sep 1913, the King's Private Secretary interviewed Brig-Gen. Johnnie Gough V.C., then serving in Aldershot under Lt Gen Sir Douglas Haig, and sought his opinion as 'to the probable attitude of the Army in the event of it being employed to coerce Ulster'.³³ Johnnie Gough let it be known in no uncertain terms that 'the Army might refuse to obey orders' and that he 'was prepared to assist Ulster by every means in my power'.³⁴ Field Marshal Sir John French, then serving as CIGS, stated in 1913 that the Army would 'as a body obey unflinchingly & without question the absolute commands of the King no matter what their private opinions might be' but 'Men are however only mortal and [that] the discipline of His Majesty's Troops would be subjected to a great strain if they were called upon to fire on men who...are flying their own flag'.³⁵ In Nov 1913, Maj-Gen H.H. Wilson informed Bonar Law, leader of the Tory Party in Westminster that 'if [the Army were] ordered to coerce Ulster, there would be wholesale defection'.³⁶ The then Director of Military Operations and arch political operator, Brig-Gen Henry Wilson, when asked what the Army would do if ordered to 'attack Belfast City Hall with Carson sitting in it' replied 'We would not go'. Wilson later indicated that he had discussed this with his [military] colleagues and 'they had all agreed'.³⁷ Army officers were thus serving notice on the government that it should not assume their loyalty in implementing British government policy in respect of Home Rule for Ireland.

While some officers were indicating that the government could not count on their support in coercing Ulster into Home Rule, other serving and retired officers were active in deliberately undermining government policy on the matter. Lord Roberts, Maj-Gen Henry Rawlinson, Brig Gen Henry Wilson and others were instrumental in buttressing the position of the Ulster Unionist leader, Sir Edward Carson.³⁸ Behind the scenes, they offered active support to the Ulstermen and kept them informed as to the government's position in relation to Home Rule. In the words of Maj-Gen Ferguson, commander of the 5th Division in Ireland in 1914, 'certain officers holding high appointments, in and out of the War office, are in the confidence of the Ulster Party, and are practically working against the Government and the constituted authority of the army'.³⁹ This is not to suggest that all officers were intriguing in support of the UVF position. Many senior officers indicated that they were prepared to follow all lawful orders of the government, regardless of their personal views on the matter of Home Rule. However a number of important personalities, in critical positions to influence the eventual outcome, were prepared to act, or refuse to act, to prevent the coercion of Ulster into a Dublin lead, Home Rule parliament.

³³ Brig-Gen J.E. Gough cited in Beckett (1986), p. 35.

³⁴ Field Marshall French to Stamfordham cited in Beckett (1986), p. 39.

³⁵ Id.

³⁶ ibid, p. 41.

³⁷ Gilbert (1992), p. 105.

³⁸ Beckett (1986) Op Cit., p. 5.

³⁹ Jenkins, Roy (1964), Asquith, (London: Collins), p. 315.

POLITICAL RESPONSE TO THE ARMY CHALLENGE

J.B. Seely, Secretary of State for War in 1913, recognised the seriousness of the situation and identified that strong action would be necessary to maintain discipline within the Army in respect of Ulster. Seely told the Commanders-in-Chief of the various Army Commands that they would be held 'individually responsible to see that there was no conduct in their commands subversive of discipline' and that any officer seeking to choose which orders they would or would not obey would be 'removed' at once by order of the King. Seely identified that it was unacceptable for professional soldiers to reserve the right to determine which lawful orders they would or would not obey.⁴⁰ Beyond that, the government do not appear to have had a coherent plan in place to ensure that Army discipline would be maintained and that they would obey all lawful orders in respect of Ulster.

THE CURRAGH INCIDENT: MARCH 1914

Incompetent handling of government instructions in respect of Ulster by the Commander in Chief of the British Army in Ireland, Lt-Gen Sir Arthur Paget, brought matters to a head in March 1914. Orders to take steps to secure arms depots in Ulster from a possible threat of seizure by the UVF were interpreted by some as a precursor to the movement of troops north to impose Home Rule on Ulster. In a clumsy attempt to explain government intentions towards Ulster and the role that the Army might play, Paget reinforced this perception and appeared to offer Officers 'domiciled in Ulster'⁴¹ the option of disappearing for the duration of the forthcoming action. Those other officers not domiciled in Ulster who refused to carry out instructions would be dismissed from the service with the loss of pensions and other entitlements. In the light of this apparent ultimatum from government, (an ultimatum never actually furnished by government), many officers tendered their resignations rather than face the prospect of acting against Ulster. To the fore in this decision were officers of the 3rd Cavalry Brigade based in the Curragh, Co Kildare, commanded by Brig-Gen Hubert Gough.

Hubert Gough now found himself as *de facto* leader of those officers who chose resignation and came to represent them in discussions with the government and Army authorities. Hubert Gough came from Anglo-Irish stock with strong views on the issue of the Union. Many other officers, serving at home and abroad, indicated their strong support for Gough's position and offered to resign in support of Ulster. Among those was Hubert Gough's brother, Brig Gen Johnnie Gough V.C. Johnnie Gough had been instrumental in drumming up support for his brother's position when Hubert had tendered his resignation and subsequently came to London for talks on 23 March 1914. One participant in the proceedings went so far as to state that without Johnnie Gough's 'energy, determination, and foresight we would not have achieved the success we did'.⁴² His efforts were highly successful, being later praised by Hubert for 'arousing the spirit of the army'.⁴³ Many of the figures who were to later gain prominence in the 1914-18 war offered their support to the position taken by the Gough brothers, including Maj Gen Rawlinson, Lt-Gen Horace Smith-Dorrien, Maj-Gen Allenby and Maj-Gen Thompson Capper.⁴⁴ Institutional support was also received from the Royal

⁴⁰ Memorandum by Seely dated 09 Dec 1913, cited in Beckett (1986), pp. 50-51.

⁴¹ Beckett (1986), p. 12.

⁴² Cited in Beckett (1989), p. 169.

⁴³ id. 44 id.

Military College, Staff College, and from the Royal Navy.⁴⁵ The scale of the problem was by now all too apparent to the government and a major crisis was on hand.

Prime Minister Asquith and his government were now faced with a major difficulty in that it appeared to be losing control over the Army. Attempts at mediation between the cabinet and the disaffected officers, represented by Hubert Gough, were initiated. The cabinet agreed a memorandum to be presented to Gough outlining the government's position and recognising that the incident was born of a 'misunderstanding'.⁴⁶ However, Seely was not convinced that the cabinet memorandum as it stood would satisfy Gough. Without Asquith's or the cabinet's knowledge, Seely took it upon himself to add to the memorandum as follows:

His Majesty's Government must retain their right to use all the forces of the Crown in Ireland, or elsewhere, to maintain law and order and to support the civil power in the ordinary execution of its duty. But they have no intention whatever of taking advantage of this right to crush political opposition to the policy or principals of the Home Rule Bill.⁴⁷

In adding to the previously agreed cabinet memorandum, Seely surrendered to Gough the government's right to use the Army to suppress any armed revolt that might be initiated by the UVF against Home Rule. However, Gough was still unhappy. He annotated the bottom of the memorandum as follows: 'We understand the reading of the last paragraph to be that the troops under our command will not be called upon to enforce the present Home Rule Bill on Ulster, and that we can so assure our officers'. Gough signed this addition to the amended memorandum and passed it to the CIGS, Field Marshall Sir John French. Sir John, perhaps desperate to close the fissure that had appeared in the Army, countersigned it. This further clarification explicitly ruled out the use of the Army to enforce Home Rule. Between them, Seely and French had inadvertently but effectively surrendered control of the government's Home Rule policy to the Army dissidents represented by Gough. The implications were all too apparent to Asquith who recognised that the additional clarifications received gave away 'the entire position of civil control over the army'.⁴⁸ Attempts by Asquith to restore the situation by the withdrawal of the clarification demanded by and given to Gough came too late. Gough had departed London for Dublin with the written concessions secured. Having exacerbated the government's difficulties by going beyond the cabinets agreed position, French and Seely tendered their resignations. In stark contrast, Gough and his co-conspirators returned to Ireland as heroes, having effectively seized control of the government's Home Rule policy.

There has always been some discussion as to whether or not the events associated with the 3rd Calvary Brigade in the Curragh in 1914 constituted an incident or a mutiny. Fifty-eight of the Cavalry Officers of the 3rd Cavalry Brigade initially indicated that they would prefer dismissal to the risk of being ordered to take aggressive action against the Ulster Volunteers.⁴⁹

⁴⁵ id

⁴⁶ Memorandum given to Brig Gen H.P. Gough cited in Beckett (1986) p. 218.

⁴⁷ ibid.

⁴⁸ Jenkins (1964), p. 312 49 Beckett (1986), p. 433.

Legally, none of the officers who tendered their resignations refused to disobey a lawful order but merely indicated what their response would be in the event that such an order was issued. The events of March 1914 have been described as a kind of 'pre-emptive mutiny'.⁵⁰ The tendering of resignations removed the possibility of them having to refuse to obey such orders. Hence the events of March 1914 are referred to as the Curragh Incident and not the Curragh Mutiny. While this distinction is legally sound, it is perhaps irrelevant. The overall effect of the incident on government policy in Ireland could not have been more profound. Not only was the government's Irish policy now in ruins, but also some commentators questioned the loyalty of the Army in other similar situations. Could, for instance, the loyalty of the rank and file be presumed in the event that they were again called upon to intervene militarily in industrial disputes in England, as had happened in the recent past?⁵¹ If officers could pick and choose which orders to follow, would the other ranks not adopt a similar posture when ordered to act against their instincts and personal dispositions? The working class press, Labour Party and Radicals all made political capital from the incident and many now questioned the ability of the government to control the Army.

The Asquith government now faced two inter-linked crises, the effective loss of civil control over the Army and the collapse of its Home Rule policy. An examination of Asquith's autobiography and personal correspondence indicates that he became firmly focused on salvaging the government's Home Rule policy and not on the restoration of civil control over the Army.⁵² Despite the fact that he had assumed the position of Secretary of State for War on the resignation of Seely, Asquith does not appear to have addressed the issue of reasserting civil control, instead continuing in his efforts to salvage Home Rule. However, the concessions made to Gough rendered any attempt to negotiate a compromise between the Nationalists and Unionists virtually impossible. Any attempt to create a Dublin parliament with jurisdiction over Ulster would result in violence, which the government would be powerless to control. Nevertheless, urged on by the King and perhaps more in desperation than in hope, Asquith convened a conference of both sides in an attempt to resolve the issue. The conference failed. Carson's negotiating position was strengthened by the knowledge that the government could not countenance the threat of force against the Unionists because of the written concessions given to Gough. In turn, John Redmond, the Irish Nationalist leader must have been aware that the government's ability to bring about Home Rule for the entire island had been seriously undermined by its inability to exercise full control over its own military. The Home Rule Act that appeared on the statute books in September 1914 was to be amended to exclude Ulster from the new arrangements. Carson had been victorious, his negotiating position greatly increased by the active support of the Army, while the governments position was substantially undermined by its inability to exercise control over its Army.

EFFECT OF THE CURRAGH INCIDENT ON IRELAND.

The role that the Army had played in shaping the future direction of Ireland was not lost on the nationalist population. It became apparent that the Army was not neutral and outside the political debate that would determine the future of the island. The concessions given to Gough were in fact the transfer of political power from a democratically elected government to a

⁵⁰ Jeffery (2006), p. 124.

⁵¹ Beckett (1986), p. 16.

⁵² Brock, Michael and Eleanor (eds), (1985), H.H. Asquith Letters to Venetia Stanley, (Oxford: Oxford University Press), pp 38-83.

group of Army officers pursuing their own political agenda. This had an 'electrifying effect' on nationalist opinion in Ireland'.⁵³ Nationalists were 'angered, dismayed and demoralised' by events.⁵⁴ This opinion was further reinforced in July 1914 when the Army opened fire in the streets of Dublin on nationalists returning from the landing of arms for the Irish Volunteers (IV) at Howth on 26 July 1914. That the Army had not moved against a similar UVF landing of arms at Larne the previous April was not lost on nationalists and further heightened the perception that the Army was essentially an instrument of Unionist, and not Government policy. Even Irish nationalists who would have been perceived as moderates in the Home Rule debate prior to the events of March 1914 now questioned the bona fides of the British Government and its ability to deliver on its promises. This led to a hardening of attitudes within the nationalist movement and a dramatic increase in the numbers joining the IV. Its numbers grew from a total of 27,000 in April 1914 to 180,000 by that summer.⁵⁵ The IV became more radical in its outlook and the influence of political moderates such as John Redmond began to wane. In their place, the stock of those who would lead the Easter Rising of 1916 began to rise. The militants within Irish nationalism now believed that the British government was unable to bring about Home Rule for Ireland with the Army so closely aligned to the Unionist cause. Further moves to import arms into Ireland were made by both Unionists and Nationalists, with the government's inability to intervene forcing it to accept the continued existence of paramilitary sectarian organisations within Ireland.⁵⁶ The long term consequences of this paramilitary sectarianism are still apparent today. The Curragh Incident was also an important event in unleashing the proponents of armed force within the Nationalist movement. The 1916 Easter Rising, War of Independence, partition and Civil War in the south, were soon to follow. The course of Irish history was soon to radically change.

EFFECT OF THE CURRAGH INCIDENT ON GOVERNMENT.

The divisive nature of the Home Rule issue had, for many years, dominated the adversarial relationship, existing between the Liberal Party and the Conservative Party within Westminster. While many Conservatives shared the concerns for the Protestant population in a Catholic dominated Ireland, they also feared for the future of the Empire if Ireland was allowed to go its own way. They were not convinced that the form of Home Rule on offer to Ireland amounted to nothing more than a form of local government and saw it as the thin end of the wedge and the precursor to the end of the Empire. That many officers shared such sentiments goes to the very heart of the Curragh Incident. For some, the incident was purely about Ulster. For others, it was an opportunity to support the Conservative Party in its efforts to 'break the government' of Prime Minister Asquith over the issue of Home Rule.⁵⁷ A great many officers did consider involvement in politics as beneath their dignity, but others had no such compunctions. They saw the Curragh Incident as an opportunity to directly involve themselves in the political affairs of the nation. Through their involvement in the Curragh Incident, they hoped to bring about a change of government to one more in keeping with their own views and aspirations. In their involvement over the question of Ulster, former and serving officers such as Lord Roberts, Henry Wilson and Rawlinson had 'every intention and every expectation of bringing

⁵³ Townshend (2005), p. 51.

⁵⁴ Jeffery (2006), pp. 122-123. 55 Townshend (2005), p. 52

⁵⁶ Beckett (1986), p. 28.

⁵⁷ Beckett (1989), p. 171.

down Asquith's government'.⁵⁸ Roberts writing to Maj-Gen H.H. Wilson stated that 'The more officers resign the worse will be the plight of the government'.⁵⁹ Henry Wilson recorded in his diary that he hoped that resignations in respect of the Curragh Incident would 'break the cabinet'.⁶⁰ While the would be conspirators failed to destabilise the government, they and those associated with the Curragh Incident effectively destroyed the government's policy on Ireland, diminished its constitutional authority, poisoned 'civil-military relations on the eve of war and...almost destroyed the army as an institution'.⁶¹

It is therefore curious that the autobiographies of both Asquith and Lloyd George do not identify the importance of restoring civil control over the military in the immediate aftermath of the Curragh Incident. Asquith appears to have remained focused on attempting to resolve the Home Rule issue and there is nothing to suggest that he gave much consideration to the wider implications of the Curragh Incident. Asquith's two-volume 'Memories and Reflections' lay out in some detail the subsequent attempts to reach an accommodation between the Nationalists and Unionists in the summer of 1914, but does not comment on the wider implications of the Army's involvement in the Home Rule matter. Nor do Lloyd George's 'War Memories' refer to the difficulties in relation to the army at that time. This is perhaps curious in light of Lloyd George's subsequently fractious relations with the Army's Generals during World War 1. The acrimonious nature of civil – military relations during much of the Great War has been examined in some detail, yet no specific link has been identified between the difficulties in World War 1 and the Curragh Incident.⁶² It is however, hard to believe that Lloyd George's future attitudes towards the Army were not in some way influenced by the events of 1914 and that the serious friction which dominated the relationship of future Prime Minister Lloyd George and the likes of Kitchener, Robertson and Haig were not, at least in some part, born from the difficult days of March 1914. The effect that the Curragh Incident had on war time civil – military relations is certainly worthy of further study.

EFFECT OF THE CURRAGH INCIDENT ON THE EUROPEAN SITUATION

Despite the difficulties the Asquith government was facing in relation to Home Rule and the Army, all such matters were about to be entirely overshadowed by the growing spectre of conflict within Europe. Churchill's 'The World Crisis 1911 – 1914' considers the Home Rule issue and the British Army's involvement in some detail. He described the Curragh Incident as 'shocking events', which 'shook the State to its foundations'⁶³ and went on to claim that German agents and statesmen believed that 'England was paralysed by faction and drifting into civil war, and need not be taken into account in the European situation'.⁶⁴ Churchill has rarely been known to understate matters but in this instance, there is no evidence to suggest that the events in Europe over the coming weeks and months were in any way influenced by the crisis in civil-military relations. It was believed that the Curragh Incident did in fact 'worry the French, and, naturally, delighted the Germans'.⁶⁵ However, there is no evidence to suggest that the German calculations that led her to offer Austro-Hungary the infamous 'blank cheque'

⁵⁸ id.

⁵⁹ Holograph from Brig-Gen Hubert Gough to Lt-Gen Ewart, cited in Beckett (1986), p. 217.

⁶⁰ Wilson diary, 29 March 1914, cited in Jeffery (2006), p. 125.

⁶¹ Beckett (1989), p. 171.

⁶² Woodward, David R. (2004), Lloyd George and the Generals, (London: Frank Cass).

⁶³ Churchill, Winston (1924), The World Crisis 1911 - 1914. London: Thornton Butterworth Ltd), p. 189.

⁶⁴ id.

⁶⁵ Neillands, Robin, (1999), The Great War Generals on the Western Front 1914-1918, (London: Robinson Publishing Ltd), p. 61.

of support in her dispute with Serbia was in any way influenced by the Curragh Incident. While Churchill may have identified genuine concerns on how civil – military relations might be perceived abroad, the reality is that the events of March 1914 had no bearing on bringing about the tragic events that were shortly to unfold in Europe.

Had the government stood its ground, accepted the resignations of the minority of disaffected officers and acted against Ulster, might the involvement of the British Army in Ireland's affairs have impacted on Britain's ability to come to France and Belgium's assistance in August 1914? The movement of the British Expeditionary Force (BEF) to France in 1914 was to be one of the best-organised and most efficient operations of the entire war, worked out in great detail by Brig-Gen Henry Wilson and executed with considerable precision. These carefully organised plans might have been thrown into chaos had the Expeditionary Force been committed to Ireland just as the war clouds were gathering over Europe. A paper drafted by Henry Wilson in his capacity as Director of Military Operations in July 1914 indicated that any attempt by the government to conduct operations in Ulster 'would require the mobilisation of the entire expeditionary force with serious consequences for home and imperial defence.'66 With the possibility of a bloody civil war between Unionists and Nationalists still ever present, Lord Milner wrote to Henry Wilson stating that 'The Army may have to take charge yet, to prevent a general relapse into anarchy.'67 The prospect of large scale Army deployment in Ireland therefore still loomed large. Hubert Gough's success in gaining assurances that the Army would not be used to coerce Ulster into Home Rule might not prevent their use to prevent an Irish civil war. This eventuality would have had the most serious of consequences. Had the Irish Command of the British Army been reinforced by all or part of the British Expeditionary Force (BEF) that summer, it is possible that the German advance into Belgium and France and subsequent drive towards Paris might have had an entirely different outcome. That the British Army would have abandoned operations in Ulster and diverted its attention to events on the continent is not in doubt, but the physical dislocation of major elements of the BEF would have thrown the carefully choreographed mobilisation plans into chaos, preventing the efficient calling up of reserves and the rapid dispatch of the BEF from their designated ports of embarkation. In addition, the prospect of the Army being engaged in military operations against or between the potential warring factors in Ulster would have greatly complicated the task of disengaging the Army and preparing it for deployment to France. The possibility that many highly experienced senior and junior officers might have been cashiered immediately before the call to arms would also have added hugely to the confusion. In his memoirs, Hubert Gough also questions Britain's ability to respond to the 'German challenge'.⁶⁸ In his autobiography, he modestly enquires, 'Did the Army in fact, and the 3rd Cavalry Brigade in particular, save England?'⁶⁹ It is difficult to be definitive in such speculation, but when success or failure hangs on a thread, as was the case during that first month of World War 1, the future history of Europe might have been substantially different as a result of Paget's inadvertent initiation of the crisis that became the Curragh Incident.

⁶⁶ Cited in Beckett (1989), p. 170.

⁶⁷ Cited in Jeffery (2005), p. 128.

⁶⁸ Gough, General Sir Hubert (1954), Soldering On, (London: Arthur Baker Ltd), p.111.

⁶⁹ id.

It is also worth considering what impact any deployment of substantial elements of the BEF to Ulster might have had on the political decision to go to the assistance of France and Belgium in 1914. Despite the extensive planning that had been completed in relation to the BEF in the event of war with Germany, no firm political commitment had been given to France prior to a formal declaration of war. When faced with the prospect of deploying the BEF in response to the German invasion of Belgium, the Asquith government agonised over the decision to commit to a European war. The cabinet was divided, as was the wider Liberal Party over the prospect. On 31 July, Asquith recorded in his diary 'Are we to go in or stand aside. Of course everybody longs to stand aside.⁷⁰ The decision to commit to war hung on a knife edge, with some members of the cabinet prepared to resign in the event of the government committing to war, while others were prepared to resign if it didn't.⁷¹ Had major elements of the BEF been deployed to Ulster and had the Army been subsequently torn asunder by significant resignations as a result, such difficulties might have tipped the political balance within cabinet. While the eventual decision to go to war was perhaps inevitable, the difficulties relating to the dislocation of the BEF might have delayed the political decision to declare war. This would have lead to a delay in the deployment of the BEF to its assigned position on the left flank of the French Army. This of course remains speculative, but with success or failure so finely in the balance during that critical first month of war, any political or military delay might have had the most serious consequences for the eventual outcome of the conflict.

EFFECT OF THE CURRAGH INCIDENT ON EFFECTIVE COMMAND AND CONTROL WITHIN THE BEF.

Unity of command is an important element in the effective control of military forces in combat. Not all British Army officers agreed with either the cause espoused by those who supported Ulster nor the manner in which the Gough brothers and others had forced the government to retreat. Many Army officers were strongly opposed to political intervention of any kind and had a deep aversion to politics and, more pertinently, to politicians. The stance taken by Hubert Gough and the officers of the 3rd Cavalry Brigade did not receive universal support. Only a minority of officers of the Irish Command offered their resignations when faced with the same set of circumstances as the cavalrymen. While some expressed similar concerns in relation to Ulster as Gough and his supporters, many indicated that they were prepared to obey orders, however unpalatable those orders might be. In this regard, the efforts of Maj-Gen Fergusson, commanding general of the 5th Infantry Division in Ireland, in maintaining discipline within his Division, are noteworthy.⁷² In many parts of Great Britain and Ireland, commanding officers addressed their officers and troops in order to ensure that their commands did not get embroiled in the ongoing crisis.⁷³ That the resignations were largely (but not entirely) confined to the 3rd Cavalry Brigade says much about the general aversion to overt political involvement, which existed in much of the British Army. It also, perhaps, says much about the power of personality and persuasion that were exhibited on both sides of the argument. Ian Beckett correctly identifies the importance of the personality of Brig-Gen Hubert Gough in creating the crisis.⁷⁴ To this might be added the ineptitude of Gen Paget.

⁷⁰ Cited in, Tuchman, Barbara (1962), The Guns of August, (New York: Random House), p. 112.

⁷¹ Ibid

⁷² Beckett (1986), p. 15.

⁷³ Strachan, (1997), pp. 6-7.74 Beckett (1986), p. 15.

The deep divisions that the Curragh Incident created within the Army, exacerbated when the CIGS, Field Marshall Sir John French was forced to resign, were deeply felt. That Gough and many others escaped from the incident not just with their careers intact but with the status of heroes in some quarters while French was forced to resign having done all (and perhaps too much) to stave off a potential disaster, was keenly felt. Anger and recriminations were perhaps inevitable, and such feelings would inevitably have still been fresh when the BEF sailed for France in August 1914. Ian Beckett states that 'irretrievable damage was done to personal relationships in the army' and that officers such as Fergusson became the targets for abuse for having induced officers to withdraw their resignations.⁷⁵ However, an examination of the accounts and biographies of the period do not reveal any open hostility amongst officers in relation to the Curragh on departure for France. The desperate struggle that the BEF found itself engaged in on arrival in Europe would perhaps have left little time or energy to devote to any re-examination of recent events. As the war took its toll and the realisation set in that this would be a long drawn out and costly affair, the events of March 1914 would have had little relevance in the light of the titanic struggle under way.

But yet we do find occasional glimpses of old animosities reappearing at various times during the war. Gough's relationship with Sir John French was never warm before the Curragh Incident⁷⁶ and the events of March 1914 did little to improve matters. In his autobiography, Gough states that at the end of the Curragh Incident, he and Sir John parted 'on outwardly friendly terms' ⁷⁷ but Gough was known to use violent language when referring to French for some months after.⁷⁸ Sir John's views of Hubert Gough can only be imagined, bearing in mind the pivotal role played by Gough in the resignation of French as CIGS. Gough later played a minor role in the dismissal of French as C-In-C of the BEF. In October 1915, Hubert Gough took the opportunity to brief the King during his visit to France and agreed that 'everyone had lost confidence in the C-in-C'.⁷⁹ While it is difficult to be definitive as to the extent to which the Curragh influenced Gough's intervention with the King, it might be assumed that the events of March 1914 went some way to determining Gough's later attitude towards French. When French's position as C-in-C in the latter part of 1915 was under direct threat, from Sir Douglas Haig amongst others, Gough's intervention with the Monarch can have done little to assist French in retaining his position.

French's difficulties with subordinates were not limited to Hubert Gough. He had acrimonious relationships with many subordinates within the BEF and not just because of the Curragh Incident. Soured personal relations brought about by French's pre-war attempts to reform the British cavalry carried on into France after the deployment of the BEF in August 1914. It was perhaps unfortunate that many of those who opposed French's reforms ended up supporting Hubert Gough during the Curragh Incident. For example, Kitchener's appointment of Lt-Gen Smith-Dorrien as a Corps Commander in the BEF was not well received by French. Smith-Dorrien had been to the fore in opposing French's reform of the cavalry and his subsequent support for Gough during the Curragh Incident can have done nothing to improve his relations with French. It is therefore no surprise that Smith-Dorrien's appointment to the

⁷⁵ Beckett (1989), p.169.

⁷⁶ Holmes Richard, (2004), The Little Field Marshal, (London: Weidenfeld & Nicolson), p.172.

⁷⁷ Gough (1954), p.112.

⁷⁸ Beckett (1989), p. 69.

⁷⁹ Cited in Holmes (2004), p.308.

BEF 'infuriated'⁸⁰ French. Relations between the two remained fraught, particularly after the Battle of La Cateau, and ultimately led to Smith-Dorrien being sacked.

It might be expected that Seely would have retained some bitterness towards Hubert Gough after he resigned from the War Department on 24 March 1914. It is strange to relate the former Secretary of State for War later found himself in command of a Canadian Cavalry Brigade on the western front and in fact served under Hubert Gough for a period of time. Gough admits that his parting from Seely in London during the Curragh Incident was not on the friendliest of terms,⁸¹ but comments that their subsequent involvement led to them becoming 'great friends'⁸². He credits Seely with being 'generous-minded and never bore malice' over recent events, while Seely suggests in his autobiography that he and Gough became 'good friends'⁸³. It would appear that, unlikely as it might seem, the war in Europe healed any enmity that might have existed between these two former protagonists.

The same can hardly be said of other professional relationships involving Hubert Gough. One of those who sided against the pro-Unionist position in 1914 was Major Philip Howell. Howell was serving in the 4th Hussars of the 3rd Cavalry Brigade in the Curragh at the time of the incident and had been instrumental in persuading a number of officers to withdraw their resignations. This did little to endear him to his brigade commander and certainly seems to have coloured their future professional relationship. When relations between Gough's Fifth Army and Howell's subordinate II Corps became fraught in 1916, Howell's poor opinions of Gough's personal and professional abilities were apparent.⁸⁴ The feelings were apparently mutual. In 1916 Gough described Howell as 'a great thorn ...he always wants to avoid fighting, and he never loyally carries out his orders.⁸⁵ Howell's position as Gough's subordinate, coloured as it was by the events of March 1914, must have been trying in the extreme.

Other difficulties arose between Henry Wilson and Gough and the animosity that marked their future relationship appears to have its origins in the Curragh Incident. While Wilson had been active in supporting the Unionist position in the build up to 1914, Gough seems unimpressed with Wilson's contribution, denouncing it in detail in his memoirs. Gough suggested that in 1914, Wilson had waited until Gough and his supporters had 'been forced to make a stand'⁸⁶ before publicly committing himself to support the position taken by Gough and his supporters. When Wilson later served under Gough's command in 1916, relations between the two were fraught.⁸⁷ Wilson however, eventually attained the position of CIGS and must have taken some delight when Gough was sacked as commander of 5th Army in 1918. Well into retirement (and long after Wilson's death at the hands of the Irish Republican Army in 1922), Gough continued his personal campaign against Wilson, launching a particularly scathing attack on Wilson just prior to his own death in 1963.⁸⁸ While neither appears to have been a particularly likeable individual, their personal enmity appears to be due in some small part to the events that occurred in London in the immediate aftermath of the Curragh Incident.

⁸⁰ ibid, p. 210.

⁸¹ Gough (1954), p. 112.

⁸² id.

⁸³ Seely, J.E.B (1930), Adventure, (London: William Heinemann Ltd), p. 223.

⁸⁴ Sheffield Gary and Todman Dan (eds) (2004), Command and Control on the Western Front, (Kent: Spellmont Ltd), p. 86.

⁸⁵ ibid, p 85.

⁸⁶ Gough (1954), p. 111.

⁸⁷ Sheffield and Todman (2004), p. 74.

⁸⁸ id.

Personality-based frictions amongst major military figures were present throughout the war. There can be little doubt but that the events of March 1914 played a part in creating these frictions. The Curragh Incident can only have compounded and heightened difficulties which perhaps have their origins elsewhere. While the British Army will have gone to war in 1914 with unity of purpose, the Curragh Incident will have done little to bring about unity of command within the BEF. However, the overpowering nature of the conflict simply overwhelmed all other considerations and reduced the Curragh Incident to a minor footnote to the conflict. The virtual destruction of the original BEF by the end of 1914, the loss to enemy action of many of the participants in the Curragh Incident and the threat to national survival that then existed left little time for a re-examination of the events of March 1914. It is perhaps for this reason that we do not see the issue of civil - military relations featuring prominently in many of the autobiographical works written by the participants in the Curragh Incidents in the Curragh Incident and pressing matters that warranted recording in respect of the dark and difficult days of 1914.

CONCLUSION

The aim of this paper was to examine the extent to which the British Army's involvement in politics in March 1914 impacted on effective civil government and military efficiency in the period prior to the commencement of World War 1. The paper found that a group of Army officers effectively destroyed the government's policy on Ireland, undermined civil control of the military and created serious internal divisions within the Army itself. The events of March 1914 might also have had the most serious of consequences for the British Army's ability to fulfil its assigned role on the left flank of the French Army in the event of the BEF being deployed to Europe.

The Curragh Incident was a unique event in British military and political history. This crisis in civil - military relations had a profound effect on political life in Great Britain and Ireland at the time. Rarely have British Army officers so directly and publicly challenged the government on a matter of policy and their direct involvement in constitutional politics had a major impact on civil governance in Great Britain and Ireland. The Curragh Incident created a crisis that divided the political establishment and placed great strains between the government and the sovereign. In challenging the government's right to exercise its constitutional authority, the Army effectively destroyed the governments stated policy objective of bringing about Home Rule for the entire island of Ireland. Within Ireland, the Curragh Incident seriously weakened the position of nationalist moderates like John Redmond. After the Incident, the militants within the nationalist movement assumed greater control than heretofore. The loss of government control over the Army led to its being incapable of preventing the movement of weapons into the country. The Curragh Incident ultimately facilitated the further development of sectarian para-military organisations on the island, leading to both short and long term consequences. There was armed rebellion on the streets of Dublin within two short years, while in the longer term, the effective loss of control over the army in March 1914 allowed for the continued existence of para-military sectarian organisations in Ireland. This was to have serious implications for the future history of the island, the effects of which are still being played out today. The Curragh Incident also created huge divisions within the Army, dividing it along political / apolitical lines, leading to rancour, disunity and personal animosity. Indeed, it has been said that the Curragh Incident came close to destroying the Army as an institution.⁸⁹ But for the collapse of the governments Home Rule policy, the Curragh Incident might also have had serious implications for Britain's ability to come to the military assistance of France and Belgium in the event of war in Europe. It is strange to relate that when such a war did emerge so soon after March 1914, it proved to be the saviour of the British Army. It restored unity of purpose, allowed for personal animosities to be put aside in the face of a threat to national survival and acted as a catalyst for the eventual restoration of more normal relations between the government and senior military officers. That many of the protagonists did not survive the War ultimately facilitated the eventual consignment of the Curragh Incident to the footnotes of history. Perhaps General Seely and Mr Churchill did one day offer little candles to the Kaiser.⁹⁰ But despite the exceptional devotion to duty and self-sacrifice demonstrated by the British Army in World War 1, the Curragh Incident indicates that the loyalty of the British Army to the institutions of state could not be taken for granted in 1914. As a case study in civil – military relations, the Curragh incident illustrates the dangers inherent in any diminution of the separation that must exist between policy and instruments of policy in a democratic state.

⁸⁹ Beckett (1986), p. 29.

⁹⁰ See opening quotation.

Easter 1916 in Cork – Order, Counter-Order, and Disorder

CQMS Gerry White and Comdt Brendan O'Shea

INTRODUCTION

The failure of the Cork Brigade of Irish Volunteers to fully participate in the Easter Rising generated considerable resentment amongst those who did, and subsequently resulted in two formal inquiries. Notwithstanding that the leadership was twice exonerated, some officers were destined to carry a burden of guilt all the way to their graves.¹ Why was this the case? What happened in Cork to cause such angst? How did the military chain of command disintegrate at the very moment it was most needed?

This paper examines events in Cork before, during, and after the Easter Rising. It uncovers the operation of parallel chains of command; identifies the mobilisation of over 1,000 Volunteers; examines the legality of the arrest and court martial of Thomas Kent; and evaluates the leadership of the brigade commander, Tomás MacCurtain.

PLANNING AND PREPARATION

On Sunday, 9 April 1916 Tomás MacCurtain chaired a meeting of the Brigade Council at his headquarters in the Volunteer Hall on Sheares street in Cork city. Assembled before him were his second in command, Terence MacSwiney, his brigade staff officers and many of his battalion and company commanders.² MacCurtain's primary task was to finalise plans for his unit's participation in the forthcoming 'Mobilisation' and 'Easter Concentration' which were to be held in accordance with a General Order for 'Manoeuvres' issued six days previously by Patrick Pearse, the Volunteer's Director of Operations. Under the terms of this order Volunteer units in the south and west of the country would mobilise in order to secure a shipment of German arms and ammunition that was due to arrive off the Kerry coast. Florence O'Donoghue later wrote that:

The Cork Brigade was to occupy positions on a north-south line from Newmarket to the Boggeragh mountains and thence westward to the Cork-Kerry border, contacting some units of the Kerry Brigade extending eastwards from Tralee. Limerick was to maintain contact with the northern end of the Cork position and extend northwards to the Shannon, [and the] Clare and Galway Brigades were to hold the line of the Shannon to Athlone.³

In a letter to Cathal Brugha, sent from Brixton Prison on the thirty seventh day of his hunger strike, Terence MacSwiney wrote, 'Ah Cathal, the pain of Easter is properly dead at last'. Cited in Costello, Francis J., Enduring the most: the life and death of Terence MacSwiney, Brandon, Dingle, 1995, p. 150.

² By April 1916 Tomás MacCurtain had succeeded in organsing the Cork Brigade of Irish Volunteers into forty seven companies. Forty four of these units, with strengths varying from ten men to eighty, formed the Cork Brigade under MacCurtain's command while the remaining three (Charleville, Glanworth and Mitchlestown) were attached to the Galtee battalion which was then under the command of Thomas Kent.

³ O'Donoghue, Florence, Tomás MacCurtain: soldier and patriot, Anvil, Tralee, 1955, pp. 72-3.

Seán Murphy, the Brigade Quartermaster, also recalled that as part of this operation the Volunteers were planning to obstruct and delay the British army at Millstreet and Rathmore by cutting the railway line. However, the written agenda for the meeting on 9 April, which survives in MacSwiney's handwriting, clearly indicates that the Cork Brigade were planning for an 'Easter Concentration', not widespread offensive action, and that matters pertaining to the organisation of companies and battalions, together with the compilation of inventories of arms, equipment, field kit and communications, were of primary concern.

During the course of the meeting MacCurtain outlined each officer's respective tasks and nominated the eight different concentration points to which each company would march two weeks hence. He also stressed the importance of carrying out their orders and notified them that there was a distinct possibility that crown forces might attempt to interfere with their operations. With this in mind he ordered that all available arms and ammunition were to be carried and each Volunteer should bring his overcoat, some blankets, and two days supply of food.⁴

There had long been expectation within the Cork Brigade that some form of military action might be in the offing, especially if the British authorities attempted to forcibly disarm the Volunteers, if conscription was introduced, or if a shipment of arms arrived from Germany. Seán Murphy later recalled that during the preceding twelve months,

Officers from Volunteer headquarters [in Dublin] frequently visited [Cork] and informed the Brigade staff that Roger Casement had recruited an Irish Brigade in Germany from Irishmen who were prisoners of war there, that the Volunteers would be officered by these men upon their arrival in Ireland, and that ample supplies of arms, ammunition, and light artillery would be made available from Germany.⁵

Therefore, on 9 April, as far as the Cork Brigade were concerned the purpose of the 'Easter Concentration' was to provide security for a German arms landing. What weapons the Volunteers already possessed were to be used only to fulfil that mission and to prevent themselves, if necessary, from being forcibly disarmed. They had neither planned nor discussed mounting any widespread offensive military action because, without the arrival of additional equipment, there was no prospect whatever of that happening. In fact Murphy later stated that:

Ammunition was so scarce that not a man [had] fired a round of live ammunition in Cork before Easter 1916. Arms consisted of three different patterns of rifles, with some shotguns. The ammunition varied from ten rounds for some patterns of rifles to thirty rounds for others. Around 75% of the latter ammunition was obtained locally through seizures from British army personnel and such.

⁴ O'Donoghue, Florence, 'The Irish Volunteers in Cork 1913 – 1916' in the Journal of the Cork Historical and Archaeological society, vol. LXXI, nos 213-4, 1966, p. 42.

⁵ Murphy, Seán, 'Account of Easter Week 1916 in Cork' (unpublished manuscript), p. 2. This document was compiled by Murphy on behalf of the Cork branch of the 1916 Association in November 1956 (authors' collection).

As the Volunteer headquarters in Dublin were unaware of this list or sources of supply, their estimate of ammunition supplies available in Cork for Easter Sunday was ten rounds per rifles with varying amounts for the shotguns ... [therefore] the Cork Volunteers had scarcely enough [ammunition] to last five minutes.⁶

While there appears to be some conflict between the accounts given by Murphy and Florrie O'Donoghue in relation to exactly how many weapons the Cork Brigade possessed at this time, it is nonetheless clear that not all Volunteers were armed with firearms. Less than 200 men had good quality rifles. The bulk of the remainder were armed with an assortment of old shotguns and revolvers, and at least 100 Volunteers were armed only with pikes. These statistics indicate the real military capability of the Cork Brigade at this time.⁷

However, unknown to MacCurtain, and also unknown to the Chief of Staff of the Volunteer movement, Eoin MacNeill, the shipment of German weapons was part of a plan for the establishment of an independent Irish Republic that was already at an advanced stage. Immediately after the outbreak of the First World War the Supreme Council of the Irish Republican Brotherhood (IRB) decided that an armed rebellion should be mounted in Ireland before the end of the conflict. That decision was copper-fastened in May 1915 when, with the British army locked in stalemate on the Western Front, a secret IRB Military Council was established comprising Patrick Pearse, Joseph Plunkett and Éamon Ceannt.⁸

This small group immediately began working on a plan for rebellion which envisaged mobilisation on Easter Sunday 1916 of over 10,000 Irish Volunteers, armed by Germany and augmented by a German expeditionary force. The Dublin Brigade of Volunteers would seize the General Post Office in Dublin and other strategic buildings and establish a series of outposts in the suburbs. Volunteer units throughout the country would establish a line along the river Shannon in order to cover the landing of the German allies would then advance on Dublin capturing or destroying RIC barracks along the way. The essential elements of this outline plan were basically sound. In fact it might well have stood some chance of success if the Volunteers nationally had been adequately trained and properly prepared; if Volunteer brigades when mobilised were in possession of clear military orders and specific objectives; if an adequate quantity of arms and equipment had been supplied: and if an integrated all-arms German expeditionary force had actually materialised.⁹

But none of this happened. The Military Council was so obsessed with secrecy that the essential elements of the plan, and its real objectives, were not communicated to the personnel upon whom the success of the operation would ultimately depend – the brigade commanders

⁶ Ibid.

⁷ Returns from the twenty companies which still survive, and which are archived at Cork Public Museum, record the statistics as follows: 57 rifles (ammunition 2776 rounds); 254 shotguns (ammunition 3075 cartridges); 84 revolvers (ammunition 828 rounds); 131 pikes; and 10lbs gelignite.

⁸ By Easter 1916 the Military Council also included Thomas Clarke, Thomas MacDonagh, Seán MacDermott and James Connolly.

⁹ Success was contingent on the successful landing of the German arms. Critical to all IRB planning was the expectation that Germany would send an expeditionary force together with artillery and a large quantity of arms and ammunition. It was also expected that at least one submarine would deploy along in the Irish Sea and patrol the east coast in order to prevent the landing of British reinforcements. However, as events unfolded, the German high command were only willing to provide 20,000 old Russian rifles captured at the battle of Tannenburg in 1914, and a relatively small quantity of mixed ammunition.

until it was far too late. At brigade level, therefore, no military briefings for an armed uprising were held; no mission was analysed in that context; no offensive courses of action were developed; no contingencies were planned; no reserve was identified; no best and worst case scenarios were either identified, developed or 'war-gamed'; and no higher commander's intent or planning guidance was communicated.

Instead, a small group of people, with virtually no military experience between them, developed an outline plan for rebellion, kept it shrouded in secrecy until literally the very last minute, and then expected the entire Volunteer movement to follow them into what would effectively have amounted to a military coup. It was never going to work and the longer the operational units in the country were kept in the dark the worse the eventual outcome was destined to be.

CONFLICTING ORDERS

As the date for the planned rebellion approached, it finally became necessary to inform the brigade commanders of the Military Council's true intentions. On Monday 17 April, Seán MacDermott tasked Brigid Foley, a member of Dublin Cumann na mBan, with delivering a sealed dispatch to the brigade commander in Cork.¹⁰ While the specific contents of this dispatch remain unknown it is reasonable to conclude that it contained new information, which expanded the role the Cork Brigade would be expected to play during the 'Easter Manoeuvres'. Seán Murphy clearly recalled that, upon reading the dispatch, MacCurtain became so concerned that he decided to send Eithne MacSwiney to Dublin on Wednesday in order to meet with Thomas Clarke, James Connolly and Seán MacDermott, and to arrange a meeting between them and Terence MacSwiney who was prepared to travel to Dublin the following day¹¹. If possible she was also to meet with Eoin MacNeill and give him the same message. She left Cork on the 12.45pm train on Wednesday 19 April, the same day that the 'Castle Document' was put into circulation in Dublin.¹²

Purporting to have been drafted by the British authorities in Dublin Castle, this document outlined detailed instructions for suppression of the Volunteer movement, and was received with outrage by the leadership, including its more moderate members such as MacNeill. In reality the document had been forged by members of the Military Council in order to encourage the Volunteer movement to support the rebellion – and initially it achieved its objective. Following a meeting of the Volunteer Executive Council that same day MacNeill sent the following order to all brigade commanders, including MacCurtain:

2 Dawson StreetDublinApril 19 1916A plan on the part of the government for the suppression and disarming of the Irish Volunteers has become known. The date of putting it into operation depends only on government orders to be given.In the event of definite information not reaching you from headquarters, you will be on the look out for any attempt to put this plan into

operation.

¹⁰ Foley, Brigid, Witness Statement (WS) 1598, Bureau of Military History (BMH), Cathal Brugha Barracks, Dublin.

¹¹ Murphy, Seán, 'Account of Easter Week 1916 in Cork', p. 3.

¹² Brigid Foley returned to Cork on the same day with another dispatch from MacDermott, the contents of which remain unknown.

Should you be satisfied that such action is imminent you will be prepared with defensive measures.

Your object will be preserve the arms and the organisation of the Irish Volunteers, and the measures taken by you will be directed to that purpose.

In general you will arrange that your men defend themselves and each other in small groups, so placed that they may best be able to hold out. Each group must be supplied with sufficient supplies of food or be certain of access to such supplies.

This order is to be passed on to your subordinate officers and to officers of neighbouring commands.

(Signed) Eoin MacNeill

Chief of Staff¹³

This was the scenario that awaited Eithne MacSwiney when she alighted from the train at Kingsbridge station, although initially she had no idea what was going on. MacDermott was at the station to meet her:

He did not speak to me, but let me know he had seen me. We travelled on the same tram to O'Connell bridge, but sat at different ends of the tram and, on alighting, Seán told me to go Tom Clarke's shop in Parnell Square at 7pm that evening. At the shop, at the hour, I saw Mrs Tom Clarke. She showed me a copy of the 'Castle Document' that was causing such excitement at the time. She told me to got to Ballybough – their home and there, for the first and last time, I saw Tom Clarke. I gave him the message I had brought. 'Impossible', he said, 'altogether impossible. He must not come to Dublin. Everyone is being watched closely; the first attempt to board a train and he would be arrested; everyone must remain at his post.'¹⁴

When the meeting with Clarke was finished Eithne MacSwiney sent a telegram to MacCurtain informing him of the outcome. She then proceeded to Volunteer headquarters at Dawson Street where Bulmer Hobson, the quartermaster general, told her that the chief of staff would be available to see her brother if he came to Dublin the following day. MacCurtain quickly decided, however, there was little point risking his deputy and decided to keep him in Cork where events were now beginning to conspire against him.

In the meantime Brigid Foley arrived in Cork with yet another dispatch from MacDermott and the following morning MacNeill's order of 19 April was also received by the brigade commander. The situation was now very confused. MacCurtains's own orders for the Easter 'Manoeuvres' had already been issued on 9 April and were now at variance with MacDermotts' dispatches and MacNeill's latest instruction. In short, MacCurtain had been planning for manoeuvres designed to provide security for an arms landing, he was then ordered to

¹³ O'Donoghue, Tomás MacCurtain, pp. 78-9.

¹⁴ MacSwiney, Eithne, WS 119, BMH, Cathal Brugha Barracks, Dublin

prepare for offensive operations, and he now found himself instructed to only take defensive measures.

At national level the Military Council's plan was also beginning to unravel. The previous weekend they deemed it necessary to inform two senior Volunteer officers, Commandant J. J. O'Connell, the Chief of Inspection, and Seán Fitzgibbon, the Director of Recruiting, that a supply of arms was then en route to Ireland on board the Aud, a German vessel disguised as a Norwegian trawler. Both men were assured that MacNeill was fully briefed on this development and they were then tasked with specific duties in relation to the operation. Due to his previous experience involvement in landing German arms at Kilcoole in August 1914 Fitzgibbon was ordered to travel to the southwest and liaise with the commanding officers of the Kerry and Limerick Brigades, while O'Connell was ordered to take charge of operations in Leinster.¹⁵

Fitzgibbon duly set off for Kerry and Limerick but O'Connell had doubts as to the authenticity of his orders, and on Thursday night, 20 April, he went to Volunteer Headquarters in order to verify them. There he met with Bulmer Hobson. The quartermaster general had earlier attended an IRB meeting and became alarmed when one Volunteer informed him that he had received orders to sabotage a railway line on Easter Sunday. When O'Connell told him of his orders, both men realised there was something seriously wrong. They immediately drove to MacNeill's home at Woodtown Park in Rathfarnham and informed their Chief of Staff of what they knew.

Furious at having been deceived, and convinced now that an armed rebellion was indeed planned for Easter Sunday, MacNeill, Hobson and O'Connell went directly to confront Pearse at St Enda's College. When Pearse admitted the truth, MacNeill declared that, short of informing the British authorities in Dublin Castle, he would do everything in his power to stop the rebellion. To this end, in the early hours of Friday morning (21 April), he drafted the following order for O'Connell in respect of the Volunteers in Munster:

> Commandant O'Connell will go to Cork by the first available train today. He will instruct Commandant MacCurtain, or, in his absence, will select an officer to accompany him to Kerry. Commandant O'Connell will immediately take chief command of the Irish Volunteers, and will be in complete control over all Volunteers in Munster. Any orders issued by Commandant Pearse, or any person heretofore are hereby cancelled or recalled, and only the orders issued by Commandant O'Connell and under his authority will have force. Commandant O'Connell will have full powers to appoint officers of any rank, to supersede officers of any rank, and to delegate his own authority or any part of it to any person in respect of the Irish Volunteers in Munster. (Signed) Eoin MacNeill

Chief of Staff

¹⁵ Foy, Michael and Barton, Brian, The Easter Rising, Sutton, Stroud, 1999, pp. 37-8.

PS Officers in Munster will report to Commandant O'Connell as required by him on the subject of any special orders they have received and any arrangements made or to be made by them as a consequence. Chief of Staff.¹⁶

MacNeill also issued a 'General Order' to all Volunteer units re-affirming his instructions, issued in the wake of the 'Castle Document', to take only defensive measures in the event of an attack or an attempted disarmament by crown forces. He was adamant that this order would:

Take the place of any orders that may have been issued in a different sense. All orders of a special character issued by Commandant Pearse, or by any other person heretofore, with regard to military movements of a definite kind, are hereby recalled or cancelled, and in future all special orders will be issued by me or by my successor as Chief of Staff.¹⁷

Later that morning, however, as O'Connell was making his way to Cork, Pearse and MacDermott called to MacNeill's home and argued that, with the German arms shipment already en route to Ireland, it was now too late to stop the rebellion. After much debate the chief of staff was eventually prevailed upon to countermand his own previous order. Once this was decided MacDermott immediately contacted Volunteer James Ryan and tasked him to take a dispatch to Cork that evening. Ryan later recalled that:

I was only too glad to get busy at something; and I was told to report at his [MacDermott's] office in D'Olier street during the afternoon and prepare to travel on the night train to Cork. When I arrived at the office he asked me if I was armed and I said yes. He then handed me a dispatch, which was to be delivered to Tomás MacCurtain in Cork. He said that it was a very important message and that I should prevent it falling into hostile hands even at the cost of my life. This looked serious and I began to think that 'another ordinary parade' on Sunday might definitely be counted out.¹⁸

In Cork, MacCurtain had been informed that O'Connell was on his way to the city and arranged to meet his train at Mallow station. When he got there, however, the train had already passed through. Returning by road MacCurtain found O'Connell at Terence MacSwiney's home at Grand View Terrace on the Victoria Road; Seán O'Sullivan, the officer commanding the Cork City Battalion, was also present. O'Connell brought all of them up to date on events in Dublin and confirmed MacNeill's order in relation to defensive measures. The meeting went on for a long time and around seven o'clock in the evening they took a break for something to eat. Eithne MacSwiney had prepared the meal with her sister Mary, and later left this impression of the men's demeanour as they ate their food:

¹⁶ O'Donoghue, Tomás MacCurtain, pp. 78-9.

¹⁷ Ibid.

¹⁸ Ryan, James, 'General Post Office area' in The Capuchin annual, 1966, p. 170.

Though they endeavoured to speak lightly and make jokes, the feeling of gloom and depression predominated. This was in marked contrast to the spirit of buoyant gaiety in which Terry had worked during the previous months.¹⁹

When the meeting resumed in the sitting room sometime after eight o'clock, Alice Cashel, a member of Cumann na mBan, arrived to receive orders from MacCurtain in relation to hiring a number of touring cars – ostensibly to drive groups of tourists around Killarney for the Easter weekend. In actual fact these were to be used to transport the arms that were due to be landed in Kerry. Once she had booked the cars she had been told to report back to MacCurtain in order to receive final instructions for Easter Sunday. When Eithne MacSwiney informed MacCurtain that Cashel was present he asked that she wait. Eventually, at around 11 p.m., Cashel became impatient and insisted on seeing the Brigade commander. When Eithne MacSwiney went into the sitting room she was shocked by what she found:

Terry stood on one side of the fireplace, his elbow on the mantelpiece, his head resting on his hand. Tomás stood in a similar attitude on the other side. Facing him, Seán O'Sullivan sat on a sofa near the window, elbows on his knees, his head bowed between his hands. O'Connell sat on an armchair, looking as if he had been defending himself; the rather odd look on his face suggested that he was at variance with his three companions; it was rather smug 'take-it-or-leave-it' expression. This vivid impression was registered in the one glance I gave from one to the other of the four. Without any knowledge of what they had been discussing, it was clear to me that something was very seriously wrong. Only some matter of the gravest import could have produced that atmosphere of anxiety, strain and heaviness of mind which was reflected on the faces and attitudes of the three, Terry, Tomás and Seán O'Sullivan; and I felt that 'Ginger' O'Connell was the cause of the trouble, whatever it was. I said, 'Miss Cashel can't wait any longer. It is after eleven. She wants you to give her her message.' Tomás spoke: 'Tell her there is no message.' I returned and delivered Tomás' answer. The reaction of Alice Cashel was a great surprise to us. She gasped. 'No message', she repeated. 'But that's impossible. There MUST be a message. That is an extraordinary thing to say. There MUST be a message.'

'Well', I replied, 'that is what Tomás said', and my sister added, 'Why not leave it 'till tomorrow?' 'But that's just it', said Alice. 'I CAN'T leave it 'till tomorrow, I MUST have the message tonight. It is an extraordinary situation to be in. I must get an answer tonight.' 'You had better go yourself and ask', I said, and she went in, to return in a few seconds, looking most upset and completely dumbfounded...She left us in a considerable state of anxiety and bewilderment. We suggested that one of the Volunteers on duty outside the house should see her home, but

¹⁹ MacSwiney, Eithne, WS 119, BMH, Cathal Brugha Barracks, Dublin.

she considered it safer to go alone. Most of the Volunteers were being watched and followed everywhere. 20

Meanwhile, Lieutenant Fred Murray of the Cork City Battalion had been busy delivering copies of MacCurtain's original mobilisation orders to both the Eyeries and Kenmare companies. On his way back to Cork by train he discovered that Sir Roger Casement, who had returned to Ireland on board the German submarine *U19* in an effort to stop the rebellion, had been arrested and the *Aud* intercepted. When he arrived back in the city in the early hours of Saturday morning he raced to the Volunteer Hall in order to inform MacCurtain of these developments.²¹ Aware of the potential for disaster which was now unfolding, MacCurtain immediately decided to go to O'Connell's hotel and brief him. As he and MacSwiney were about to leave their headquarters, however, James Ryan arrived from Dublin with MacDermott's latest dispatch, which confirmed that the rebellion would go ahead as planned. Faced with yet another change in plan, MacCurtain clearly felt that he had no other option but to follow standard military procedure by 'obeying the last order' and he told Ryan: 'tell Sean we'll blaze away as long as the stuff lasts.'²²

The following day, Easter Saturday (22 April), the situation changed again when MacNeill was informed of Casement's arrest and the interception of the Aud. The chief of staff now had no doubts. Without German support, any armed rebellion was doomed to fail and would inevitably result in heavy loss of life. In order to save the Irish Volunteers from annihilation he immediately issued the following instructions, which cancelled all previous orders for mobilisation on Easter Sunday:

Volunteers completely deceived. All orders for special action are hereby cancelled and on no account will action be taken. (Signed) Eoin MacNeill Chief of Staff²³

Later that day he issued a more specific order, copies of which were dispatched to units throughout the country and placed in the following morning's *Sunday Independent*:

Owing to the very critical position, all orders given to the Irish Volunteers for tomorrow, Easter Sunday, are hereby rescinded, and no parades, marches or other movements of Irish Volunteers, will take place. Each individual Volunteer will obey this order strictly in every particular. Chief of Staff²⁴

²⁰ Ibid.

²¹ The Aud was originally due to arrive off the Kerry coast at Tralee bay and rendezvous with a contingent of waiting Volunteers on Holy Thursday, 20 April. However the Military Council became concerned that an early landing might alert the British and decided to change the date of the rendezvous to Easter Sunday. This information was transmitted by way of the United States and didn't reach Germany until after the Aud had left for Ireland. As wireless was not then fitted to German ships, it never reached its captain, Karl Spindler. The information was, however, intercepted by British naval intelligence but no action was taken at that stage lest it might become clear to Germany that their codes had actually broken. Casement was also at this time trying unsuccessfully to raise an 'Irish Brigade' to fight the Allies from Irish soldiers languishing in prisoner of war camps. When he discovered the quantity and quality of the arms being supplied by the Germans he decided to return to Ireland to try and persuade the Military Council to postpone the Rising. Three days after the Aud departed Casement left Williamshaven for Ireland, accompanied by Robert Montieth and Daniel Bailey, on board the submarine U19 which was commanded by Lieutenant Weisbach.

²² O'Donoghue, Tomás MacCurtain, p. 84.

²³ Ibid., p. 87

²⁴ Sunday Independent, 23 April 1916.

In order to ensure that the Volunteers understood that this order was issued by him as chief of staff, MacNeill also issue the following authentication note:

The order issued to the Irish Volunteers, printed over my signature in today's Sunday Independent, is hereby authenticated. Every influence should be used immediately and throughout the day to secure faithful execution of this order, as any failure to obey may result in a very great catastrophe.

Chief of Staff²⁵

In the meantime Ryan had reported back to MacDermott and informed him his mission to Cork had been successful, whereupon MacDermott appointed him to his personal staff with orders to parade at Liberty Hall the following morning. But at around ten o'clock that night Ryan was summoned to a house on Rathgar Road where he discovered the Volunteer Executive in conference:

After some time the door of the meeting room opened and Eoin MacNeill appeared. He asked me if I had carried a dispatch to Cork the previous day and if I knew where to find the leaders there. I answered yes to both questions. Good! Well, I was now to go to Cork again, this time by motor car. It was urgent and I must deliver these dispatches as soon as possible. In his hand he held five or six slips of paper, each in identical terms and signed by him. They were orders cancelling the Sunday manoeuvres. I was to deliver one to Pierce McCann in Tipperary, one to MacCurtain in Cork, one to the OC Tralee, if possible the remainder to officers of any groups of Volunteers I might see on parade on the journey ... Eoin MacNeill's brother, James, was to come with me driving his own car.²⁶

MOBILISATION

Whether the Cork Brigade would mobilise as previously ordered by MacDermott, and face the possibility of an armed conflict with the British army, now depended literally on how soon Ryan could get back to MacCurtain. Time was critical because that very afternoon many Volunteers of the Cork Brigade were already beginning to mobilise. Across the city all arms, ammunition and supplies were moved into the Volunteer Hall, which was under armed guard. The first rural Volunteers to mobilise were fifteen men from the Cobh Company commanded by Captain Michael Leahy. This group made their way to the hall on Saturday evening and took over guard duty from the city Volunteers. They were later joined by twenty seven men from the Dungourney company under the command of Captain Maurice Ahern and that night all of them slept on the floor of the hall lying on beds made from straw provided by the brigade quartermaster.

Then, as dawn broke on Easter Sunday, Volunteers from all over the county arose, had breakfast, said farewell to their loved ones, and set out for their designated assembly points. In the Volunteer Hall Seán Murphy spent the morning distributing first aid kits and other items

²⁵ O'Donoghue, Tomás MacCurtain, p. 87.

²⁶ Ryan, 'General Post Office area', pp. 171-2.

of equipment. Speculation was rife about the precise objectives of the 'Manoeuvres' upon which they were about to embark but when Volunteer Dan Donovan from C company saw the first-aid kits being distributed, followed by tins of Oxo cubes, he turned to a comrade and remarked: 'this looks like the real thing.'²⁷

When all supplies had been issued 163 Volunteers from the Cork City Battalion, together with those from Cobh and Dungourney, formed up outside their headquarters and, after a final address by MacCurtain, marched off to the Capwell railway station where they boarded a train for Crookstown. MacCurtain had arranged to travel to West Cork by car but just as he was about to leave the Volunteer Hall James Ryan arrived and delivered a copy of McNeill's latest order.

The brigade commander was now in an impossible position. All over the county his men were marching to their concentration points as ordered. He was also acutely aware that, in the absence of a national uprising, any possible confrontation with crown forces was guaranteed to fail. The situation was now fraught with danger but when he weighed up his options MacCurtain decided his only possible course of action was to permit the men to concentrate as ordered, and once that was complete he would then order them all to 'stand down'. His only consolation was that the plan for rebellion had not been disclosed to his unit and this would at least enable him to justify the day's activity as a 'training exercise'.

Then, as heavy rain began to fall, MacCurtain, accompanied by Terence MacSwiney and Bob Hales, set off by car for West Cork. His first stop was near Crookstown where he dispatched orders for the column marching to Macroom to stand down upon arrival. He next moved on to Bweeing in North Cork where he met T. J. Golden, the company commander of the Courtbrack Company, who later recalled that

Tomás MacCurtain appeared to be in a great hurry. He addressed the whole parade and said that the exercises were cancelled. The men were to return quietly to their homes and keep their arms safely. They may soon be wanted again, he said, and may be called upon in the near future. We were to remain alert and 'stand to arms' until further notice.²⁸

MacCurtain then carried on to Inchigeela and stood down the Volunteers concentrated at this location. The officers in charge of the other concentration points had already been told to stand down if no further instructions were forthcoming.

So it was that the Volunteers of the Cork Brigade demobilised and returned home confused, dismayed and soaked to the skin with green dye from their Volunteer hats running down their faces.

²⁷ O'Donoghue, Tomás MacCurtain, p. 95.

²⁸ Feeney, P. J., Glory O, glory O, ye bold Fenian men, np, Dripsey, 1996, p. 48.

According to Seán Murphy 'between 1100 and 1200 men had been mobilised in County Cork for Easter Sunday',²⁹ but Florence O'Donoghue provided the following, more detailed information regarding the number of Volunteers who assembled at the eight designated concentration points:

CONCENTRATION POINT	NUMBER
Lauragh	80
Kealkil	29
Inchigeela	55
Macroom	339
Bweeing	222
Millstreet	67
Barley Hill	57
Carriganimma	120
Total	1029

By late afternoon, MacCurtain was completely frustrated with what had turned out to be a wasteful exercise and he decided to go to Ballingeary in an attempt to evaluate the situation with Seán O'Hegarty, the senior IRB officer in the county. The headlights on his car failed, however, and MacCurtain, MacSwiney and Hales were forced to spend Sunday night at Carrigadrohid instead. At first light on Easter Monday morning they finally set off for Ballingeary and spent the day discussing developments with O'Hegarty, who proved no wiser than they were. Eventually, and with nothing resolved, they began the return journey to Cork a little after six o'clock that evening.

At this point MacCurtain and MacSwiney were completely unaware that any Rising had started in Dublin. Only the officers back in the city, Seán Murphy and Sean O'Sullivan, had heard a variety of unconfirmed reports and received a note delivered by Mary Perolz from the Dublin Cumman na mBan. Written on the flyleaf of a pocket notebook the words read: 'We start at noon today', and it was signed 'P. H. P.'³¹ Unsure what action to take these officers decided their best course of action was to barricade themselves into the Volunteer Hall. They also posted scouts at several strategic points around the city in order to report the movements of the army and police, and Volunteer Tadhg O'Leary was dispatched on the train to Macroom in an unsuccessful attempt to find their commanding officer and his deputy.

NEGOTIATIONS

When the brigade commander eventually arrived back in Cork at around 9 p.m., on Easter Monday night the first inkling he received that anything was afoot came by way of information received from Volunteer Denis Breen, whom he encountered on the outskirts of the city. When he finally arrived at the Volunteer Hall he was first amazed at the level of activity that was going on, and then became seriously concerned when handed the note from Mary Perolz.

²⁹ Murphy, 'Account of Easter Week 1916 in Cork', p. 4.

³⁰ O'Donoghue, Tomás MacCurtain, p. 98.

³¹ Ibid., p. 108. In his account of events in Cork Seán Murphy states that the order read: 'We go into action at noon today'. Murphy, 'Account of Easter Week 1916 in Cork', p. 7.

While this clearly did not constitute another order it did indicate that at least some Volunteer elements in Dublin were about to embark on military action.

The more MacCurtain thought about the situation, however, the more difficult it appeared. His men had only just returned home from a gruelling day on Easter Sunday, during which the majority had been soaked to the skin and at least one day's rations had been consumed. The expected German arms had not materialised. He had no effective communications with Dublin. He had no reliable intelligence reports from which to make any deductions. His brigade was now completely dispersed and even if he could manage to mobilise some of them they would provide no opposition whatsoever to the combined firepower of the British army and RIC. A hostile crowd had also gathered in the street outside his headquarters, and with the British army in Victoria barracks probably preparing to move against him MacCurtain knew he no longer had any room to manoeuvre. In the absence of any clear orders or information from Dublin he decided his best course of action was to concentrate on defending the Volunteer Hall against attack. He later recorded that

We decided not to leave the hall, come what may. We were convinced that the soldiers would surround us and that we would die there, but we were satisfied no one could say that we had run away from the fight, and indeed there was no such thought in our minds.³²

If nothing else this was at least consistent with his last instructions from MacNeill. However, not all of his men were satisfied with this decision. 2nd Lieut Robaird Langford, C Company, Cork City Battalion, later recalled:

The situation was very tense and strained. The younger officers particularly wanted to fight, and were very resentful of the waiting policy adopted by the leaders. They expressed their views, but the weight of the influence and authority of the older men (as they regarded the Brigade officers) was against them.³³

In the meantime, and unknown to MacCurtain, the Lord Mayor of Cork, Councillor T. C. Butterfield, had already commenced an initiative to prevent an outbreak of hostilities in the city by contacting Brigadier General W. F. H. Stafford, the General Officer Commanding (GOC) in Cork. He suggested that before any military attempt be made to capture the Volunteer Hall he (Butterfield) should first be given an opportunity to persuade the Volunteers to hand over their weapons peacefully and thus avoid any casualties or damage to the city. Stafford agreed and appointed his aide-de-camp, Captain F. W. Dickie, to take charge of negotiations. Butterfield then called on the Assistant Bishop of Cork, Dr Daniel Cohalan to enlist his help. On Monday night they went to the Volunteer Hall and met MacCurtain, who assured them that he had no intention of initiating military action but would defend his position if attacked. Satisfied that violence was not about to break out Butterfield and Cohalan then began a sequence of negotiations in an effort to find a peaceful solution to the crisis.

³² Transcript of Tomás MacCurtain's diary, L. 1945. 29, Cork Public Museum.

³³ Robaird Langford papers, U 156, Cork Archive Institute.

The following morning, Tuesday 25 April, saw an intensification of the fighting in Dublin, but in Cork all remained quiet. Some news of the rebellion, however, was now spreading throughout Cork county, and while some individual company commanders responded and mobilised small numbers, in the absence of any concrete information they too decided to remain in their respective locations and await further orders. For his part, MacCurtain remained fortified within his headquarters awaiting further contact with the lord mayor and the bishop, but none was made. Instead, early on Wednesday morning, he received reports that the British army had deployed artillery on the hill of Gurranebraher and positioned a number of machine guns in the Malt House directly opposite the Volunteer Hall. He then received a visit from the city coroner, William Murphy, who also asked that no military action be taken until Butterfield and Cohalan returned.

Throughout Wednesday and Thursday Butterfield and Cohalan continued to negotiate with Captain Dickie until an agreement was eventually reached. The Volunteers would hand up their arms to the Lord Mayor on the following Monday for safekeeping, and in return no action would be taken against them.

On Friday Butterfield and Cohalan returned to the Volunteer Hall and put these terms to MacCurtain, together with a threat from Dickie that the Volunteer Hall would be shelled if he refused to accept them. MacCurtain agreed in principle but sought clarification on the following questions: would the matter was kept out of the newspapers; would the arms handed-in be returned to the Volunteers once the crisis was over; would the RIC cease harassing his men; and would MacCurtain and MacSwiney be permitted to visit Volunteer units in Limerick and Kerry to inform them of the situation in Cork and recommend acceptance of similar terms?

These queries were transmitted to General Stafford and later that night, Captain Dickie met with Bishop Cohalan at his residence and informed him that as far as the GOC was concerned the arms would be returned once the crisis has passed – but he couldn't speak for Parliament or the civil authority. He also stated that the GOC would use his influence to curb the activities of the RIC and to ensure that the terms of the agreement were kept out of the press. He would also issue the travel permits requested by MacCurtain and if these terms were accepted he would agree to a general amnesty for all the Volunteers in his area other than those found in treasonable correspondence with the enemy.³⁴

Satisfied with this news, Butterfield, accompanied by Captain Dickie, returned to the Volunteer Hall at around 2am on Saturday morning, and met MacCurtain, MacSwiney, and Sean O'Sullivan. The five of them sat around the fire in deep discussion until 5am, when the following terms were agreed:

1. The military have no idea of confiscation, and as far as the military are concerned the arms will be returned once the crisis is over; but the military cannot speak for Parliament or the civil authority, nor can they give an assurance that a law will not be passed to disarm the Irish Volunteers and all similar associations.

³⁴ Letter from Bishop Cohalan in the Cork Free Press, 20 May 1916.

- 2. Care will be taken that the papers do not mention the handing in of the rifles.
- 3. The County Inspector of Police will be spoken to in order to check the indiscreet zeal of individual policemen.
- 4. A permit will be given to the Volunteer leaders to visit Limerick, Tralee and other districts, to submit to the Volunteers of these centres the Cork Agreement, and to counsel acceptance of it.
- 5. If these terms are accepted, there should be a general amnesty, unless in the case of persons found in treasonable correspondence with the enemy.³⁵

Having spent the night without sleep agonising over the decisions they had taken, MacCurtain and MacSwiney departed for Limerick and Kerry on the 8am train, unaware that their comrades in Dublin were on the verge of surrender, or that the Cork Constitution was carrying a report which stated: 'The Cork Sinn Féiners have handed up their rifles to the police'.³⁶ This was a flagrant breach of the terms agreed just hours before and caused considerable unrest amongst the Volunteers in the city. The situation was made worse later on Saturday night when Captain Dickie arrived at Volunteer Hall to see MacCurtain on his return from Limerick, and demanded that all arms now be handed up by midnight on Sunday, rather than on Monday as previously agreed. MacCurtain was incensed by this demand and Dickie's failure to keep the matter out of the newspapers. The following morning (Sunday 30 April), accompanied by MacSwiney, he again met with the bishop and lord mayor, and informed them that under the current circumstances he could not possibly ask his men to hand over their arms. After lengthy debate Cohalan eventually persuaded the brigade commander to put the matter before a general meeting of the Volunteers at 8 o'clock on Monday night, at which time both he and the lord mayor would also address them. Butterfield then wrote to Dickie outlining the Volunteers' position and suggesting a meeting at noon the following day.

While all of these discussions were taking place the Cork Brigade did actually manage to take some offensive military action – but without either MacCurtain's approval or knowledge. A small party of Volunteers apprehended, searched and threatened Sergeant Crean of the RIC barracks at Ballinadee in West Cork. They then moved on and cut the telegraph wires between Clonakilty and the War Signal station at Galley Head.³⁷ Clearly these Volunteers wanted to make some contribution to the Rising, but by then it was far too late.

Unknown to them, however, their very limited action probably did have an impact, because when Captain Dickie met with Butterfield and Cohalan in the City Club at noon the following day (Monday 1 May), his manner was far from conciliatory. In fact he delivered the following ultimatum:

³⁵ Ibid.

³⁶ Cork Constitution, 29 April 1916.

³⁷ Mac Giolla Ghoille, Breandán (ed.) Intelligence notes 1913-1916, Oifig an tSoláthair, Dublin, 1966, p. 234.

The agreement between the Asst. Bishop of Cork, the Lord Mayor of Cork, the Cork City Branch of Irish Volunteers, and the General Commanding in the South of Ireland, has not been complied with as agreed on, the General can no longer hold himself bound by the concessions agreed on. If however, all arms, ammunition and explosives of any kind in the possession of any member of that body be handed over by them to the custody of the Lord Mayor of Cork, before 8 p.m., on this date, the General will make every effort to ensure that the concessions agreed on will be carried out. He cannot guarantee this, as the matter now rests with the Commander in Chief, Ireland. In the event of arms not being handed over as agreed, it will be the General's duty to consider all concerned as offering opposition to H. M. Forces and they will be dealt with accordingly as rebels in arms against the Crown. Signed at Cork at noon, on May 1, 1916, on behalf of the General Officer Commanding the South Irish Area. F. W. Dickie Captain A.D.C. and Intelligence Officer

General Staff.³⁸

Later that afternoon Cohalan received a phone call from Dickie confirming that all guarantees previously given by the British authorities were now withdrawn. When the bishop protested vehemently at this development Dickie assured him that although the formal guarantees were withdrawn, the arrangements agreed to would go through and it was on this basis that the bishop and the lord mayor went to speak to the rank and file Volunteers that night.³⁹

One hundred and forty Volunteers had gathered in the hall and they heard Butterfield and Cohalan urge them to accept the terms of the agreement and hand up their weapons. In the subsequent ballot ninety per cent of those present voted in favour of the agreement and once the meeting was over some of these Volunteers immediately marched down to the lord mayor's home at 68 South Mall and handed in their guns. Those who disagreed with this decision were adamant that the British would again renege on their commitments with 2nd Lieut Donal Óg O'Callaghan, B Company, Cork City battalion, declaring 'There will be treachery. The leopard does not change his spots'.⁴⁰ Accordingly, they either retained their arms at secret locations around the city, or, in a final act of defiance, removed the firing pins to render the weapons unserviceable. From MacCurtain's perspective the week-long crisis had now been brought to an end without bloodshed; his Brigade remained intact; he genuinely expected the British authorities to honour the terms of the agreement; and all things considered he was convinced he had taken the correct course of action.

³⁸ Chavasse, Moirin, Terence MacSwiney, Clonmore and Reynolds, Dublin 1961, pp. 73-4.

³⁹ Notwithstanding the rigid stance taken by Captain Dickie during the final stages of the negotiations, in his account of the events in Cork Seán Murphy states that Bishop Cohalan wrote that 'the one bright feature of the events of the past fortnight was our experience of the military gentleman [Dickie] who took part in our peace conferences. He was insistent on securing that there should be no military danger in the city but he wanted no irritating or humilitating conditions. He is a North of Ireland Protestant.' Murphy, 'Account of Easter Week 1916 in Cork', p14.

⁴⁰ Chavasse, Moirin, Terence MacSwiney, p. 76.

However, the agreement lasted a mere twenty four hours because on the morning of Tuesday, 2 May, the homes of known Volunteers across the city were raided with MacCurtain, his brother Seán, and nine others arrested and incarcerated in the county gaol.⁴¹ The lord mayor later managed to negotiate MacCurtain's release but it was abundantly clear that the agreement was not worth the paper upon which it was written.

THOMAS KENT

On that same day the last major incident of the Easter Rising occurred, not in Dublin or in Cork city, but at a farmhouse owned by the Kent family at Bawnard, Castlelyons, County Cork. A party of RIC had been dispatched to arrest the Kent brothers – Thomas, David, Richard, and William – as part of the ongoing nationwide round-up of known Volunteers. They were not expecting any violent resistance but that was precisely what they encountered. When called upon to surrender the brothers refused and a gun battle erupted that lasted three hours and only came to an end when David was wounded and all of their ammunition had been expended.

During the fighting, however, Head Constable Rowe had been shot and killed. In reprisal the RIC now decided to summarily execute all four brothers. This was stopped when a British army officer intervened, but when Richard Kent then attempted to escape he was shot and seriously wounded.

The two wounded brothers were taken to the military hospital in Fermoy, but Thomas and William were moved to Cork and incarcerated in the Military Detention Barracks.⁴² When they were court-martialled on 4 May William was acquitted, but Thomas was found guilty and sentenced to death. He was executed by firing squad in the exercise yard of the detention barracks at dawn on 9 May.

However, the circumstances of that court martial, the quality and quantity of the evidence produced, the speed with which the entire proceedings were conducted, and the legality of the sentence imposed raised a number of serious issues. In the first instance, the Defence of the Realm Act (DORA), passed by parliament on 8 August 1914, vested extraordinary powers in the hands of the military. Thus when Kent appeared in Victoria barracks to be charged he found himself standing not before a judge and jury but rather before a field general court martial. He was then charged with contravening the Act,

In that he took part in an armed rebellion and in waging war against His Majesty the King, such act being prejudicial to the Defence of the Realm and being done with the intention and for the purpose of assisting the enemy.⁴³

Cornelius Collins, Dáithí Cotter, Donal Óg O'Callaghan, Christopher O'Gorman, Sean Nolan, Fred Murray, Cornelius Murphy, James Murphy and Patrick Trahey. Mary MacSwiney, the president of Cuman na mBan and Nora O'Brien, its secretary, were also arrested in Cork that Tuesday.
Richard Kent died of his wounds two days later.

⁴³ Thomas Kent court martial documentation, p. 5, 'Charge Schedule'. A copy of this documentation can be viewed at the military museum, Collins Barracks, Cork.
When proceedings got underway he found himself faced with a raft of evidence presented by the policemen and soldiers who had been involved in the gun-battle – none of which, however connected Kent to the death of Head Constable Rowe or proved that he had even fired a single shot. Unrepresented by counsel he asked only nine questions in cross-examination, offered a mere seventy one words in a rebuttal statement, and was not permitted to call witnesses to speak on his behalf.

It was also clear that none of the Kent brothers had been involved in what by any stretch of the imagination could be called an armed rebellion. They had neither heard of, nor seen the Proclamation of the Republic, and they were certainly not waging a war or assisting the enemy (in this case Germany). In fact the events of Easter Week had completely passed them by. By the time they were arrested Pearse had surrendered in Dublin and MacCurtain had negotiated the agreement in Cork. Therefore if the Kents were 'guilty' of anything it was nothing more than following MacNeill's order of 19 April (cited above) to prevent themselves from being forcibly disarmed – which in this context might have amounted at most to causing an affray or engaging in violent disorder. Accordingly, the charge as presented against Thomas Kent made no sense whatever, especially given that his brother William was acquitted and both of them had been in the same place at the same time in exactly the same circumstances. This begs the question why one was found guilty and one was not – and the answer is obvious.

In the summer of 1915 Thomas Kent had become closely involved with Terrence MacSwiney in arranging public meetings to attract new Volunteers. He was also well known to the RIC, having disrupted a number of British army recruiting meetings, and by Easter 1916 he had become a commandant in the Galtee Battalion. Aged 51, he was sentenced to death on 4 May 1916 not for his actions at Bawnard, because there is no evidence in his court martial documentation to suggest that he did anything except surrender. He was sentenced to death because of who he was and because of the leadership position he held within the Volunteer movement. In Dublin General Maxwell wanted to make an example of the Volunteer leadership and Thomas Kent was another a convenient scapegoat.⁴⁴ He paid for Maxwell's policy with his life, but the charges against him remain unproven. Thomas Kent was not guilty as charged at his court martial and the documentary evidence that survives leaves this matter in no doubt whatsoever.

INCARCERATION

However the death of Thomas Kent was not the end of the matter. While he was being courtmartialled large numbers of Volunteers were being rounded up and also locked behind bars in the detention barracks. In fact most of them were woken from their sleep on the morning of 9 May by the volley of shots that terminated Kent's life. Captain Michael Leahy, the officer commanding the Cobh Company, later recalled that in an effort to find out where he and other officers from his unit had hidden their weapons,

We were told the same fate [as Kent's] would be ours. Another argument that was used to get us to give up our rifles was telling us that the Cork

⁴⁴ General Maxwell confirmed the findings of the court martial on 6 May 1916.

men had given up theirs and that none of them had been arrested. Why should we hold out? We continued to refuse to give any information.⁴⁵

In fact crown forces had been busy arresting Volunteers all over Cork city and county since 2 May, and although MacCurtain remained at large he was powerless to intervene. He later recalled the anguish of seeing his fellow Volunteers being taken into custody not being able to do anything about it.

It was a wretched business that week to be looking at them and hundreds of boys arrested by them. Often I said to myself that it was a great pity that I myself had not been kept in jail when I was there instead of looking at those fine men tied up by them and being brought from every part of the country.⁴⁶

Eventually MacCurtain was also apprehended when, at 7.15pm on the evening of 11 May, the RIC raided his home at 40 Thomas Davis Street and re-arrested him:

Siobhan, my wife's sister, started to cry when I was leaving the house but Eilis (my wife) did not say a word. She did not want to put any trouble on me along with what I had already and she told me to have courage. This was a great help to me. I kissed Siobhan and Sile and Tomas Óg who was in the cot and went with the peelers ... I was put in the Detention Barracks ... I was searched and everything I had was taken from me except for the copy of the Imitation of Christ that I had in English, it was a very small little book and a great comfort to me I was put into the cell ... Eilis gave me a glass of milk before I left the house and I was not hungry ... After all the work I was very tired ... I put the board on the floor of my cell and went to sleep.⁴⁷

The following morning he got his first real taste of prison life when a bell awoke him at 6am in order that he and the other the prisoners could wash themselves before breakfast and commencement of the daily routine.

I was given a mug of some stuff at 8 o'clock and a piece of bread I think the drink was a mixture of chocolate and cocoa – immediately I had that breakfast eaten a solder came to the door to me and said 'Do not be afraid of anyone here but raise your head and look them between the two eyes.' That encouraged me and lifted the spirit in me and I did so ... We were all let out in the air from 11 to 12 o'clock and a guard of soldiers around us. We would be walking around after one another about six feet apart and we would not be allowed to say a word to one another. We got a dinner which was not too bad altogether and what we

⁴⁵ Leahy, Michael WS 96, BMH, Cathal Brugha Barracks, Dublin.

⁴⁶ MacCurtain diary, L. 1945. 29, Cork Public Museum.

⁴⁷ Ibid.

got for breakfast we got again in the evening for supper. We had another 'in the air' between four and five o'clock ... it was in the yard in which we used to walk that Tomás Ceannt was buried after he was shot.⁴⁸

By now 140 members of the Cork Brigade were incarcerated in the detention barracks where they remained in complete ignorance of their fate for three weeks.

Then, on the evening of 21 May, they were told to be 'ready for road' the following morning. At 7.30am the Volunteers of the Cork Brigade, together with men from other units who had been locked up in Cork, were all handcuffed together in pairs and marched off under military escort to the Great Southern and Western Railway Station on the Lower Glanmire Road. They whistled and sang as they marched down Military Hill, through St. Luke's Cross, and down Grattan Hill to the station where a large crowd of terrified relatives and friends had gathered. Amid chaotic scenes of anguish and distress the military escort would not permit any contact between the Volunteers and their families and instead herded the captives on board a train bound for Dublin where they were detained in Richmond Barracks.

At this stage fifteen rebel leaders had been executed and a public outcry had begun to reverberate throughout the country. Afraid of alienating the nationalist population of Ireland and aware of pubic opinion in America, the British government decided to stop the executions and intern the rebels in Britain instead. MacCurtain and many of the men under his command left Richmond Barracks on 1 June and, as a sign of the shift in public opinion that was then taking place, they were cheered as they marched through the streets of Dublin to board a cattle ship at the North Wall that would take them into exile.

Upon arrival in Britain they were divided into two groups – one being sent to Wakefield detention barracks and the other to Knutsford prison. Later that month MacCurtain, MacSwiney and a number of other Cork Volunteers from both locations were transferred to an interment camp in North Wales at a place called Frongoch.⁴⁹ It was here, in a rat-infested former distillery, which until recently had been used to house German prisoners of war, that the Irish internees established their 'university of revolution' with classes soon commencing in Irish history, language and culture. More importantly, it was here that the Volunteers from the Cork Brigade came together with people like Michael Collins, and began a detailed analysis of the failure of the rebellion.

On 11 July MacCurtain was transferred to Reading Gaol, where he remained haunted by what had happened and by the perception of his own personal failure. After many long, lonely hours of deliberation he finally reached a conclusion and confided it to his diary:

It is nearly five months ago now and it is many a turn I have had since, and my judgement in the matter is that we could not have done otherwise than we did.⁵⁰

⁴⁸ Ibid.

⁴⁹ According to a copy of the 'Frongoch Roll' compiled by Joseph Murray, Secretary to the Volunteers' Committee of Camp Management, which is held in the Allen Library, O'Connell School, North Richmond St. Dublin, a total of eight-nine Volunteer from County Cork were detained in Frogoch. 50 Ibid.

Nevertheless, the failure of the Cork Brigade of Irish Volunteers to take part in the Easter Rising continued to be the cause was of much concern at local and national level. Donal Óg O'Callagahan's statement that "three incompetent men in a state of blue funk" had led the Brigade, represented the view of a militant minority in Cork while a general concern remained amongst the surviving leaders of both the IRB and Irish Volunteers.⁵¹ Accordingly, after the Volunteers returned to Ireland in 1917 MacCurtain and other senior brigade officers requested Volunteer headquarters to hold an inquiry into their activities during Easter Week.⁵²

A court of inquiry consisting of Cathal Brugha, Diarmuid Lynch and Con Collins convened in Cork and interviewed MacCurtain, and other Volunteer officers throughout the city and county. The IRB also held its own inquiry and both found that no blame was attributable to the Cork Brigade, as 'it was impossible for them to do anything in the circumstances.'⁵³

EVALUATION OF THE BRIGADE COMMANDER

Taken in the context of the time, cognisant of the conflicting orders he received, and recognising the parallel chains of command within which he was forced to operate, it is our firm view that both MacCurtain's own personal evaluation of his leadership and the finding of the two inquiries are correct. In his capacity as commander of the Cork Brigade of Volunteers, MacCurtain could not, and should not, have done anything other than what he did.

The fact that MacCurtain received nine different and conflicting orders within three weeks was intolerable and a situation within which no competent military commander could have been expected to operate successfully.

⁵¹ MacSwiney, Eithne, WS 119, BMH, Cathal Brugha Barracks, Dublin.

⁵² The leadership of the Limerick and Kerry Brigades also requested that an inquiry be held into the failure of their units to take part in the Rising.

⁵³ Murphy, 'Account of Easter Week 1916 in Cork', p. 11.

DAY	DATE (1916)	CATEGORY	INITIATED BY	Content	Received in Cork
Monday	3 April	General Order	Pearse	Manoeuvres on	5 April
Sunday	9 April	Brigade Commander's Conference			
Monday	17 April	Dispatch	MacDermott via Brigid Foley	Unknown Wednesday	16 April 19 April
		Castle Document published			
Wednesday	19 April	Dispatch	MacDermott via Brigid Foley	Unknown	19 April
Wednesday	19 April	Order	MacNeill	Defence only	20 April
Friday	21 April	Order	MacNeill	Command and Control	21 April
			via J.J. O'Connell		21 April
Friday	21 April	General Order	MacNeill	Defence only	21 April
		MacNeill re	considers		
Friday	21 April	Countermanding Order	MacNeill via James Ryan	Rising on	22 April
		Arms landing fails			
Saturday	22 April	General Order	MacNeill via James Ryan	Rising cancelled	23 April
Sunday	23 April	Sunday Independent – Mobilisation cancelled			23 April
Monday	24 April	Note	Pearse via Mary Perolz	Rising on	24 April
Monday	24 April	Dispatch	MacDermott via Brigid Foley	Unknown	Not delivered

ORDERS ISSUED TO THE CORK BRIGADE OF VOLUNTEERS DURING APRIL 1916

Furthermore, the absence of a formal written military operational order proved critical. MacCurtain had no clear mission statement. There was no definable higher commander's intent and no meaningful planning guidance was offered. There was no clear identifiable concept of operations, no serious logistics planning had been undertaken, and the members of the Cork Brigade did not possess sufficient arms and ammunition to mount any meaningful military operations. Furthermore, there was no reserve of arms, ammunition, or equipment

other than what might have been landed from the *Aud*, but there was no advance knowledge of whether these stocks were even compatible with the rifles they already possessed.

Kept in abject ignorance of the IRB's real intentions until the very last moment, had MacCurtain chosen to commit his Brigade against a credible, competent and far superior military force it is distinctly possible that neither he nor many of his colleagues would have survived – and those who did would in all probability have been promptly executed. The fate of Thomas Kent, for what would have amounted to a significantly lesser offence, adequately proves this point.

Instead, by making a realistic evaluation of the circumstances within which he found himself, recognising his military limitations, and identifying the capability of his enemy, MacCurtain conducted a proper military estimate of the situation and then made the correct military decision. By having the self confidence to make that hard choice he displayed solid leadership and sound judgment, and preserved his force intact and available for future operations.

MAIN LESSONS LEARNED

The main lesson that Tomás MacCurtain learned from his experience at Easter 1916 was that secret societies were no longer relevant in the quest for Irish freedom. The IRB had deceived and manipulated the Volunteer movement in order to push that quest in a particular direction, which ultimately had probably more to do with making a valiant blood sacrifice than waging a competent military campaign with some prospect of success.

He also identified the complex command relationships that exited in April 1916 and the manner in which members of both the Supreme and Military Councils of the IRB were able to operate unhindered within Volunteer command structure. This effectively gave rise to parallel chains of command which in turn caused widespread confusion and ultimately made the positions of the brigade commanders on the ground untenable.



IRB INFLUENCE ON THE IRISH VOLUNTEER CHAIN OF COMMAND DURING APRIL 1916

For MacCurtain, parallel chains of command were an absurdity and he vowed never to be trapped between them again. At Easter 1916 he was the brigade commander of the Cork Brigade of Irish Volunteers and took his orders in that context directly from the Volunteer chief of staff, Eoin MacNeill. However, he was also a member of the IRB, subject to the authority of the Supreme Council, and he found himself taking different instructions from the Military Council. This was never going to work and on Good Friday Terence MacSwiney described the situation as one of "order, counterorder and disorder". ⁵⁴ Not surprisingly then, MacCurtain resigned from the IRB in 1917 determined instead to regenerate the Cork Brigade and develop it into a credible military force operating within the parameters of a clearly defined chain of command. Internment did not rid him of his military and political aspirations it served only to intensify both.

CONCLUSION

As the process of reorganisation got underway in 1917 not all members of the Cork Brigade had come to the same conclusions as MacCurtain. Some remained convinced of the efficacy and relevance of the IRB, others continued to question his decision to hand over arms to the lord mayor, and a minority were determined to conduct their own operations in the future irrespective of what the brigade commander had to say.

In fact none of the brigade commander's problems had actually disappeared and many of them had actually become more critical. The difference this time, however, was that he had learned from his experience; he was acutely aware of the difference of opinion within his ranks; and he fully understood the complexity of commanding such a diverse group of individuals.

As the Cork Brigade of Volunteers embarked on the next phase of Ireland's struggle for independence the challenges facing Tomás MacCurtain as the Brigade commander were immense. It would take a leader of extraordinary talent and huge personal integrity to maintain cohesion within a military unit which was still reeling from the perception of failure at Easter 1916 with many of the more militant Volunteers now intent on amending that situation any way they could. That MacCurtain actually managed to continue operating within the Volunteer chain of command while also keeping his unit intact speaks volumes and leads to the evaluation that the Volunteers of the Cork Brigade were fortunate to have him as their commanding officer until his murder on 20 March 1920.

Equally it is clear that they were in fact more than fortunate to have had his leadership available to them at Easter 1916, because had any other course of action been taken the outcome would in all probability have been devastating, and the impact unquantifiable. Brigade Commandant Tomás MacCurtain made the correct military decisions at Easter 1916 – of that there is no doubt whatsoever.

⁵⁴ Chavasse, Moirin, Terence MacSwiney, p. 82.

Burning of the Dublin Custom House, May 25th 1921

*Text of Lecture delivered by Captain M. O'Kelly, Infantry School, Military College, June 1935*¹

On the 25th May, 1921, the Irish Republican Army accomplished the total destruction of the Dublin Custom House, thereby paralysing British Civil Administration in this country.

The scheme had its origin in a Council Meeting of the Headquarters Staff of the Republican Forces held at the O'Rahilly's house, 40 Herbert Park, Dublin 4. The purpose of the meeting was to discuss the military situation and the following were present:-

Cathal Burugha	Gearoid O'Sullivan	
Michael Collins	J.J. O'Connell	
Austin Stack	Sean McMahon	
Richard Mulcahy	Sean Russell	
Pierce Beasley	Liam Mellows	
	Eamon De Valera	

They were all agreed that the time had come to deliver a smashing blow to England – some bigger military operation than anything yet attempted. Two projects were laid before the Conference. One, the taking of Beggars Bush Barracks, a strong military position in the hands of the enemy or the destruction of the Custom House; both these suggestions came from President DeValera.

The following Government Departments were housed in the Custom House:

- Inland Revenue
- Local Government
- Estate Duty Control Registers
- Stamp Office
- Income Tax and Joint Stock Company Registers

Its destruction would reduce the most important branch of British Civil Government in Ireland to virtual impotence and would, in addition, inflict on her a financial loss of about two million pounds.

¹ This lecture was subsequently submitted to the Bureau of Military History, as a witness statement. Comdt O'Kelly had been a Lieutenant in 2nd Bn at the time of the burning and was a participant in the action. No responsibility is accepted for the historical veracity of the account. The editorial board, from the account, composed the accompanying sketch.

The Officer Commanding the Dublin Brigade was ordered to investigate the relative merits of the two schemes and a member of the Intelligence Department was ordered to take up his residence in a house opposite Beggars Bush Barracks and make his report. This report, received in due course, expressed the view that to take this strongly fortified position by surprise was almost impossible, and after some deliberation, the Custom House operation was decided upon.

The Officer Commanding Dublin Brigade was successful in carrying out a personal reconnaissance of the building; carrying some envelopes in his hand, he entered the building one day and under the pretext of looking for someone in one of the numerous Departments, made his way through the huge building without arousing any suspicion, thus making the fixing of details possible. A ground plan of the building was copied from one in the National Library.

Comdt T. Ennis, Officer Commanding 2nd Bn was appointed to take charge. He was informed that he could have his pick of the Brigade. The number required to carry out the job was estimated at one hundred and twenty. This number did not include a covering party for outside or a guard for the City Fire Stations, which were provided for by the Officer Commanding the Brigade. The units actually engaged inside the building were the 2nd Battalion and Active Service Unit (ASU). Outside, there was a section of the 1st Battalion.

The opinion was expressed by the President that if these one hundred and twenty men were lost and the job accomplished, the sacrifice would be well justified.

Equipment. The material required for the operation was -

- Paraffin oil and petrol (280 gallons in 140 x two-gallon tins)
- Cotton-waste x 2 bales

These had to be procured at the earliest possible moment and, accordingly, the Officer Commanding B Coy 2 Bn, was detailed to commandeer the paraffin and petrol. Officer Commanding D Coy, 2 Bn was to get the cotton waste a week prior to the operation, which was fixed for 25th May 1921. Both these officers were successful in getting the material – the paraffin and petrol was got by holding up horse-drawn tanks in the streets and making prisoners of the drivers; the tins were procured by carrying out a raid on the Shell Company's yard and the waste came from Broadstone Railway Station. The process of filling the petrol tins was started immediately in one of the company dumps. The other equipment necessary was as follows:

- ➢ Hatchets
- Bolt Cutters
- > Transport

These were left over until the morning of the 25th.

ASSEMBLY

Oriel Hall was the assembly point. Orders were issued to report there at 12 noon on the 25th and accordingly, the boys drifted along in the usual groups of two s and threes. It was, however, observed by the first few to arrive that the Goods Yard of the Great Northern Railway (G.N.R) was occupied by the enemy, some of whom were actually leaning over the wall overlooking Oriel Hall.² Word to this effect was dispatched to the Battalion Commander at 100 Seville Place,³ who immediately gave orders to have the assembly point changed to Sean Connolly Hall.⁴



It was about 1215 hrs when the last man arrived at the new venue. 'The Manager', by which name Comdt T. Ennis was known to all, was present. He had already given instructions to the Officer Commanding D Coy, 2 Bn, earlier that morning to commandeer a heavy motor lorry, proceed to the dump, load the stores and report to him at 1215 hrs at the venue. The lorry duly arrived at this moment. This car was commandeered from outside Findlaters Shop in O'Connell Street, where it had been in the process of being unloaded, when Officer Commanding D Coy, accompanied by his driver and one other, came on the scene. They were agreed that the vehicle met the necessary requirements, so the Officer Commanding informed the men who were unloading, as politely as he could, that he required the car for a few hours. The men handed over the car without any fuss, whereupon the vehicle was driven to the dump⁵ and loaded with the stores. This done, it was driven to Connolly Hall where all officers, Section Leaders and men were paraded for orders.

² Modern housing on this site - Place name indicated on gable end - ed.

³ This building still exists - located beside the railway bridge on Seville Place (see Sketch) - ed.

⁴ This building was located on Beresford Place behind the Custom House - ed.

⁵ While the Dump was depicted on the on the sketch accompanying the original lecture, it was impossible to reconstruct its location for this article - ed.

ORDERS

The Battalion Commander briefly explained the operation to all present and told them what was required of them. He also outlined the result it was expected to have upon the enemy. He was in possession of a plan of the inside of the building by which he pointed out the allotted position to be taken up upon entry, at the same time detailing the officers for each floor. There were four Company Commanders present. One of these, Officer Commanding D Coy, was appointed Second-in-Command. The route was outlined and the following orders were issued: The Guard to enter at 1258 hrs, man all entrances, dismantle telephonic communication, allow all persons who desired in but none to be allowed to leave and make prisoners of the two policemen at the Main Entrance. The lorry was to be at this entrance at 1259 hrs.

Every man was to be in possession of a hatchet. They would raid likely shops for these along the way.

The main body was to enter at 1300 hrs. On arrival at the main entrance, each man was to take two 2-gallon tins off the lorry. They would then proceed to allotted corridors, instruct the members of staff to collect all personal belongings and proceed to the main hall, taking particular care that no person pocketed any official documents. They were to close all windows, smash all presses, collect all papers in a heap on the floor and thoroughly soak the floor and all inflammable material with petrol. As each floor was ready for firing, the Officer I/C of the floor would report the fact to the Second-in-Command, who would give the orders to set fire, starting at the top floor. In order to guard against possible confusion, it was strictly forbidden for any man to have a whistle in his possession. In the event of a hitch occurring that would prevent the job being finished the Battalion Commander would give a signal blast, which would be the blast for every man to get away. This completed the orders and all proceeded in the direction of the Custom House by the planned routes.

ARMAMENT

Every man was armed with a revolver and six rounds.

PROTECTION

The Officer Commanding Dublin Brigade, had arranged for a covering party to be posted on the railway bridge overlooking the Custom House. He also had men posted in all Fire Brigade Stations to prevent their being of assistance to the enemy.

OPERATION

At 1300 Hrs, the appointed time, the party converged on the Custom House from the direction of Store Street, Gardiner Street and Amiens Street. There were a large number of people about at the time – it being the midday rush hour. Therefore the various groups of men passed unnoticed. The success of the operation depended on the elements of surprise and speed, but, unfortunately, a lot of time was lost in the herding of the staff to the main hall – all of whom were completely surprised at the audacity of the attack. The suddenness with which the building was entered threw them into a state of panic, though at first, some were inclined to take the whole thing as a joke. On seeing the number of guns in evidence, they realised that real business was intended. Others, who were stout supporters of the enemy administration, were very reluctant to do as ordered and here a little gentle persuasion was necessary.

The lady members of the staff, in particular, became panicky and hysterical, and a considerable amount of time was lost on this account. The caretaker rushed to the telephone although previously warned against doing do and had to be shot. The enemy were, however, warned from an unknown source with the result that they arrived in strength at 1317 hrs – seventeen minutes after the building had been entered and before preparations for firing had been completed.

The first lorry to arrive was engaged by the covering party from the Railway Bridge with grenade and revolver fire. (According to official reports, four Tans were wounded).

The unexpected had happened and the men inside, on hearing the shooting, took up position at the doors and windows and opened up on the enemy who were also taking up positions.

At this time, excitement was running high amongst the staff. Above the din could be heard the blast of a whistle. This came from one of the attackers who apparently had become excited too.

The man on the top landing, on hearing the whistle and thinking it was the whistle to get away, rushed to the ground floor towards the main entrance. Just at this time, the Battalion Commander appeared in the main hall and realized that his original plan had miscarried through one of the men giving a whistle blast, contrary to orders. He, with characteristic decision, ordered Lt J. Slattery, who was posted at the main entrance, to close the door. He then ordered all men, from the main hall, upstairs – at the same time giving the order to 'set fire'. The promptness with which the Battalion Commander acted saved the situation and succeeded in re-establishing control when all looked like being lost. The man, on their part giving ready obedience to their leader, rushed up the stairs after him and set about the task of destroying the top portion of the building with thoroughness, leaving nothing to chance. By the time they had completed their task, the second floor had also been set alight and it was only with the greatest difficulty, fighting through the blinding smoke, that they succeeded in making their way back to the ground floor.

The building was now completely surrounded by enemy. The Black and Tans had been reinforced by military who were keeping up a continuous fire on the building with machine guns from armoured cars and a Lewis which they had brought into position underneath the railway bridge.

A number of casualties occurred amongst the staff from stray bullets coming through windows and doors (newspaper reports give one killed and six wounded). The men inside were replying to the fire whenever an inviting target showed up. Some of the ASU, known as the Squad, were armed with Peter the Painters and used them to good advantage.

The position was now becoming impossible inside with the fire spreading rapidly, when the Battalion Commander gave the order for everyone to get out. The Staff rushed out, shouting 'friends, friends.' It was a case of every man for himself now so most of the men, having fired their six shots, dumped the guns and filed out behind the staff. Once outside, the higher officials of the Staff picked out their own who were set free. The remainder, being all IRA, were placed under a heavy guard to await the arrival of the lorries.

Just at this time, there were a few rushes from the building in twos and threes – men trying to fight their way through the cordon. For most it was a futile effort. A couple were fortunate in getting away, but others were badly wounded including the Battalion Commander. His was a miraculous escape as he was one of the very last to leave the building and had to decide between being burned to death, being captured or getting away in a rush. The odds were one in a hundred against getting away. If he were captured, it would, in all probability, mean shooting, he being a much-wanted man. This fact, I think, decided him upon attempting to get away. He selected the only point where the enemy appeared to be weak, and with a gun in each hand made a rush from a side gate towards the lane opposite.⁶ He had only gone about twenty yards, when he fell wounded with a bullet in the hip. He picked himself up and made a second dash, firing as he went, was struck again, this time on the leg, but he kept going as best he could until he arrived at the top of the lane, where he saw a horse-drawn cart, into which he scrambled. Luckily, the driver of the cart, who was friendly towards the IRA, recognized him and willingly took him to safety.

The entire operation was successfully carried out in the face of an enemy in superior numbers and firepower and was a hazardous undertaking in itself, calling for a high degree of determination and skill, on the part of the Commander, and of unwavering courage on the part of the remainder.

KILLED	WOUNDED	
Capt Paddy O'Reilly	Comdt T. Ennis	
Lt Stephen O'Reilly	Lt J. Slattery	
Dan Head	J. Ward	
Eddie Dorrins		
Sean Doyle		

CASUALTIES

Total enemy casualties are unknown because the true figures were never published by the British Authorities.

SURPRISE

This operation brings out the element of surprise very forcibly – the importance of striking the enemy at a vital part when he least expects it. The main nerve of British Administration in Ireland was centred in the Custom House and that nerve was completely destroyed in broad daylight, in the midst of a city occupied by a large garrison and ceaselessly patrolled by armed patrols.

⁶ From physical inspection of the area, the lane referred to is probably that running behind Liberty Hall and parallel to Lower Abbey Street

PROTECTION

A force can be regarded as secure from surprise only when protection is furnished in every direction from which attack is possible. Here the enemy was allowed to get within striking distance of the Main body, from all directions. Time was the all-important factor in this operation. Therefore, ambush parties should have been posted at all likely routes for the purpose of gaining that time and holding up the enemy's advance.

QUICK DECISION

An outstanding lesson to be learned from this operation is the value of quick decision in the leader, as instanced, in this case where we see Comdt T. Ennis, suddenly confronted with a situation which threatened to imperil the success of the action, display the qualities that make a leader, in the rapidity with which he made his decision and turned what might have been failure into success.

Defence Forces Review 2007

Ireland's First Engagement in United Nations Peacekeeping Operations: An Assessment¹

Col Richard E.M. Heaslip (Retd)

INTRODUCTION

In the twenty-first century, peacekeeping has become an accepted concept, usually associated with conflict management and resolution. In Ireland, for most people, it is a term, which is now synonymous with United Nations (UN) operations. In fact, peacekeeping may be considered a by-product of the UN's use of military resources in conflict resolution, and it arose from a pragmatic response by the organisation to a perceived threat to international peace and stability in the first decade of the Cold War.

In the early years of the organisation's history, it deployed unarmed military officers from its member states to Palestine and Kashmir as independent international witnesses to observe and report on the conflicts in these regions. These first ventures into 'peacekeeping' were at one end of the military conflict-resolution options tried by the UN. The other extreme of that spectrum of military options saw the UN engage in the Korean War. Those early years of the UN coincided with the emergence and intensification of the Cold War. The Cold War placed an added emphasis on the strategic interests and reach of the superpowers, who also had the power of veto in the Security Council, with consequential limitations on the UN's freedom of action. Nevertheless, the requirement for the use of an agreed limited, international, military response option remained. This was especially apparent after the 1956 Suez Canal debacle, when it was in the superpowers' interest to stabilise a major international flashpoint. To police this disputed post-conflict zone, a lightly armed. UN-led, military force drawn from nonaligned and neutral states was deployed in November 1956. This force was mandated by the Security Council to conduct operations aimed at ensuring peace throughout its area of operations. It was designated the United Nations Emergency Force (UNEF). This type of force together with the deployment of UN unarmed observers thereafter became a blueprint for the UN's approach to containing other potentially destabilising conflicts.

As the UN evolved its approach to conflict resolution, Ireland remained outside the organisation. It did not gain membership until December 1955 and therefore did not contribute to the early UN observer missions. However, Ireland was a member of the UN when the concept of armed UN peacekeeping started to emerge. Even at that early stage, Ireland displayed some interest in these matters but it did not get directly involved until 1958 when it provided officer observers for an observer mission in Lebanon. Nevertheless, Ireland's involvement in UN peacekeeping is now more widely remembered for, and incorrectly dated from, the Defence Forces' participation with troops in the 1960 Congo operation, referred to in UN terms as *Operation des Nations Unies au Congo* (ONUC). It is posited in this paper that popular and academic opinion have both undervalued and often ignored the Irish contribution to the UN military observer missions in the Middle East. In this region, Ireland, through the commitment of officer observers to the United Nations Observer Group in Lebanon (UNOGIL), initiated its

¹ This paper was originally presented at the conference 'The United Nations anniversary – Looking forward', held at the Royal Irish Academy, Dublin, 18 November 2005, to mark the fiftieth anniversary of Ireland's accession to the UN.® Royal Irish Academy. Reprinted by kind permission of the RIA from Irish Studies in International Affairs, Volume 17, 2006 (31-42). www.ria.ie/publications/isia

involvement in the peacekeeping process that continued through the follow-on contribution to the United Nations Truce Supervision Organisation (UNTSO). From those first steps in the unarmed observer missions, there was a direct connection also to Irish participation in the armed UN force in the Congo, a connection that appears to have been equally forgotten.

In this paper, the intention is to correct this view and argue for the UNOGIL and UNTSO missions as the genesis of Irish engagement in international peacekeeping.² Colonel Justin McCarthy led the Irish Defence Forces officer observer group on these international military missions. He had a central role in projecting the capabilities, professionalism and contribution of Defence Forces officers, but his contribution has been forgotten in the passage of time. This oversight too will be addressed, with a view to emphasising the importance of his formative contribution to the Defence Forces' modus operandi on overseas missions. The paper will also discuss the background to the decision to participate in UN peacekeeping and will highlight the lessons learned by the Irish government from this initial experience with UNOGIL and UNTSO. In this way it is proposed to provide insight into the important contribution of these missions in the Middle East to Ireland's preparation for, and involvement in, the armed troop mission in the Congo.

UNITED NATIONS OBSERVER GROUP IN LEBANON (UNOGIL)

The story of what would become Ireland's first involvement of Defence Forces personnel on service outside the state begins in Lebanon with the Irish Honorary Consul in Beirut. In 1958 this was Sir Desmond Cochrane, who as part of his consular duties was actively engaged in submitting routine reports on developments in the region. His report for May 1958, submitted to Dr Eoin MacWhite at the Department of External Affairs in Dublin, outlined a deteriorating situation in Lebanon and accurately forecast the subsequent intercommunal violence.³ The Lebanese government attributed this violence to interference from Egypt and Syria, then functioning as the United Arab Republic, and requested UN support. On 11 June, the UN Security Council authorised the dispatch of a UN observer group, which was designated UNOGIL. On 23 June 1958, UN secretary-general Dag Hammarskjold requested Irish participation in this mission. Eamon Kennedy, Irish charge d'affaires at the Permanent Mission to the UN, dispatched a coded cable to this effect at midday Eastern Standard Time.⁴ The Irish government's positive response was dispatched from Iveagh House at 12.08 hours on 24 June.⁵ Overnight, the entire spectrum of national decision-making was activated and Ireland agreed to provide five officers for the UN mission in Lebanon, and the Defence Forces set about selecting them.

² See also Richard E.M. Heaslip, 'UNOGIL and UNTSO: 1958-60. The pre-Congo origins of Ireland's involvement in United Nations peacekeeping', in Michael Kennedy and Deirdre McMahon (eds), Obligations and responsibilities: Ireland and the United Nations 1955-2005. Essays marking fifty years of Ireland's United Nations membership (Dublin, 2005), 79-116. The paper presented at the conference 'The United Nations anniversary – Looking forward', on 18 November 2005, was based on this article.

³ National Archives of Ireland, Department of Foreign Affairs (hereafter cited as NAI DFA), 305/329/1, Political situation in Lebanon, Cochrane to MacWhite (letter), 17 May 1958.

⁴ NAI DFA Permanent mission to the United Nations New York (hereafter cited as PMUN), 222/13/1, cables from PMUN to the Department of External Affairs, Dublin, 23 June 1958. The cable of 23 June contained the following message. 'Most urgent for Secretary General's Office has inquired today on telephone if we could urgently provide five officers of quote Major or Captain rank unquote to join UN Observation Team in Lebanon stop will cable further details after visit headquarters this afternoon uneireann' [sic]

⁵ NAI DFA PMUN, 222/13/1, the Department of External Affairs to PMUN (clear cable), 24 June 1958. The government's response from Iveagh House was as follows, 'Please inform Secretary General Government Agreeable in principle stop details being settled and will wire later stop request no publicity until details being settled' [sic]

IRELAND'S DECISION TO PARTICIPATE IN UNOGIL

In investigating the background to this very prompt decision, it transpires that it was the culmination of almost 18 months of deliberation on possible Irish involvement in UN military operations. The Department of Foreign Affairs' files held at the National Archives of Ireland show that the state's interest in possible Irish involvement in UN military conflict management dates from the very formation of UNEF in November 1956.⁶ UNEF was the first of its kind, a lightly armed, international force under UN command deployed to peacefully contain the explosive potential of a Cold War flashpoint. This force was interposed between the Egyptian and Israeli forces in Gaza at the conclusion of the Suez Canal War in 1956. Ireland was then less than a year in the organisation and Costello's coalition government was in power. The Secretary to the Department of Defence, Peadar McMahon, wrote on behalf of his minister to Sean Murphy, Secretary to the Department of External Affairs, with a specific request. In this correspondence, dated 20 November 1956, he sought information on a range of issues affecting possible Irish participation in such a force.⁷

From November 1956 onward, the Permanent Mission to the UN in New York was very proactive on these matters. The experimental nature of the UNEF mission and the newly emerging concept of 'peacekeeping' was the focus of their attention They considered Indonesia's intention to withdraw its contingent from UNEF as a opportunity for possible Irish involvement. This situation arose in July 1957. At this stage, de Valera's Fianna Fail government was in power when *charge d'affaires* Kennedy sought guidance from Dublin on the possibility of Ireland's participate in such a UN force. In Iveagh House, Conor Cruise O'Brien was handling the file and he canvassed the views of the Department of Defence reply outlined a range of issues inhibiting the possibility of such participation, including the low strength of the Defence Forces and the requirement to amend the Defence Act. The Department of External Affairs then prepared a memorandum for government on this issue.⁸

The government noted these difficulties, but nevertheless, in its decision of September 1957 directed the Department of Defence to begin preparation of the amendments to the Defence Act in anticipation of any future UN request for Iris troops. From this point onward, the process was firmly in train to prepare for the possibility of involvement in UN peacekeeping initiatives. This was the point from which the government's 'decision in principle' to participate in future UN military activities can be dated. The Cabinet meeting of 18 March 1958 again addressed the issue and decided to accept the Department of Defence's proposals for amendment to the Defence Act but put further preparation on hold until an actual opportunity to participate arose.⁹ Therefore, since November 1956, from the birth of armed UN peacekeeping, successive governments were positively disposed to Defence Forces participation in UN military missions. The invitation to participate in the 1958 UNOGIL mission was the first opportunity that presented itself. This Lebanon mission had an added interest because the numbers requested were low an participation was limited to officer observers. Politically too, the issue was unlikely to be contentious for de Valera's government given the interest of Costello government the previous November.

⁶ NAI DFA PMUN, 185PK/5Vol 1, UNEF file [sic]

⁷ NAI DFA PMUN, 185PK/5Vol 1. The Department of Defence correspondence to the Department of External Affairs, 20 November 1956 with attachments to the Department of External Affairs, 22 November 1956 and PMUN, 17 December 1956.

⁸ NAI DFA, 305/173/1 Pt1, United Nations Emergency International Force file with enclosure 'Memorandum for the government', 27 August 1957.

⁹ NAI, Department of the Taoiseach, Cabinet files 2/18, 21 March 1958.

SELECTION OF OFFICER VOLUNTEERS

On the military side, to support the decision made on Wednesday morning 24 June 1958, there was a requirement to select personnel for a mission without precedent in the Defence Forces' short history. The Chief of Staff, Major General Mulcahy and the Adjutant General, Colonel Hally, shortlisted twelve officers for consideration and ordered them to report to Defence Forces headquarters at 1000 hrs on 25 June 1958.¹⁰ Within the military, a peremptory summons to the Adjutant General's Office is out of the ordinary and usually has adverse disciplinary connotations and so each officer was fearful as to why he was required there at such short notice. These fears were only allayed at the appointed time when Mulcahy and Hally informed them of the UN request and the government's positive response to it. The officers were also informed that five of those present would leave in two days for observer duty in Lebanon. Based entirely on this scant information volunteers were sought. With no time to consult their wives or next of kin, all did so. Five were then selected and Lieutenant Colonel Justin McCarthy was nominated to lead the group. From the very beginning McCarthy featured prominently in correspondence between Dublin and the mission in New York. Born and educated in England, he joined the Defence Forces in 1932, was commissioned in 1934 and was a Lieutenant Colonel by 1945. He later completed the British army staff course at the British army staff college, Camberley, England and held a range of important appointments before his selection for UNOGIL.¹¹ Unusually for an officer of his time, he was a fluent French speaker. It is likely that this, together with his completion of the British army staff course, and his performance in a variety of demanding career appointments all combined to mark him as the best candidate to lead the group on this historic assignment, the first foreign deployment of Irish military personnel on operational duties.

IRISH OFFICERS IN UNOGIL

Following the completion of a minimum of military administrative formalities and a meeting with Taoiseach Eamon de Valera on 26 June, the McCarthy group left for Lebanon on 28 June 1958.¹² Soon after they joined the mission, the operational situation became much more complicated for UNOGIL. A republican coup toppled the regime in Iraq, which threatened to destabilise the region. The Lebanese and Jordanian governments both felt threatened by the coup in Iraq and sought military assistance from the United States and Britain. The United States deployed marines to Beirut, and Britain deployed its troops to Amman. While these military deployments appeared to contain the situation, the entire Middle Eastern region, and Lebanon in particular, remained tense from July to October. Eventually, all the issues, which had made the region the focus of international diplomatic and military attention, were resolved. This was achieved diplomatically through the good offices of UN secretary-general Hammarskjold. In October, the United States and Britain withdrew their forces and UNOGIL, having first expanded to over 600 personnel, was eventually downsized and withdrawn in December 1958.

¹⁰ Patrick Lavelle, 'UNOGIL silver jubilee, 1958-83', An Cosantoir, June (1983), 189-93:189.

¹¹ Military Archives, biographical notes (extras from personal file) 0/4530 Colonel Justin McCarthy.

¹² NAI DFA PMUN, 22/13/1, paper and photo clippings, 27 June 1958. The event was a major national news item and the subject of very favourable comment.

In addition to the original five, the Defence Forces subsequently provided 45 other Irish officers in four separate deployments.¹³ All of these officers went through a nomination and selection process identical to the original five. They each received orders to report to Defence Forces headquarters and were then presented with the option of making themselves available as volunteers. They all choose to volunteer despite the limited knowledge of the mission, its hardships or dangers. Many felt they had voluntarily enlisted in the Defence Forces and consequently were available for whatever deployment was required of them.¹⁴ In this manner, and out of this experience, the Defence Forces' commitment to the 'volunteer' concept of overseas service was established and has survived to the present day.

Beirut, in July and August 1958 was a highly sensitive, complicated, Cold War flashpoint. UNOGIL was required to walk a tightrope between the conflicting demands of the host government interests and those of an occupying superpower. There was also the prevailing threat from the United Arab Republic, a belligerent adjoining state. In this confused operational cauldron, McCarthy, after only one month in the mission and at the request of his UNOGIL superior, was promoted to full colonel status and appointed deputy to UNOGIL's Norwegian commander Major General Odd Bull. Taking over the reins at UNOGIL headquarters was an endorsement of McCarthy's professional ability, diplomacy and impartiality. This was a real coup for the Irish, coming as it did so early in the mission and especially given that Ireland had no previous record in UN missions. It is contended here that this event is comparable to Lieutenant General Sean McKeown's achievement in the Congo a few years later. However, despite all of this, it went unnoticed at home and inexplicably was not recognised as the historic event that it was for the Irish state and the Defence Forces.

While it was operational as a mission, UNOGIL maintained a high-profile presence of unarmed UN military observers called UNMOs in all parts of Lebanon. Across the mission area, the Irish officers were deployed as UNMOs to UNOGIL's five operational sectors (Tripoli, Baalbek, Chtura, Marjayoun and Saida). Each sector had a headquarters controlling the outposts dispersed across the respective sectors. A unique feature of this mission was that it had an air operation element equipped with helicopters and light aircraft. These elements reinforced the work of the ground observation posts, checkpoints and mobile patrols, the combined effort of which contributed significantly to defusing and containing the explosive potential that existed in the rural regions of the country, especially along its borders with Israel and Syria. The Irish provided a number of qualified pilots who conducted the aerial observation patrols and one of these, Commandant Desmond Johnston, also joined the task force assigned to oversee the British withdrawal from Jordan.¹⁵ All across the mission, both in the sector and mission headquarters, Irish officers were invariably selected for, and assigned to, key staff appointments. The Irish officers were selected for these coveted staff appointments by their immediate operational superiors, which was an international endorsement of their ability, training and professionalism.

¹³ The second group (five officers) departed on 4 August, the third (ten officers) on 28 August, the fourth (eleven officers) on 28 September and the fifth (nineteen officers) on 4 October 1958. Based on Lavelle UNOGIL p 193, interview with Lieutenant Colonel Thomas Furlong, Bray, Co. Wicklow, 15 February 2005 and interview with Colonel Colm Cox, Milltown, Co. Kildare, 25 February 2005.

¹⁴ Interview with Colonel Colm Cox, Milltown, Co. Kildare, 25 February 2005. Cox, who served as a military observer with UNOGIL in 1958, stated in the interview that this opinion was widely held by the Defence Force officers of that time.

¹⁵ Interview with Major General Fergus O'Connell, Dublin, 24 March 2005. O'Connell served as a military observer with the UNOGIL mission in 1958 and provided the information on Johnston's service with the UN task force deployed to Amman.

However, in one area the Irish were poorly prepared for operations overseas: in uniform and equipment. Ireland had equipped its Defence Forces to meet the very basic requirements for operations within the state and any prospect of foreign deployment was never considered. Consequently, the Defence Forces were ill-prepared to equip those departing on the UNOGIL mission and an *ad hoc* approach prevailed. On this basis, the Naval Service provided duffle coats, Millets of Capel Street, Dublin provided something resembling a lightweight uniform and the Fórsa Cosanta Áitiuil provided a 'combat blouse pattern' bulls-wool uniform.

In reality, the UNOGIL mission was a proving ground and a steep learning curve for the Irish state, its civil service and its Defence Forces. In New York, the staff at the Permanent Mission, using the limited communication means of telegram, air mail, diplomatic courier and the unreliable nature of the transatlantic telephone, maintained very effective lines of communication with their headquarters in Iveagh House. The civil servants in the Departments of External Affairs and of Defence adjusted very quickly to the necessity for rapid decision making to meet deadlines imposed by the UN. For the Defence Forces, there was the necessity to respond quickly to government decisions and provide suitable, trained personnel to meet Ireland's commitments.

For the individual officers selected for service in UNOGIL, the mission was an experience beyond their wildest dreams given the normal service expectation of those who had joined the Defence Forces in the 1940s and 1950s. The termination of the mission and their subsequent return to mundane barrack duties was a huge anticlimax. Sixteen months later on 11 April 1960, after much debate as to national authorisation to wear UN medals, these officers paraded for the first time as a group in Dublin to receive their UN service medal.¹⁶ For those on parade that day, the idea of becoming involved in any further foreign-service campaigns was not a realistic proposition. The medal parade brought closure to this historic first venture into soldiering for peace. Two absent UNMOs were overlooked in the formality of this great occasion, which was the first presentation of non-national medals to serving Defence Forces personnel. They remained on duty with UNTSO in the Middle East.

UNITED NATIONS TRUCE SUPERVISION ORGANISATION (UNTSO)

When the UNOGIL mission ended, the pressure came on UNTSO to maintain stability across the region. The UNTSO mission was in place since 1947, overseeing the armistice lines between Israel and its Arab neighbours. UNTSO headhunted two Irish personnel, McCarthy and Jordan, who then transferred to UNTSO when UNOGIL disbanded in mid-December 1958. This transfer occurred following the UN secretary-general's request for their services and with the full agreement of the Irish government. In stark contrast to the lack of publicity for McCarthy and Jordan to UNTSO was widely publicised by the Government Information Bureau in all the national media.¹⁷ McCarthy and Jordan were the first Irish officers to serve in UNTSO. Ireland has since maintained an unbroken commitment to this mission, which remains the longest overseas mission for the Defence Forces.

¹⁶ NAI DFA 305/329/3, award of medal to Irish officers in UNOGIL file. This file contains a copy of the Defence Forces' Ceremonial Order 3/1960 dated 6 April 1960. It also gives insight into the protracted correspondence regarding national authorisation for wearing UN medals. In this first Defence Forces United Nations medal parade there was also a further unique historic dimension in that the Taoiseach Mr Sean Lemass was presenting a UN medal to his son-in-law Captain Jack O'Brien (Cavalry Corps) who had served in UNOGIL.

^{17 &#}x27;UN chief asks for two Irish officers', Irish Press, 16 December 1959

UNTSO was an unarmed observer mission with a wide ranging mandate deployed to Israel's disputed frontiers. On the Egyptian front, along the Gaza strip area, the UNTSO mission coexisted with the armed UN force UNEF. McCarthy had been strongly recommended by his UNOGIL Norwegian superior, Major General Odd Bull, to the UNTSO Chief of Staff, the Swede, Major General Carl von Horn. On this recommendation and in light of his performance at UNOGIL headquarters, McCarthy was assigned by von Horn to the troublesome Gaza sector.

McCarthy's designated appointment was as chairman of a Mixed Armistice Committee, which on this front was arbitrating between Egypt and Israel. External Affairs in Dublin were continuing to exercise a hands-on approach to these matters and when they became aware of the full nature of McCarthy's appointment they expressed strong misgivings. Dublin perceived possible implications for Irish neutrality in this appointment and informed the Permanent Mission in New York accordingly.¹⁸ The matter was eventually resolved and an important precedent relating to the deployment of Irish officers to an observer mission was established. This was the acceptance that the nature of duties performed by Irish personnel on a UN mission was directed by the head of that mission. From then on, such matters were treated as operational and administrative issues arising in the UN theatre and within the authority and competence of the respective UN chief of staff. They were therefore not a matter for consultation with either national governments or those in the mission area. After this initial difficulty, McCarthy and Jordan settled into the routine of their respective appointments. Jordan served at UNTSO headquarters in Jerusalem and later in Damascus. McCarthy continued with his brief in the Sinai, until they were both recommended for a further extension of their UNTSO service in December 1959. McCarthy's tenure in his appointment was not without incident. He was commended by Major General von Horn particularly for his handling of serious incidents occurring in his area, and for the professional and diplomatic manner in which he dealt with the strained command relationship between the respective UN generals with UNTSO and UNEF.

When there was an active large-scale commitment to the UNOGIL mission, the national response at all levels was marked by a very positive, proactive, 'can do' attitude in all government departments. When the mission concluded and the involvement in UNTSO followed, there was a return to a more usual form of civil service bureaucracy. At that point, the unresolved, mundane but important issues were addressed, for example personnel administrative issues such as leave, medical support, conditions of service, pensions, etc., all of which were satisfactorily resolved. Regarding financial matters, the Department of Defence on the prompting of the Department of Finance sought reimbursement from UN sources for expenses arising in the course of its commitment of Irish personnel on UN duty and this amounted to $\pm 3,015$ 9s 11d,¹⁹ Regarding these costs, the permanent mission staff in New York investigated the matter with the UN Secretariat and other contributing nations.

¹⁸ NAI DFA PMUN, 222/13/1, Department of External Affairs to PMUN, 6 January 1959; PMUN to the Department of External Affairs, 7 January 1959 and PMUN to the Department of External Affairs, 23 January 1959

¹⁹ NAI DFA PMUN, 222/13/1, Department of External Affairs to PMUN, Department of Defence correspondence, 9 February 1960. This correspondence outlined a claim for reimbursement for a special clothing allowance and the additional equipment issued to each officer, plus an 'entertainment allowance' issued to McCarthy. The claim totalled £3,295 0s 0d, less the cost recovered from coats and medical kit returned to stores - £279 10s 1d, thus requiring £3,015 9s 11d to be paid. In effect, the state's first venture into UN soldering cost £3,015 9s 11d.

This process established what costs were chargeable to the UN and, based on their research, the staff in New York tactfully suggested that the claim should not be pursued further.²⁰ All of these problems arose from a lack of knowledge regarding UN procedures. Dealing with and resolving command, control, operational and administrative issues gave experience to national administrators and decision makers. This prepared all concerned for the Congolese venture that was to follow one year later.

Other issues arose of particular interest to the military. McCarthy unwittingly drew the wrath of national authorities when he applied for a year's extension to his service with UNTSO. McCarthy, ever the perfect staff officer, had initiated this request in accordance with UNTSO procedures through the UNTSO chain of command to his own national authorities. On receipt of the application at Defence Forces headquarters, it was deemed to have been sought outside national military channels and McCarthy was severely admonished. Having complied with the relevant UNTSO procedure, McCarthy took issue with the Adjutant General's admonishment and sought redress through his UNTSO superior, Major General von Horn. Von Horn's letter, though couched in diplomatic language, went straight to the nub of this issue by reminding the Irish authorities that the correct UN procedure had been applied throughout.²¹ Following this direct involvement by the UNTSO general, the matter was quickly resolved.

The significance of this almost unimportant military administrative event was considerable. It is apparent from von Horn's correspondence that the Irish authorities, particularly Defence Forces Headquarters and the Department of Defence, were unaware of either the real nature or the importance of Colonel McCarthy's duties (for example, his high-profile role as chairman of the Egypt-Israel Mixed Armistice Commission, then administering the more volatile of the Israel-Arab armistice lines). Dublin was also unaware of, or overlooked, the orders and administrative procedures applicable to UN missions in general and UNTSO in particular. This was compounded by the terms of the Adjutant General's reprimand of Colonel McCarthy, which also suggests a lack of appreciation of the 'independence' of UN missions and the attendant international status of officers deployed to those missions. This minor hiccup vis-avis national relations and communication with the Irish officers in UNTSO was an important step in awakening staff in Defence Forces Headquarters to the sensitivities of working to international standards.

From this point on, staff officers at national headquarters were alert to how such matters as administrative control should be exercised over personnel deployed to a UN mission. Thereafter, greater care was taken to ensure that communication with those in the field was done through the appropriate channels. This incident also highlighted the requirement to improve direct communication with national elements deployed outside the country, which up to this point appear to have depended on airmail correspondence. It is posited here that this was the driving force behind the necessity for having a reliable, nationally controlled, means of communication available to national authorities for contact with overseas elements. At a later stage, the recognition of this requirement led to the high frequency radio contact established soon after the Congo operation unfolded in I960.

²⁰ NAI DFA, 305/329/4, Iveagh House copy of PMUN letter to the government

²¹ NAI DFA PMUN, 222/13/1, memorandum from Hammarskjold to PMUN, 9 July 1959.

OPERATION' DES NATIONS UNIES AU CONGO (ONUC)

The Defence Force officers in UNTSO continued with the routine of their duties into 1960. On 30 June 1960 the Republic of the Congo, a former Belgian colony, became independent and within days erupted into a paroxysm of violence. Belgium dispatched troops to restore order and protect its nationals without the approval of the new Congolese government. The Congolese government responded by seeking military assistance from the UN, which was sanctioned by the Security Council on 14 July. The advance elements of what was to become ONUC were deployed to the Congo on 16 July I960.²² At the outset, Ireland was requested by Hammarskjold to provide other officer observers for the new force and then on 16 July a formal request was submitted for an infantry battalion. This was later increased to two battalions, a total of 1.200 men. Once again, Ireland responded promptly and the request was acceded to on 19 July with the advance elements reporting to the Congo on 22 July. As UNTSO was always the immediately available pool of trained UN military personnel, it was called upon to provide Major General von Horn to act as force commander for the new UN force in the Congo. On arrival, von Horn sought the assistance of Colonel McCarthy from UNTSO to function as his chief of staff.²³ Dublin agreed to this request and McCarthy was redeployed from Jerusalem to Leopoldville. Interviews with McCarthy's former UNOGIL colleagues suggest that McCarthy's experience in establishing UNOGIL and his ability to get things done in a mixed international military staff were the attributes that made him ideally suited to the unprecedented task facing ONUC's force commander.24

In just over 25 months, Ireland, having initially committed five officers to the unarmed UNOGIL mission in June 1958, had now committed in excess of 1,200 personnel to an armed peacekeeping force many thousands of miles away from home. McCarthy had been the senior officer in charge of those first Irish UNMOs and now, on reporting for duty with Major General von Horn's staff at ONUC headquarters in Leopoldville, he became the Irish link to three UN missions: UNOGIL, UNTSO and now ONUC. He gave himself completely to the demands of his extensive duties in ONUC headquarters and, in the performance of these duties, he died in a tragic car accident in Leopoldville on 27 October 1960. Subsequently, following a commendation by Major General von Horn to the Irish national military authorities, he was posthumously awarded the Distinguished Service Medal.²⁵

This ended the distinguished career of Colonel Justin McCarthy. He was the first Defence Forces officer to lead an overseas deployment of Defence Forces personnel to a UN mission and the first to serve in three different UN peacekeeping operations. Tragically, he was also the first Defence Forces officer to give his life in the performance of UN peacekeeping. To date, he also remains the most senior of the 85 Defence Forces fatalities on UN operations.

²² United Nations Operation in the Congo (July 1960 – June 1964), 2001, available at http://www.un.org/Depts/DPKO/Missions/onuc.htm (15 February 2006).

²³ Carl von Horn. Soldiering for peace (New York, 1964), 184.

²⁴ Interview with Brigadier Patrick Dixon, Athlone, Co. Westmeath, 18 February 2005. Dixon served as a military observer with UNOGIL in 1958. During this service he served at UNOGIL headquarters and observed the regard in which McCarthy was held by the entire headquarters staff.

²⁵ Military Archives, Orduithe gnathaimh gineralta an Ard Aidiunach (hereafter cited as OGG), General Routine Order 10/1967, signed by Major General Collins Powell on 30 May 1967, notifying that the Minister for Defence had awarded the Distinguished Service Medal (Second Class) posthumously to McCarthy.

McCarthy's death preceded by ten days the tragedy of the Niemba Ambush, when nine Irish soldiers lost their lives, and was understandably overlooked in the scale of that catastrophe. However, these deaths so early in the ONUC mission were a harsh coming-of-age for the nation, as Ireland became aware of the cost that was to be borne in the cause of peace. Participation in UNOGIL established Ireland's place 'amongst the nations of the world', UNTSO continued a tenuous engagement in peacekeeping, for Ireland. The experience contributed to the state's learning process about peacekeeping, and participation in ONUC followed. At that critical juncture in Cold War world politics. Ireland established itself as a reliable member of the UN peacekeeping 'club' of neutral and non-aligned states. Involvement with the UN and other organisations in the cause of peace has continued since then and has now become an accepted dimension of Defence Forces service and of Irish foreign policy.

CONCLUSION

Since joining the UN, Ireland has participated in over 30 peacekeeping missions dispersed over the five continents. Being without colonial baggage and remaining uncompromised by superpower affiliations or influence, Ireland also established an enviable reputation as an impartial 'honest broker' over this period. It has, through its involvement in peacekeeping, lived up to the expectations of those for whom participation in and commitment to the UN organisation was the grand strategy to establish Ireland's place on the world stage. This achievement is now a matter of historical record and one to which the Defence Forces peacekeeping operations have made a significant contribution. The genesis of that Defence Forces involvement in peacekeeping operations remains UNOGIL, closely followed by UNTSO, the mission in which the Defence Forces have retained a continuing unbroken presence since December 1958.

Upon reflecting on the significance of the UNOGIL, UNTSO and ONUC missions, there is a requirement for proper recognition of the path-finding role of Colonel McCarthy and his 49 Irish UNOGIL colleagues. At a personal level, their 1958 experience of foreign soldiering in the cause of peace infused 50 Irish participants with a personal confidence in their professionalism. They also had confidence in their training and a belief in their ability to hold their own on the international stage. In the first instance, these officers were dependant on, and sustained by, the national military training that they had received. Deployed to an international organisation run by a multinational military staff, they found their training compared more than favourably with other military officers from more combat-experienced armies. Considered from the UN perspective the quality, strength and flexibility of these resources provided by Ireland was impressive, as was the speed with which they were deployed to the mission area. This positive performance from a first-time participant in peacekeeping marked Ireland as being eminently suitable for the 'peacekeeping club' of reliable, neutral and non-aligned nations. Having proved itself in these early unarmed missions, Ireland and its Defence Forces undoubtedly became a future contender for early consideration for challenging peacekeeping missions.

From the national perspective, the role and performance of its UNMOs in this first mission was recognition of the calibre of the respective Irish officers and validation of national military training and expertise. The early weeks of UNOGIL tested and forged Ireland's ability to react quickly and positively to an emerging international security challenge. In turn, this contributed to national confidence regarding peacekeeping matters, thereby facilitating a positive response

by the government in July I960 to the secretary-general's request for Irish troops for ONUC. In addition, participation in UNTSO, together with the instructive lessons that this provided for national civil and military administrations, was instrumental in preparing all concerned for the major escalation to participation in armed troop missions, which emerged with the problem in the Congo in 1960.

At a more functional level, participation in the 1958 Lebanon mission also raised the public profile of the Defence Forces with the publicity and media coverage it generated, ensuring the unparalleled success of the Defence Forces' 1958 recruiting campaign.²⁶ Those recruited during this campaign became the trained soldiers of 1960 and from this trained resource the battalions and companies for ONUC were drawn, which were in turn commanded, staffed, trained and led by many of the UNOGIL veterans.

²⁶ Minister for Defence, Kevin Boland, moving the estimates for his department on 29 April 1959, stated that the 1958 recruiting campaign for the Defence Forces was the most effective since 1950, due to the high profile for the Defence Forces from United Nations service, Dail Debates, vol, 174, col, 1273 (29 April 1959) and comment in 'Dail Report', Irish Press, 30 April 1959.

Defence Forces Review 2007

The Strategic Corporal: A Challenge for the Irish Defence Forces

Comdt Ian Byrne DSM

Armed forces are first and foremost emergency services, needing physiology's [sic] analogous to those of animals who are never completely relaxed to potential danger.... Each organ must know its place and purpose and be tuned to react with speed, accuracy and power to the first hint of danger.¹

(Downey, 1977:63)

INTRODUCTION

The subjects of leadership, participation, and decision-making have long occupied an important position in the social psychology of organisations. Three forces seem to converge to explain the attention given to this trilateral relationship.² It is of potential practical importance in modern administration, it straddles political and organisational theory and relates to problems therein, and it concerns the value and purpose of life and work. There is another force operating within the context of the Defence Forces that is perhaps the very essence of this trilateral relationship – it is essential to the development of military leaders. I was witness to the demonstration of this in a junior leader who, when faced with danger in a crisis situation overseas, demonstrated the necessary characteristics to bear the responsibility of any potential strategic consequences that might follow. He displayed leadership, relied on participation and illustrated ability in effective decision-making. It was at this moment that I truly believed in the concept and existence of the strategic corporal.

THE CHALLENGE OF THE MODERN BATTLESPACE

The collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991 not only brought about an end to the Cold War but also an end to a definitive international security environment. The end of the twentieth century was marked by uncertainty about the future of military affairs. International conflict is now becoming more asymmetric and there is greater confidence in the frameworks being developed to explain and understand the current security situation. Strategies and policies are being developed so that military doctrine and associated military acquisitions are beginning to reflect the new security realities. Military institutions are undergoing changes aimed specifically at adjusting to the challenges of the modern battlespace, which has gone from the rural countryside to densely populated areas, and from the from the enemy who targets national interests militarily to one who takes a more asymmetric approach – by including civilians in the mix of 'legitimate' targets. As a result, soldiers are expected to be not only technically proficient in fighting wars but also capable of supervising civil-military affairs, providing humanitarian aid and performing a wide range of other activities relating to order and stability.³

¹ Downey, J.C.T. (1977) Management in the Armed Forces: An Anatomy of the Military Profession, London, McGraw-Hill.

² Heller, F.A. (1971) , London, Tavistock

³ Liddy, L. (2005) 'The Strategic Corporal: Some Requirements in Training and Education', Australian Army Journal, II:2.

It is now time to acknowledge new dimensions of organisational development and perhaps adopt different doctrine and training regimes to prepare soldiers for greater responsibility in the multi-dimensional battlespace that faces them. This is the time of the strategic corporal.

THE CHALLENGE FOR THE IRISH DEFENCE FORCES

The White Paper on Foreign Policy in 1996 states that, while there is no universally agreed definition of foreign policy, a working definition is the pursuit by a state of its interests, concerns, and values in the external environment.⁴ The pursuit of this foreign policy has a direct impact on all personnel who deal with this external environment on behalf of the Government. This influences military personnel on active service, either at home or abroad, who by virtue of their employment pursue the specific objectives of Government. The judgement, decisionmaking and actions of the strategic corporal have the potential to influence the battlespace and affect the outcome of the mission and the reputation of this country. General Charles C. Krulak, a US Marine who is synonymous with the phrase 'strategic corporal', identifies the individual Marine as the most conspicuous symbol of American foreign policy.⁵ If this is true in the Irish context, then the Defence Forces must bear the responsibility for training and preparing the individual soldier for the consequences of strategic decisions. This soldier is, after all, a major symbol of Irish foreign policy.

The development of the strategic corporal concept acknowledges the importance of the role of the non-commissioned officer (NCO) within modern – particularly asymmetric warfare – where the enemy is non-conventional and more difficult to ascertain. The strategic corporal must make decisions that can have far-reaching consequences and in order to make good decisions you need confidence in your judgement.⁶

WHAT IS THE STRATEGIC CORPORAL?

Military doctrine teaches three levels of war: strategic, operational and tactical. At the strategic level a nation or group of nations determines national foreign security objectives and uses national assets to achieve these objectives. In terms of a military involvement in conflict, these can range from peacekeeping to a declaration of war. Senior military commanders design military campaigns based on these national objectives. The operational level is the link between the strategic objectives and the tactical employment of forces on the battlefield, focusing on joint and combined operations. The tactical level engages the actual fight in the battlespace where its effect has an inexorable link back to the strategic commander. This link has ensured that the notion of the strategic corporal has become one of the most recognised terms of the new era of warfare. The military environment within the battlespace of today generates enormous responsibility for the soldier who must deal with rapidly changing security implications. War is developing into an asymmetric conflict where the enemy is not clear, and the distinction between the combatant and non-combatant is becoming blurred.

⁴ Department of Foreign Affairs (1996) The White Paper on Foreign Policy, Stationery Office.

⁵ Krulak, General C.C. (1999) 'The Strategic Corporal: Leadership in the Three Block War', Marines Magazine, January 1999.

⁶ Koch, E. (1998) in Muoio, A. 'Decisions', (online)(cited 30 January 2006). Available from

URL:http://www.fastcompany.com/online/18/one.html.

It will be the soldier who prepares for the complex, high-stakes, asymmetrical battlespace that will determine the success or otherwise of the military campaign. This soldier is the strategic corporal. The strategic corporal will face the 'three-block war', the entire spectrum of military challenges in the span of a few hours and within the space of three contiguous city blocks. The nature of peacekeeping missions demands a high degree of responsibility from junior leaders. We must empower junior leaders, allow them to make decisions, hold them accountable, and allow the leadership potential within each of them to flourish. Micro-management must become a thing of the past.⁷

THE MILITARY DECISION-MAKING PROCESS

Making sound and timely decisions is a key objective of command. Throughout the spectrum of military operations commanders make decisions. Effective decisions result from a systematic approach to decision-making, involving a thorough analysis of all available facts and assumptions.⁸ This places decision-making as a foremost human activity, which is involved in all levels of war. Decision-making can be defined as the selection of a course of action from among alternatives⁹. This selected course of action is then based upon a combination of rational calculation, intuition and chance.¹⁰ However, it must be borne in mind that decisions will always have alternatives, uncertainties will always come into play, and nothing can paralyse a decision-making process more than uncertainty can.¹¹

Methods of Decision-Making

In military operations four general principles of decision-making apply.¹²

- Influences ensure that decisions cannot be made in a vacuum.
- Whoever can make and implement sound decisions faster gains an advantage.
- Decisions require intuition and analysis.
- Uncertainty means there is no perfect solution.

The two methods of decision-making this article will discuss are analytical and recognitional. The traditional approach to decision-making, through the use of models that generate and compare options based on weighted features is referred to as 'analytical decision-making' because it uses a scientific, quantitative approach and depends on a relatively high level of situational certainty and accuracy. The greater the degree of situational certainty the more effective the decision should be. This analytical method is used when there is time to analyse the problem, consult subject matter experts, justify the decision and deal with uncertainties in a progressive manner. The basic idea is to compare multiple options concurrently to arrive at an optimal solution. Experience is less important for effective analytical decision-making than an emphasis on reasoning power. Typically, this approach is more appropriate for deliberate planning, administration, staff work and dealing with plans and policies.

⁷ Krulak, General C.C. (1999) 'The Strategic Corporal: Leadership in the Three Block War', Marines Magazine, January 1999.

⁸ Department of Defence (1980) Manual of Staff Duties.

⁹ Weihrich, H. and Koontz, H. (1993) Management: A Global Perspective, New York, McGraw-Hill.

¹⁰ United States Marine Corps, BOL4805 Student Handbook (2004) 'Decision-Making Process', USMC Basic School, Training Command.

¹¹ Rainbow, R. (1998) in Muoio, A. 'Decisions, Decisions', (online)(cited 30 January 2006). Available from URL:http://www.fastcompany.com/online/18/one.html.

¹² Australian Department of Defence (1995) Australian Naval Doctrine Publication 6 - Decision-Making Theory, Naval Command and Control.

A new model for military operations planning based on a qualitative assessment of the situation does not seek the ideal solution but a judgement on the first solution that will work, and is called 'recognitional decision-making'.¹³ This model evolves from recent studies in real-world scenarios, involving tactical commanders in field. Decision-makers draw upon their experience to identify a situation as representative of, or analogous to, a particular class of problem encountered earlier. Recognitional decision-making is used in training to increase the pace of decision-making to best replicate the potential crisis feasible within military operations. This method relies on the intuitive approach requiring less planning time, less information and an increased ability to maintain the initiative.¹⁴ This intuitive decision-making thus replaces analysis with experience and judgement and is more suited to the fluid, rapidly changing environment of a crisis. Senior military leaders have the required life experiences to effectively make recognitional decisions but as they are often removed from the tactical level it may be the junior leader who is required to make this decision. Therefore we must do everything in our power to build the largest possible experience base before we are thrust into a crisis situation.¹⁵

OODA Cycle

A retired US army officer, Colonel J. Boyd, developed an important concept relating to decision-making that demonstrates that a soldier in the midst of a conflict continuously moves through a cycle of recognitional decision-making called the OODA cycle.¹⁶ This pattern refers to a person's ability to 'observe-orient-decide-act' more quickly than the enemy, thereby responding and reacting at an advantage. It is important to note that the number of environmental factors that need to be considered directly affects this cycle as the more factors that must be dealt with the slower the decision. The traditional military decision-makers are at the higher echelons of the hierarchy with a large number of factors to consider. They are usually removed from the decision by both time and space and engage in recognitional decision-making, which relies on experience and judgement to increase the probability of making the right decision.

In summary, an analytical decision can be made when time permits progressive consideration of uncertainties using reasoning power whereas recognitional decisions are made under pressure using intuition, experience and judgement. The OODA cycle demonstrates that the speed of the decision can be critical. If strategic corporals at the lower echelon of the hierarchy are involved in the decision-making process they will naturally have fewer factors to consider than those at the higher echelon, which may result in faster movement through the OODA cycle.

EXAMINING PARTICIPATIVE MANAGEMENT

Participation can be defined as the 'who, what, where, and how aspects of involvement' and also as the process in which influence is shared among individuals who are otherwise hierarchically unequal.¹⁷ Participation is above all a process of involving those who are

¹³ Schmitt, J. and Klein, G. (1999) 'A Recognitional Planning Model', (online)(cited 5 December 2005). Available from

URL:http:///www.dodccrp.org/events/1999/1999/CCRTS/pdf_files/track_3/105klein.pdf

United States Marine Corps, BOL4805 Student Handbook (2004) 'Decision-Making Process', USMC Basic School, Training Command.
Ibid

¹⁶ Krulak, General C.C. (1999) 'The Strategic Corporal: Leadership in the Three Block War', Marines Magazine, January 1999.

¹⁷ Glew, D.J. (1995) 'Participation in Organisations: A Preview of the Issues and Proposed Framework for Future Analysis – Special Issue: Yearly Review of Management', Journal Of Management, Autumn 1995.

influenced by decisions, in making decisions. Participation in problem solving and decisionmaking not only increases involvement but also motivates people.¹⁸

Throughout many definitions lies the implicit commonality that a participative management approach balances the interconnection of managers with employees in order to attain a strategic outcome. I define participation as *a shared and structured effort by superiors with subordinates to allow a greater involvement in organisational decision-making*. The strength of this definition is that it facilitates participation vertically throughout the organisation and does not confine it to position, rank or employment. This definition also supports the purposeful nature of participation toward a strategic goal and ensures the onus of initiative for the organisational-individual relationship rests on the organisation.

Participation can take a number of forms but this article deals only with direct participation, which engages the individual either in 'direct consultative' participation or 'direct delegative' participation.¹⁹ Direct consultative participation is the practice whereby management encourages individuals to share their opinions but retain the right of the final decision. Prior consultation can be used either where the decision rests entirely with the superior or where the decision emerges as a result of joint superior-subordinate participation, with each sharing in the final determination. On the other hand, direct delegative participation gives employees increased responsibility and autonomy and delegates the decision entirely to the subordinate.²⁰

There is some value at this stage in differentiating between power and influence, two terms closely associated with participation in the decision-making process. A person exercises power to the extent that the behaviour of others is influenced in accordance with certain intentions.²¹ The most usual exercise of power in decision-making is by direct intervention by the subordinate in a consultative forum, where a person is present at the time the decision is being made. One exercises power over another whenever their preferences are incorporated in the decision process. On the other hand a person exercises influence over another where as a result of direct intervention their preferences are only considered in the process of arriving at decisions. In terms of these definitions of power and influence participation refers to a process in which two or more parties influence each other in making decisions.²² It is thus the nature and timings of these decisions, whether by superior or subordinate, which will define the relationship.

Participative management is a synthesis of many different management theories, and it addresses the relationship between the issues of governance over the individual and the roles of the employees within the organisation. It is a method that gives employees responsibility, accountability and authority over their work. It has clear goals, does not turn the organisation over to the employees and retains a hierarchy suitable to the organisation. This relates to both the consultative and delegative forms of direct participation. Depending on the degree of participative management it involves individuals either sharing their opinions or having

¹⁸ Nonas, K. (2005) 'Vision versus Reality in Organisational Change', Department of Psychology, Goteborg University, Stockholm, Elanders Gotab.

¹⁹ Cabrera, E.F., Cabrera, A. and Ortega, J. (2001) 'Employee Participation in Europe', Working Paper 01-6.

²⁰ Heller, F.A. (1971) Managerial Decision-Making, London, Tavistock.

²¹ Goldhammer, H. and Shils, E. (1939) 'Types of Power and Status', American Journal of Sociology, 45, 171-182.

²² Heller, F.A. (1971) Managerial Decision-Making, London, Tavistock.

increased responsibility and autonomy. Participative management can be structured as a form of collaboration where people's recommendations are actually implemented. This type of management rests on the following theoretical assumptions:²³

- Subordinates are motivated to share influence with decision-makers.
- Subordinates are capable of contributing usefully to the decision process.
- > In general this willingness and capability is not utilised by superiors.

A wide spectrum of attitudes and expectations towards participation can be found with some promoting a positive disposition while others engendering criticism. No one form of participation is right for all employees. The degree to which superiors share in the structured effort with subordinates to allow greater involvement in organisational decision-making will vary from organisation to organisation, and from management to management. For example research indicates that low authoritarian individuals prefer participative management, while high authoritarian individuals dislike participative management and favour a structured approach.²⁴

Participation places demands on individuals' ability to communicate, but they must be met by structural conditions for the exchange of information.²⁵ Members of a hierarchy may have varying attitudes towards participation at the organisational level because different levels of management may have different fears of it or requirements from it. Research considers several other organisational characteristics that act as barriers to effective participation. Employees do not participate in organisational decision-making for three reasons: structural reasons where the real decisions are made higher up in the chain of command, relational reasons which promote too much competition, and societal reasons where the culture of the organisation separates the employees and the managers.²⁶ Barriers to effective participation also include the attitudes, knowledge, skills and capabilities of both the subordinate and the superior, and the organisational structure itself.²⁷

THE MILITARY CHAIN OF COMMAND

Command relationships are important in the development and employment of the strategic corporal. The military is characterised by an authoritarian system with a well-defined chain of command, predicated on strict adherence to prescribed rules, regulations, policies, and procedures. Command is defined as the authority that a commander lawfully exercises over subordinates by virtue of rank or assignment.²⁸ This command system is highly structured and does not lend itself to change. The structure of a Defence Forces presupposes a military chain of command where authority and responsibility rest at a high level within the vertical command relationship. This authoritarian regime is accepted in the military and is essential for its survival. The responsibility for decision-making lies at the top level of the hierarchy, while the bottom levels carry out the orders. Rigid vertical command relationships may unnecessarily slow down the decision-making process in the modern battlespace but completely horizontal

²³ Heller, F.A. (1971) Managerial Decision-Making, London, Tavistock.

²⁴ Hogan, R.T. (1991) 'Personality and Personality Measurement', in Dunnette, M.D. and Hough, L.M. (eds), Handbook of Industrial and Organisational Psychology, Palo Alto, California, Consulting Psychologists Press.

Nonas, K. (2005) '*Vision versus Reality in Organisational Change*', Department of Psychology, Goteborg University, Stockholm, Elanders Gotab.
Neumann, J.E. (1989) 'Why People don't Participate in Organisational Change', in Woodman, R. and Pasmore, W. (eds), *Research in Organisational*

Change and Development, 3, Greenwich, CT, JAI Press.

²⁷ Heller, F.A. (1971) Managerial Decision-Making, London, Tavistock.

²⁸ Harper, G. and Hayward, J. (2003) Born To Lead, Exisle Publishing.

ones may prove too difficult to manage.²⁹ The formal structure of the vertical command relationship is central to military discipline and this tenet of superior-subordinate relationship has changed very little over time. Military discipline requires that soldiers must still do what they are told within the legal framework laid down. Any change to a participative management style will have a direct impact on the superior-subordinate relationship - then the Defence Forces may have to redefine the balance between this vertical command relationship and a more horizontal one if it is to facilitate greater participation.

Culture is a phenomenon that surrounds us all and defines leadership.³⁰ The military exist in a command and control culture that is a powerful and stable force within the organisation. Understanding the dynamics of this can be a guiding principle in the choice of strategy or leadership style to attain certain outcomes. If one is to lead effectively, one must understand specifically the forces of both the human factor and organisational culture.³¹ Authoritarian organisations are effective in emergency situations but they have many problems. Orders are passed down and people can avoid making decisions.³² The implication here is that to effectively align your organisation with a change in decision-making may require dropping of old beliefs and behaviours.

CONCLUSION

The strategic corporal is considered a competent, professional, technologically proficient decision-maker who is acutely aware of his actions. The constabulary role of our troops on peacekeeping missions demands a high degree of responsibility. This role requires the ability to adapt to an ever-changing environment and this environment is becoming multidimensional and more easily subjected to global review through media relations. The traditional approaches to the decision-making process emphasise the analytical model suitable for administrative positions where time is not critical. A recognitional decision-making model asserts that, when there is less planning time and less information, personnel use intuition and draw on their experience of previous decision-making. This is the kernel – they must have had that previous exposure to real decision. However, decision-making comes with the price of added responsibility and junior leaders must be entrusted with responsibility in order to prepare for and be allowed to make these decisions, especially if one acknowledges that strategic consequences may follow.

A dramatic experience on overseas duty forced me to rely on a subordinate to assist in making decisions that affected lives, mine included. I now believe that he represents the strategic corporal. The military environment within the battlespace of today with ever-changing security implications generates enormous responsibility for the soldier. To prepare for the challenges of future campaigns the Irish Defence Forces should perhaps develop NCOs and prepare them for the responsibility of making strategic decisions. This kind of management system clearly has risks, it means that one has to place a lot of trust in subordinates.

²⁹ Szepesy, J. (2005) 'The Strategic Corporal and the Emerging Battlefield', Master of Arts in Law and Diplomacy Thesis, (online)(cited 21 October 2005). Available from URL:http://www.fletcher.tufts.edu/research/2005/Szepesy.pdf.

³⁰ Schein, E.H. (2005) 'Organizational Culture & Leadership', (online)(cited 18 November 2005). Available from URL:http://www.tnellen.com/ted/tc/schein.html.

³¹ Stein, M. (2003) 'Organizational Culture and Leadership: A Review of the Literature and Application using the Competing Values Framework Model', (online)(cited 17 November 2005). Available from URL:http://www.hicbusiness.org/biz2003proceedings.htm>.

³² Davidmann, M. (2005) 'Styles of Management and Leadership', (online)(cited 22 September 2005). Available from URL:http://www.solbaram.org/articles/clm2.html.

REFLECTION

Perhaps truly successful decision-making relies on a balance between the analytical and recognitional, the deliberate and instinctive. The strategic corporal should benefit from some degree of autonomy even at lower levels within the hierarchy. Increased participation may provide the strategic corporal with a greater understanding of the organisational processes and develop important problem-solving and communication skills. Maybe it is now time for the organisation to formalise their involvement, and for NCOs to then accept the challenge.

The ability of the Defence Forces to develop the strategic corporal will depend on its personnel and the experience they gain. Had my subordinate waited for my command or stopped to discuss the situation, he might have destroyed his ability to trust his instinct that saved a life.

You must; you should: The doctrine of Command Responsibility and its implications for the Military Commander

Comdt Jerry Lane

For everyone to whom much is given, from him much will be required; to whom much has been committed, of him they will ask the more.

Luke 12:48.1

INTRODUCTION

Commanders at all levels are vested with authority, control and responsibility for their actions and the actions of those under their command. With the passage of time and the evolution of war, soldiers, and particularly their commanders, have been called to account for their actions, and indeed their inactions. This is achieved by the application of the doctrine of *Command Responsibility*. The underlying theory of the doctrine of command responsibility within the Law of War² states that: 'military commanders are responsible for the acts of their subordinates'.³ If subordinates violate the laws of war, and their commanders fail⁴ to prevent or punish these crimes, then the commanders also can be held responsible. Command responsibility⁵ is not a recent development in military codes or national law, though it has particularly evolved in the aftermath of the Second World War.

There is an underlying sub-text to the doctrine; a Commander must *take* responsibility, and must impose and maintain control and order.⁶ There is an implied distinction in moral standards, and consequently, higher standards of integrity and moral obligation are imposed upon the Commander. Westmoreland stated that: 'While basic laws underlie command authority, the real foundation of successful leadership is the moral authority derived from professional competence and integrity.'⁷

This moral dimension is further emphasised by executive instruments, such as the 'Lieber Code' of 1863, which stated: 'Men who take up arms against one another in public war do not cease on this account to be moral beings responsible to one another.'⁸

¹ Cited by Fitton, R. (1994) Leadership, Oxford, UK, Westview Press, at 246.

² The Law of War defines, permits, and prohibits various activities that relate to the conduct of war or armed conflict. It is also referred to as the Law of Armed Conflict (LOAC).

³ Rogers, A.P.V. (2004) Law on the Battlefield, (2nd Ed.) Manchester, UK, Juris Publishing, Manchester University Press at 189. See also Dinstein, Y. (2005) The Conduct of Hostilities, Cambridge, UK, Cambridge University Press at page 237; Green, L.C. (2000) The Contemporary Law of Armed Conflict, Manchester, UK, Juris Publishing, Manchester University Press, at 303.

⁴ A failure to act, i.e. a sin of omission may result in a commander being declared *particeps criminis* – an accessory to the facts, and consequently culpable.

⁵ Hereafter referred to as "the doctrine."

⁶ The maintenance of 'order' is a recurring phenomenon in military forces. For example, section 168(1) of the Defence Act (1954) (Ireland) refers to the "... maintenance of good order and discipline."

⁷ See n. 1 at 168. General William Westmoreland was the Commander of US troops in Vietnam from 1964 to 1968.

⁸ United States, Instructions for the Government of Armies of the United States in the Field, General Orders (No. 100 of 24th April 1863) (The "Lieber Code"), USA at 1.
HISTORICAL EVOLUTION

Command responsibility has long been present in the area of military history. In around 500 B.C., Sun Tzu wrote in Ping Fa – 'the Art of War' - about the duty of commanders to ensure that subordinates conduct themselves with a certain level of civility in armed conflict.⁹

The first 'international' recognition of commanders' obligations to act lawfully occurred during the trial of Peter von Hagenbach by an ad hoc tribunal in the Holy Roman Empire in 1474. Von Hagenbach was convicted of murder, rape, and other crimes that '...he as a knight was deemed to have a duty to prevent'.¹⁰ The Tribunal did not, however, explicitly rely on a doctrine of command responsibility.

In an effort to control the behaviour of armies in the field, in the early 1860s the US government worked with Alfred Lieber, a professor at Columbia University, to codify the rules governing warfare.¹¹

In the aftermath of World War I, the international community, though making considerable efforts, failed to bring Kaiser Wilhelm to trial for alleged war crimes. The 'Nuremberg' and 'Manila' trials (post WWII) allowed for substantial development of the doctrine; the most relevant military cases being In Re Yamashita,¹² and the cases of Generals Von Leeb,¹³ and Von List,¹⁴ respectively. These were followed by the courts-martial cases of Capt Medina¹⁵ and Lieutenant Calley in the aftermath of the 'My Lai massacre' in Vietnam in 1968.

In recent years, relevant inclusion in the Hague and Geneva Conventions, and the adoption of Additional Protocol I (API) to the Geneva Convention in 1977 has meant the firm establishment of the doctrine.¹⁶ Contemporary development has occurred with the establishment of the so-called 'hybrid' tribunals; the ICTY and the ICTR.¹⁷ The ICTY has applied the doctrine in several of its judgments, including Celebici,¹⁸ Aleksovski,¹⁹ Blabrevskic,²⁰ Krstic,²¹ and Krnojelac.²²

⁹ Womack, B. (2003) 'The Development and Recent Applications of the Doctrine of Command Responsibility: With Particular Reference to the Mens Rea Requirement' (2003) 1 International Crime and Punishment, Selected Issues 101 at page 117.

¹⁰ Levine, E. 'The Mens Rea Requirement of Command Responsibility: Modern Developments and Future Direction,' *Global Policy Forum*. Available from <URL:http://www.globalpolicy.org/intljustice/ general/2005/command.htm>.

¹¹ See above at n.8.

¹² In Re Yamashita [1946] 327 US 1.

¹³ US v. Wilhelm Von Leeb [the 'High Command' case] [1946] 11 Trials of War Criminals Before the Nuremberg Military Tribunals Under Control Council Law No. 10.

¹⁴ US v. General Wilhelm List et al. [the 'Hostage' case][1946] 11 Trials of War Criminals, at 759.

¹⁵ US v Ernest L. Medina, [1971] CM 427162 ACMR.

¹⁶ See Appendix A. Specific duties arise which require awareness and preventative action by the Commander as a result of Articles 86 and 87 of the Protocol Additional to the Geneva Convention's That of 12 Aug 1949, and Relating to the Protection of Victims of International Armed Conflicts (Protocol 1), June 8, 1977, 1125 UNTS 3, 16 ILM 1391 (1977).

¹⁷ International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia, and the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda. Article 7 of the ICTY Statute gives a wide scope to "individual criminal responsibility", covering all persons who "planned, instigated, ordered, committed or otherwise aided and abetted in the planning, preparation or execution of a crime".

¹⁸ The Prosecutor v. Zejnil Delalic, Zdravko Music, Hazim Delic and Esad Landzo [1998] IT-96-21- (Judgment, TC). Hereafter the 'Celebici' case.

¹⁹ The Prosecutor v. Zlatko Aleksovski, [2000] IT-95-14/1-A (Judgment, AC).

²⁰ The Prosecutor v. Blabrevskic, [2000] IT-95-14-T, PP 264-266 (Judgement, TC).

²¹ The Prosecutor v. Krstic, [2001] IT-98-33-T (Judgment, TC).

²² The Prosecutor v. Krnojelac, [2002] IT-97-25-T, PP 91-95 (Judgement, TC).

In doing so, the ICTY has made the most significant contribution to the elucidation of the command responsibility doctrine in the post-World War II era. Most recently, in 1998, Article 28(a) of the 'Rome Statute' of the International Criminal Court²³ provided the most recent definition of Command Responsibility:²⁴

THE DOCTRINE AS A FUSION OF KNOWLEDGE AND COMMAND?

1. Knowledge

A detailed examination of knowledge in the context of epistemological perspectives is not at issue here. What is under immediate consideration is the notion that knowledge *empowers* and *obligates* the commander, or more particularly that knowledge may impute responsibility to the commander in the context of the doctrine.

Lord Justice Devlin has stated ²⁵ that there are three degrees of knowledge: Actual, Constructive and Wilful.²⁶ Whilst it is accepted that 'actual knowledge' of subordinates' crimes is sufficient, debate has centred on the appropriate level of 'constructive knowledge' required to warrant individual criminal responsibility.²⁷

Two different formulations of 'constructive knowledge' have emerged; they may be expressed as 'strict' and 'lenient'.

- The strict (Broad) standard assesses whether the commander, in the circumstances, 'should have known' of his subordinates unlawful actions. This places him under a proactive duty to remain informed of troops' activities.
- Under a more lenient (narrow) standard, the commander is held responsible only where he fails to discover his subordinates' actions 'from information already available to him'.

Both tests have received support in post-WWII jurisprudence on command responsibility which has unfortunately resulted in *mens rea* standard for command responsibility has remaining in a state of confusion for some time.

²³ Hereafter the "ICC." The ICC will be a permanent court, situated in The Hague, with jurisdiction to try those accused of Genocide, Crimes against Humanity, War Crimes, and in time the crime of Aggression.

Attached as Appendix A. United Nations, 'Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court,' (1998) UN Doc. 2187 UNTS 90, and hereafter referred to as the "Rome Statute." Ireland ratified the Rome Statute on 11th April 2002, having originally signed the statute on 7th October 1998.
 Roper v Taylors Central Garages [1951] 2 TLR 284.

 ²⁶ Devlin LJ's dicta have been followed in this jurisdiction. The concept of 'wilful' knowledge is not further considered.

²⁷ See generally Detter, I. (2000) The Law of War (2nd Ed.); Dinstein, Y. (2005) The Conduct of Hostilities; and Green, L.C. (2000) The Contemporary Law of Armed Conflict.

Strict vs. Lenient standards: General Yamashita – Knowledge: when is the Commander fixed with liability?

The first international trial where a commander was charged on the basis of responsibility for atrocities was *In Re Yamashita* heard before a US Military Commission.²⁸ In finding Yamashita guilty, the Commission espoused a strict (should have known) standard, stating that where 'there is no effective attempt by a commander to *discover* and control the criminal acts, such a commander may be held responsible.'²⁹



General Yamashita.

In the *High Command Case*,³⁰ another US Military Tribunal - at Nuremberg - upheld the strict (should have known) standard, accusing the (German) General Von Leeb of: 'a wanton, immoral disregard of the action of his subordinates amounting to acquiescence.'³¹

The lenient standard is evident in the *Hostage Case*,³² where a US Military Tribunal limited the commander's duty to know to situations where he has already received some information about his subordinates' unlawful actions.



General Von Leeb, (High Command Case).



General Von List, (Hostage Case).

²⁸ In Re Yamashita [1946] 327 US 1. General Tomoyuki Yamashita was the Commanding General of the 14th Army Group of the Japanese Imperial Army on the Philippine Islands from October 1944 until September 1945.

²⁹ Ibid at 44.

³⁰ US v. Wilhelm Von Leeb [the 'High Command' case] [1946] 11 Trials of War Criminals Before the Nuremberg Military Tribunals Under Control Council Law No. 10.

³¹ Ibid at page 1,462.

³² US v. General Wilhelm List et al. [the 'Hostage' case][1946] 11 Trials of War Criminals, at 759, 1230.

More recently, Article 86(2) of API to the Geneva Conventions of 1949 only imposes criminal liability on a commander where he could have learned of subordinates' unlawful conduct 'from information already available to him,' i.e. the lenient standard of constructive knowledge.³³ The ICTY first considered command responsibility in the 'Celebici' case.³⁴ The ICTY found that post-WWII jurisprudence established a strict 'should have known' standard.³⁵ Indeed more recently article 28(a) of the Rome Statute imposes individual responsibility on military commanders for crimes committed by forces under their effective command and control if they 'either knew or, owing to the circumstances at the time, "<u>should have known</u>" that the forces were committing or about to commit such crimes.'³⁶ Interpreted literally, Article 28(a) adopts the stricter 'should have known' standard.

In summary, notwithstanding the inconsistent nature of the application of the caselaw, the knowledge requirement in its current state indicates that a strict standard of 'should have known...' The most important factor in the reduction of war crimes is an assertive and proactive command structure that seeks to prevent its subordinates from committing atrocities. Recognizing this fact, the international community seeks to hold commanders personally liable for the crimes committed by subordinates if the commander 'knows or should know' that the subordinates are involved in criminal conduct and the commander fails to take action to stop the more junior troops.³⁷ This essentially means that a Commander is now in a 'strict liability' situation as regards the knowledge of his subordinate's actions and/ or inactions.

2. Command

Nature of Command.

The notion of command retains an aura of duty, privilege, responsibility and obligation.³⁸ One is said to be placed 'in command' of a unit; one 'takes' command of a particular unit. Webb states that: 'Command is tough, risky, lonely – the most challenging job an officer can have. But it is also the very emblem of traditional military service.'³⁹

Command has a distinct Irish statutory and regulatory basis pursuant to Section 2 of the Defence Act (1954), as amended, and Paragraph 67 of Defence Forces Regulation Administration 7.⁴⁰

Responsibility.

Whilst a commander may, by exercise of authority, devolve specific authority to subordinates to decide and to act within their own areas of delegated responsibility, he or she retains overall responsibility for his or her command. Responsibility is thus a fundamental concept of command, which cannot be devolved. The Defence Forces Staff Duties Manual states: 'The commander alone is responsible for all that his unit does or fails to do. He cannot delegate this responsibility to any other individual.'⁴¹

³³ Appendix A.

³⁴ Celebici - n. 18.
35 Ibid at paragraphs 373 – 390.

³⁶ See Appendix A.

³⁷ Referred to as "the Yamashita standard." Mahle, A.E. 'Command Responsibility – An International Focus,' Public Broadcasting Service (online) at <URL:http:??www.pbs.org/wnet/justice/author>.

^{38 &}quot;For I am a man under authority, having soldiers under me and I say to this man, Go, and he goeth; and to another, Come and he cometh; and to my servant, Do this, and he doeth it," (Matthew 8:9).

³⁹ Webb, J. (1998) 'Military Leadership in a Changing Society,' delivered at the Naval War College Conference on Ethics. Online at <URL: http://www.jameswebb.com/speeches/leadershipethics. Html>.

⁴⁰ Humphreys and Craven define command as follows: "... the control that a person exercises over others by virtue of his/her military rank, and appointment..."Humphreys, G. and Craven, C. (1997) *Military Law in Ireland*, Dublin, Ireland, Round Hall Sweet & Maxwell (Dublin) at 14.

⁴¹ Staff Duties Manual, (1996) Defence Forces Printing Press, at paragraph 104.

Control.

Control is the process through which a commander, assisted by his staff, organizes, directs and co-ordinates the activities of the forces allocated to him. To achieve this, he and his staff employ a common doctrine for command and use standardised procedures for control (including staff work) in conjunction with the equipment, communication and information systems available.⁴²

In the context of the doctrine of Command Responsibility, the ICC requires Commanders to be in command or to be effectively acting as a military commander (*de jure or de facto*); i.e. to exercise 'effective command and control over forces', or 'fail to exercise control' properly over such forces. Crucially, the caselaw of the ICTY has emphasised that '... there must be a *superior-subordinate relationship* ... even though it may only be of a transient nature.'⁴³

THE NECESSARY INGREDIENTS OF COMMAND RESPONSIBILITY: ICTY CASE LAW: HOW MUCH COMMAND MUST A COMMANDER WIELD?

The ICTY's leading decision on command responsibility is the 'Celebici' Case.⁴⁴ Four persons were indicted before the ICTY in relation to human rights violations and including command responsibility.⁴⁵ The Trial Chamber of the ICTY established a substantive test requiring, inter alia:

- the existence of a superior-subordinate relationship;
- that the superior knew or had reason to know that the criminal act was about to be, or, had been committed, and
- that the superior failed to take the necessary and reasonable measures to prevent the criminal act or punish the perpetrator thereof.

As previously mentioned the ICTY has considered and applied the command responsibility doctrine in several of its judgments. This caselaw has enabled lessons to be extracted from the existing knowledge (of previous cases), which have been developed and improved. The end result may be seen in the influence exerted by the ICTY case law in the formulation of Article 28(a) of the Rome Statute.

EXPRESS OBLIGATIONS

As a result of the degree of inhumanity experienced in WW II, humanitarianism was said to have been 'catapulted to the forefront of the development of the law of war'.⁴⁶ The Geneva Conventions and the many international treaties and subsequent protocols thereto have given us codified definite instruments of the law of armed conflict. Such instruments are undoubtedly humanitarian in nature and their particular relevance to the military is summarised in the writings of Professor Chris Greenwood:

⁴² Command and control are thus inextricably linked with commanders and staffs requiring knowledge and understanding of each other's roles if they are to perform their duties effectively.

⁴³ Hendin, S. 'Command Responsibility and Superior Orders in the Twentieth Century - A Century of Evolution,' Sydney University Law site Online at http://www.murdoch.edu.au/elaw/issues/v10n1/ hendin 101_text. html at para 239.

⁴⁴ See n. 18 at para 241. In 1992, Bosnian Muslim and Croat forces took control of the predominantly Bosnian Serb Konjic municipality in BiH. These forces established a prison camp in the village of Celebici where Serb prisoners were killed, tortured, sexually assaulted and subjected to cruel and inhuman treatment

⁴⁵ Esad Landzo (a camp guard), Zdravko Mucic (the camp commander), Hazim Delic (the deputy camp commander) and Zejnil Delalic (the coordinator of the Bosnian Muslim and Bosnian Croat forces in the area, and later commander in the Bosnian Army).

⁴⁶ Bantekas, I. (July 1993) 'The Contemporary Law of Superior Responsibility,' 93 American Journal of International Law, at 2.

 \dots the assumption that the laws of armed conflict are an obstacle to the effective conduct of military operations is a misconception \dots the laws of armed conflict reinforce, rather than contradict, good military practice.⁴⁷

EXPRESS OBLIGATIONS: THE DUTY OF COMMANDERS?

What is the nature and extent of <u>express obligations</u>? First of all they impose a number of obligations or duties upon commanders. Tony Rogers'⁴⁸ analysis of the international instruments reveals the following:

- A *duty to prevent* crimes being committed by their subordinates;
- A *duty to deal with breaches* (i.e. to prevent and, where necessary, suppress and report the occurrences to the competent authorities);
- A *duty to educate and inform* members of their command of their obligations under the Law of Armed Conflict;
- A *duty to punish* (or at the very least initiate disciplinary proceedings) against perpetrators. ⁴⁹

These duties are said to arise in the main pursuant to Geneva Convention I, and the Additional Protocol I (AP I) thereto.

The Medina Trial - Failure (of Duty) to prevent atrocity & the duty to Act.⁵⁰

The Medina court martial trial exposed the savagery of war as waged by elements of the US Army in Vietnam in 1968.⁵¹ Capt. Ernest Medina (one of only two US officers brought to trial as a result of the My Lai incident – the other being Lt. William Calley) was charged with the killing of over one hundred Vietnamese civilians.



Lieutenant William Calley.



Captain Ernest Medina.

⁴⁷ Greenwood, C. (1993) Command and the Laws of Armed Conflict, (Occasional Paper No. 4), Strategic and Combat Studies Institute, UK.

^{48 (2004)} Law on the Battlefield, (2nd Ed.) Juris Publishing, Manchester University Press, at pages 189 - 214. Major General Tony Rogers is a former Director of the Army Legal Services of the British Army.

 ⁴⁹ Rogers appraisal of the express obligations (termed "duties") meets with general approval of writers such as Ilias Bantekas and Frederic de Millinen.
 50 US v Ernest L. Medina, [1971] CM 427162 ACMR.

⁵¹ On 16th March 1968, US troops of Charlie Company, Task Force Barker, 11th Infantry Brigade entered the village of My Lai, in the Quang Tri province of Vietnam. The troops commanded by Captain Ernest Medina were to engage a large unit of Viet Cong. However no VC were located in the area. The US troops proceeded to massacre approximately two hundred Vietnamese, mostly old men, women and children. A precise figure cannot be ascertained due to the various conflicting accounts of the massacre.

The central thrust of the case against Medina was grounded upon the fact that, as the officer in command of the infantry company, he was responsible, and therefore, accountable for the actions of his subordinates. This arose particularly, if he knew that the killings were either taking place or were about to take place. The brief for the prosecution alleged:

... the accused became aware that his men were probably killing noncombatants. [and], after becoming aware of the killing of noncombatants by his troops, declined to exercise his *command responsibility* by not taking necessary and reasonable steps because his troops to cease the killing of non-combatants. ... It is finally the prosecution's contention that as a commander the accused, *had a duty to* [act] *interfere* [and] *he may be held personally responsible* ...⁵²

However Captain Medina was acquitted of involuntary manslaughter.

AN IMPLIED OBLIGATION: THE ETHICAL COMMANDER?53

- Does the doctrine imply a standard of ethics for the commander?

Just as military commanders can induce their subordinates to accomplish heroic acts beyond the pale of traditional human limitations, they also possess the power of ordering, or acquiescing to, acts that are inhumane in the extreme. A commander may condone, or even direct, conduct that goes far beyond the 'normal' standards of warfare. Unsurprisingly therefore, Zhukov identifies that: '... the correct commanding of troops is of great importance. This embraces a wide range of military-political, moral, material and psychological factors.'⁵⁴ Hickling states that Commanders at all levels should be made aware of what has been termed 'the ethical climate of command'.⁵⁵ He believes that this constitutes a code of behaviour in addition to that prescribed as a legal rule. But what shapes this 'code' of behaviour? Richard Gabriel believes that:

The first moral obligation of any officer is to ensure that his conduct and that of his superiors is basically consonant with the values of the society and the constitution that he has sworn to uphold together with the moral constraints of the military system.⁵⁶

Ian Huntley examines the need for ethical leadership, the desirability of ethical behaviour, and the ethical role and responsibilities of the leader.⁵⁷ He asks if leadership can be completely ethical. He then proceeds to look at ethical leadership in the military context, and sets out the legal 'requirements.' It looks at what soldiers want to be and what they need to be. Crucially he suggests: 'History has demonstrated that it is vitally important that officers have a sophisticated understanding of military ethics and appreciate their responsibility to take positive action to ensure that their men act ethically.'⁵⁸

⁵² See n. 53, at 193.

⁵³ Impavidum ferient ruinae - Nothing can shatter the steadfastness of an upright man, generally attributed to Horace. Literally translates as "the ruins (of the world) will strike him undaunted." From Eugene Ehrlich (2001) Veni, Vidi, Vici, Harper Collins, at 133.

⁵⁴ See n.1 at 184. Zhukov himself may have had questions to answer in the context of Command Responsibility had his actions on the Russian Front been judicially scrutinised.

⁵⁵ Cited by Smith, H. (1994) (Ed.) The Force of Law: International Law and the Land Commander, Australian Defence Studies Centre at 158.

⁵⁶ Gabriel, R. (1982) To serve with Honor: A Treatise on Military Ethics and the Way of the Soldier, Connecticut, USA, Greenwood Press, at 140 - 141. Emphasis added.

⁵⁷ Huntley, I (2003) 'Ethical Military Leadership,' Harris Manchester College, Oxford, Online at URL:http://www.farmington.ac. uk/ documents/reports/pdf/b03/ME10.pdf.

⁵⁸ Ibid at 41.

Finally there is a recurring theme within the literature and research linking command responsibility and leadership (as opposed to command). British Army doctrine states: 'The thing that sets a good army or a good soldier apart from an effective one is its ethos, its ethical basis; and in achieving this as in all else, leadership is key.'⁵⁹

ETHICS: THE IRISH DEFENCE FORCES EXPERIENCE

A Command & Staff Leadership text emphasises the relevance of ethics: 'If there is any one factor that marks leadership and command at any level critical, it is the ethical visibility of leaders and their fundamental charge to represent selflessly the organisation, the profession and the nation.'⁶⁰

Indeed, the Chief of Staff recently outlined the importance of the 'moral component' in developing [Defence Forces] operational capability:

The moral component is concerned with the human dimension; it is to do with motivating personnel to endure hardship, to exercise lethal force and to exercise restraint as the occasion demands. It is to do with leadership and morale, with operating within the law and *from a strong ethical base*.⁶¹

Surprisingly however, no substantive Defence Forces doctrine has been promulgated to deal with this most relevant and professionally applicable area. While there is recognition of an inherent moral code within military leadership,⁶² this remains imprecise and vague. Therefore, can it be stated that the Defence Forces places a low emphasis on military ethics? Contrast the following international military approaches:

- a. **British Army.** The relevant British Army doctrine aptly titled 'Soldiering: The Military Covenant' holds: '... unless an Army is focussed on higher external ethics, it risks moral bankruptcy.'⁶³
- b. **US Army.** The US Army has gone so far as to develop a concept of 'ethical reasoning' for commanders (See below).⁶⁴
- c. **CanadianArmed Forces.** Having had to confront the aftermath of several serious instances of ill discipline and brutality in Somalia,⁶⁵ the Canadians undertook a comprehensive review of its procedures, including its training and education policies. Since that review a strengthened emphasis has been placed on ethical development and moral reasoning for commanders at ALL levels.⁶⁶

⁵⁹ British Army (2000) Soldiering: The Military Covenant, (ADP Vol. 5 - No. 71642), MOD, at 3-13.

 ^{1996, 1-2} to 1-3. It is important to note that there is very little instruction available concerning ethics and more particularly military ethics.
 Sreenan, J. Lieutenant General, (2006) 'Chief of Staffs Address,' 24th February 2006 at the Military College, Ireland. Particular emphasis added.
 "Operational capability is made up of three (3) separate but inter-related components: the conceptual component, the physical component and the moral component."

⁶² Ibid.

 $^{63 \ \} N.\ 59\ at\ 3\text{-}1.$

⁶⁴ US Army (1990) FM 20 - 100, 'Army Leadership & the Army,' online at <URL:http://www.au. af.mil/au/awc/awcgate/awc-ethx.htm>.

⁶⁵ See earlier, the Medina Court Martial. Interestingly, the Canadian Armed Forces concluded that there had also been a failure of leadership and this in turn contributed to the incidents of ill discipline.

⁶⁶ Canadian Armed Forces, (2006) 'Military Culture and Ethics,' Canadian Armed Forces, Online at URL:http://www.forces.gc.ca/site/Reports/somalia/vol1/V1C5_e.asp.



US Army Ethical Reasoning. ADAPTED FROM US ARMY (1991) 'ARMY LEADERSHIP & THE ARMY,' FM 20 -100

The reader may note that in all three military organisations, substantial emphasis is placed on the commander's interaction with, and application of military ethics.

Military Ethics is a broad and comprehensive area and requires detailed examination by the Defence Forces. Underpinning this statement is the fact that, while we undoubtedly recognise the importance of military ethics; we have failed to develop a body of formal 'corporate' ethical knowledge; *we have no formal Defence Forces code of ethics*.

Central issue: What are the express and implied implications for the Commander of the doctrine of Command Responsibility?

1. Express issues of obligation

The express obligations or duties as outlined, provide Military Commanders with a definite standard, which must be achieved. In a sense it is a burden from which they are relieved since adherence to the law is an active requirement. Rogers's⁶⁷ analysis of the international instruments reveals the following:⁶⁸

⁶⁷ N. 48 at 189 – 214.

⁶⁸ Appendix A refers. The principal international instruments are Articles 83, 86 and 87 of Additional Protocol I to the Geneva Conventions; and, Article 47 of the first Geneva Convention (GC I).

- A duty to prevent crimes being committed by their subordinates. The Commander must ensure that his subordinates are aware of their obligations under the law of war, and that necessary measures are taken to prevent violations of the law of war. This is also expressed as a duty to act.
- *A duty to deal with breaches* (i.e. to prevent and, where necessary, suppress and report the occurrences to the competent authorities).
- A duty to educate and inform members of their command of their obligations under the Law of Armed Conflict. Every commander holds full responsibility for proper law of armed conflict training within his/ her sphere of authority.
- A duty to punish (or at the very least initiate disciplinary proceedings) against perpetrators. The prerogative of discipline has rested with commanders through the ages. For example, Von Clausewitz states: 'In the soldier, the natural tendency for unbridled action and outbursts of violence must be subordinated to demands of a higher kind: obedience, order, rule and method.'⁶⁹

2. Implied Obligations: an ethical standard

(1) Awareness

The very existence of the doctrine with its attendant express and unearthed implied elements obliges commanders at all levels to be aware of their responsibilities and professional implications imposed by the doctrine. Major C.A. Bach cited by Fitton expressed it accurately when he said: 'Know your men, know your business, know yourself.'⁷⁰ In addition to the professional obligations imposed, the common law generally requires knowledge of the law (by all), expressed as: '*Ignorantia juris neminem excusat* – Ignorance of the law does not excuse.'⁷¹

(2) Adoption of and Adherence to an ethical standard

One of the central conclusions of this thesis is the need for the Defence Forces to establish and develop a firm ethical standard. Richard Gabriel expresses the compelling need for such a standard:

In this increasingly complex society, the soldier must have firm ethical moorings. If not, he risks being overwhelmed by the social and organizational forces that restrict his intellect, his will, and his freedom.

CONCLUSIONS

1. What's the relevance to Commanders?

As regards commanders, the responsibility for the success or failure of a military mission falls squarely on their shoulders. But, this responsibility extends to more than just mission success. Recognition of a commanders prescribed and inherent obligations allows one to prepare and plan accordingly. This preparation should ensure that where conflict is to be undertaken it should be conducted within the parameters of ethical and

moral standards.

⁶⁹ Smidt, M. (2000) 'Yamashita, Medina, and Beyond: Command Responsibility in Contemporary Military Operations,' Military Law Review, Vol. 164, at pages 155-234.

⁷⁰ N. 1 at 246.

⁷¹ Murdoch, H (1993) Dictionary of Irish Law (2nd Ed.), Topaz Publications, at 255.

You are members of a profession. You have rules governing your profession. Without rules to govern your profession, it's not a profession. Every profession is bound by ethics and the laws of warfare and the principles of humane treatment are the guidelines of the professional soldier. ... Within our society and under the law, the value placed on human life is sacred. When the accused put on [his] uniform ... he was not relieved of his conscience. ... The accused ... was not given a license to slaughter unarmed men, women, and children ... This accused has failed in his duty as an officer.

(Daniel, Trial of Lt Calley, 1971)

The prosecutor's damning synopsis of the behaviour of Lt Calley at My Lai captures the 'higher' standard required of the commander. The commander is different; higher standards of moral obligation and ethical behaviour are expected. The writer submits that the nature of the combat situation may mitigate but it will never excuse.

For a Commander adherence to ethical standards is crucial – but what standards? Who will set these standards? Commanders are expected to embrace a series of qualities – command, control, responsibility, accountability, adherence to standards, required behaviour - all feature in their professional life. In addition, however, there is a need to establish a nexus with the individuals' 'inner character', as well as one's moral and ethical awareness and accompanying sense of obligation (or duty). This requires awareness of ethical standards of behaviour, the adoption of a formal 'code' of ethics, and a heightened sense of responsibility to the victims of war and armed conflict.

2. The inherent nature of Command Responsibility

The doctrine plays a fundamental role in regulating the behaviour of superiors and their subordinates in times of war. It represents an evolution of the notion of war and an application of previous experiences to construct a detailed and precise requirement from military commanders. Michael Smidt finds that Command Responsibility 'is the legal and ethical obligation a commander assumes for the actions, accomplishments, or failures of a unit'.⁷² However further study needs to be completed in order to advance our store of corporate knowledge, educate our commanders in the field and at home, and absorb the doctrine into our military psyche.

3. The Commander in the context of the doctrine.

The Military is a unique society. A commander has tremendous power and authority over subordinates not normally extended to superiors in civilian life. Coupled with this significant lawful control over the troops is the commander's authority over a military unit's destructive capabilities. Commanders are to be relied on to control their military force capability and the conduct of their subordinates. In this context, the fusion of leadership and command may well merit further examination. I submit that the most important factor in the reduction of war crimes is an assertive and knowledgeable commander who seeks to prevent subordinates from committing atrocities. Michael Smidt citing Napoleon tells us 'The honour of a general consists ... in keeping subalterns under his orders on the honest path...'⁷³

⁷² N. 69 at 165.

⁷³ N. 69 at 155.

4. The need for a Code of Irish Military Ethics.

The Irish Defence Forces has not yet adopted a formalised code of ethics. It has, to its credit, recognised the inherent merit and organisational benefit that derives from 'ethics' in the general sense. However it has failed to develop this further. Richard Gabriel reflects on the necessity for such a code or structure:

As long as men remain human, there will be a need for military ethics to sustain that humanity, ... and to place limits on the destructive abilities of the soldier. ... For the military to fail to develop and teach a code of ethics is to ignore a crucial obligation to its membership, to make them good in the exercise of a profession that often directly confronts the face of absolute evil.⁷⁴

Furthermore Colonel Anthony Hartle emphatically declares the value of such persons: 'Persons of strong character are the ultimate resource for any military organisation, and they are by definition persons of integrity – individuals whose actions are consistent with their beliefs.'⁷⁵ There is hope for the future, while expanding upon his treatise of the moral component, the Chief of Staff stated: 'We must give a good understanding of legal responsibility but it must be underpinned by a sense of *moral responsibility*, and the *concept of personal moral responsibility* as enshrined in law.'⁷⁶ What better way than a formal code of military ethics?

Finally ... you must, you should ...

Military Commanders have no immunity from liability for War Crimes, the law applies to them in equal measure as to any war criminal, and the liability 'mechanism' of particular relevance is the doctrine of Command Responsibility. Ireland has resolved to adhere to the provisions of the Rome Statute; therefore our military commanders are bound to its application.

Part I: You must - Consideration of the most important stakeholders?

The victims of war are some of the most vulnerable human beings. Commanders must not be afflicted with what Philip Caputo describes as '... the inability to distinguish civilians from combatants ...'⁷⁷ With limited (or perhaps no) ability to resist the infliction of evil from uncontrolled troops, humanity must I believe, place its trust in a commander's ability, determination, and willingness to supervise their subordinates and prevent atrocities. An awareness and understanding of the express and implied duties of command responsibility will assist and direct him or her in this regard.

Part II: You should – adoption of ethical standards – 'He merits praise who does what he ought to do, not [just] what he is allowed to do.'⁷⁸

Joel Hayward (2003:9) focuses on the exacting standards required of commanders:

⁷⁴ N. 56 at 227.

⁷⁵ Cited by Toner, J. (2003) 'Military or Ethics,' Air & Space Power Journal, (online), Online at

<URL:http://www.airpower.au.af.mil/airchronicles/apj/apj03/sum03/toner. Html >.

⁷⁶ N. 61. at 6.

⁷⁷ Caputo, P. (1977) A Rumour of War, London, UK, Pimlico, at xix.

^{78 &}quot;Id facere laus est quod decet, non quod licet." Ehrlich cites Seneca's proverb whereby a Commander is encouraged to follow the ethical AND legal path. Ehrlich E. (2001) Veni, Vici, New York, Harper Collins, at 130.

... to remain functional in the face of mortal peril; to inspire subordinates to act with courage and aggression; to carry out the violence necessary to ensure victory; to provide restraints on that violence in order to meet decent standards of morality, justice and legality; to assume direct responsibility for the lives and health of all involved.

The stakes are high for Commanders. It is worth repeating the words of General MacArthur (cited by Hickling in Smith 1994:93). He gives a credible and coherent warning to Commanders:

The soldier, be he friend or foe, is charged with the protection of the weak and unarmed. *It is the very essence and reason for his being*. When he violates this sacred trust, he not only profanes his entire cult but also threatens the very fabric of international society.⁷⁹

⁷⁹ Emphasis added.

APPENDIX A

EXTRACTS FROM THE RELEVANT INTERNATIONAL LEGAL INSTRUMENTS

* (EMPHASIS ADDED)

ROME STATUTE OF THE INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT, (1998)

Article 28(a)

(a) A military *commander* or person effectively acting as a military commander shall be criminally responsible for crimes within the jurisdiction of the Court committed by forces under his or her *effective command and control*, or effective authority and control as the case may be, as a result of his or her *failure to exercise control* properly over such forces, where:

- (i) That military commander or person either *knew or, owing to the circumstances at the time, should have known* that the forces were committing or about to commit such crimes; and
- (ii) That military commander or person failed to take all necessary and reasonable measures within his or her power to prevent or repress their commission or to submit the matter to the competent authorities for investigation and prosecution.⁸⁰

GENEVA CONVENTION I - CONVENTION FOR THE AMELIORATION OF THE CONDITION OF THE WOUNDED AND SICK IN ARMED FORCES IN THE FIELD. GENEVA, 12 AUGUST 1949.

Article 47

The High Contracting Parties undertake, in time of peace as in time of war, to disseminate the text of the present Convention as widely as possible in their respective countries, and, in particular, to include the study thereof in their programmes of military and, if possible, civil instruction, so that the principles thereof may become known to the entire population, in particular to the armed fighting forces, the medical personnel and the chaplains.

⁸⁰ Key terms emphasised. Note that Article 28(b) deals with the superior responsibility of civilians.

PROTOCOL ADDITIONAL TO THE GENEVA CONVENTION'S THAT OF 12 AUG 1949, AND RELATING TO THE PROTECTION OF VICTIMS OF INTERNATIONAL ARMED CONFLICTS (PROTOCOL 1), JUNE 8, 1977.

Article 83 - Dissemination

- 1. The High Contracting Parties undertake, in time of peace as in time of armed conflict, to disseminate the Conventions and this Protocol as widely as possible in their respective countries and, in particular, to include the study thereof in their programmes of military instruction and to encourage the study thereof by the civilian population, so that those instruments may become known to the armed forces and to the civilian population.
- 2. Any military or civilian authorities who, in time of armed conflict, assume responsibilities in respect of the application of the Conventions and this Protocol shall be fully acquainted with the text thereof.

Article 86 - Failure to act

- 1. The High Contracting Parties and the Parties to the conflict shall repress grave breaches, and take measures necessary to *suppress all other breaches*, of the Conventions or of this Protocol which result from a failure to act when under a duty to do so.
- 2. The fact that a breach of the Conventions or of this Protocol was committed by a subordinate does not absolve his superiors from penal or disciplinary responsibility, as the case may be, if they knew, or had information which should have enabled them to conclude in the circumstances at the time, that he was committing or was going to commit such a breach and if they did not take all feasible measures within their power to prevent or repress the breach.

Article 87 - Duty of Commanders

- 1. The High Contracting Parties and the Parties to the conflict shall require military commanders, with respect to members of the armed forces under their command and other persons under their control, to *prevent* and, where necessary, to *suppress and to report* to competent authorities breaches of the Conventions and of this Protocol.
- 2. In order to prevent and suppress breaches, High Contracting Parties and Parties to the conflict shall require that, commensurate with their level of responsibility, commanders ensure that members of the armed forces under their command are *aware of their obligations* under the Conventions and this Protocol.
- 3. The High Contracting Parties and Parties to the conflict shall require any commander who is aware that subordinates or other persons under his control are going to commit or have committed a breach of the Conventions or of this Protocol, to initiate such steps as are necessary to prevent such violations of the Conventions or this Protocol, and, where appropriate, *to initiate disciplinary or penal action against violators* thereof.

Abstracts - MA (LMDS) 62nd Command and Staff Course 2005-2006

THE STRATEGIC CORPORAL – A Challenge for the Irish Defence Forces

Comdt Ian Byrne MA (TECH COMMNS) BCOMM DIP COMP SC

ABSTRACT

Military institutions are undergoing changes aimed specifically at adjusting to the challenges of the modern battlespace. It is now time to adopt doctrine to prepare soldiers for greater responsibility in the multi-dimensional environment that faces them. One of these changes involves recognition that the 'strategic corporal' must be aware of the significance of all decisions and must have some comprehension of the political context of any actions. The strategic corporal operates at the tactical level of war but can influence the strategic level. In response to these challenges *do the Defence Forces prepare junior leaders for the responsibility of making strategic decisions* and *could participative management facilitate the development of future strategic corporals*?

This thesis outlines decision-making as a foremost human activity that requires a combination of experience and intuition. An analytical decision involves a comparison of various options concurrently when time permits an analysis of the problem, whereas recognitional decisions require intuition and draw upon experience to identify a situation as representative of one encountered earlier. The thesis highlights the strategic corporal's need to prepare for recognitional decision-making in a crisis situation. This is particularly critical because whoever can make and implement sound decisions faster gains an advantage. It describes various types of participation and the process of involving those who are influenced by decisions, in making decisions. The selection of the direct consultative approach to participation recognises the subtle difference between the subordinate having influence or power over the decision-making process.

A combination of qualitative and quantitative research using theoretical sampling of corporals and senior officers, provides comparative data concerning the key concepts of the strategic corporal, decision-making, participative management and the barriers to participation in the decision-making process.

The resultant findings highlight the need to acknowledge the existence of the strategic corporal, and the need to develop NCOs in preparation for that role. It demonstrates that the Defence Forces are not ready to hand over the responsibility of decision-making to subordinates nor are the subordinates prepared to accept this challenge. There is great willingness to involve subordinates in participative management at the appropriate level but the subsequent issues of influence and power do not align with the vertical hierarchy of military command and control.

Through reading this thesis I hope that you come to appreciate and understand some of the challenges that face the Defence Forces in the future.

ORGANISATIONAL LEARNING AND THE INTERCULTURAL WORKPLACE

Comdt Patrick W. Condon

ABSTRACT

Ireland has seen dramatic change to the demographics of the working population in this country since the mid 1990s. This change has been driven by a successful economy, which is creating large numbers of jobs year on year. Many of these jobs in service industries and the building sector are being filled by workers from the EU and from further afield. The operating environment has changed and is presenting a number of issues that must be faced by organisations that intend to survive and remain relevant. One of these issues is the presence of members of ethnic minorities in many Irish workplaces. Irish organisations have had to adapt to this new dynamic of ethnic diversity. Accordingly, organisational change is required and allied to change is the concept of organisational learning.

This thesis examines the concepts of organisational change and organisational learning. It also explores the concept of the intercultural workforce and attempts to discover any possible links between an ethnically diverse workplace and improved organisational learning. A case study is conducted with two organisations, Dublin Bus and the Irish Police Force, An Garda Siochana. The former already has a range of policy and experience with diversity issues and the latter has recently announced its intention to actively recruit members of minorities.

This study is relevant to many Irish organisations that are seeking to recruit members from a more diverse population. While organisational change is required and can pose some difficulty, there are also benefits to be gained from this new diversity. The Defence Forces will not be insulated from change and in time members of ethnic minorities will seek careers in all branches of the service. It is time for all organisations to be proactive, to plan now, in order to adapt to the new environment.

Does The United Nations Employ a Human Security Paradigm in its Efforts To Establish and Maintain International Peace and Security? Cote D'ivoire – A Case Study

Comdt David Cowhig

ABSTRACT

International relations during the Twentieth Century were dominated by balance of power (realist) and international law/order (liberal) perspectives. Global order in the latter half of that century came largely under the influence of the bi-polar powers, the US and the USSR. This order changed, however, with the ending of the Cold War. The altered dynamic resulted in major changes in global relationships and impacted on state and regional security worldwide. This impact was felt to the greatest degree in Africa and acted as a catalyst for what appears to

be a cycle of intra-state violence across that continent, particularly south of the Sahara. The UN was established, following the Second World War, as the overarching body with responsibility for maintaining international peace and security. Its role in this regard, however, was severely restricted by the East versus West standoff. The post-Cold War environment of the late Twentieth and early Twenty-first Century provided renewed expectations of the organisation and created a belief that the UN could finally make its mark internationally. Early successes, however, were followed by high-profile failures.

Within this setting the academic and policy-making communities continued to search for a security paradigm that might be effective in this new era. The Human Security concept provided theory for just such a paradigm. It posited that people, and not the state, should be the primary paradigm focus, and this idea generated much debate within academic and policy-making circles as to definition, utility and state sovereignty. This thesis conducts an examination of the evolution of this new security paradigm and endeavours to evaluate whether the United Nations employs it, and if so what this might mean for the Irish Defence Forces, given our current international peacekeeping commitments. A case study of United Nations intervention in Côte d'Ivoire in West Africa was used to achieve this end, and key United Nations documentation was analyzed to further the research.

The findings inform us of the difficulties encountered by the United Nation's in its effort to protect people and deal with issues of sovereignty, identifying some significant weaknesses in the organisation's approach. The research also discovers issues, including force protection matters, relevant to the Irish Defence Forces and considers what that organisation must do to resolve these.

TRANSFORMATIONAL LEADERSHIP IN THE DEFENCE FORCES – A CASE STUDY

Comdt Patrick J. Doherty BA

ABSTRACT

"The Defence Forces fully recognises that its personnel are its most valued resource and consequently, the leadership and management of that resource is vitally important to the organisation's capability to deliver on its missions and roles" (Defence Forces Strategy Statement, 2005:12). Leadership in the Defence Forces, as in all military organisations, is of vital importance, as detailed in the Defence Forces Strategy Statement, 2005 – 2007 above.

Transformational Leadership transforms employees to pursue organisational goals over self-interests...performance beyond the call of duty...for the sake of the leader, team, unit or organisation. Transformational theorists note that a transformational leader possesses 'charisma'.

The purpose of this thesis is to explore transformational leadership through a case study of the Defence Forces, in order to ascertain if it can live up to its espoused potential. The thesis examines whether there is a utility for the Transformational Leadership theories and paradigm

in the Irish Defence Forces leadership development and to contribute to the professional body of knowledge and research on leadership and leadership development in the Defence Forces. In recent years, we are seeing some significant change and new initiatives in the Defence Forces, not just organisational change, but initiatives to enhance our educational development, our leadership competencies, our international standing and indeed initiatives to change the way we think, the way we approach challenges and decision making, at all levels of the organisation. Does this signal the fostering and encouraging of a new era in our approach to leadership development? Is this transformational leadership, or at least the characteristics of transformational leadership, being adapted to fit a peacetime Defence Force, such as ours?

Towards answering my primary question, *Transformational Leadership in the Defence Forces: A Case Study*, I conducted a survey Questionnaire on Transformational Leadership in the Defence Forces and semi-structured interviews with selected experts on important issues arising from the survey.

My findings clearly show that certain styles and characteristics of transformational leadership are being fostered, developed and indeed encouraged in the Defence Forces today. The application of transformational styles of leadership has a valuable and important role to play in the enhancement of leadership development in military organisations such as the Defence Forces. On conclusion of my research, I found that transformational leadership skills develop over a person's career span and are enhanced through training and experience.

Finally, I focus on outlining how the research can be used to suggest a way forward for the development of a leadership strategy for the Defence Forces.

CULTURE AND COUNTERINSURGENCY: BRIDGING THE GAP

Major Joseph M. Duncan BA MSc

ABSTRACT

The world is becoming increasingly more complex, and despite the promise of globalisation, its population is not yet a homogeneous community with the same values and worldview. The impact of cultural clashes is played out on CNN every day, and arguably the one area where cultural differences are most noticeable, to the frustration of both a weary public and perplexed military professionals, is in the context of current counterinsurgency efforts. While there are as many solutions to counterinsurgency woes as there are paid consultants, no one has yet constructed a model that recognizes the broad impact of culture on military conflicts. The aim of this thesis to bridge the existing gap between culture (anthropology) and counterinsurgency theory in order to provide military planners with the practical tools they need to incorporate cultural differences into the development of plans and strategies.

This is accomplished by examining the theoretical significance of culture as argued by many respected authors; studying essential elements of different counterinsurgency strategies; diving into the murky waters of classic anthropology and current comparative culture studies

to select the most promising cross-cultural models; and finally, proposing a conceptual linkage between the two disciplines that provides needed insight to planners and lays the groundwork for future development.

'ARNHEM' MEN REMEMBERED. THE INTERROGATION OF COLLECTIVE MEMORY

Comdt Gareth J. Evans B Sc Eng DIP Eng MIEI

ABSTRACT

Memory is fundamental to our ability to conceive the world. It is the facility by which past experience is remembered and the future created. Collective memory is a specific group's shared representation of the past from an agreed viewpoint and is constituted through the negotiation and selection of individual memories. It is also a reflection of the social identity of the group that framed it.

The purpose of this thesis is to explore the significance of the social context of memory within community. In particular it examines how collective memories are constructed and the motivation behind them, using the community of Arnhem and Oosterbeck as a case study. Arnhem and Oosterbeck is synonymous with Operation "Market Garden", a failed attempt by Allied forces to secure a bridgehead over the River Rhine during the Second World War.

Foucault's conceptualisation of memory as a discursive practice allows for its investigation by the postmodernist tool of discourse analysis. This methodology is used to analyse the discursive struggle within the collective memory of the community, focusing on collective memories contained within memorial sites erected to commemorate the battle of Arnhem and Oosterbeck. Particular emphasis is placed on discourses, which privilege certain groups. The theoretic lens through which this study was approached was the presentist and popular approach to memory.

The resultant findings and analysis highlight the important role that the participation of military personnel in the public commemoration process can play in the establishment of a meaningful and sustained relationship with local community. It also recommends that the Irish Defence Forces should be more proactive in dealing with the public to ensure that deserved recognition is given to the service of Irish soldiers both at home and abroad.

AN EXPLORATION OF THE RECENT EMERGENCE OF THE EURO JIHADIST, AND THE IMPLICATIONS FOR IRELAND

Comdt David Goulding B Sc

ABSTRACT

Clausewitzian war between states has all but disappeared and is now replaced by non-state conflicts and actors like terrorist groups. Terrorism is not a new phenomenon and has been used to introduce fear and panic amongst its random and innocent victims throughout the ages. Both the United States and the European Union, through their respective security strategic statements, identify international terrorism as one of the main threats facing the world today. Europe faces new threats, which are more varied, less detectable and less conventional. Terrorism is spreading without regard to sovereign boundaries as evidenced by the most recent 2005 London attack. The worrying trend emerging from that atrocity was the use of home-grown suicide bombers or Euro Jihadists.

This study explores the underlying causes that made European citizens like Hasib Husain, blow himself up on a London bus on 7th July 2005 – killing and maiming dozens. The factors regarding motivation, recruitment and radicalisation associated with the modern phenomenon of the Euro Jihadist are examined to assess whether or not there is a cause of concern for Ireland. This study shows that a threat does indeed exist to Ireland. This threat stems from Ireland's membership of the European Union, the presence in Ireland of many international businesses, including American, Israeli and British, and the continued use of Shannon Airport by American forces. The research was conducted by carrying out an extensive literature review to ascertain currently held views with respect to the aforementioned areas. In order to assist in answering the primary research question interviews were conducted with a number of subject matter experts. The interviewees represented the Islamic, academic and security domains.

The findings also identified a number of significant issues that warrant further study. A deeper and unbiased understanding of the Islamic world is required not only to assist our comprehension of Islamist terrorism but also to aid efforts at the successful integration of Muslim communities into their host societies. The lack of primary source material and a lack of empirical data regarding suicide bombers were a major drawback, but one area that should be examined in greater detail is the work of the recruiter or dispatcher. Future studies should profile the processes and pathways of violent radicalisation as distinct from the psychological profiling of individual terrorists. In short an interdisciplinary study of terrorism is required to assist in the defeat of International Terrorism.

PRIVATE MILITARY COMPANIES – A Study of International and National Legislation

Comdt Denis Harrington BA

ABSTRACT

This thesis examines the existence of legislation both at national and international level in relation to Private Military Companies (PMCs), and asks the question, is present legislation at these levels sufficient to control their employment. It further explores what guidelines for legislation would improve the existing situation, by proposing a list of eleven points to interested parties within the industry and analysing the responses.

The thesis begins by attempting to define the newest actor within the private military industry and discovers how difficult it is even to define, due to the many different names commentators have on the companies. It continues with a review of the employment of PMCs and explores how widespread their employment is, ranging from basic security work to interrogation of prisoners in Abu Ghraib prison in Iraq, to strategic planning at the highest level within the US military.

The legislation at international level is researched by examining The Hague and Geneva Conventions along with the UN and Organisation of African Unity, and the national legislation of USA, UK and South Africa. These three countries were selected as they have the most prominent PMCs operating in the world today. While researching the topic mention was made of PMCs in Russia, however due to lack of information this was not followed, at this time. The views of members of the private military industry along with commentators and academics who have written on the subjects were studied and analysed.

A detailed case study of the British Government's Green Paper 'Private Military Companies, Options for Regulation,' was carried out. This was chosen because it is the most current and relevant attempt to discuss legislation of PMCs. As a result of this research eleven guidelines were presented for comment based on the green paper, some current legislation and commentary by interested parties.

The main conclusion of this thesis is that present legislation at national and international level is not sufficient to control PMCs activities worldwide.

IS NATION BUILDING POSSIBLE FOR SUB-SAHARAN AFRICAN STATES IN THE TWENTY FIRST CENTURY? ERITREA - A CASE STUDY.

Comdt Tom Heskin BBS

ABSTRACT

The purpose of this thesis is to examine nation building in Sub-Saharan Africa and to consider the issues that are necessary for its success. A case study on Eritrea allows for an exploration of nation building, in a small, recently liberated African state. The findings from this study may be of use elsewhere on the African continent. The analysis on the case study is assisted by the personal experience of the author who worked there as part of UNMEE (United Nations Mission to Eritrea and Ethiopia) in 2003.

The countries of Sub-Saharan Africa are immersed in a cycle of on going instability resulting in conflict and poverty. This thesis sets about examining the possibilities for nation building in the region and how this process might achieve success, set in the context of under development and poor government. Nation building is regarded as a process of constructing a nation, by using the power of the state to unify its population, so that the state can remain politically viable and stable in the long term. This process is considered in the context of efforts by Sub-Saharan states to mould former colonial territories into coherent national entities.

The thesis adopts a qualitative approach, utilising semi-structured interviews combined with a country case study, that enables the construction of arguments and generation of ideas from the research analysis. The interviews were conducted with academics, members of the development community, authors and journalists all of whom have knowledge and personal experience of Eritrea or Sub-Saharan Africa.

The findings inform us about some of the key issues that pertain to nation building in Eritrea and Sub-Saharan Africa. Nationhood is a special problem in the region. Nation building is evolutionary rather than revolutionary, it usually takes a long time to achieve and is a social process. In order to achieve nation building good governance is essential. Eritrea was found to have problems that impede nation building in the political arena and there is the strong possibility that the country could fracture along ethnic or religious lines. It was found that Eritrea possesses cultural attributes that are important to achieving nation building. In the area of development it was found that the relationship with aid donors is a key issue for countries in the region, if progress is to be achieved.

YOU MUST, YOU SHOULD: THE DOCTRINE OF COMMAND RESPONSIBILITY AND ITS IMPLICATIONS FOR THE MILITARY COMMANDER

Comdt Jerry Lane. BL, LLM.

ABSTRACT

The history of humanity is one of conflict and frequent acts of brutality and atrocity. Yet it's a history that also reveals a persistent and growing effort to curb such excess. The evolution of command responsibility, within the broader confines of the law of armed conflict, illustrates the interaction of experience, bone fide aspirations and theory. The resultant doctrine produces a workable concept of behaviour and code of standards uniquely applicable to the military profession. This thesis explores the implications arising from the application of the doctrine of Command Responsibility – both its express (legal) natures and implied standards of behaviour. Hence the thesis title: 'You must, you should...'

A regular assertion in military forces is that the profession of arms has a long and proud tradition, with high and exacting standards derived in part from the nature of war and the conditions of military service. Traditionally, soldiers are expected to possess military virtues in all facets of their lives. This is inherent in the idea that the military is not a job but a way of life - a calling. Commanders occupy a central place in the hierarchy of the application of these virtues and their impact on humanity. In addition to substantive case law and case study of commanders in war, the reader will be introduced to a young platoon commander in a combat environment. The story of Lt Philip Caputo provides a contextual companion to my exploration of Command Responsibility. Caputo as a commander lost control of his troops and in doing so failed the test of command responsibility.

Any assignment of research and study brings with it an opportunity for introspection and reflection. This has afforded me an opportunity to identify and address inherent perspectives, which presented possible obstacles to a thorough application of research and objective analysis. Recognition of necessary perspective transformation and its attendant professional and personal benefits ensued.

This research project examines the doctrine of Command Responsibility; it explores not only the express dicta of the law but also the subjective application of those laws when viewed in a historical and human context. A rich theme of ethical and moral behaviour is evident, interwoven through the evolution of the doctrine. It is this ethical standard that flows pursuant to, but also in tandem with, the express obligations of international law. It is time for the Defence Forces to formally embrace this ethical dimension.

WHAT IS THE OPTIMAL SAFETY MANAGEMENT SYSTEM FOR THE IRISH NAVAL SERVICE FLEET?

Lt Cdr Michael Malone

ABSTRACT

Operating vessels in the North Atlantic is an inherently dangerous business. The working environment is one of the harshest worldwide. The Irish Naval Service operates eight vessels in such conditions and yet, has not adopted a formal safety management system.

This thesis looks at safety management systems and examines the formal systems used within the Royal New Zealand Navy, the Royal Navy and the statutory safety management system that is being used in the commercial marine sector. It reviews these systems and the underlying theory and looks at the traditional system in use in the Irish Naval Service. It also examines the concept of safety culture and how a good safety culture is encouraged within an organization. It looks at accident statistics and risk management within the Irish Naval Service. To research this thesis I have used a combination of questionnaires, interviews and literature and drawn on these data sources to inform me as to the possible courses of action that could

be taken by the Irish Naval Service. The findings inform us in relation to the safety management model that has just been introduced in the Defence Forces and how it is to operate. They inform us as to its origins. The findings

identify significant shortcomings in the traditional safety system and call for the adoption of a formal safety management system with independent validation of the systems being used. It indicates possible courses of action that are available to the Irish Naval Service and how best to ensure the safety of its capital assets and, more importantly, its personnel using a modern goal-setting approach.

SCIENTIFIC PRINCIPLES OR THEORY? DEFINING THE CRITICAL PATH TO SUCCESSFUL CHANGE IMPLEMENTATION

Comdt John McCrann

ABSTRACT

The aim of this thesis is to examine strategies for change in military organisations. In the past change strategies were theory-based and focused on changing organisational culture in order to effect changes. More recently the emphasis has shifted to strategic frameworks based on scientific principles or what are called 'recipes for success' in order to successfully implement change. Chief among these new methods is the use of project management tools and techniques as a means to implement organisational change, not only in business organisations but also in military organisations. The research question posed is: '*Is the projects approach the critical path to implementing change in a military organisation?*'

The aim is to examine organisational change in the context of emerging 'strategic frameworks', based on scientific principles, as an effective model to implement change.

The study begins with a literature review and the research process uses a focus group with members of the Reserve Defence Forces to elicit their views on their organisational and structural change programme in which they have been involved over the last number of years. This is followed by a number of interviews with key personnel involved in implementing military change projects, both in the Reserve Defence Forces in Ireland and abroad in the Norwegian Defence Forces. Effective communication based on a project organisation at all levels emerges as the critical factor in determining the perceived success or otherwise of implementing change. In addition management tools such as a balanced score card are best business practice in terms of measuring the success or failure of change.

The emergence of the communication factor and the ability to measure change are discussed by the author in order to provide recommendations as to how the implementation of change in the Reserve Defence Forces may be improved by adopting first, project management tools and techniques, second, implementing a communication's strategy and third, a strategic tool to measure success: the balanced scorecard. In answering the central thesis question, the research supports the use of project management to provide a strategic framework, a 'critical path' that includes both communication and a measurement system to successfully implement change in a military organisation. It also highlights the need to develop a theory of project management.

SOLDIERS OF OPPORTUNITY : 'INTRAPRENEURS' IN THE MILITARY?

Comdt Stuart McNamara

ABSTRACT

This thesis contrasts the traits desirable in an army officer with those of the entrepreneur to see what untapped raw material in terms of human capital is available to a military organisation such as the Irish defence forces.

Of particular interest were traits such as calculated risk taking, innovation and experiential or double loop learning. Using two models from the Israeli army, concepts of innovative leadership such as mission command were examined and found to be relevant in linking entrepreneurial tendencies to military leadership.

The concept of the 'intrapreneur' or intra corporate entrepreneur, an entrepreneur who works within and for the good of an organisation was explored. The creation of an organisation that facilitates intrapreneurship was also examined and the key factors were found to be the encouragement of experiential learning and tolerance of learning from mistakes and also the provision of mentoring through the encouragement of transformational leadership.

The field research confirmed that eighty percent of Irish army officers had intrapreneurial tendencies and found that a new Cadet Empowerment Programme would actively encourage

innovation and independent thinking by young officers. Intrapreneurs need challenge, so organisations should not go overboard on facilitation as to do so would obviate the need for innovation and positive conflict.

Finally, a recommendation is made which if implemented could dramatically improve the flow of innovation within the Defence Forces.

PROVINCIAL RECONSTRUCTION TEAMS IN AFGHANISTAN: EXPLORING THE IMPACT ON CIVIL-MILITARY RELATIONSHIPS

Comdt Thomas O'Callaghan

ABSTRACT

Over the past twenty years Afghanistan has suffered Soviet occupation, civil war and attack by the US and its allies in their pre-emptive war on terror. Reconstructing this nation of 25 million people presents a huge challenge to the disparate civil and military groups comprising the international assistance community operating there. Provincial Reconstruction Teams (PRTs) are an outcome of a US initiative to help build a secure and stable environment in the provinces of Afghanistan, and to help the Afghan Government strengthen its authority beyond Kabul.

There are two international military forces operating in Afghanistan. The US-led force, comprises approximately 12,000 Coalition personnel, and has focussed on ousting the Taliban regime and al-Qaida. The International Security Assistance Force, (ISAF), is a United Nations-mandated force. It was established to assist in the maintenance of security for Kabul and its surrounding areas. At present thirty countries contribute to an approximately 9,000 strong force. Whereas the former are fighting a war, the latter represent a humanitarian intervention to support the government & bring stability to the country. Both forces operate PRTs.

This thesis utilised qualitative research and documentary analysis methods to elucidate the impact of PRTs on the civil-military relationship. During interviews, NGO personnel criticized PRTs for blurring the lines between military & humanitarian action and emphasized the need to respect the humanitarian space. The military and civilian organisations operating in Afghanistan do not view the provision of aid in the same way. Military commanders who use 'hearts and minds' type operations have been accused of invading the humanitarian space and producing a confusion of identity among the population in the provision and delivery of aid. Case study analysis of various PRTs indicated that their differing strategies influenced the cooperation & support received from NGOs.

As the global war on terrorism continues, PRTs provide a platform to achieve stability, expand security and commence development. In this context, it has never been more important for the military and civilian assistance providers to engage in open dialogue and develop working relationships. This research has shown that best results are achieved when the military component of PRTs focus on security and the civilians focus on humanitarian assistance.

ROGUE PILOTS: A DILEMMA FOR THE AIR CORPS TODAY?

development of, or can assist in the birth and nurturing of rogue pilots.

Comdt R. O'Connor

ABSTRACT

The Rogue Pilot is a pilot who is happy to disregard or ignore the normal rules and regulations that apply when flying an aircraft. In examining the concept of the rogue pilot it is important that the rogue is defined within the aviation environment, that the characteristics of the individual rogue are considered, and the question of the rogue existing in isolation is answered. As part of the study of the rogue, the organisation within which the rogue pilot operates must be looked at and which, as a result of its actions or inactions, has the potential to prevent the

The group identified as being most at risk are younger, recently qualified pilots. Being in a position to be influenced by their peers, they have not yet accumulated the experience that will enable them to see the traps that might lie before them.

The aim of this thesis is to examine the concept of the rogue pilots and show what affect they can have on aviation, and enable a conclusion to be drawn if they pose a dilemma for the Irish Air Corps.

HAS THE NAVAL SERVICE A CREDIBLE ROLE TO PLAY IN THE SAFETY OF IRISH COMMERCIAL FISHING VESSELS AT SEA?

Lt. Cdr. Pearse O'Donnell (N.S.)

ABSTRACT

This thesis examines the concept of the Naval Service contributing to the national safety management system of Irish fishing vessels at sea. In the majority of safety related scenarios, concerning fishing vessels, the first naval involvement occurs during the Search and Rescue phase after a serious incident has already occurred on board the fishing vessel. This thesis proposes an alternative approach and investigates if the Naval Service can shift its role from the reactive to the pro active by contributing to fishing vessel safety in a pre-emptive and preventative manner.

The research for this thesis consists of a review of literature that pertains to Safety Management theory and Organisational Safety Culture theory. A Risk-Based Decision Making processes along with national and international safety reports, specific to the fishing industry, were also researched. The thesis also uses the methodology of the semi-structured interview model to answer the research question. The sources for this qualitative research include interviews conducted over a wide spectrum of safety and fishing professionals including policy makers, policy instigators, policy enforcers, fishing organisation representatives and skippers of fishing vessels.

The principle findings of this study are that the Naval Service, using its sea going assets and maritime expertise, has a credible role to play in the safety management of Irish fishing vessels at sea. Through the medium of conducting safety inspections on board fishing vessels, the Naval Service can increase the awareness and importance of safety, and promote the growth of a safety culture that acts as a deterrent against poor safety practices. The research acknowledges the importance of compulsory safety inspections once they are carried out in a consultative and advisory manner. There is agreement that this is the optimum approach in encouraging compliance with regulations and empowering fishermen with an ownership in their own safety management system.

The research conducted for this study suggests that if the recommendations as outlined in this paper were realised then it would have the beneficial effects, of enhancing the safety management on board Irish fishing vessels and establishing the foundation for a more constructive relationship between the Naval Service and the fishing community.

THE IRISH DEFENCE FORCES: BULLYING IN THE WORKPLACE – DO THE DEFENCE FORCES' ANTI-BULLYING POLICIES AND PROCEDURES MEET CURRENT STANDARDS OF BEST PRACTICE WITHIN THE IRISH WORKPLACE?

Comdt Tim O'Donoghue

ABSTRACT

The Irish Defence Forces, as an organisation, is unique within the State. It is an inherently dangerous working environment because of the training it undertakes and the operations that it conducts both at home and abroad. Despite the risks associated with military service, 83 per cent of Defence Force's personnel surveyed in 2001 indicated that they were very satisfied with the work that they had to do. Unfortunately the survey also established that over 26 per cent of personnel who responded to the questionnaire had experienced bullying at some time during their careers in the Defence Forces. The purpose of this thesis is to discover the how the Defence Forces have reacted to the phenomenon of workplace bullying during the last four years by examining the primary research question: 'Do the Defence Forces' anti-bullying policies and procedures meet current standards of best practice within the Irish workplace?' The study reviews the approach taken by the organisation to deal with the issue of workplace bullying and tracks the advances made in developing anti-bullying policy and procedures as well as examining the cultural and attitudinal changes that have taken place. It also establishes, in as far at it is practicable, what the current best practice models in workplace bullying prevention are.

The research was conducted by carrying out a wide-ranging review of relevant literature and was supported by the use of data collected through the conduct of interviews. The findings point to the deep commitment on the part of the organisation to tackle the problem of bullying at all levels. They also indicate that the organisation is meeting current best practice requirements in terms of its policies and procedures, the focus and composition of its Independent Monitoring Group and its awareness programme. However, the findings also indicate that developing awareness of policy and procedure is insufficient and that a wider understanding of organisational values and behaviours is required to combat workplace bullying. It is suggested that the adoption of a Learning Organisation model by the Defence Forces could provide the link between policy and behavioural awareness.

THE GROWING PROBLEM OF SUICIDE: Lessons for the Defence Forces

Commandant John O'Loghlen,

ABSTRACT

According to the World Health Organisation in the region of one million people worldwide die from suicide each year and 10 to 20 times more attempt suicide. In Europe alone, 58,000 people commit suicide annually, and about 10 times that number attempt to take their own lives. This data from the WHO does not include deaths that are identified as undetermined. As a result, we are not likely to ever know the true rates of suicide. There are about 450 suicides annually in Ireland, greater than the number of road deaths. The rate for young men aged between fifteen and twenty-four in Ireland is three times higher than it was twenty years ago.

Hanging and drowning were found to be the most common methods used and causal factors can vary from depression to substance abuse, relationship difficulties, financial problems, and social isolation.

The most recent statistical analysis into suicide in the Defence Forces found that over 33 years there were 732 deaths of which 63 were suicides. More than half of these were suicide by gunshot, mainly from firing a weapon placed in the mouth. About half the suicides happened on a military site, while close to one third occurred while the person was on duty. The annual statistics of 15 suicides per 100,000 in the Irish Defence Forces are similar to those in the UK Armed Forces and the US Marine Corps. Traditionally in the Irish Defence Forces, gunshot was the most common method of suicide. However in the last five years due to increased restriction in access to weapons, brought about by a greater awareness of suicide in the organisation, the most common method has been hanging. Six were by hanging, while two were by gunshot.

In 1993 suicide was decriminalised in Ireland, in 1998 a National Task Force on Suicide sat for the first time and in 2005 the National Strategy for Action on Suicide Prevention 2005 – 2014 was launched, reflecting a greater awareness and concern among national policy makers regarding the alarming growth in suicide numbers. To date no significant policy or strategy on suicide prevention exists within the Irish Defence Forces. It is time for the current military senior staff to take a lead from the national political and social actions in this area and adopt a similar position and approach to the National Strategy for Action on Suicide Prevention. The purpose of this thesis is to investigate the reasons and factors for the alarming rate of suicide in today's society. The outcome of this investigation has resulted in specific recommendations for the Irish Defence Forces, which may generate debate, encourage the production of a comprehensive policy and strategy paper for the Defence Forces, the purpose of which will be to prevent or reduce the rate of suicide within the Organisation. Central to this study is an analysis of the literature on suicide and research on Irish Defence Force suicide reports and other military organisations. I believe that with a more comprehensive policy and strategy on suicide, action can be taken that will lead to a more educated, caring and understanding Organisation, thus resulting in the prevention or reduction of suicide.

The findings of this study will inform in relation to current attitudes on suicide in the Defence Forces and its prevention and serve to initiate debate on required policy and strategy. It will also identify significant issues that may warrant further study.

Why the Greek – Cypriots Rejected the Annan Plan 'V' for a Solution to the Cyprus Problem

Major Stylianos C. Siakallis

ABSTRACT

This thesis is a study of the reasons why the Greek-Cypriots voted 'no' during the referendum of April 2004 for a solution to the Cyprus problem, based on the Annan Plan V.

The Cyprus problem does not concern only the Cypriots. It is also a European and international problem. Whether and how it will be resolved will have repercussions beyond the territorial boundaries of this island-state...

Undoubtedly, the Annan Plan V was the result of the most intensive and concerned international efforts after 1974 to resolve the Cyprus problem. The architects of the Plan knew that the Plan had several weaknesses but for them the most important objective was to have it approved. This, they assumed, would have ended the stalemate in Cyprus and any problems that would emerge would be manageable and contained. Above all, much broader objectives would have been served.

The findings of this study, show that the Cyprus problem constitutes a major challenge for the European Union (EU). And the promise is to achieve an arrangement which would not only safeguard and promote EU ideals and interests but would also act as a model of peaceful coexistence and creativity between Greek-Cypriot Orthodox Christians and Turkish-Cypriot Muslims.

GENERATIONAL CHANGE: IMPLICATIONS FOR THE MANAGEMENT OF FUTURE LEADERS

Comdt Paul A. Whelan

ABSTRACT

The values and characteristics exhibited by each generation reflect the societal influences of its time, and so generational values are in a constant state of change. Today's generation, popularly referred to as generation 'Y', exhibit traits and values that have unique and certain impacts upon society and ultimately on organisations, be they corporate or military. They are an impressive generation who have benefited from evolutionary developments in parenting, education and technology. They value challenge, embrace change and seek to achieve work-life balance. They are multi-cultural. They will ask questions where their generational predecessors would silently imagine the answers, and remain disappointed.

This thesis explores whether the socialisation techniques employed by the Irish Defence Forces can adequately and effectively accommodate this new generation successfully within its hierarchical structure. The Defence Forces, in consonance with other international military forces, is diversifying into more expansive roles that require new levels of professionalism to cater for widening military and non-military liaisons. As the science of psychology grows increasingly within corporate structures, with the intention of attracting and maintaining professionally suited employees, this thesis questions whether or not the Irish Defence Forces should consider adjustment to the socialisation processes and procedures currently used. The issue for the Irish Defence Forces, having offered the employment challenge of the 'life less ordinary', resides in the quest to maintain it.

Civilian Expatriate Selection and Training Practice and Theory - A Signpost for the Irish Defence Forces?

Comdt Patrick White

ABSTRACT

The aim of this thesis is to examine current expatriate management theory and sample of other Irish organisations expatriate management experiences, so that comparison with current Defence Forces expatriate management practices can be made. This examination centres on five core topics, Culture, Selection, Training, Support and Repatriation practices. The research question posed is *'Civilian Expatriate Selection and Training Practice and Theory a signpost for the Defence Forces?'*

The research process uses qualitative semi - structured interviews with selection of representatives, who were responsible for the management of expatriates, from the Irish Governments Department of Foreign Affairs, Trócaire – the Irish Catholic Churches

International Development Agency, a major Irish Financial Institution and the Defence Forces itself.

The interview data, combined with the literature is analysed and compared against the Defence Forces current human resource management of personnel serving overseas and likely future developments. I suggest that the Defence Forces present practices are unlikely to meet the emerging challenges of longer duration, culturally complex assignments and that a more integrated approach to expatriate management will be required.

SHORT BIOGRAPHICAL STATEMENT

- 1. **Commandant Jerry Lane** is a serving professional military officer with nineteen years service. He holds a Diploma in Law and Barrister at Law postgraduate degree from the Honourable Society of Kings Inns, Dublin as well as a Masters in Law from University College Cork, and a MA (LMDS) from the NUIM. He is currently completing a Masters in Criminology at the University of London and he holds the appointment of Brigade Legal Officer, 4 W Bde.. He has completed courses at the International Institute of Humanitarian Law, San Remo, Italy and the Law School, University of Liverpool. He has lectured extensively at home and abroad most recently to members of the Iraqi Military and Law Enforcement community. He has served as a Legal Advisor to several formation commanders at home and overseas and as a courts martial prosecutor. He was most recently awarded 'Best Overall Student of the 62nd Senior Command & Staff Course' (MA LMDS) in 2006.
- CQMS Gerry White was born in New York city in 1957. He is currently based in Collins Bks Cork, where he lectures on Irish History and contributes regularly to the Irish Examiner and Evening Echo newspapers and The Holly Bough periodical. He is the author of The Barracks - A History of Victoria/Collins Barracks, (Mercier Press 1997) and co author with Brendan O'Shea of The Irish Volunteer Soldier 1913 -1916 (Osprey UK 2003), Baptised in Blood - The Formation of the Cork Brigade of Irish Volunteers 1913 -1916 (Mercier Press 2005), and The Burning of Cork (Mercier Press 2006)
- 4. Comdt Brendan O'Shea is a serving professional military officer with thirty years service. He holds a BA in History from UCG, a BCL from UCC, a Diploma in International Humanitarian Law from the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) in Geneva, and a PhD in History from UCC. He is the author of Crisis at Bihac Bosnia's Bloody Battlefield (Sutton Publishing UK 1998), The Modern Yugoslav Conflict 1991-1995 (Frank Cass UK 2005), editor of In The Service of Peace Memories of Lebanon (Mercier Press 2001) and co-author with Gerry White of The Irish Volunteer Soldier 1913 -1916 (Osprey UK 2003), Baptised in Blood The Formation of the Cork Brigade of Irish Volunteers 1913 -1916 (Mercier Press 2005), and The Burning of Cork (Mercier Press 2006)
- 5. Lt Col Michael Dolan is a serving professional military officer with thirty years service. In 2003, he graduated with a first class honours masters degree from National University of Ireland (Maynooth) and, in January 2007, completed a post-graduate diploma in Library and Information Services (DLIS) through the University of Wales, Aberystwyth. He has previously contributed to An Cosantóir and the Defence Forces Review. Since 2004, he has held the post of Defence Forces Librarian.

- 6. **Comdt Ian Byrne DSM** is a serving military officer with 23 years service. He holds a BComm from the National University of Ireland (Dublin), a post graduate Diploma in Computer Science from the National University of Ireland (Cork), a Master of Arts in Technical Communications from University of Limerick, and a Master of Arts (LMDS) from National University of Ireland (Maynooth). He is a graduate of the 62nd Senior Command and Staff Course. He is currently serving as an instructor at the Defence Forces Command and Staff School.
- 7. **Comdt David Dignam** is a serving military officer with 26 years service. He holds a BA in History and Geography from the National University of Ireland (Galway), and a first class honours Masters (LMDS) from NUI (Maynooth). He is a graduate of the Defence Forces Command and Staff School and has also completed the UK's Advanced Command and Staff Course at the Defence Academy at Shrivenham, England. He also holds an honours Masters degree in Defence Studies from Kings College London. He is currently serving as an instructor at the Defence Forces Command and Staff School.
- 8. **Comdt Michael O'Kelly** was, at the time of the incident he describes, a Lieutenant in E Coy, 2 Bn IRA. This paper was presented in the form of a lecture to the Infantry School, Military College in June, 1935. It was subsequently submitted as a witness statement to the Bureau of Military History in 1956. In the interest of accurate portrayal of his lecture, no attempt has been made to edit his work.
- 9. James Greenwood was a journalist with the Pall Mall Gazette, an evening newspaper, was founded in February, 1865 by Frederick Greenwood and George Smith. The original idea was to digest the news from the morning papers and to publish substantial articles on political and social questions. Pall Mall Gazette published a high percentage of radical human interest stories and used the paper to campaign for various causes. In 1867, Greenwood visited the Curragh of Kildare in response to stories emanating from that area. The article reproduced here was initially published as an article in the Pall Mall Gazette was incorporated into the Evening Standard in 1923 and contact between the editor of the Defence Forces Review and that paper indicates no objection to the reprinting of the article.